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Abstract	  
In	  this	  thesis,	   I	  critically	   investigate	  how	  issues	  of	  sexual	   justice,	  sexual	  politics	  and	  
normative	   heterosexuality	   are	   interpreted,	   constructed,	   and	   discussed	   in	   several	  
salient	  emancipatory	  or	  critical	  legal	  and	  political	  projects	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  
especially	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   family	   relations.	   Subordination	   feminism,	   men	   and	  
masculinity	   studies,	   queer	   theories,	   and	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice	   are	   the	  
major	   theories	   I	   engage	   with.	   	   After	   critically	   reviewing	   the	   strengths	   and	  
weaknesses	   of	   these	   theories,	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   worth	   incorporating	   a	   combined	  
approach	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  in	  thinking	  about	  gender	  
oppression,	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   law	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   The	   combined	  
approach,	   I	  argue,	   is	  an	  approach	  that	  draws	  on	  queer	  theories,	   liberal	  theories	  of	  
sexual	  justice,	  some	  feminist	  theories,	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  	  	  	  
I	   contend	   that	   one	   of	   the	   core	   insights	   of	   queer	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	  
studies	   is	   the	  rejection	  of	  an	  oversimplified	  and	  unidimensional	  concept	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   and	   gender	   power	   relations;	   a	   concept	   that	   is	   frequently	   assumed	   by	  
subordination	   feminism.	   Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	   view	   the	  
power	  relations	  of	  gender	  and	  the	  gender	  oppression	  in	  the	  family	  as	  multi-­‐layered	  
and	   complex,	   not	   just	   about	  male	   domination	   and	   female	   subordination.	   	   I	   argue	  
that	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   see	  more	   realities	   and	   previously	   hidden	   or	  marginalised	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   oppression	   by	   incorporating	   perspectives	   inspired	   by	   queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   I	   further	   contend	   that	   we	   cannot	  
effectively	  subvert	  normative	  heterosexuality	  by	  only	  seeing	  and	  addressing	  gender	  
normativity	   in	   one	   gender.	   I	   discuss	   the	   implications	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	  
studies	  in	  equality	  law,	  family	  law	  and	  gay	  men’s	  studies.	  	  In	  conclusion,	  I	  argue	  that	  
queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinity	  studies	  can	  broaden	  our	  base	  of	  concerns	  and	  
knowledge	  of	  sexual	  injustices	  and	  sexual	  oppression	  in	  sexual	  justice	  projects.	  It	  is	  
an	   approach	  worth	   considering	   and	   an	   area	   of	   sexual	   justice	   study	  worth	   further	  
exploration	  and	  research.	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Chapter	  1   Introduction:	  Themes,	  Approaches,	  and	  Structure	  of	  the	  
Thesis	  
1.1   Research	  purposes	  and	  research	  topics	  
The	  general	  aim	  of	  the	  thesis	   is	   to	  critically	  re-­‐examine	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  
sexual	   justice,	   sexual	  politics,	  and	   law	   in	  modern	  democratic	   societies,	   inspired	  by	  
approaches	   developed	   by	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   I	   will	  
critically	  investigate	  how	  issues	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  sexual	  politics,	  gender	  oppression,	  
and	   normative	   heterosexuality	   are	   interpreted	   and	   discussed	   in	   salient	  
contemporary	  non-­‐conservative,	  emancipatory	  or	  critical	  legal	  and	  political	  projects	  
on	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   in	   modern	   Anglo-­‐American	   scholarship,	   especially	   in	   the	  
areas	  of	  family	  relations.	  	  
Among	   the	   non-­‐conservative	   sexual	   projects,	   liberal	   sexual	   justice	   theories,	  
subordination	   feminist	   theories	  1	  and	   queer	   theories	   are	   three	   of	   the	  most	   visible	  
and	   salient	   approaches	   in	   current	   progressive	   or	   critical	   schools	   of	   thoughts	   on	  
sexual	   justice	   (sexuality	   and	   gender	   justice),	   sexual	   politics	   and	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	   They	   all	   contribute	   greatly	   from	   different	   angles	   to	   present	  
challenges	  to	  some	  aspects	  of	  sexual	  injustices	  and	  to	  help	  the	  unravelling	  of	  some	  
of	   the	   oppression	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   It	   is	   therefore	   worth	   critically	  
reviewing	   these	   contributions	   and	   the	   possible	   limitations	   of	   their	   arguments	   on	  
normative	  heterosexuality,	  sexual	  politics,	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  critically	  examine	  
the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  some	  widely-­‐regarded	  progressive	  or	  emancipatory	  theories	  of	  
liberal	  sexual	  justice	  and	  theories	  of	  subordination-­‐feminist	  sexual	  justice	  in	  law	  and	  
politics.	   To	   what	   extent	   and	   in	   which	   aspects	   do	   these	   theoretical	   systems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 	  I	   use	   the	   terms	   ‘subordination	   feminism’	   and	   ‘subordination-­‐feminist	   studies	   of	   men	   and	  
masculinities’	   to	   refer	   to	   those	   feminist	   theories	   and	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	   that	  hold	   that	  
currently	  men	  or	  (male)	  masculinity	  are	  systematically	  and	  institutionally	  privileged,	  while	  women	  or	  
(female)	   femininity	   are	   systematically	   and	   institutionally	   oppressed,	   subordinated	   and	  
disadvantaged,	  and	  which	  furthermore	  hold	  that	  gender	  oppression	  is	  overall	  unilateral	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  women	  or	  femininity	  are	  oppressed	  or	  subordinated	  by	  men	  or	  masculinity.	  Normatively,	  these	  
gender	   justice	   projects,	   consciously	   or	   unconsciously,	   tend	   to	   focus	   on	   or	   prioritise	   the	   gender	  
oppression	  of,	  and	  gender	  injustices	  towards,	  women	  or	  femininity.	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  terms	  in	  more	  
details	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	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contribute	   to	   the	   task	   of	   destabilising	   and	   subverting	   the	   constraining	   practices,	  
rules,	   systems,	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   in	   modern	   democratic	  
societies?	  To	  what	  extent	  are	  sexuality	   justice	  and	  gender	   justice	  promoted	  under	  
their	   proposals?	   And	   to	   what	   extent	   and	   in	   which	   aspects	   might	   some	   of	   these	  
proposals	  commit	  certain	  similar	  faults	  as	  conservative	  and	  traditionalist	  theories	  do	  
in	  their	  projects	  of	  law,	  sexuality,	  and	  gender?	  
Moreover,	   in	  what	   respects	   and	   to	  what	   extent	  might	   some	  of	   the	   contemporary	  
emancipatory	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics	   projects	   actually	   be	   at	   risk	   of	  
producing,	   reproducing	   and	   promoting	   some	   problematic	   norms,	   ideologies,	  
stereotypes,	   laws,	   and	   practices	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   in	   their	   legal	   and	  
political	   theories	   and	   proposals?	   More	   broadly,	   what	   are	   the	   implications	   and	  
limitations	   of	   queer	   and	   post-­‐structuralist	   theories’	   intervention	   in	   sexual	   politics,	  
sexual	   justice,	   and	   law?	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   approaches	   inspired	   by	   queer	   humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  should	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  our	  thinking	  about	  
the	  challenges	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  sexual	   justice,	  sexual	  politics,	  and	  law	  
in	  modern	  democratic	  societies.	  	  
Normative	   heterosexuality	   (or	   heteronormativity)	   denotes	   social	   structures	   and	  
culture	  that	  privilege,	  prioritise,	  or	  naturalise	  the	  institutions,	  norms,	  ideologies,	  and	  
practices	   of	   heterosexuality.	   The	   terms	   (normative	   heterosexuality	   or	  
heteronormativity)	  were	  used	  by	  critical	  sexual	  theorists	  such	  as	  queer	  theorists	  and	  
feminists	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   normalisation,	   standardising,	   and	   privileging	   of	   certain	  
sexuality	   norms	   and	   gender	   norms	   based	   on	   the	   assumptions	   and	   ideologies	   of	  
dominant	  heterosexuality.2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 	  For	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   origin	   and	   meaning	   of	   	   the	   terms	   ‘normative	   heterosexuality’	   ,	  
‘heteronormativity’,	  and	  other	  related	  concepts	  such	  as	  'compulsory	  heterosexuality',	   ‘heterosexual	  
contract’,	  ‘heterosexual	  matrix’,	  and	  ‘heterosexual	  imaginary’,	  see	  Chrys	  Ingraham,	  ‘Heterosexuality:	  
It’s	  Just	  Not	  Natural!’,	   in	  Diane	  Richardson	  and	  Steven	  Seidman	  eds.,	  Handbook	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  
Studies	   (London:	   Sage,	   2002),	   75-­‐76;	   Steven	   Seidman,	   ‘Critique	   of	   Compulsory	   Heterosexuality’,	   in	  
Lena	   Martinsson	   and	   Eva	   Reimers	   eds.,	   Norm-­‐struggles:	   Sexualities	   in	   Contentions	   (Newcastle:	  
Cambridge	  Scholars	  Publishing,	  2010),	  191-­‐208.	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Early	  gay	   liberationists	  and	   lesbian	  feminists	  have	  already	  noticed	  and	  emphasised	  
that	  the	  institution	  of	  heterosexuality	  is	  constituted	  by	  both	  gender	  constraints	  and	  
sexuality	  constraints.	  They	  hold	  that	  ‘normative	  heterosexuality	  creates	  a	  structural	  
order	   of	   gender	   binarism,	   hetero/homo	   sexual	   division,	   male	   dominance,	   and	  
heterosexual	   privilege.’	  3	  Sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   projects	   that	   aim	   to	  
question	  normative	  heterosexuality	  therefore	  include	  at	  least	  two	  core	  dimensions:	  
challenging	   sexuality	   injustice	   and	   challenging	   gender	   injustice	   in	   the	   institutions,	  
systems,	  and	  culture	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.4	  Indeed,	  as	  queer	  feminist	  Judith	  
Butler	   suggests,	   gender	  normativity	   is	   highly	  bound	  up	  with	   sexuality	  normativity;	  
and	  both	  of	   them	  are	  also	  closely	  connected	  with	   the	  norms	  and	  requirements	  of	  
sexual	   dimorphism	   of	   the	   sexed	   bodies.	   She	   describes	   the	   compulsory	   coherence	  
among	  sexed	  body,	  gender,	  and	  sexual	  desires	  within	  normative	  heterosexuality	  as	  
‘the	  heterosexual	  matrix.’5	  Hence	  normative	  heterosexuality	  (or	  heteronormativity)	  
can	  be	  conceptualised	  as:	  
‘a	  regime	  that	  organizes	  sex,	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  order	  to	  match	  
heterosexual	  norms.	  It	  denotes	  a	  rigid	  sexual	  binary	  of	  bodily	  
morphology	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  gender	  and	  sexual	  identities	  .	  .	  .	  It	  
demands	  a	  coherence	  of	  idealized	  morphologies,	  presumptive	  
heterosexual	  desire	  and	  a	  thoroughly	  constructed	  gender	  binary.’6	  
In	  this	  thesis	  I	  start	  with	  the	  insight	  that	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice,	  
which	   intend	   to	   query	   the	   regime	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   to	   promote	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	   Seidman,	   ibid.,	   192.	   However,	   as	   my	   later	   arguments	   will	   demonstrate,	   I	   criticise	   the	  
assumption	  and	  belief	  that	  gender	  injustice	  is	  almost	  always	  male	  domination	  (over	  female),	  as	  some	  
lesbian	  feminist	  and	  gay	  liberationist	  theories	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  suggest.	  	  
4	  Although	   normative	   heterosexuality	   is	   primarily	   a	   concept	   related	   to	   sexuality	   normativity	   and	  
gender	  normativity,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  their	  intersections	  with	  other	  axes	  of	  social	  categories	  such	  
as	  class,	  race	  and	  age	  in	  heteronormativity	  should	  be	  neglected.	  For	  example,	  when	  addressing	  the	  
injustice	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  gay	  men,	  we	  not	  only	  need	  
to	   pay	   attention	   to	   how	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms	   might	   affect	   gay	   men	   as	   a	   social	   group	   in	  
normative	  heterosexuality,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  appreciate	  the	  way	  class,	  culture	  or	  ethnic	  background	  
may	   also	   intersect	  with	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   categories.	   Sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   projects	  
therefore	   should	   be	   sensitive	   to	   difference	   and	   diversity	   within	   particular	   gender	   and	   sexuality	  
groups.	  	  	  
5	  Judith	   Butler,	   Gender	   Trouble:	   Feminism	   and	   the	   Subversion	   of	   Identity	   (New	   York:	   Routledge,	  
1999),	  6,	  208	  n.6.	  
6	  M	  do	  Mar	   Castro	   Varela,	  N.	  Dhawan	   and	  A.	   Engel,	   'Introduction',	   in	  M	  do	  Mar	   Castro	   Varela,	  N.	  
Dhawan	   and	   A.	   Engel	   eds.,	   Hegemony	   and	   Heteronormativity:	   Revisiting	   'The	   Political'	   in	   Queer	  
Politics	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2011),	  11.	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sexual	  justice,	  ought	  to	  address	  both	  sexuality	  injustice	  and	  gender	  injustice	  that	  are	  
present	   in	   the	   institutions	  and	  culture	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  This	   is	  mainly	  
because	  they	  are	  often	  highly	  interconnected	  with	  and	  mutually	  supported	  by	  each	  
other	   and	   also	   because	   they	   both	   play	   core	   roles	   in	   maintaining,	   producing,	   and	  
reproducing	   the	   restrictive	   heteronormative	   norms,	   practices,	   and	   ideologies.	   As	  
feminist	   Stevi	   Jackson	   holds,	   heterosexuality	   is	   not	   simply	   a	   form	   of	   sexual	  
expression	   but	   also	   a	   set	   of	   gender	   constraints	   which	   orders	   and	   regulates	   our	  
sexual	   and	   social	   life:	   ‘Heteronormativity	   defines	   not	   only	   a	   normative	   sexual	  
practice	  but	  also	  a	  normal	  way	  of	  life.’7	  Scholar	  Jonathan	  Ned	  Katz	  also	  argues	  that	  
‘heterosexual	   order	   enshrines	   not	   procreation	   but	   [biological]	   sex	   difference	   and	  
eroticism.’8	  He	  suggests	  that	  a	  critique	  of	  heterosexual	  order	  ought	  to	  address	  both	  
the	   sex/gender	   norms	   and	   the	   erotic	   norms	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   	   Katz	  
criticises	   Monique	   Wittig’s	   critique	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   because	   her	  
critique	   focuses	   almost	   entirely	   on	   its	   sex/gender	   orders	   while	   she	   ‘presents	   no	  
adequate	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘’sexual,’’	  erotic	  half.’9	  	  
As	   the	   above	   analysis	   indicates,	   we	   can	   argue	   that	   in	   projects	   to	   elucidate	   and	  
promote	  sexual	   justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	   it	   is	   important	  to	  address	  both	  sexuality	  
injustices/constraints	  and	  gender	  injustices/constraints	  of	  the	  systems	  of	  normative	  
heterosexuality.	   Without	   addressing	   both	   dimensions	   of	   gender	   injustice	   and	  
sexuality	  injustice	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  projects	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  we	  will	  not	  be	  able	  
to	   really	   unsettle	   and	   to	   rework	   the	   norms	   and	   culture	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  Accordingly,	  I	  will	  illustrate	  in	  Chapter	  2	  that	  my	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  
of	  sexual	  justice	  includes	  both	  the	  dimensions	  of	  sexuality	  justice	  and	  gender	  justice	  
and	  my	  use	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   sexual	  politics	  also	  comprises	  both	  sexuality	  politics	  
and	  gender	  politics	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 	  Stevi	   Jackson,	   ‘Gender,	   Sexuality	   and	   Heterosexuality:	   The	   Complexity	   (and	   Limits)	   of	  
Heteronormativity’,	  Feminist	  Theory	  7,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  107.	  
8	  Jonathan	  Ned	  Katz,	  The	   Invention	  of	  Heterosexuality	   (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007),	  
157.	  
9	  Ibid.	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As	  families	  are	  one	  of	  the	  core	  sites	  where	  the	  constraints	  and	  impact	  of	  normative	  
heterosexuality	  are	  most	  frequently	  and	  profoundly	  experienced	  and	  contested,	  this	  
thesis	   will	   focus	   particularly	   on	   examining	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   sexual	  
justice	  in	  family-­‐related	  issues	  and	  laws	  such	  as	  family	  violence.	  I	  will	  criticise	  those	  
theories	   of	   sexual	   justice,	   laws,	   and	   policies	   that	   either	   show	   tendencies	   to	  
standardise	  heterosexist	  experiences	  or	  show	  tendencies	  to	  perpetuate	  gender	  bias,	  
gender	  discrimination,	  and	  gender	  stereotypes	  in	  family-­‐related	  issues.	  I	  argue	  that	  
not	   only	   are	   conservative	   traditionalist	   projects	   guilty	   of	   perpetuating	   oppression	  
and	   injustices	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   in	   the	   family,	   but	   that	   also,	  
unfortunately,	   sometimes	   even	   certain	   so	   called	   ‘progressive’	   feminist	   or	   liberal	  
approaches	  may	  also	  help	  to	  produce	  and	  reproduce	  some	  unjust	  heteronormative	  
stereotypes,	   discrimination,	   practices,	   and	   oppression	   in	   their	   assumptions	   and	  
projects	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  Gender	  equality	  for	  women	  in	  the	  family	  certainly	  
should	   be	   taken	   very	   seriously	   in	   family	   justice	   projects.	   However,	   I	   hold	   that	  
concerns	  for	  gender	  justice	  and	  gender	  equality	  in	  families	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  generally	  
reduced	  to	  or	  narrowly	  interpreted	  as	  mainly	  only	  concerned	  about	  justice/equality	  
for	   (heterosexual)	   women	   in	   families.	   For	   example,	   influential	   liberal	   justice	  
philosopher	  John	  Rawls	  and	  liberal	  feminist	  philosopher	  Susan	  Okin	  both	  generally	  
reduce	   the	   issues	   of	   gender	   injustice	   in	   the	   family	   to	   issues	   of	   injustice	   towards	  
(heterosexual)	   women	   in	   the	   family. 10 	  The	   violence	   and	   injustice	   of	   crude	  
stereotyping	  and	  overgeneralisation	  of	  sex/gender	  in	  some	  family	  law	  jurisprudence	  
and	   jurisdictions	   ought	   to	   be	   examined	   also.	   I	   will	   criticize	   this	   kind	   of	   gender	  
reductionist	  family	  justice	  and	  family	  law	  theories	  and	  approaches	  in	  later	  chapters.	  	  	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	   contend	   that	  although	  many	  aspects	  of	   sexual	   injustices	   in	  modern	  
democratic	  societies	  have	  been	  appropriately	  raised	  and	  challenged	  by	  progressive	  
or	   emancipatory	   liberal	   and	   feminist	   legal	   and	   political	   theories	   and	   proposals	   on	  
sexuality,	  gender,	  and	  justice,	  nevertheless	  some	  aspects	  of	  unjust	  and	  problematic	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   normativity	   in	   the	   institutions	   and	   culture	   of	   normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  John	  Rawls,	  Justice	  as	  Fairness:	  A	  Restatement	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  162-­‐
167;	  Susan	  Moller	  Okin,	  Justice	  Gender	  and	  the	  Family	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  books,	  1989),	  134-­‐186.	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heterosexuality	   are	   generally	   marginalised	   or	   neglected	   in	   major	   progressive	   or	  
emancipatory	   legal	   and	   political	   theories.	   Moreover,	   some	   assumptions	   and	  
ideologies	  that	  are	  popular	   in	  some	  subordination	  feminist	   legal	  theories	  and	  legal	  
policies	  may	  actually	  contribute	  to	  the	  reinforcement,	  production,	  and	  reproduction	  
of	  some	  old	  or	  new	  forms	  of	  injustices,	  hierarchies,	  and	  exclusions	  in	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	  and	  therefore	  perpetuate	  normative	  heterosexuality.	   In	  other	  words,	  while	  
some	   liberal	   and	   subordination	   feminist	   projects	   regarding	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
contribute	   much	   in	   addressing	   certain	   aspects	   of	   historical	   and	   traditionalist	  
oppression	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   while	   they	  
have	   been	   generally	   regarded	   as	   progressive	   or	   emancipatory	   legal	   and	   political	  
projects,11	  there	  are	  still	  some	  areas	  of	  sexual	   injustices	  they	  might	  fail	  to	  properly	  
address	   in	   their	   projects.	   Furthermore,	   some	   of	   the	   proposals	   and	   policies	   from	  
subordination	   feminisms	   might	   serve	   to	   generate,	   create,	   and	   maintain	   some	  
problematic	   forms	   of	   myths,	   stereotypes,	   exclusion,	   enforcement,	   discrimination,	  
distinctions,	   and	   oppression	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   and	   therefore	   to	   perpetuate	  
the	  norms,	  practices,	  and	  culture	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  I	  will	  critically	  review	  
the	  pros	  and	   cons	  of	   influential	   subordination	   feminist	  discourses,	   ideologies,	   and	  
policies	   on	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics,	   especially	   in	   family	   law	   and	   family	  
justice	   related	   issues.	   I	   will	   illustrate	   how	   their	   projects	   might	   incur	   the	   risk	   of	  
perpetuating	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   injustices	   in	   law	   and	   society	   and	  why	  we	  need	  
also	  to	  consider	  voices	  other	  than	  subordination	  feminisms	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  
gender	  justice.	  
Liberal	  sexual	  justice	  theories,	  especially	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  theories,	  are	  also	  among	  
the	  most	  eloquent	  and	  salient	  schools	  of	  thought	  in	  contemporary	  Anglo-­‐American	  
legal	   and	  political	   theories	   against	   conservative	   sexual	  projects	   and	  against	   sexual	  
injustices.12 	  They	   argue	   against	   conservative	   and	   traditionalist	   sexual	   morality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  For	  example,	  see	  Wendy	  Brown’s	  critiques	  of	  progressive	  politics.	  Wendy	  Brown,	  States	  of	   Injury	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995).	  
12	  Liberal	   theories	  of	  gay	   rights	  provide	  normative	   justifications	  and	  moral	  grounds	   for	   the	   law	  and	  
politics	  of	  gay	  rights	  and	  sexuality	  justice.	  For	  example,	  see	  Nicholas	  Bamforth,	  Sexuality,	  Morals	  and	  
Justice:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Rights	  Law	  (London:	  Washington	  D.C.,	  Cassell,	  1997);	  Nicholas	  
Bamforth	   and	   David	   A.	   J.	   Richards,	   Patriarchal	   Religion,	   Sexuality,	   And	   Gender:	   A	   Critique	   of	   New	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politics	   and	   law	   such	   as	   the	   New	   Natural	   Law	   theory13 	  by	   providing	   moral	  
justifications	   for	   liberal	   sexual	   politics	   and	   law.	   	   Liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice	  
such	   as	   liberal	   gay	   rights	   theories	   generally	   base	   their	   sexual	   justice	   projects	   on	  
some	  kinds	  of	  important	  liberal	  humanist	  values	  such	  as	  privacy,	  equality,	  freedom,	  
or	  personal	  autonomy.14	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   their	  normative	   justifications	   for	   liberal	  
sexual	   justice,	   I	  will	  argue,	  are	  very	  valuable	  as	  they	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  normative	  
grounds	   and	  humanist	   values	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics	   projects	   against	  
normative	   heterosexuality.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	  might	   be	   some	   problems	   in	  
their	  proposals	  worth	  further	  reflection.	   I	  will	  critically	  review	  some	  leading	   liberal	  
sexual	  justice	  theories	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
Some	   post-­‐modernist, 15 	  post-­‐structuralist, 16 	  and	   queer	   theorists	   have	   already	  
pointed	   out	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   in	   certain	   subordination	   feminist	   or	   liberal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Natural	   Law	   (New	   York:	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2008);	   Morris	   B.	   Kaplan,	   Sexual	   Justice:	  
Democratic	   Citizenship	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Desire	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1997);	   David	   A.	   J.	   Richards,	  
Women,	  Gays,	  and	   the	  Constitution:	  The	  Grounds	   for	  Feminism	  and	  Gay	  Rights	   in	  Culture	  and	  Law	  
(Chicago:	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Press,	   1998);	   David,	   A.	   J.	   Richards,	   Identity	   and	   the	   Case	   for	   Gay	  
Rights:	  Race,	  Gender,	  Religion	  as	  Analogies	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1999);	  Richard	  D.	  Mohr,	  
Gays/Justice:	   A	   Study	   of	   Ethics,	   Society,	   and	   Law	   (New	   York:	   Columbia	   University	   Press,	   1988);	  
Richard	  D.	  Mohr,	  The	  Long	  Arc	  of	  Justice:	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Marriage,	  Equality,	  and	  Rights	  (New	  York:	  
Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Carlos	  A.	  Ball,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Gay	  Rights:	  An	  Exploration	  in	  Political	  
Philosophy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2003).	  	  
13	  New	  Natural	  Law	  is	  a	  modern	  school	  of	  thought	  in	  moral,	  political	  and	  legal	  philosophy	  that	  argues	  
for	   and	   defends	   certain	   conservative	   sexual	  morality	   and	   gender	   ideologies.	   Germain	  Grisez,	   John	  
Finnis	   and	   Robert	   P.	   George	   are	   among	   the	   key	  members	   in	   this	   school.	   For	   a	   systematic	   and	   in-­‐
depth	  critique,	  see	  Bamforth	  and	  Richards,	  ibid.	  
14	  Humanism	  in	  ethics,	  law	  and	  politics	  are	  theories	  and	  projects	  that	  aim	  to	  reduce	  human	  suffering	  
and	  to	  enhance	  well-­‐being.	  They	  generally	  emphasise	  the	  values	  of	  human	  dignity,	  freedom,	  equality,	  
compassion,	   respect	  and	  empathy.	  See	  Ken	  Plummer,	   ‘Critical	  Humanism	  and	  Queer	  Theory:	  Living	  
with	   the	   Tensions’,	   in	   Norman	   K.	   Denzin	   and	   Yvonna	   S.	   Lincoln	   eds.,	   The	   Sage	   Handbook	   of	  
Qualitative	  Research.	  4th	  ed.	  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage,	  2011),	  198.	  
	  	  	  	  Liberal	  humanist	  theories	  in	  law	  and	  politics	  base	  their	  normative	  projects	  on	  various	  fundamental	  
human	   values	   that	   are	   widely	   recognised	   in	   liberal	   societies,	   such	   as	   human	   dignity,	   equality,	  
freedom	   or	   personal	   autonomy.	   	   They	   often	   debate	   on	   which	   human	   value	   or	   values	   are	   more	  
fundamental	   in	   liberal	   legal	   and	   political	   systems.	   Liberal	   gay	   rights	   theorist	   Nicholas	   Bamforth	  
provides	  a	  useful	  and	  inspiring	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  modern	  liberal	  theories	  of	  gay	  rights	  and	  sexual	  
justice.	  He	  concludes	  that	  the	  value	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  can	  best	   justify	  gay	  rights	   law	  and	  politics.	  
See	  Bamforth,	  n	  12	  above,	  196-­‐271.	  
15	  Sociologist	   Steven	   Seidman	   holds	   that	   postmodernism	   is	   ‘a	   broad	   cultural	   and	   intellectual	  
standpoint	   that	   views	   science,	   and	   all	   claims	   to	   knowledge,	   as	  moral	   and	   social	   forces	   and	   that	   is	  
suspicious	  of	  systematizing,	  theory-­‐building	  projects.’	  In	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  
he	  thinks	  the	  major	  point	  of	  postmodernism	  is	  on	  ‘the	  creation	  of	  social	  spaces	  that	  encourage	  the	  
proliferation	   of	   pleasures,	   desires,	   voices,	   interests,	   modes	   of	   individuation	   and	   democratization.’	  
See	   Steven	   Seidman,	   ‘Identity	   and	   Politics	   in	   a	   ‘‘Postmodern’’	   Gay	   Culture:	   Some	   Historical	   and	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projects	  of	  sexuality,	  gender,	   justice,	  and	  law.17	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  and	  expand	  some	  of	  
their	  insights.	  However,	  I	  will	  also	  discuss	  some	  problems	  in	  some	  post-­‐structuralist	  
and	  queer	  projects	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	   I	  hold	   that	  despite	   their	  emphasis	  on	  
critical	   thinking	   in	   sexual	   politics,	   some	   post-­‐structuralist	   and	   queer	   feminist	  
projects	  might	  not	  be	  fully	   immune	  from	  some	  of	  the	  major	   limitations	   frequently	  
found	   in	   subordination	   feminist	   approaches	   and	   ways	   of	   thinking.18	  I	   will	   suggest	  
that	  the	  arguments	   from	  queer	   legal	   theorist	   Janet	  Halley	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  
and	  inspiring	  for	  approaches	  found	  in	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  
and	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  and	  further	  develop	  some	  of	  her	  points	  in	  this	  thesis.19	  Some	  of	  
the	  limitations	  in	  her	  legal	  theory	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  
Another	  problem	  in	  current	  queer	  projects	  is	  that	  while	  there	  are	  explicit	  or	  implicit	  
normative	   concerns,	   normative	   values,	   and	   moral	   implications	   in	   several	   visible	  
queer	   projects, 20 	  queer	   theorists	   seldom	   clearly	   elaborate	   and	   address	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conceptual	  Notes’,	   in	  Michael	  Warner	  ed.,	  Fear	  of	  A	  Queer	  Planet:	  Queer	  Politics	  and	  Social	  Theory	  
(Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993),	  106.	  
16	  Post-­‐structuralism	  is	  a	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  challenges	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  fixity,	  completeness	  and	  
invariableness	   of	   the	   structures	   in	   the	   intellectual	   world.	   Ian	   Buchanan	   argues	   that	   ‘[i]ts	   principal	  
characteristic	   is	  scepticism	  (to	  the	  point	  of	   irrationality	  according	  to	   its	  critics)	  towards	  any	  form	  of	  
completeness	   of	   either	   knowledge	   or	   understanding.	   It	   rejects	   all	   transcendental	   and/or	   idealist	  
ontologies	   and	   epistemologies	   and	   accepts	   only	   those	   theories	   of	   being	   and	   knowledge	   that	   are	  
premised	   on	   the	   final	   unknowability	   of	   these	   things.’	   See	   Ian	   Buchanan,	   ‘Post-­‐structuralism’,	   in	  A	  
Dictionary	  of	  Critical	  Theory	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  .	  (Accessed	  10	  May,	  2014)	  	  
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199532919.001.0001/acref-­‐
9780199532919-­‐e-­‐546	  	  
17	  For	   example,	   queer	   feminist	   Judith	   Butler	   challenges	   essentialist	   understandings	   of	   the	   idea	   of	  
‘women’	  and	   the	  marginalisation	  of	   LGBT	  people	   in	   some	   feminist	   theories.	  See	  Butler,	  n	  5	  above.	  
See	   also	   Leslie	   J.	   Moran,	   ‘What	   Kind	   of	   Field	   is	   “Law,	   Gender	   and	   Sexuality”?	   	   Achievements,	  
Concerns	  and	  Possible	  Futures’,	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  17,	  no.	  3	  (2009),	  309-­‐313;	  Janet	  Halley,	  Spilt	  
Decisions:	   How	   and	  Why	   to	   Take	   a	   Break	   from	   Feminism?	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	  
2006);	  Katherine	  M	  Franke,	  ‘What's	  Wrong	  with	  Sexual	  Harassment?’,	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  49,	  no.	  4	  
(1997),	  691-­‐772;	  Brown,	  n	  11	  above.	  
18	  For	   example,	   queer	   legal	   scholar	   Janet	   Halley	   has	   pointed	   out	   that	   some	   post-­‐modern	   feminist,	  
post-­‐structuralist,	  and	  queer	  feminist	  projects	  such	  as	  Judith	  Butler’s	  works	  still	  hold,	   imply,	  or	  rely	  
on	  some	  gender	  subordination	  theses	  of	  women,	  femaleness	  and	  femininity.	  See	  Halley,	  ibid.,	  18-­‐20,	  
29-­‐30,149-­‐150,247-­‐253,	  273-­‐276	  and	  309-­‐311.	  
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  For	  example,	  queer	  theorist	  Michael	  Warner	  argues	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘sexual	  autonomy’	  in	  his	  
queer	  projects.	  See	  Michael	  Warner,	  The	  Trouble	  with	  Normal:	  Sex,	  Politics	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Queer	  
Life	   (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  1-­‐17.	  Queer	  theorist	   Judith	  Butler	  talks	  about	  the	  
‘normative	  aspiration’	  of	  agency	  and	   freedom.	  See	   Judith	  Butler,	   ‘On	  Being	  Beside	  Oneself:	  On	   the	  
Limits	  of	  Sexual	  Autonomy’,	  in	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  ed.,	  Sex	  Rights:	  The	  Oxford	  Amnesty	  Lectures	  2002	  
(Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  67-­‐69.	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normative	  grounds	  or	  justifications	  implied	  in	  their	  queer	  projects.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  
we	   also	   need	   to	   examine	   and	   analyse	   the	   normative	   implications	   and	   normative	  
dimensions	  in	  queer	  projects.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  various	  strands	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  also	  provide	  an	  
analysis	  of	  gender,	  sexuality,	  and	  social	  justice.	  Some	  of	  them	  endorse	  more	  or	  less	  
a	   conservative	   traditionalist	   view	   and	   essentialist	   gender	   roles.21	  Some	   insist	   and	  
base	   their	   thinking	   and	   critiques	   of	   men	   and	   masculinities	   on	   the	   overarching	  
premise,	  belief,	  and	  assumption	  that	  men	  as	  a	  social	  group	  are	  a	  privileged	  gender	  
group,	  an	  approach	   largely	   informed	  by	  subordination	   feminist	  ways	  of	   thinking.22	  
Still	  some	  others	  suggest	  that	  not	  only	  should	  gender	  injustices	  towards	  and	  sexism	  
against	  women	  be	  unravelled	  and	  challenged,	  but	  also	  that	  sexism	  against	  men	  and	  
gender	  injustices	  towards	  men	  qua	  men	  should	  be	  challenged.23	  I	  will	  contend	  that	  
the	  third	  approach	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies,	  which	  I	  label	  as	  ‘humanist	  men	  
and	   masculinities	   studies’,	   is	   the	   more	   balanced,	   promising,	   and	   appropriate	  
approach	  among	  the	  above	  three	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  approaches.	  I	  argue	  
that	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice	  projects	  would	  benefit	  from	  incorporating	  and	  
considering	   research	   and	   perspectives	   from	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	  
studies.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	   some	   limitations	   and	   insufficiencies	   in	   the	  
humanist	  approach	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  and	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  this	  kind	  
of	  approach	  of	  studies	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  could	  benefit	  from	  an	  incorporation	  
of	  some	  liberal	  sexual	  justice	  and	  queer	  notions,	  concerns,	  and	  insights.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	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  example,	  see	  John	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  Keepers:	  Servants,	  soldiers,	  and	  godly	  men	  (New	  
Brunswick:	  Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  45-­‐66;	  Katherine	  K.	  Young,	  and	  Paul	  Nathanson.	  ‘But	  Are	  
the	  Kids	  Really	  All	  Right?	  Egalitarian	  Rhetoric,	  Legal	  Theory	  and	  Fathers’,	  New	  Male	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  1	  
(2012),	  61-­‐82.	  
22	  For	  example,	  see	  R.	  W.	  Connell,	  The	  Men	  and	  The	  Boys	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2000);	  Ann	  C.	  McGinley	  
and	   Frank	   Rudy	   Cooper,	   ‘Introduction:	  Masculinities,	  Multidimensionality,	   and	   the	   Law:	  Why	   They	  
Need	   One	   Another’,	   in	  Masculinities	   and	   the	   Law:	   A	  Multidimensional	   Approach	   (New	   York:	   NYU	  
Press,	  2012),	  3.	  
23	  For	  example,	  Pasi	  Malmi,	  Discrimination	  Against	  Men:	  Appearance	  and	  Causes	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  a	  
Modern	  Welfare	   State	   (PhD	   Thesis,	  University	   of	   Lapland,	   2009).	   In	   public	   international	   law	   areas,	  
there	  is	  also	  research	  that	  shares	  concerns	  in	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  For	  example,	  
see	   Sandesh	   Sivakumaran,	   ‘Lost	   in	   Translation:	  UN	  Responses	   to	   Sexual	  Violence	  Against	  Men	  and	  
Boys	  in	  Situations	  of	  Armed	  Conflict’,	  International	  Review	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  92,	  no.	  877	  (2010),	  259-­‐
277;	   R.	   Charli	   Carpenter,	   ‘Recognizing	   Gender-­‐Based	   Violence	   Against	   Civilian	   Men	   and	   Boys	   in	  
Conflict	  Situations’,	  Security	  Dialogue	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  83-­‐103.	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In	  conclusion,	  I	  propose	  to	  examine	  the	  approaches	  of	  the	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	   studies	   in	   thinking	   about	   gender	   oppression,	   normative	  
heterosexuality,	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  first	  suggest	  a	  convergence	  between	  liberal	  
sexual	  justice	  theories	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  I	  will	  use	  liberal	  
sexual	   justice	   theories	   to	   justify	   the	   moral	   grounds	   and	   significance	   of	   humanist	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   while	   also	   bringing	   humanist	   the	   insights	   and	  
concerns	   of	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies’	   into	   liberal	   sexual	   justice	   theories.	  
Together	  they	  can	  form	  liberal	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  approaches.	  
Then	   I	   suggest	   a	   blend	   of	   the	   queer	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   approaches	  
that	  brings	  queer	  orientations	   into	   liberal	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  
while	  also	  bringing	  liberal	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  orientations	  into	  
queer	   studies.	   I	   will	   contend	   that	   liberal	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	  
could	   benefit	   from	   considering	   some	   notions	   and	   insights	   from	   queer	   theories,	  
while	  queer	  projects	  could	  also	  benefit	  from	  considering	  some	  insights	  from	  liberal	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  suggest	  the	  significance	  
and	   need	   to	   incorporate	   the	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
perspectives	   into	   research	   into	   law	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   	   Since	   this	   combined	  
approach	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  in	  law	  and	  politics	  is	  still	  
at	  its	  infant	  stage	  and	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  established,	  especially	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  legal	  
theory,	  one	  of	  the	  core	  academic	  gaps	  that	  this	  thesis	  is	  aiming	  to	  fill	  therefore,	  is	  to	  
further	   develop	   and	   defend	   the	   theory	   and	   insights	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  in	  legal	  and	  political	  theories	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
In	   respect	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   gay	   studies	   and	   queer	   studies,	   I	   will	   hold	   that	   the	  
perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   could	   possibly	  
contribute	   to	   research	   about	   gay	  men’s	   needs	   and	   interests,	   but	   it	   has	   yet	   to	   be	  
taken	  seriously	  enough	  in	  gay	  and	  queer	  studies	  scholarship.	  For	  example,	  this	  kind	  
of	  approach	  might	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  better	  and	  identify	  the	  specific	  difficulties	  
and	  discriminations	  gay,	  bi,	  or	  trans	  gender	  fathers	  might	  experience,	  but	  which	  are	  
not	  always	  captured	  or	  appreciated	   in	   subordination	   feminist	  and	   lesbian	   feminist	  
family	   law	  scholarship.	   I	  will	   also	  hold	   that	   the	   jurisprudence	  of	   sexuality,	   gender,	  
and	   justice	   could	  benefit	   from	   incorporating	   the	   lens	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	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masculinities	  studies.	  Furthermore,	   I	  will	  contend	  that	  unless	  we	  can	  also	  take	  the	  
injustices	   of	   the	   gender	   normativity	   of	   men	   and	   sex/gender	   discrimination	   and	  
prejudices	  against	  men	  as	  men	  seriously	  and	  address	   them	  systematically,	  we	  will	  
not	   be	   able	   to	   truly	   destabilise	   and	   transform	   the	   system	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	   Limitations	   in	   some	  post-­‐structuralist	   and	  queer	   feminist	   projects	  
will	   be	   illustrated.	   I	   will	   argue	   for	   the	   needs	   and	   benefits	   of	   incorporating	  
perspectives	   inspired	  by	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	   in	   the	   law	  
and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  to	  better	  address	  the	  constraining	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	  norms	  and	  practices	  and	  to	  better	  unsettle	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  feminism	  I	  will	  hold	  that	  perspectives	  from	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies	  are	  consistent	  with	  those	  humanist	   feminist	  projects	  that	  are	  
willing	   to	   see	   and	   address	   structural	   and	   collective	   gender	   injustices	   towards	   not	  
just	  women,	  but	  also	   structural	  and	  collective	   injustices	   towards	   trans	  people	  and	  
structural	  and	  collective	  gender	  injustices	  towards	  men	  qua	  men.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  this	  
kind	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  approach	  is	  definitely	  consistent	  with	  
these	   kinds	   of	   humanist	   feminist	   projects,	   because	   elimination	   of	   discrimination	  
against	  girls	  and	  women	  certainly	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  core	  insistences	  and	  goals	  of	  the	  
approach	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  They	  are	  both	  parts	  of	  
wider	  queer	  humanist	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	  projects.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
I	  will	  contend	  that	   insights	   from	  some	  liberal	  sexual	   justice	  theories	  can	  shed	   light	  
on	   the	   normative	   implications	   and	   grounds	   for	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies’	   projects	   against	   oppressive	   normative	   heterosexuality.	  
Therefore,	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  will	  also	  draw	  on	  some	  of	  
the	   insights	  and	  arguments	   from	   liberal	   sexual	   justice	   theories,	   such	  as	   liberal	  gay	  
rights	   theories.	   I	  also	  hold	   that	   there	  are	  explicit	  or	   implicit	  normative	  dimensions	  
and	   aspirations	   in	   queer	   projects,	   so	   queer	   projects	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   read	   as	   just	  
projects	  of	  pure	  deconstruction.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  learning	  from	  queer	  approaches	  
reminds	   us	   that	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   need	   constant	   self-­‐
reflection	  and	  self-­‐correction.	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1.2   Research	  questions	  
In	   this	   section,	   I	   introduce	   the	  main	   research	  questions	  and	  methodologies	  of	   the	  
thesis.	  As	  stated	  earlier,	  the	  main	  research	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  
significance	  and	  usefulness	  of	  studies	  inspired	  by	  approaches	  from	  queer	  humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  in	  unravelling,	  challenging,	  and	  transforming	  some	  aspects	  of	  
sexual	  injustices,	  sexual	  discrimination,	  and	  sexual	  stereotypes	  and	  prejudices	  in	  the	  
regime	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   in	   modern	   democratic	   societies.	   I	   focus	  
primarily	   on	   reviewing	   contemporary	   Anglo-­‐American	   scholarship	   on	   the	   law	   and	  
politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  
I	  ask	  in	  this	  thesis:	  what	  are	  the	  harms	  and	  injustices	  in	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  
in	   modern	   democratic	   societies?	   How	   can	   we	   properly	   address	   its	   problems	   and	  
oppressive	  practices?	  What	  are	  adequate	  normative	  grounds	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  legal	  
and	   political	   projects	   in	   modern	   democratic	   societies	   in	   order	   to	   challenge	   the	  
problematic	   sexuality	   norms	   and	   practices	   and	   gender	   norms	   and	   practices	   in	  
normative	   heterosexuality?	   What	   is	   the	   relationship	   and	   dynamic	   of	   gender	  
oppression	   and	   sexuality	   oppression	   in	   the	   regime	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality?	  
And	  how	  does	  normative	  heterosexuality	  operate	  in	  contemporary	  family	  relations?	  
How	   are	   the	   issues	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   sexual	   justice,	   and	   families	  
presented,	   conceptualized,	  and	  addressed	   in	  current	   influential	   sexual	  politics	  and	  
sexual	   justice	  projects?	  What	  are	   the	  pros	  and	   cons	  of	   these	   theories	  of	   sexuality	  
and	   gender	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  way	   that	   they	   address	   the	   problems	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality	  and	  sexual	  justice?	  What	  kinds	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  injustices	  are	  
highlighted	  and	  which	  are	  neglected	  in	  their	  theories	  and	  ideologies?	  Why	  are	  some	  
aspects	   of	   bias	   and	   injustice	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   less	   likely	   to	   be	  
acknowledged	   and	   addressed	   in	   some	   major	   feminist	   or	   liberal	   proposals,	   while	  
other	   aspects	   are	   prioritised	   and	   highlighted?	   What	   are	   the	   consequences	   of	  
marginalisation	  and	  trivialisation	  of	  certain	  sexual	  injustices	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  what	  are	  the	  impacts	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  marginalization	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   perpetuation	   and	   reproduction	   of	   certain	   oppressive	   norms	   and	  
ideologies	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality?	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Is	  it	  proper	  and	  just,	  as	  some	  subordination	  feminists	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  suggest	  
in	  their	  gender	  theories	  and	  gender	  law	  policies,	  to	  focus	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  issues	  
of	   structural	   oppression	   of	   and	   injustice	   towards	   women	   in	   their	   discussion	   of	  
gender	  oppression	  and	  gender	  injustice?24	  	  For	  example,	  is	  the	  approach	  to	  gender	  
justice	   and	   gender	   equality	   proposed	   and	   recommended	   by	   international	   law	  
feminism	   in	   the	   CEDAW	   convention25	  and	   its	   treaty	  monitoring	   body,	   the	   CEDAW	  
committee,	  appropriate	  and	  fair?	  26	  	  As	  Darren	  Rosenblum	  has	  pointed	  out,	  CEDAW	  
is	  ‘the	  central	  pillar	  of	  gender	  norms	  at	  the	  international	  level,’	  but	  it	  ‘continues	  to	  
focus	   so	   narrowly	   and	   exclusively	   on	   women.’	  27	  Being	   the	   primary	   source	   of	  
international	   law	   in	   the	   area	  of	   gender	   justice	   and	   gender	   equality	   and	  being	   the	  
principal	   UN	   treaty	   devoted	   entirely	   to	   sex	   discrimination	   and	   gender	   equality,	  
CEDAW	   only	   focuses	   narrowly	   on	   and	   targets	   discrimination	   against	   ‘women.’	   As	  
feminist	  international	  law	  scholar	  Alice	  Edwards	  points	  out:	  ‘the	  treaty	  clearly	  cover	  
sex	   discrimination	   only	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   women.’	  28	  Is	   this	   kind	   of	   gender	   justice	  
approach	  in	  law	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  in	  tacking	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	   injustices?	  Or	  might	   this	  kind	  of	  women	  specific	  and	  women	  
exclusive	   gender	   justice	   approach	   in	   law	   and	   politics	   actually	   produce	   and	  
reproduce	   some	   problematic	   heteronormative	   ideologies,	   rules,	   and	   constraints?	  
What	   are	   the	   implications	   for	   gay	   men	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   women-­‐exclusive	   gender	  
justice	  law	  and	  policies?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  	  For	  example,	  see	  Rawls,	  n	  10	  above,	  162-­‐167;	  Okin,	  n	  10	  above,	  134-­‐186.	  	  
25	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  Against	  Women,	  opened	  for	  signature	  
Mar.	  I,	  1980,	  19	  I.L.M.	  33,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/34/180	  [hereinafter	  the	  CEDAW	  Convention].	  	  
26	  The	   CEDAW	   committee	   is	   the	   treaty	   monitoring	   body	   of	   the	   CEDAW	   Convention.	   Its	   main	  
responsibilities	   are	   ‘the	   review	  of	   State	   party	   compliance	  with	   the	   Convention	   and	   the	   drafting	   of	  
General	   Recommendations.’	   See	   Leilani	   Farha,	   ‘Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Discrimination	  
Against	   Women’,	   in	   Malcolm	   Langford	   ed.,	   Social	   Rights	   Jurisprudence:	   Emerging	   Trends	   in	  
International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  554.	  
	  	  	  	  For	  a	   feminist	   interpretation	  and	  elaboration	  of	   the	  CEDAW	  Convention	  and	  CEDAW	  Committee,	  
see	   Marsha	   A.	   Freeman,	   Beate	   Rudolf,	   and	   Christine	   Chinkin,	   eds.,	   The	   UN	   Convention	   on	   the	  
Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  Women:	  A	  Commentary	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	   2012).	   See	   also	   Dianne	   Otto,	   ‘Women’s	   Rights’,	   in	   Daniel	  Moeckli,	   Sangeeta	   Shah,	   Sandesh	  
Sivakumaran	   and	   David	   Harris,	   eds.,	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Law	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	   University	  
Press,	  2010),	  345-­‐364.	  
27	  Darren	  Rosenblum,	  ‘Unsex	  CEDAW,	  or	  What's	  Wrong	  with	  Women's	  Rights’,	  Colum.	  J.	  Gender	  &	  L.	  
20,	  no.	  2	  (2011),	  100.	  
28	  Alice	   Edwards,	   Violence	   against	   Women	   under	   International	   Human	   Rights	   Law	   (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  154.	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What	   are	   the	   core	   insights	   and	   characteristics	   of	   approaches	   inspired	   by	   queer	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  of	   sexual	   justice	  and	  sexual	  politics?	  Why	  
do	  we	  need	   them	  and	  how	  will	   they	   contribute	   to	   the	   struggle	   against	  normative	  
heterosexuality?	   What	   are	   the	   moral	   foundations	   and	   reasons	   for	   adopting	  
combined	  queer	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  inspired	  perspectives?	  
In	  which	  parts	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  perspectives	  inspired	  by	  queer	  and	  humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	   converge	  with	   feminist	  or	   liberal	   insights?	   In	  which	  
parts	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  they	  diverge?	  How	  will	  combined	  approaches	  inspired	  
by	  queer	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  respond	  to	  practical	  issues	  in	  
the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality,	   gender	   and	   family	   such	   as	   family	   violence	   and	  
parental	  responsibilities?	  These	  are	  all	  significant	  and	  relevant	  questions	  that	  I	  will	  
explore	  further	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Overall	  this	  thesis	  will	  argue	  for	  the	  values,	  needs	  and	  
benefits	   of	   taking	   the	   perspectives	   inspired	   by	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies	   more	   seriously	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality,	   gender,	  
justice,	  and	  family.	  
1.3   Methodologies:	  	  queer	  approach	  and	  moral/political	  philosophy	  approach	  
Interdisciplinary	   approaches	   are	   adopted	   as	   the	  methodology	   in	   this	   thesis.	   I	   use	  
both	   critical	   thinking/queer	   approaches	   and	   analytical	   moral	   and	   political	  
philosophical	   approaches	   to	   study	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	  
Furthermore,	   I	   emphasise	   the	   significance	   of	   referring	   to	   up	   to	   date	   empirical	  
qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   research	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   in	   these	   areas.	   	   I	   hold	  
that	   each	   kind	   of	   approach	   plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   and	   has	   its	   unique	   contribution	   in	  
legal	  and	  political	  research	  into	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  therefore	  can	  complement	  
each	  other	  in	  any	  research	  into	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  I	  further	  argue	  that	  
queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  would	  hold	  that	  all	  three	  approaches	  
are	  valuable	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  research	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  	  
1.3.1   Critical	  and	  queer	  thinking	  approach	  
The	   first	   major	   approach	   adopted	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	   queer	   and	   critical	   sexual	  
theory	  approach.	  Critical	  and	  queer	  thinking	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	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gender	  will	   survey	   beyond	   the	   positive	   law,	   the	   ‘black	   letter’	   of	   existing	   law,	   ‘the	  
texts	  of	   law’,	  or	   the	  moral	   foundations	  of	   law.	   ‘They	  seek	   to	  examine	  and	  explore	  
the	  place	  of	   law	  within	   the	  wider	  social	  order.’29	  Critical	  and	  queer	   thinking	  brings	  
social,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  critiques,	  concerns,	  and	  inquiries	  into	  legal	  studies	  and	  
queries	   the	   power	   relations	   and	   politics	   in	   it.	   	   Furthermore,	   critical	   and	   queer	  
approaches	   also	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   subjecting	   orthodox	   and	   dominant	  
knowledge,	   thinking,	   beliefs,	   and	   ideologies	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   to	   critical	  
reflection.	  
Queer	   is	   primarily	   understood	   and	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   not	   as	   a	   fixed	   identity,	   but	  
rather	   as	   a	   theoretical	   approach,	   position,	   commitment,	   and	   model	   for	   critical	  
inquiry,	   through	   which	   to	   reflect	   and	   re-­‐examine	   the	   stability,	   naturalness,	   and	  
legitimacy	   of	   often	   naturalized,	   taken	   for	   granted,	   or	   moralised	   social	   norms,	  
boundaries,	   categories,	   ideologies,	   and	   distinctions	   in	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   As	  
queer	   legal	   scholar	   Leslie	   Moran	   argues,	   it	   is	   an	   approach	   that	   emphasises	   ‘the	  
virtue	  of	  openness’	  and	  ‘the	  ongoing	  importance	  of	  critical	  reflection’.30	  	  It	  is	  also	  an	  
approach	   and	   commitment	   to	   investigate	   and	   unravel	   the	   power	   relations,	   the	  
knowledge-­‐power	   nexus,	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   social	   construction	   of	   sexuality	   and	  
gender	   normativity.31	  	   And	   as	   queer	   theorist	   Judith	   Butler	   insists,	   this	   kind	   of	  
critical/queer	   thinking	   is	   significant	   in	   resisting	   sexual	   oppression	   and	   sexual	  
injustices.32	  Too	   often	   dominant	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms	   easily	   make	   some	  
groups	   of	   people,	   some	   types	   of	   bodies,	   or	   some	   forms	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality	  
performances	   unintelligible,	   illegible,	   or	   unrecognizable.33	  Queer	   approach	   and	  
critical	   thinking	   is	  crucial	   in	  sexual	   justice	  projects	   in	  order	   to	  unravel	  constraining	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms	   and	   to	   resist,	   to	   rework,	   and	   to	   unsettle	   the	   violent	  
hierarchies,	  exclusions,	  and	  oppression	  of	   them.	   I	  draw	  on	  queer	  theorists	  such	  as	  
Judith	  Butler	  and	  Leslie	  Moran’s	   insights	  and	  argue	  that	  the	  queer/critical	   thinking	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Leslie	   J.	  Moran,	   ‘Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Bodies	  of	   Law’,	   in	  Diane	  Richardson	  and	  Steven	  Seidman	  eds.,	  
Handbook	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Studies	  (London:	  Sage,	  2002),	  299.	  
30	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  311-­‐312.	  
31	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  60-­‐62.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  65.	  
33	  Butler,	  Undoing	  Gender	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2004),	  4-­‐9,	  13-­‐14.	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approach	   is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  approaches	  adopted	   in	  queer	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	   studies	   in	   thinking	   about	   men	   and	   masculinities	   issues	   in	   law	   and	  
politics.	  
Queer	   theory	   opposes	   biological	   determinism34	  and	   takes	   social	   constructionist	  
perspectives	   on	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Social	   constructionists	   contend	   ‘that	   social	  
categories	  are,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  culture-­‐specific,	  that	   is,	  they	  are	  the	  product	  of	  
social	   dialogues	   and	   assumptions	   which	   vary	   from	   society	   to	   society	   and	   age	   to	  
age.’35	  Social	   constructionism	   in	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   holds	   that	   social	   categories	  
and	  social	  identities	  such	  as	  the	  ideas	  of	  masculinity,	  femininity,	  homosexuality,	  and	  
heterosexuality	   are	   produced	   and	   constructed	   under	   the	   interaction	   of	   various	  
complex	  and	  contradictory	  social	  forces.36	  For	  example,	  both	  Foucault	  and	  Jonathan	  
Ned	   Katz	   argue	   that	   homosexuality	   and	   heterosexuality	   identities	   are	   relatively	  
recent	   products	   in	   Western	   societies	   and	   the	   concept	   and	   institution	   of	  
heterosexuality	  is	  not	  as	  natural	  or	  normal	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  be.37	  Katz	  points	  out	  that	  
heterosexuality	   ‘signifies	   one	   particular	   historical	   arrangement	   of	   the	   sexes	   and	  
their	   pleasures.’38	  The	   definition	   and	   boundary	   between	   social	   categories	   such	   as	  
masculinity/femininity	   or	   homosexuality/heterosexuality	   are	   constantly	   changing,	  
are	   never-­‐finished	   contestations,	   and	   are	   subjected	   to	   endless	   processes	   of	  
redefinition.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Biological	  essentialism	  and	  biological	  determinism	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  hold	  that	  biological	  sex	  
determines	  the	  corresponding	  proper	  or	  natural	  gender	  expression	  and	  sexual	  desires.	  As	  MacKinnon	  
describes:	  	  ‘Historically,	  being	  essentialist	  on	  sex	  or	  race	  has	  meant	  being	  biologically	  determinist:	  as	  
if	   people	   are	   the	   way	   they	   are,	   act	   and	   think	   and	   feel	   the	   way	   they	   do,	   have	   the	   abilities	   and	  
resources	  and	  occupy	  the	  social	  status	  they	  have	  because	  of	  their	  sex-­‐	  or	  race-­‐specific	  physiology	  …	  
The	   so-­‐called	   natural	   traits,	   in	   the	   essentialist	   view,	   determine	   social	   outcomes	   and	   individual	  
qualities.’	  See	  Catherine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Women’s	  Lives,	  Men’s	  Laws	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  2005),	  85.	  MacKinnon	  herself	  claims	  that	  feminism	  rejects	  biological	  determinism	  and	  is	  anti-­‐
essentialist.	   She	   claims	   that	   women	   are	   subordinated	   only	   because	   patriarchal	   culture	   normalises	  
and	  legitimatise	  men’s	  control	  and	  oppression	  of	  women.	  Women	  are	  not	  biologically	  determined	  to	  
be	   subordinated.	   Their	   oppression	   is	   only	   a	   cultural	   product	   of	   patriarchy.	   She	   argues	   for	   a	  
transformation	   from	  male	   culture,	   male	   law	   and	  male	   state	   to	   women’s	   state,	   women’s	   law	   and	  
women’s	  empowering	  culture.	  See	  MacKinnon,	  32-­‐43.	  
35	  See	  Bamforth,	  n	  12	  above,	  75.	  
36	  For	   example,	   see	   Niall	   Richardson,	   Clarissa	   Smith,	   and	   Angela	   Werndly.	   Studying	   Sexualities:	  
Theories,	  Representations,	  Cultures	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  2013),	  21,	  45-­‐46.	  
37	  Michel	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality:	  An	  Introduction,	  Volume	  I,	   translated	  by	  Robert	  Hurley,	  
(New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1990),	  43,101;	  Katz,	  n	  8	  above.	  
38	  Katz,	  ibid.,	  14.	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In	  modern	  Western	   societies,	   science	   seeks	   to	   schematise,	  monitor,	   and	   regulate	  
human	  sexuality	  via	  careful	  observation,	  surveillance,	  categorisation,	  discussion,	  and	  
classification	   of	   human	   sexual	   practice,	   desires,	   gender	   performances,	   and	  
anatomical	  body.	  As	  Michel	  Foucault	  points	  out:	  
‘[T]he	  notion	  of	  sex	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  group	  together,	  in	  an	  artificial	  
unity,	  anatomical	  elements,	  biological	  functions,	  conducts,	  sensations,	  
and	  pleasures,	  and	  it	  enabled	  one	  to	  make	  use	  of	  this	  fictitious	  unity	  as	  a	  
causal	  principle,	  an	  omnipresent	  meaning,	  a	  secret	  to	  be	  discovered	  
everywhere:	  sex	  was	  thus	  able	  to	  function	  as	  a	  unique	  signifier	  and	  as	  a	  
universal	  signified	  .	  .	  .	  the	  knowledge	  of	  sexuality	  gained	  through	  
proximity	  a	  guarantee	  of	  quasi-­‐scientificity;	  but	  by	  virtue	  of	  this	  same	  
proximity,	  some	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  biology	  and	  physiology	  were	  able	  to	  
serve	  as	  a	  principle	  of	  normality	  for	  human	  sexuality.’39	  
Social	  constructionist	  perspectives	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  such	  as	  the	  queer	  theory	  
approach,	  therefore	  holds	  that	  social	  categories	  of	  sex,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality	  are	  to	  
certain	  extent	  all	  products	  of	  historical	  contingency.	  	  
However,	   by	   claiming	   that	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   categories	   are	   culturally	   and	  
historically	  produced,	  queer	  theorists,	  such	  as	  Foucault	  and	  Butler,	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  
importance	  and	  influence	  of	  material	  reality.	  What	  they	  want	  to	  emphasise	  is	  rather	  
that	   we	   cannot	   understand,	   recognise,	   describe,	   and	   evaluate	   materiality	   and	  
bodies	  outside	  our	  situated	  cultural	  signs	  and	  background.	  We	  have	  to	  and	  already	  
interpret	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  material	  reality	  such	  as	  the	  human	  body	  in	  the	  specific	  
cultural	   context	   in	  which	  we	   live	   and	   are	   embedded.	   Purely	   cultural	   signs	   do	   not	  
produce	  a	  material	  body,	  but	  ‘the	  body	  does	  not	  become	  sexually	  readable	  without	  
those	   signs,	   and	   that	   those	   signs	   are	   irreducibly	   cultural	   and	  material	   at	   once.’40	  
Butler	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  material	  body	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  
sex,	   gender,	   and	   sexuality,	   but	   insists	   that	   how	   we	   evaluate	   and	   recognise	   the	  
human	  body	   is	   inseparable	   from	   the	   cultural	  background	  and	   interaction	  of	   social	  
forces	  in	  the	  specific	  society	  we	  live.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Foucault,	  n	  37	  above,	  154-­‐155.	  
40	  See	  Butler,	  n	  33	  above,	  87.	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Overall	  by	  adopting	  social	  constructionist	  perspectives	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  the	  
approach	   of	   queer	   theory	   argues	   that	   sex,	   gender,	   and	   sexuality	   are	   identity	  
categories	  produced	  by	   the	  networks	  of	  historical	   and	   local	   social	   forces.	  Under	  a	  
Foucauldian	  and	  queer	  line	  of	  thinking,	  social	  categories	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  are	  
products	  of	  knowledge	  systems,	  discourses,	  and	  power	  relations.41	  There	  is	  sociality	  
of	   sexuality	  and	  gender,	   that	   is,	   they	  are	   socially	   constituted	  and	  mediated,	  never	  
purely	  natural.42	  A	  queer	  perspective	  thus	  rejects	  a	  pure	  essentialist	  understanding	  
of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   as	   it	   ignores	   the	   forces	   of	   culture	   discourses	   and	   social	  
norms	  in	  shaping	  and	  constituting	  the	  meaning	  of	  sex,	  gender,	  and	  sexuality.	  Queer	  
thinking	  instead	  would	  like	  to	  trouble	  the	  coherence,	  naturalness,	  and	  fixity	  of	  ‘the	  
heterosexual	   matrix’,43	  the	   compulsory	   heteronormative	   requirements	   and	   the	  
regulatory	   norms	   of	   sexuality	   performances	   and	   gender	   performances.	   	   A	   queer	  
approach	   aims	   to	   reflect	   critically	   on	   how	   normative	   heterosexuality	   is	   produced,	  
reproduced,	   and	   reinforced	   in	   law,	   politics,	   and	   everyday	   life	   and	   would	   like	   to	  
develop	  and	  practise	  ‘managerial	  techniques’	  44	  to	  try	  to	  mobilise	  resistance	  and	  to	  
open	  up	  options	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  As	  maintained	  by	  Annamarie	  Jagose,	  
in	   general	   ‘queer	   describes	   those	   gestures	   or	   analytical	   models	   which	   dramatise	  
incoherencies	   in	   the	   allegedly	   stable	   relations	   between	   chromosomal	   sex,	   gender	  
and	   sexual	   desire.’45	  Queer	   theorist	   Butler	   emphasizes,	   as	   previously	   mentioned,	  
that	  queer	  and	  critical	  reflection	  is	  crucial	  for	  ‘a	  philosophy	  of	  freedom,’	  46	  and	  is	  an	  
important	  analytic	  tool	  to	  unsettle	  sexual	  oppression	  and	  gender	  injustices.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Tamsin	  Spargo,	  Foucault	  and	  Queer	  Theory	  (Cambridge:	  Icon	  Books,	  1999),	  14-­‐26.	  
42	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  68-­‐69.	  	  
43	  Judith	   Butler	   describes	   the	   heterosexual	   matrix	   as	   ‘[t]hat	   grid	   of	   cultural	   intelligibility	   through	  
which	   bodies,	   genders,	   and	   desires	   are	   naturalized…a	   hegemonic	   discursive/epistemic	   model	   of	  
gender	  intelligibility	  that	  assumes	  that	  for	  bodies	  to	  cohere	  and	  make	  sense	  there	  must	  be	  a	  stable	  
sex	  expressed	  through	  a	  stable	  gender	  (masculine	  expresses	  male,	  feminine	  expresses	  female)	  that	  is	  
oppositionally	   and	   hierarchically	   defined	   through	   the	   compulsory	   practice	   of	   heterosexuality.’	   See	  
Butler,	  n	  5	  above,	  208.	  
44	  Michel	  Foucault,	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Concern	  for	  the	  Self	  as	  a	  Practice	  of	  Freedom’,	  in	  Paul	  Rabinow	  ed.,	  
Ethics,	  Subjectivity	  and	  Truth:	  The	  Essential	  Works	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984	  (New	  York:	  The	  New	  
Press,	  1997),	  298.	  	  
45	  Annamarie	  Jagose,	  Queer	  Theory	  (Victoria:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  3.	  
46	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  67.	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However,	   as	   queer	   theorist	   Judith	   Butler	   also	   elaborates,	   queer	   theory	   does	   not	  
deny	   the	   necessities	   and	   the	   significance	   of	   employing	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
categories	   such	   as	   ‘gay’,	   ‘lesbians’,	   ‘men’,	   and	   ‘women’	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  in	  everyday	  social	  life.	  	  We	  have	  to	  use	  them,	  she	  argues,	  
because	  these	  terms	  already	  ‘lay	  their	  claim	  on	  us	  prior	  to	  our	  full	  knowing.’47	  They	  
are	  part	  of	  the	  important	  ‘constitutive	  sociality	  of	  the	  self.’48	  We	  cannot	  rework	  and	  
reshape	   current	   heteronormative	   legal	   and	   political	   order	  without	   acknowledging	  
the	   impacts	  and	  significance	  of	   the	  social	  meanings	  of	   these	   identity	  categories	   in	  
our	  culture	  and	  in	  everyday	  social	  life.	  Butler	  holds	  that:	  
‘[m]y	  agency	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  denying	  this	  condition	  of	  my	  
constitution.	  If	  I	  have	  any	  agency,	  it	  is	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  am	  
constituted	  by	  a	  social	  world	  I	  never	  chose	  .	  .	  .	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  “I”	  that	  I	  
am	  finds	  itself	  at	  once	  constituted	  by	  norms	  and	  dependent	  on	  them	  but	  
also	  endeavors	  to	  live	  in	  ways	  that	  maintain	  a	  critical	  and	  transformative	  
relation	  to	  them.’49	  	  
Agency	   and	   autonomy	   co-­‐exist	   with	   the	   inevitable	   historicity	   and	   sociality	   in	   our	  
gendered	   and	   sexual	   lives.	   Subversion	   and	   transformation	   are	   only	   possible	   from	  
within	   the	   specific	   social	   context	   of	   which	  we	   are	   embedded	   in	   and	   are	   partially	  
composed	   of.	   Furthermore	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   identities	   have	   important	   and	  
ambivalent	  meanings	   for	   us.	  We	   are	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   empowered,	   enabled,	   and	  
given	   meaning	   because	   of	   social	   identities,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   we	   may	   also	  
experience	  constraints,	  exclusions,	  prejudices,	  and	  stereotypes	  because	  of	  our	  social	  
identities.	  	  To	  some	  extent,	  we	  are	  compelled	  to	  speak	  in	  the	  language	  of	  identities.	  
The	  crucial	  point	  is	  not	  to	  abandon	  or	  deny	  the	  roles	  of	  identity	  categories	  in	  social	  
life,	  in	  law,	  and	  in	  politics,	  but	  rather	  to	  be	  always	  aware	  and	  vigilant	  of	  the	  possible	  
violence,	   contestation,	   and	   arbitrary	   categorization	   that	   may	   be	   based	   on	   those	  
identity	   categories.	   We	   need	   to	   be	   attentive	   to	   both	   the	   positive	   sides	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Judith	  Butler,	  Bodies	  That	  Matter:	  On	   the	  Discursive	   Limits	  of	   "sex"	   (Abingdon:	  Oxon,	  Routledge,	  
2011),	  174.	  
48	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  50.	  
49	  Butler,	  n	  33	  above,	  3.	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possible	  violent	  hierarchy	  in	  recognition	  politics	  and	  law.	  	  Therefore	  Butler	  suggests	  
that	  we	  need	  to	  follow	  a	  ‘double-­‐path’	  in	  politics.	  She	  contends	  that:	  	  
‘we	  must	  use	  this	  language	  [identity	  categories]	  to	  assert	  an	  entitlement	  
to	  conditions	  of	  life	  in	  ways	  that	  affirm	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  sexuality	  
and	  gender	  in	  political	  life,	  and	  we	  must	  also	  subject	  our	  very	  categories	  
to	  critical	  scrutiny,	  find	  out	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  inclusivity	  and	  
translatability,	  the	  presuppositions	  they	  include,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  
must	  be	  expanded,	  destroyed	  or	  reworked	  both	  to	  encompass	  and	  open	  
up	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  human	  and	  gendered.’50	  
Hence	  the	  crucial	  point	   that	   the	  queer	   theory	  approach	  would	   like	   to	  make	  about	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   categories	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	   meaning	   and	   importance	   of	  
recognition	   and	   identities	   in	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   areas,	   but	   rather	   that,	   by	  
employing	   these	   identity	   categories	   and	   by	   promoting	   the	   aims	   of	   progressive	  
politics,	   we	   also	   need	   always	   to	   be	   self-­‐reflexive	   about	   how	   the	   boundaries	   are	  
drawn,	  maintained,	  and	  policed;	  why	  they	  are	  constructed	   in	  such	  ways;	  what	  are	  
the	  benefits	  and	  what	  are	  the	  costs;	  and	  what	  are	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  possible	  
violence	   in	   the	  process	  of	   such	   categorization;	   and	  how	   to	  open	  up	  more	  options	  
and	   recognition.	   As	   queer	   theorists	   Foucault	   and	  Moran	   suggest:	   because	   of	   the	  
inevitability	   of	   power	   relations	   in	   the	   process	   of	   constructing	   identities	   and	   of	  
making	  distinctions,	  we	  need	   to	  develop	  and	  practice	   ‘managerial	   techniques’51	  to	  
mobilise	  resistance,	  to	  open	  up	  possibilities,	  and	  to	  ‘play	  these	  games	  of	  power	  with	  
as	  little	  domination	  as	  possible.’52	  
Queer	   legal	   theorist	   Leslie	   Moran	   summarises	   these	   points	   of	   queer	   approach	  
clearly.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   he	   shares	   ‘the	   urgent	   concerns	   raised	   by	   contemporary	  
gender	  sexual	  political	  activists	  and	  scholars	  about	  the	  investments	  and	  alignments	  
that	   have	   been	   made	   between	   progressive	   political	   projects	   and	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	  
agenda.’53	  However,	  he	  also	  has	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  76.	  
51	  Foucault,	  n	  44	  above.	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  310-­‐312.	  
52	  Foucault,	  ibid.	  	  
53	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  311.	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‘concerns	  about	  the	  critiques	  they	  offer,	  in	  particular	  of	  their	  investment	  
in	  the	  simplistic	  violent	  hierarchies	  of	  politics	  as	  either	  progressive	  or	  
reactionary,	  of	  the	  analysis	  offered	  as	  truth	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  stark	  errors	  
of	  the	  past.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  some	  comfort	  in	  absolutes,	  my	  concern	  is	  
the	  way	  they	  tend	  to	  promote	  sweeping	  generalisations,	  crude	  
totalisations,	  new	  hierarchies,	  new	  political	  elites.’54	  
His	   suggestion	   is	   neither	   an	   abandonment	   of	   progressive	   recognition	   politics,	   nor	  
does	   he	   think	   progressive	   politics	   can	   be	   totally	   free	   from	   ‘the	   tendency	   to	  
violence.’55	  His	   recommendations	   for	   critical	   sexual	   and	   gender	   researches	   in	   law	  
are	  to	  ‘be	  attentive	  to	  the	  peculiarities,	  to	  small	  difference,’	  and	  to	  be	  sensitive	  to	  
‘the	  contradictions,	  the	  paradoxes,	  the	  inconsistencies.’56	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  argues	  
the	   significance	   of	   ‘the	   virtue	   of	   openness’	   and	   the	   development	   of	   ‘managerial	  
techniques’	  and	  the	  need	  to	  refuse	  crude	  totalisations	  and	  to	  face	  the	  challenges	  of	  
‘contingency,	   incoherence,	   contradiction,	   multiplicity	   and	   permeability.’57	  Moran	  
further	  argues	  that	  an	  ‘either/or’	  approach	  and	  dichotomy	  frequently	  employed	  in	  
progressive	   and	   emancipatory	   politics	   and	   law	   is	   not	   always	   able	   to	   capture	   the	  
complexities,	   ambivalence,	   and	   contradictions	   of	   social	   institutions	   and	   human	  
relations.	  For	  example,	  the	  home,	  the	  family,	  marriage	  or	  domestic	  partnerships	  are	  
institutions	   ‘of	   both	   safety	   and	   danger,	   security	   and	   insecurity,	   and	   stability	   and	  
instability.’58	  	   A	   crude	   totalisation	   or	   overgeneralisation	   of	   these	   institutions	   as	  
either	  sites	  of	  security	  or	  sites	  of	  violence	  in	  family	  law	  and	  in	  family	  policies	  might	  
run	   the	   risk	  of	  not	   seeing	   some	  other	   important	   realities	  and	  dimensions	   in	   these	  
institutions.59	  
I	  find	  the	  elaboration	  and	  insights	  of	  Moran	  and	  Butler	  very	  persuasive	  and	  useful.	  
Moran’s	   insights	   about	   the	   need	   to	   be	   attentive	   to	   peculiarities	   and	   small	  
differences	   and	   to	   be	   sensitive	   to	   contradictions,	   conflicts,	   tensions,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Ibid.,	  311-­‐312.	  
55	  Ibid.,	  311.	  
56	  Ibid.,	  312.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  311.	  
58	  Leslie	  Moran,	  ‘What's	  Home	  Got	  to	  Do	  with	  It?	  Kinship,	  Space,	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Family,	  Spouse	  and	  
Civil	  Partnership	  in	  the	  UK’,	  Yale	  JL	  &	  Feminism	  17,	  no.	  1	  (2005),	  294.	  
59	  Ibid.,	  267-­‐295.	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inconsistencies	  are	  very	  inspiring	  for	  research	  into	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  
His	  arguments	   for	   the	  need	   to	  avoid	  crude	  generalisations	   in	   legal	   research	  about	  
sexuality	   and	  gender,	   to	  develop	  managerial	   techniques	   to	   resist	   domination,	   and	  
for	  stressing	   ‘the	  ongoing	   importance	  of	  critical	   thinking’	  are	  crucial.	  Furthermore,	  
his	  reminding	  us	  of	  the	  possible	  danger	  of	  adopting	  an	  either/or	  model	  in	  family	  law	  
research	   is	  very	   inspiring.	   	   I	  also	  agree	  with	  Butler’s	  suggestion	  and	  elaboration	  of	  
the	   need	   for	   a	   double-­‐path	   politics	   in	   sexual	   justice	   projects.	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   their	  
insights	   in	   my	   arguments	   for	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
perspectives	  on	  sexual	  justice	  and	  the	  family.	  
Overall	  I	  agree	  with	  Moran’s	  and	  Butler’s	  insights	  that	  queer	  or	  critical	  sexual	  theory	  
approaches	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  suspend	  or	  paralyse	   identity	  categories	  and	   recognition	  
politics.	   Nor	   do	   queer	   approaches	   deny	   their	   needs,	   usefulness,	   and	  
meaningfulness.	  The	  crucial	  point	   is	   rather	   to	  highlight	   the	   importance	  of	  ongoing	  
critical	  reflection	  on	  normative	  and	  progressive	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  
justice.	  	  Just	  as	  Butler	  maintains:	  ‘[t]he	  political	  deconstruction	  of	  ‘’queer’’	  ought	  not	  
to	   paralyse	   the	   use	   of	   such	   terms,	   but,	   ideally,	   to	   extend	   its	   range,	   to	   make	   us	  
consider	  at	  what	  expense	  and	  for	  what	  purposes	  the	  terms	  are	  used,	  and	  through	  
what	  relations	  of	  power	  such	  categories	  have	  been	  wrought.’60	  As	  Butler	  highlights,	  
the	   queer/critical	   thinking	   approach	   is	   an	   important	   tool	   to	   resist	   and	   transform	  
oppressive	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  normativity.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  would	  draw	  on	  insights	  
from	  the	  queer	  approach	  to	  thinking	  about	  issues	  of	  sexuality,	  gender,	  masculinity,	  
and	   justice.	   	   For	   example,	   in	   areas	   of	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   of	   gender	  
justice	   and	   gender	   violence,	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  we	  might	  want	  to	  ask	  whether,	  by	  only	  focusing	  on	  addressing	  
gender	  violence	  against	  women,	  particular	  kinds	  of	  gender	  normativity	  and	  gender	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  Butler,	  n	  47	  above,	  174.	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performativity 61 	  are	   produced,	   reproduced,	   and	   prescribed	   in	   the	   CEDAW	  
Committee’s	   jurisprudence	  of	  gender	  violence.62	  	  And	  what	  are	  the	   implications	  of	  
those	   particular	   norms	   in	   law,	   politics,	   and	   everyday	   social	   life	   of	   gender	   and	  
sexuality?	  	  
By	   employing	   and	   incorporating	   queer	   thinking	   approaches	   in	   this	   thesis,	   I	   will	  
interrogate	   how	   certain	   forms	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   might	   be	   produced,	  
reproduced,	  and	  reinforced	  by	  certain	  schools	  of	  thought	  and	  their	  legal	  and	  public	  
policies.	  I	  will	  also	  query	  how	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  normativity	  serves	  to	  restrict	  and	  
regulate	   our	   daily	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   performances	   and	   how	   gendered	   legal	  
subjects	  are	  constructed	  in	  heteronormative	  law	  and	  culture.	  I	  will	  further	  ask	  how	  
to	   open	   up	  more	   possibilities,	   how	   to	   be	  more	   sensitive	   to	   the	  marginalised	   and	  
silenced	   voices,	   and	   how	   to	   be	  more	   vigilant	   to	   the	   possible	   violence	   in	  modern	  
progressive	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	   which	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  
promote	   sexual	   justice,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   might	   also	   ‘promote	   sweeping	  
generalisations,	   crude	   totalisations,	   new	   hierarchies,	   new	   political	   elites.’63	  	   For	  
example,	   I	   will	   critically	   illustrate	   and	   examine	   how	   the	   standard	   paradigms	   of	  
heterosexual	   female	   victims	   are	   produced,	   reproduced,	   and	   perpetuated	   in	   the	  
jurisprudence	  of	  family	  violence	  and	  gender	  violence	  and	  how	  this	  kind	  of	  paradigm	  
might	   perpetuate	   some	   oppressive	   heteronormative	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms,	  
myths,	  and	  stereotypes.	  	  
1.3.2   Moral/ethical/political	  philosophy	  approach	  
The	   second	  major	   approach	   the	   thesis	  will	   adopt	   is	   the	   approach	  of	   inquiries	   and	  
analyses	   within	   moral	   and	   political	   philosophy	   of	   the	   normative	   foundation	   and	  
requirements	   of	   law	   and	   public	   policies	   in	   areas	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Legal	  
scholar	  Leslie	  Moran	  labels	  this	  approach	  a	  legal	  philosophical	  approach	  on	  law	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Queer	  feminist	  Judith	  Butler	  uses	  the	  concept	  ‘gender	  performativity’	  to	  ‘describe	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
gender	   is	   produced	   as	   an	   effect	   of	   a	   regulatory	   regime	   that	   requires	   the	   ritualised	   repetition	   of	  
particular	  forms	  of	  behaviour.’	  See	  Spargo,	  n	  41	  above,	  75;	  Butler,	  n	  5	  above,	  xv.	  
62	  See	   Christine	   Chinkin,	   ‘Violence	   Against	   Women’,	   in	   Marsha	   A.	   Freeman,	   Beate	   Rudolf,	   and	  
Christine	  Chinkin,	  eds.,	  The	  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  Forms	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  
Women:	  A	  Commentary	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  443-­‐474.	  
63	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  311-­‐312.	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sexuality.	  64	  This	  approach	   invites	   scholars	   to	   think	  about	  and	  debate	  ethically	  and	  
normatively	   about	   the	  moral	   foundations,	   normative	   values,	   ethical	   grounds,	   and	  
state’s	   roles	   in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	   law,	  public	  policies,	  and	  projects.	   I	  argue	  that	  
this	   kind	   of	   normative	   inquiry	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   is	  
crucial	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explore	  the	  moral	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  justice	  projects,	  law	  
and	   policies	   against	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   to	   identify	   the	   moral	  
wrongfulness	   and	   injustices	   of	   certain	   oppressive	   heteronormative	   regulations,	  
ideologies,	  and	  practices.	  
I	   argue	   that	   queer	   and	   moral	   philosophy	   approaches	   have	   different	   focuses	   and	  
strengths	  and	  can	  complement	  each	  other	   in	  research	   into	  and	  projects	   for	  sexual	  
justice.	  	  There	  are	  benefits	  of	  using	  them	  together	  in	  analysing	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  
of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  Adopting	  queer	  and	  critical	  thinking	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  
cannot	  also	  ask	  and	  investigate	  the	  normative	  and	  moral	  dimensions	  in	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	  of	   sexuality	  and	  gender.	   	  An	  exploration	  of	   the	  moral	   values,	   implications,	  
and	   requirements	  of	   sexual	   justice	  politics	   and	  projects	  does	  not	  prevent	  us	   from	  
also	   wanting	   to	   question	   and	   reflect	   critically	   on	   how	   the	   distinctions,	  
generalisations,	  and	  hierarchies	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  are	  made	  in	  normative	  legal	  
and	   political	   systems	   and	   judgements.	   I	   further	   hold	   that	   both	   approaches	   are	  
indispensable	   and	   both	   could	   contribute	   to	   our	   understanding	   in	   analysing	   law,	  
sexuality,	  gender,	  and	  justice.	  	  
Judith	   Butler	   already	   implies	   that	   both	   the	   normative	   claims	   such	   as	   sexual	  
autonomy	  and	  sexual	  rights	  and	  the	  critical	  thinking	  and	  reflection	  of	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	  normativity	  are	  important	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.65	  
However,	   Butler	   herself,	   like	   many	   queer	   theorists,	   generally	   focuses	   more	   on	  
adopting	   the	   critical/queer	   approaches	   in	   her	   research	   despite	   her	  
acknowledgement	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  normative	  ideas	  in	  sexual	  politics.	  She	  does	  
not	  clearly	  elaborate	  why	  certain	  sexual	  oppression	  and	  sexual	  injustices	  are	  morally	  
wrong	  or	  what	  are	  the	  normative	  grounds	  and	  requirements	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Moran,	  n	  29	  above,	  297-­‐99.	  	  
65	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  48-­‐78.	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law.66	  I	   argue,	   however,	   that	   queer	   projects	   such	   as	   Butler’s	   do	   have	   normative	  
concerns	   and	   implications	   and	   in	   addition	   to	   those	   of	   a	   queer	   approach;	  we	   also	  
need	   an	   analysis	   grounded	   in	   moral	   philosophy	   to	   think	   about	   the	   normative	  
implications	  in	  queer	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics,	  sexual	  justice,	  and	  law.	  
In	   this	   thesis	   I	   am	   in	   accordance	   with	   Butler’s	   view	   that	   to	   think	   critically	   is	   a	  
necessary	   requirement	   for	   a	   responsible	   ethics	   and	   social	   justice	   project.	   67	  	  
Normative	  sexual	  justice	  projects	  need	  critical	  reflections	  and	  I	  want	  to	  expand	  her	  
insight	   by	   claiming	   that	   ethical/moral	   concerns	   and	   reflections	   are	   also	   important	  
dimensions	  in	  critical	  thinking	  projects.	  	  
I	   suggest	   that	  both	  approaches	  are	   crucial	   in	  projects	   regarding	   sexual	   justice	  and	  
sexual	   politics.	   There	   are	   often	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   normative	   dimensions,	   values,	  
aspirations,	   and	   concerns	   in	   some	   queer	   projects.	   For	   example,	   queer	   theorists	  
suggest	  or	   imply	   the	  values	  of	   freedom,68	  life,69	  non-­‐violence,70	  sexual	  autonomy,71	  
or	   agency72	  etc.	   in	   their	   queer	   projects.	   Queer	   projects	   such	   as	   the	   projects	  
proposed	   by	   Michael	   Warner	   or	   Judith	   Butler	   do	   have	   moral	   and	   normative	  
concerns,	  requirements,	  and	  implications.	  We	  need	  moral	  philosophical	  analysis	  and	  
inquiry	   about	   the	   normative	   implications	   and	   dimensions	   of	   queer	   projects.	   For	  
instance	  we	  need	  to	  think	  about	  why	  we	  need	  to	  open	  up	  possibilities,	  why	  we	  need	  
to	  resist	  domination,	  and	  why	  values	  such	  as	  freedom,	  autonomy,	  or	  agency	  ought	  
to	   be	   promoted	   or	   secured.	   There	   are	   moral	   and	   normative	   implications	   behind	  
queer	  projects	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  thought	  about	  critically.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	   there	  are	  also	  critical	   reasons	  why	  normative	   legal	   theories	  of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  should	  also	  always	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  For	   example,	   see	   Nicholas	   Bamforth,	   ’Introduction’,	   in	   Sex	   Rights:	   The	   Oxford	   Amnesty	   Lectures	  
2002	  (Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  20-­‐21.	  
67	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  78.	  
68	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  311;	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  67.	  
69	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  56.	  
70	  Ibid.,	  73.	  
71	  Warner,	  n	  20	  above,	  1-­‐17.	  
72	  Butler,	  n	  33	  above,	  3-­‐4.	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possible	  exclusion,	  distinction,	  hierarchies,	  and	  categories	  they	  made	  or	  relied	  on	  in	  
their	  normative	  systems	  and	  judgements.	  Critical	  thinking	  reminds	  us	  to	  be	  always	  
vigilant	  of	  the	  possible	  violence	  behind	  normative	  judgements	  and	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	   ‘the	   virtue	  of	   openness’	   in	   thinking	   about	   normatively	   the	   law	  and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Our	   moral/normative	   system	   ought	   not	   to	   be	  
treated	  as	  a	  complete,	  closed,	  static,	  total,	  and	  absolute	  system.	  Instead	  we	  need	  to	  
be	  aware	  of	  the	  inevitable	  incompleteness	  of	  our	  moral	  judgements	  and	  normative	  
projects.	   We	   need	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   be	   willing	   to	   face	   the	   inevitable	   certain	  
unknowingness	  of	  humanness	  and	  some	  uncertainties	  in	  social	  life.73	  	  Therefore	  we	  
also	  need	  to	  highlight	  ‘the	  ongoing	  importance	  of	  critical	  thinking’74	  and	  ‘the	  virtue	  
of	  openness’	  in	  our	  normative	  projects	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  
Claiming	  we	  should	  employ	  both	  critical	  thinking	  and	  moral	  thinking	  in	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  should	  expect	  a	  utopian	  law	  
and	  politics	  of	   sexuality	  and	  gender	  with	  no	   tensions	  or	  contestation	   in	   it.	   Instead	  
tensions	  and	  contestation	  are	  always	   inevitable	   in	   life	  and	   theory	  of	   sexuality	  and	  
gender.	   Instead	   of	   shying	   away	   from	   tensions	   and	   challenges,	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  should	  agree	  with	  queer	  theorists	  such	  as	  
Judith	  Butler	  and	  Leslie	  Moran	  and	  hold	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  tensions	  requires	  and	  
invites	   us	   to	   constantly	   reflect	   and	   re-­‐examine	   our	   normative	   presumptions,	  
ideologies,	  	  theories,	  and	  judgements.75	  And	  as	  scholar	  Ken	  Plummer	  maintains	  that	  
‘[w]e	   have	   to	   live	   with	   the	   tensions,	   and	   awareness	   of	   them	   is	   important	  
background	  for	  the	  self-­‐reflexive	  social	  researches.’76	  	  
1.3.3   The	  significance	  of	  critical	  humanist	  empirical	  researches	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   critical/queer	   approach	   and	   the	   moral/political	   philosophy	  
approach,	   I	   will	   also	   emphasise	   the	   importance	   of	   drawing	   on	   and	   considering	  
relevant	   insights,	   findings,	   and	   data	   from	   empirical	   researches	   about	   men,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  72-­‐73.	  
74	  Moran,	  n	  17	  above,	  312.	  
75	  Butler,	  n	  20	  above,	  78;	  Moran,	  ibid.,	  310-­‐312.	  	  
76	  Plummer,	  n	  14	  above,	  195.	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masculinities,	  sexuality,	  and	  gender	  in	  sexual	  justice	  research.	  	  Although	  this	  thesis	  
is	  not	   itself	  a	  piece	  of	  direct	  empirical	   research,	   several	   insights	  and	   findings	   from	  
important	   relevant	   pieces	   of	   empirical	   research	   about	   men,	   masculinities,	   and	  
gender	  will	  be	  discussed	  and	  be	  referred	  to.	  And	  one	  of	  the	  most	  inspiring	  styles	  of	  
empirical	   research	   in	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   is	   the	   critical	   humanist	   approach	   of	  
qualitative	  studies.	  
According	   to	   Ken	   Plummer,	   critical	   humanism	   in	   empirical	   qualitative	   studies	  
suggests	  ‘orientations	  to	  inquiry	  that	  focus	  on	  human	  experience―that	  is,	  with	  the	  
structure	   of	   experience	   and	   its	   daily	   lived	   nature―and	   that	   acknowledge	   the	  
political	   and	   social	   role	   of	   all	   inquiry.’	  77 	  	   Typical	   pieces	   of	   critical	   humanist	  
qualitative	   research	   ‘focus	  on	  human	  subjectivity,	   experience,	  and	  creativity.	   They	  
start	  with	  people	  living	  their	  daily	  lives.’	  78	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  approach	  is	  not	  ‘value-­‐
free’	  but	  is	  always	  preoccupied	  with	  concerns	  about	  some	  human	  values.	  Humanist	  
values	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  such	  critical	  humanist	  inquiries:	  ‘In	  the	  most	  general	  terms,	  
critical	   humanism	   champions	   those	   values	   that	   give	   dignity	   to	   the	   person,	   reduce	  
human	   sufferings,	   and	   enhance	   human	  well-­‐being.’	  79	  	   In	   other	   words,	   qualitative	  
research	   from	   a	   critical	   humanist	   consists	   of	   those	   pieces	   of	   empirical	   research	  
which	  focus	  on	  human	  experience,	  the	  human	  situation,	  and	  human	  needs,	  with	  an	  
underlying	   concern	   for	   human	   dignity,	   freedom,	   and	   social	   justice.	   	   For	   example,	  
balanced	   critical	   humanist	   qualitative	   research	   into	   family	   violence	   and	   gender	  
stereotypes	  should	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  the	  complex	  realities	  and	  experiences	  
of	  violence	  in	  the	  family.	  And	  this	  information	  and	  these	  findings	  should	  help	  us	  to	  
think	  about	  issues	  of	  family	  violence	  and	  social	  justice.	  	  
To	  see	  and	  understand	  various	  voices	  and	  realities	  better,	  it	  is	  crucial	  for	  us	  to	  keep	  
legal	   research	   informed	   by	   up	   to	   date	   and	   balanced	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	  
empirical	   research.	   For	   example,	   balanced	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   research	  
about	  family	  violence	  and	  gender	  stereotypes	  would	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Ibid.,	  197-­‐198.	  
78	  Ibid.,	  198.	  
79	  Ibid.,	  198.	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complex	   realities	   and	   experiences	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   family.	   And	   this	   empirical	  
information	   and	   findings	   would	   help	   us	   better	   analyse	   and	   understand	   issues	   of	  
family	  violence	  and	  social	  justice.	  	  
I	   argue	   therefore	   that	   there	   are	   benefits	   and	   significance	   for	   sexual	   justice	   and	  
sexual	   politics	   projects	   in	   taking	   seriously	   both	   a	   critical/queer	   approach	   and	   a	  
moral/political	   philosophy	   approach	   while	   also	   basing	   the	   critical	   and	   normative	  
analysis	  on	  up	  to	  date	  and	  balanced	  data	  and	  findings	  from	  empirical	  studies,	  such	  
as	  critical	  humanist	  qualitative	  researches	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  I	  further	  suggest	  
that	   this	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   interdisciplinary	   approach	   that	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  adopt	  in	  thinking	  about	  issues	  of	  sexuality,	  gender,	  justice,	  and	  
law.	   Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   employ	   both	   queer/critical	  
approach	  and	  moral	  philosophy	  approach	  in	  analysing	  and	  thinking	  about	  issues	  of	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   while	   also	   emphasising	   the	   importance	   of	   considering	  
findings	  and	  information	  from	  empirical	  research.	  	  
By	   applying	   the	  moral/ethical	   approach	   to	  men	   and	  masculinities	   research,	   queer	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  would	  like	  to	  explore	  the	  moral	  values,	  the	  
moral	   grounds,	   and	   the	   normative	   requirements	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   their	  
implications	   for	   men	   and	   masculinities	   in	   law,	   politics,	   and	   social	   life.	   By	   also	  
employing	   the	   queer	   approach,	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
would	   like	  to	   investigate	  how	  the	   ideas,	  norms,	  performativity,	  and	  stereotypes	  of	  
masculinities	   are	   produced,	   reproduced,	   and	   reiterated	   in	   normative	  
heterosexuality	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  them	  in	  sexual	  and	  gender	  life	  and	  politics.	  	  
And	   both	   the	   normative	   analysis	   and	   critical	   reflection	   will	   benefit	   from	   being	  
informed	  by	  the	  up	  to	  date	  and	  balanced	  empirical	  research	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  
1.4   The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis:	  
In	   Chapter	   2	   I	  will	   clarify	   and	  explain	   some	  of	   the	   key	   concepts	   and	   terms	   in	   this	  
thesis,	   such	   as	   sexual	   justice,	   sexual	   politics,	   discrimination,	   oppression,	   and	  
subordination	  feminism.	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In	  Chapter	  3	  I	  explore	  the	  development	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘normative	  
heterosexuality’	  (or	  heteronormativity)	  in	  emancipatory	  and	  critical	  sexual	  studies.	  I	  
will	   critically	   review	   how	   the	   concepts	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   gender	  
oppression,	   and	   sexual	   justice	   are	   understood	   and	   defined	   in	   early	   lesbian	   and	  
radical	  feminist	  theories,	  gay	  liberationist	  theories	  and	  contemporary	  subordination	  
feminisms,	   including	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   I	   will	  
critically	  examine	  several	  visible	  subordination	  feminist	  and	  subordination-­‐feminist	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   projects	   and	   ways	   of	   thinking	   on	   sexual	   justice,	   sexual	  
politics,	   and	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   especially	   in	   family	   related	   areas.	   I	   will	  
argue	   that	   despite	   their	   great	   contribution	   to	   challenging	   women’s	   oppression,	  
there	   are	   limitations	   in	   subordination	   feminist	   thinking,	   ideologies	   and	   legal	   and	  
political	  policies.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  rework	  and	  unsettle	  some	  historical	  ideas	  
of	   gender	   oppression,	   but	   they	   might	   also	   produce,	   reproduce,	   and	   perpetuate	  
some	   old	   and	   new	   gender	   normativity,	   exclusion	   and	   injustices	   in	   the	   law	   and	  
politics	  of	  sexuality	  on	  the	  other.	   	   I	  will	  hold	  that	  we	  also	  need	  perspectives	  other	  
than	  subordination	  feminism	  in	  thinking	  about	  gender,	  justice,	  and	  law.	  
In	  Chapter	  4	   I	   first	  examine	   the	   theory	  of	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  
and	   its	   implications	   for	   research	   on	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	   oppression.	   I	   will	  
argue	   that	   they	   provide	   very	   valuable	   but	   often	   neglected	   insights	   on	   issues	   of	  
sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	   oppression.	   However,	   I	   will	   also	   point	   out	   some	   of	   the	  
insufficiencies	  and	  limitations	  of	  this	  school	  of	  thought.	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   important	   points	   and	   insights	   from	   queer	   theories	   on	   normative	  
heterosexuality,	   sexual	   politics,	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	   oppression	   will	   also	   be	  
critically	   reviewed.	   I	   pay	   particular	   attention	   to	   Janet	   Halley’s	   queer	   legal	   theory,	  
because	   it	   is	   relevant	   to	   those	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
approaches	   that	   I	   would	   like	   to	   suggest	   and	   develop	   in	   this	   thesis.	   However,	  
important	   differences	   between	  my	   proposed	   project	   and	   her	   project	   will	   also	   be	  
elaborated	  and	  discussed.	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In	  Chapter	  5	  I	  will	  critically	  examine	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  several	  
liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  I	  will	  
first	  discuss	  Dworkin’s	  liberal	  theory	  of	  justice	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  sexual	  politics	  
against	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  because	  he	  proposes	  one	  of	  the	  most	  persuasive	  
and	  influential	  theories	  of	  liberal	  justice	  in	  normative	  legal	  and	  political	  theory.	  It	  is	  
worth	  critically	  evaluating	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  the	  application	  and	   implications	  of	  
his	  liberal	  justice	  theory	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  issues.	  I	  will	  hold	  that	  although	  his	  
liberal	  theory	  of	  justice	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  valuable	  normative	  justification	  for	  sexual	  
justice	   law	  and	  politics,	  his	   theory	  nevertheless	   leaves	  unchallenged	  many	  aspects	  
of	  structural	  heteronormative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  ideologies,	  norms,	  practices,	  and	  
prejudices.	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   also	   critically	   review	   liberal	   theories	   of	   gay	   rights	   on	   sexual	  
justice.	   I	  will	   focus	   on	   the	   liberal	   theories	   of	   gay	   rights	   of	  Nicolas	   Bamforth80	  and	  
Carlos	   A.	   Ball,	   because	   to	   me	   they	   present	   some	   of	   the	   most	   sophisticated	   and	  
persuasive	  arguments	   from	   those	  perspectives	  on	   issues	  of	   law	  and	   sexual	   justice	  
and	  are	  worth	  further	  reflection.	  Their	   insights,	  arguments,	  and	  elaboration	  of	  the	  
value	  of	   sexual	  autonomy	   in	   law	  and	  politics	  of	   sexuality	  and	  gender	  are	   inspiring	  
and	   valuable.	   I	   hold	   that	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   could	  
benefit	   from	   drawing	   on	   some	   of	   the	   important	   insights	   in	   their	   sexual	  
autonomy/sexual	  justice	  theories.	  	  	  
However,	   perspectives	   from	  queer	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	  might	  
not	  find	  gay	  rights	  theories	  totally	  unproblematic.	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  two	  points.	  The	  first	  
is	  the	  tendency	  to	  imply	  certain	  sexual	  hierarchy	  and	  sexual	  stratification	  in	  some	  of	  
their	   systems	   of	   sexual	   morality.	   Certain	   sexual	   practices	   or	   relations	   might	   be,	  
implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	  prioritised	  in	  their	  sexual	   justice	  projects	  while	  others	  might	  
be	  marginalised.	  The	  second	  point	   is	  that	  some	  of	  their	  theories	  and	  ideologies	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  	  One	  of	  the	  important	  works	  from	  Nicolas	  Bamforth:	  Patriarchal	  Religion,	  Sexuality,	  And	  Gender:	  A	  
Critique	  of	  New	  Natural	  Law	  is	  co-­‐authored	  with	  another	  leading	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  scholar	  David	  A.	  J.	  
Richards.	  In	  this	  book,	  they	  present	  one	  of	  the	  most	  thorough,	  detailed	  and	  insightful	  critiques	  of	  the	  
theory	   of	   new	   natural	   law:	   an	   influential	   contemporary	   theory	   holding	   conservative	   sexist	   and	  
homophobic	  ideologies	  in	  theology,	  ethics	  and	  law.	  See	  Bamforth	  and	  Richards,	  n	  12	  above.	  	  	  
37	  
	  
gender	   justice	  and	  gender	  oppression	  are	  significantly	   influenced	  by	  subordination	  
feminist	  ideologies	  and	  approaches.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  always	  unproblematic	  
to	  take	  subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  as	  a	  general	  guide	  when	  thinking	  about	  
gender,	  justice,	  and	  law.	  
In	  Chapter	  6,	  by	  drawing	  on	   insights	  and	  notions	  from	  queer	  theory,	   liberal	  sexual	  
justice	  theories,	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies,	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  favour	  
of	  considering	  the	  perspectives	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  in	  
research	  into	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  illuminate	  the	  main	  themes	  and	  
arguments	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   and	   the	   possible	  
contribution	   of	   these	   kinds	   of	   approaches	   in	   the	   law	   and	  politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	  
gender.	   I	   conclude	   this	   thesis	   by	   arguing	   for	   the	   significance	   and	   need	   of	   also	  
considering	  queer	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  perspectives	  in	  law,	  
sexuality,	  gender,	  and	  justice.	  
The	  perspectives	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  
existence	   of	   various	   great	   contributions	   from	   feminist	   and	   liberal	   theories	   in	  
challenging	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  in	  pursuing	  sexual	  justice.	  Nor	  do	  I	  claim	  
that	   the	  perspectives	  of	   queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   are	   complete	   and	  
the	  only	  kind	  of	  legitimate	  perspectives	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  Neither	  will	  these	  
approaches	   be	   free	   of	   internal	   tensions	   themselves.	   The	  main	   purpose	   is	   only	   to	  
propose	   and	   to	   offer	   a	   kind	   of	   crucial	   but	   currently	   often	   overlooked	   and	  
marginalised	   approach	   in	   legal	   and	   political	   studies	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   I	  
suggest	   that	   by	   adopting	   these	   ways	   of	   thinking	   we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   better	  
appreciate	  and	  address	   some	  marginalized	  or	   ignored	  angles	  when	   thinking	  about	  
law,	   sexuality,	   and	   gender	   in	   jurisprudence	   and	   political	   theory.	   Certain	   sexual	  
injustices	  and	  gender	  oppression	  in	  the	  regimes	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  could	  
be	  better	  exposed,	  unravelled,	  addressed,	  and	  reworked	  by	  wearing	  the	  spectacles	  
of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	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Chapter	  2   Central	  Concepts	  and	  Key	  Terminologies:	  Sexual	  Justice,	  
Sexual	  Politics,	  Gender	  Oppression	  and	  Subordination	  
Feminism	  	  	  	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   explain	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  key	   concepts	  of	   ‘sexual	   justice’	   and	  
‘sexual	   politics’	   are	   used	   in	   this	   thesis.	   I	   suggest	   that	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	  
justice	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  umbrella	  concepts	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  keep	  both	  dimensions	  of	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   in	   view	   in	   our	   query	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   	   I	   then	  
clarify	  my	  usage	  of	  some	  key	  terms	  such	  as	   ‘sex’,	   ‘sexuality’	  and	   ‘gender’,	  and	  the	  
terms	  ‘oppression’	  and	  ‘discrimination’	  will	  also	  be	  elaborated.	  Finally,	  I	  examine	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘subordination	  feminism’.	  	  
2.1   Sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice	  
The	   term	   ‘sexual	   politics’	   first	   became	   popular	   following	   feminist	   scholar	   Kate	  
Millet’s	  famous	  book	  ‘Sexual	  Politics’.	  She	  uses	  the	  term	  sexual	  politics	  to	  highlight	  
and	   to	   criticise	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   male	   domination	   over	   women	   that	   she	   has	  
observed	  and	  objected	  to	  within	  gender	  relationships.1	  Millet	  argues	  that	  politics	  is	  
about	  governance	  and	  unequal	  power	  relations	  between	  social	  groups.	  She	  claims	  
that	   her	   theory	   of	   sexual	   politics	   can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘notes	   towards	   a	   theory	   of	  
patriarchy.’2	  In	   her	   opinion,	   a	   gender	   relationship	   is	   relationship	   of	   subordination	  
and	   domination,	   a	   relationship	   whereby	   ‘male	   rules	   females’.3	  Millet’s	   ground-­‐
breaking	  work	   inspired	  many	   later	   feminist	   works	   on	   sexual	   politics	   of	   patriarchy	  
and	   male	   domination,	   including	   very	   influential	   radical	   feminist	   scholarship.	  
However,	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘sexual	  politics’	  is	  later	  used	  by	  scholars	  to	  refer	  also	  to	  politics	  
in	   erotic	   and	   intimate	   parts	   of	   life.4	  Some	   theorists	   prefer	   to	   reserve	   the	   term	  
‘sexual	   politics’	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   struggle	   against	   discrimination	   and	   constraints	   in	  
erotic	   and	   intimate	   lives	   rather	   than	   dominance	   and	   resistance	   in	   gender	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Kate	  Millet,	  Sexual	  Politics	  (Chicago:	  Univ.	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2000),	  23-­‐58.	  
2	  Ibid.	  
3	  Ibid.,	  25.	  
4	  For	  example,	  Steven	  Seidman,	  Embattled	  Eros:	  Sexual	  Politics	  and	  Ethics	  in	  Contemporary	  America	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  1992);	  John	  d'Emilio,	  Sexual	  Politics,	  Sexual	  Communities	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  2012).	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relationships	   as	  Millet	   originally	  proposed.	   For	   example,	   John	  d'Emilio	  uses	   sexual	  
politics	   to	   denote	   politics	   in	   erotic	   aspects	   of	   life;	   this	   is	   different	   from	   Millet’s	  
original	   usage	   of	   the	   phrase.5	  In	   this	   section	   I	   take	   a	   third	   route	   by	   using	   sexual	  
politics	  as	  an	  umbrella	  concept	  to	  include	  both	  dimensions	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  
politics	  and	  I	  illustrate	  the	  benefits	  of	  such	  a	  definition.	  
Similarly	   ‘sexual	   justice’	   is	  used	  by	  scholars	  to	  refer	  to	  either	   justice	  between	  men	  
and	  women6	  or	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  sexuality.7	  I	  take	  a	  third	  route	  by	  treating	  sexual	  
justice	   as	   an	   umbrella	   concept	   encompassing	   both	   gender	   justice	   and	   sexuality	  
justice.	  	  
Due	   to	   the	  complex	  meanings	  of	   the	   terms	   ‘sex’	  and	   ‘sexual’,	   	   ‘sexual	   justice’	  and	  
‘sexual	  politics’	  also	  have	  multiple	  meanings	  as	  shown	  above;	  there	  are	  two	  major	  
differences	   in	   the	   terms	   ‘sex’	   and	   ‘sexual’.	   One	   refers	   to	   aspects	   of	   cultural	   and	  
biological	   divisions	   between	   men	   and	   women;	   the	   other	   to	   erotic	   and	   intimate	  
aspects	   of	   life.	   As	   Stevi	   Jackson	   indicates:	   ‘[t]he	  words	   “sex”	   and	   “sexual”	   can	   be	  
used	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   erotic	   (e.g.,	   “having	   sex,”	   “sexual	   fantasies”)	   or	   to	   denote	  
differences	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (as	  in	  “the	  two	  sexes”	  or	  “the	  sexual	  division	  
of	  labour”).’8	  ‘Sexual	  justice’	  and	  ‘sexual	  politics’	  therefore	  denote	  two	  different	  but	  
related	   aspects,	   that	   is,	   politics	   and	   justice	   in	   gender	   relations	   and	   politics	   and	  
justice	   in	   eroticism	   and	   intimacy.	   The	   former	   can	   be	   labelled	   as	   the	   domain	   of	  
gender	  justice/gender	  politics,	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  domain	  of	  sexuality	  justice/sexuality	  
politics.	   Together,	   both	   can	   be	   subsumed	   under	   the	   broader	   concepts:	   ‘sexual	  
politics’	  and	  ‘sexual	  justice’.	  	  ‘Sexual	  politics’	  has	  already	  been	  used	  as	  an	  umbrella	  
concept	  by	  some	  scholars	  to	  encompass	  both	  the	  gender	  and	  the	  sexuality	  aspect	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  D'Emilio,	  ibid.	  
6	  Barbara	  Arneil	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  Sexual	  Justice/Cultural	  Justice:	  Critical	  Perspectives	  in	  Political	  Theory	  and	  
Practice	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007).	  
7Morris	   B.	   Kaplan,	   Sexual	   Justice:	   Democratic	   Citizenship	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Desire	   (London:	  
Routledge,	  1997).	  
8	  Stevi	   Jackson,	   ‘Heterosexuality’,	  Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Sociology.	  George	  Ritzer	  ed.,	  Blackwell	  
Publishing,	   2007.	   Blackwell	   Reference	   Online.	   (Accessed	   18	   April,	   2014)	  
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chu
nk_g978140512433114_ss1-­‐27	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politics.9	  Similarly,	   sexual	   justice	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   umbrella	   concept	   to	  
include	   both	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   justice.	   However,	   by	  making	   such	   a	   distinction	  
between	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	   I	   do	   not	   suggest	   the	   boundary	   between	   sexuality	  
politics	  and	  gender	  politics	  (or	  the	  boundaries	  between	  sexuality	  justice	  and	  gender	  
justice)	   is	   always	   without	   convergence	   or	   overlap.	   Indeed,	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	  
although	   analytically	   distinguishable,	   in	   reality	   constantly	   overlap,	   crosscut,	  
intersect	  and	  are	  closely	  bound	  up	  with	  each	  other.	  For	  instance,	  in	  issues	  of	  gender	  
justice	  towards	  women	  in	  the	  family	  one	  can	  hardly	  ignore	  the	  impact	  of	  sexuality	  in	  
women’s	  family	  life.	  Similarly,	  with	  sexuality	  justice,	  one	  must	  address	  the	  influence	  
of	  gender	  norms	  and	  ideologies	  in	  shaping	  sexuality	  normativity.	  	  
Precisely	  because	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	   justice	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  umbrella	  
concepts	   to	   include	  both	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  aspects	  of	  politics	  and	   justice,	   they	  
can	   become	   very	   useful	   tools	   to	   allow	   us	   to	   keep	   both	   the	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
dimensions	  of	   the	   institution	  of	  heterosexuality	  on	  track	   in	  our	   investigation	  while	  
questioning	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   	   Since	   the	   institution	   of	   heterosexuality	  
mainly	  constitutes	  prescribed	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  norms,	   it	   is	  also	  crucial	  to	  keep	  
both	  sides	  in	  view	  in	  our	  aim	  to	  understand	  and	  critically	  review	  the	  oppression	  of	  
normative	   heterosexuality.	   Furthermore,	   constraining	   gender	   orders	   are	   almost	  
inextricably	  interconnected	  with	  the	  constraining	  sexuality	  orders	  in	  the	  institution	  
of	  heterosexuality.	  By	  using	  the	  broader	  concepts	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  justice,	  we	  
will	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  both	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  injustice	  in	  view	  to	  examine,	  monitor	  
and	   further	   challenge	   the	   close	   interplay	   and	   mutually	   supportive	   relationship	  
between	  oppressive	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  norms.	  Therefore,	  I	  will	  use	  sexual	  politics	  
and	  sexual	  justice	  as	  umbrella	  concepts	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Stevi	  Jackson,	  ‘Sexual	  Politics:	  Feminist	  Politics,	  Gay	  Politics	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Heterosexuality’,	  in	  
Terrell	   Carver	   and	   Veronique	   Mottier	   eds.,	   Politics	   of	   Sexuality	   (Oxford:	   Routledge,	   1998),	   68-­‐69;	  
Matthew	  Waites,	   ‘Sexual	  Politics’,	  Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Sociology.	  George	  Ritzer	  ed.,	  Blackwell	  
Publishing,	   2007.	   Blackwell	   Reference	   Online.	   (Accessed	   18	   April,	   2014).	  
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chu
nk_g978140512433125_ss1-­‐96	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For	  reasons	  stated	  above,	  ‘sexual	  politics’	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  the	  
contestation	  of	  injustice	  and	  oppression	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  related	  issues.10	  	  In	  
other	   words,	   sexual	   politics	   includes	   the	   concerns	   of	   both	   gender	   and	   sexuality	  
politics.	   Similarly,	   sexual	   justice	   in	   this	   thesis	   denotes	   both	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
justice.	   Principles	   and	   theories	   of	   justice	   concern	   the	   proper	   arrangements	   and	  
distribution	   of	   resources,	   entitlements,	   interests,	   benefits	   as	  well	   as	   burdens	   and	  
responsibilities	  among	  people	  in	  societies.11	  Principles	  and	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice	  
therefore	   are	   about	   the	   legitimate	   and	   proper	   arrangements	   of	   entitlements,	  
respect,	   protection,	   duties	   and	   restrictions	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality;	  
theories	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice	  are	  inextricably	  interconnected.	  In	  fact,	  
normative	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   projects	   in	   pursuit	   of	   sexual	  
justice.	   	  Critical	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  exposing	  power	  struggles	  
and	  possible	  unjust	  oppression	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  
2.2   Sex,	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
The	   usage	   of	   three	   other	   key	   terms:	   sex,	   sexuality,	   and	   gender	  must	   be	   clarified,	  
since	   different	   scholars	   have	   applied	   different	   definitions	   in	   their	   research.	   I	   will	  
briefly	  define	  how	  I	  am	  using	  these	  terms	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
As	  mentioned	  above	  ‘sex’	  is	  a	  term	  with	  complex	  meanings;	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  use	  three	  
different	  but	  related	  meanings.	  First,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  meanings	  
of	  ‘sex’	  relates	  to	  the	  erotic	  and	  intimate,	  and	  such	  is	  also	  the	  case	  with	  ‘sexuality.’	  
Stevi	  Jackson	  distinguishes	  the	  term	  ‘sex’	  from	  ‘sexuality’	  by	   limiting	  the	  former	  to	  
denote	  carnal	  acts	  while	  treating	  the	  latter	  as	  a	  broader	  term	  for	  one’s	  erotic	  life.	  I	  
find	  this	  distinction	  useful	  and	  apply	  it	  in	  the	  present	  research.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  erotic	  
sex	  and	  sexuality	  are	  distinguished	  as	  follows:	  	  the	  term	  erotic	  ‘sex’	  denotes	  sex	  acts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Matthew	  Waites	  defines	  sexual	  politics	  as	  ‘the	  contestation	  of	  power	  relations	  with	  respect	  to	  sex,	  
gender,	  and	  sexuality.	  See	  Waites,	  ibid.	  
11	  According	   to	   John	   Rawls,	   principles	   of	   social	   justice	   ‘define	   the	   appropriate	   distribution	   of	   the	  
benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  social	  cooperation.’	  See	  John	  Rawls,	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  
University	  Press,	  1971),	  4.	  Nicolas	  Bamforth	  defines	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  as	  ‘a	  theory	  about	  the	  proper	  
distribution	   of	   entitlements	   between	   individuals	   or	   groups	   in	   society.’	   See	   Nicolas	   Bamforth,	  
Sexuality,	  Morals	   and	   Justice:	   A	   Theory	   of	   Lesbian	   and	  Gay	   Rights	   Law	   (London;	  Washington	  D.C.:	  
Cassell,	  1997),	  5.	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and	   sexual	   behaviour,	   while	   ‘sexuality’	   as	   a	   broader	   term	   denotes	   ‘all	   erotically	  
significant	   aspects	   of	   social	   life	   and	   social	   being,	   such	   as	   desires,	   practices,	  
relationships	  and	  identities.’12	  	  	  
The	   second	  meaning	  of	   the	   term	   ‘sex’	   refers	   to	   general	   differences	  between	  men	  
and	  women.13	  Thus,	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  also	  use	  ‘sex’	  to	  refer	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  general	  
distinction	  between	  people	  with	  different	  sexed	  bodies	  (male,	  female	  or	  intersex)14	  
and	   gender.	   For	   example,	   as	   stated	   above,	   ‘sexual	   politics’	   in	   this	   thesis	   not	   only	  
denotes	  politics	  of	  sexuality,	  but	  also	  includes	  the	  aspect	  of	  politics	  between	  people	  
with	  different	  sexed	  bodies	  and	  gender.	  	  
The	   third	  usage	  of	   the	   term	   ‘sex’	   in	   this	   thesis	   refers	  narrowly	   to	  biological	   sexed	  
bodies,	   the	   material	   base	   of	   sex.15	  ‘Sex’	   in	   this	   sense	   denotes	   the	   biological	  
difference	   of	   bodies	   between	  men,	   women	   and	   intersex	   people.	   	   Related	   to	   this	  
usage	  is	  a	  distinction	  of	  sex/gender.	  From	  the	  1970s	  second	  wave	  feminists	  began	  to	  
argue	   for	   a	   distinction	   between	   sex	   and	   gender.16	  Scholars	   who	   do	   so,	   tend	   to	  
contrast	  these	   ideas	  by	  claiming	  that,	  while	   ‘sex’	   is	  a	  given,	  natural,	  pre-­‐social	  and	  
biological	   difference	   between	   men	   and	   women,	   gender	   is	   malleable	   and	   socially	  
constructed.17	  In	  this	  kind	  of	  sex/gender	  dichotomy,	  sex	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  supposedly	  
‘natural’	   biological	   distinctions	   between	   males	   and	   females	   primarily	   found	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  reproductive	  functions	  of	  their	  bodies.18	  ‘Gender’,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 	  Stevi	   Jackson,	   ‘Gender,	   Sexuality	   and	   Heterosexuality:	   The	   Complexity	   (and	   Limits)	   of	  
Heteronormativity’,	  Feminist	  theory	  7,	  no.1	  (2006),	  106.	  
13	  Jackson,	  n	  8	  above.	  	  
14	  Intersex	  people	  are	  people	  who	  born	  with	  ‘non-­‐standard’	  (not	  male	  or	  female)	  sex	  chromosomes,	  
genitalia	  or	  reproductive	  organs.	  See	  Victoria	  Clark,	  Sonja	  J.	  Ellis,	  Elizabeth	  Peel	  and	  Damien	  W.	  Riggs,	  
Lesbian	  Gay	  Bisexual	  Trans	  and	  Queer	  Psychology:	  An	  Introduction	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press,	  2010),	  262-­‐263.	  
15 	  See	   Janet	   Halley,	   Spilt	   Decisions:	   How	   and	   Why	   to	   Take	   a	   Break	   from	   Feminism?	  
(Princeton:Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  24.	  	  	  
16	  See	  Michelle	  K.	  Owen,	  ‘Gender’,	  in	   Lorraine	  Code	  ed.,	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Feminist	  Theories	  (London:	  
Routledge,	  2000),	   220-­‐222;	   Judith	  Butler,	  Gender	  Trouble:	   Feminism	  and	   the	   Subversion	  of	   Identity	  
(New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  8-­‐	  9.	  
17	  Stevi	  Jackson,	  Heterosexuality	  in	  Question	  (London:	  Sage,	  1999),	  6-­‐7.	  
18	  Barbara	  Ryan,	  ‘Sex	  and	  Gender’,	  Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Sociology,	  George	  Ritzer	  ed.,	  Blackwell	  
Publishing,	   2007.	   Blackwell	   Reference	   Online.(Accessed	   18	   April,	   2014).	  
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chu
nk_g978140512433125_ss1-­‐81	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means	  socially	  constructed	  cultural	  expectations,	  differences	  and	  practices	  based	  on	  
one’s	   biological	   sex.	   Gender	   reflects	   ‘society's	   expectations	   about	   how	   men	   and	  
women	  should	  act,	  dress,	  move,	  and	  comport	  themselves	  in	  the	  context	  of	  everyday	  
social	   interaction.’ 19 	  Feminists	   who	   adopt	   this	   kind	   of	   dichotomy	   intend	   to	  
distinguish	   gender	   from	   ‘natural’,	   ‘pre-­‐social’	   sex	   bodies	   and	   to	   highlight	   the	  
contingencies	   of,	   and	   the	   non-­‐determinism	   of,	   the	   constructed	   social	   roles	   of	  
gender.20	  	   Although	   the	   sex/gender	   distinction	   is	   sometimes	   useful	   as	   an	   analytic	  
tool,	   the	   tendency	   to	   uncritically	   treat	   sex/gender	   distinction	   as	   a	   kind	   of	  
nature/culture	  distinction	  can	  be	  problematic.	  
Although	  the	  third	  use	  of	  the	  term	  sex	  in	  this	  thesis	  refers	  to	  biological	  categories,	  I	  
suggest	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  to	  some	  extent	  biological	  ‘sex	  itself	  
is	   a	   gendered	   category.’21	  It	   is	   important	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	  
(biological)	  sex	  and	  gender	  are	  almost	  inseparable	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  and	  are	  
implicated	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  one	  another.22	  For	  example,	  recently	  critical	  sexual	  
theorists	  such	  as	  Judith	  Butler,	  Drucilla	  Cornell	  and	  Stevi	  Jackson	  have	  all	  questioned	  
the	   way	   the	   sex/gender	   dichotomy	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   pure	   nature/culture	  
dichotomy.23	  For	   them,	   the	   belief	   that	   our	   sexed	   bodies	   are	   purely	   biological,	  
natural,	  pre-­‐discursive,	  and	  pre-­‐social	  facts	  without	  gender	  categories	  construction	  
is	  delusional.	  They	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  material	  base	  of	  human	  sexed	  
bodies,	  but	  they	  do	  insist	  that	  we	  understand	  and	  interpret	  sexed	  bodies	  through	  a	  
gender	  lens.	  As	  Judith	  Butler	  points	  out:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Michele	   Adams,	   ‘Inequality/Stratification,	   Gender’,	   Blackwell	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Sociology,	   George	  
Ritzer	   ed.,	   Blackwell	   Publishing,	   2007.	   Blackwell	   Reference	   Online.(Accessed	   April	   18,	   2014).	  
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chu
nk_g978140512433115_ss1-­‐39	  	  
20	  Owen,	  n	  16	  above,	  220-­‐222;	  Butler,	  n	  16	  above,	  8-­‐9.	  
21	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  10.	  
22	  Clark,	  Ellis,	  Peel	  and	  Riggs,	  n	  14	  above,	  268.	  
23	  Judith	   Butler,	   Undoing	   Gender	   (London:	   Routledge,	   2004),	   87;	   Drucilla	   Cornell,	   At	   the	   Heart	   of	  
Freedom:	  Feminism,	  Sex	  and	  Equality	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  6-­‐8;	  Jackson,	  
n	  17	  above,	  6-­‐7.	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  ‘Sex	  is	  made	  understandable	  through	  the	  signs	  that	  indicate	  how	  it	  
should	  be	  read	  or	  understood.	  These	  bodily	  indicators	  are	  the	  cultural	  
means	  by	  which	  the	  sexed	  body	  is	  read.	  They	  are	  themselves	  bodily,	  and	  
they	  operate	  as	  signs,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  way	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
what	  is	  ‘‘materially’’	  true,	  and	  what	  is	  ‘‘culturally’’	  true	  about	  a	  sexed	  
body.	  I	  don’t	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  purely	  cultural	  signs	  produce	  a	  
material	  body,	  but	  only	  that	  the	  body	  does	  not	  become	  sexually	  readable	  
without	  those	  signs,	  and	  that	  those	  signs	  are	  irreducibly	  cultural	  and	  
material	  at	  once.’24	  
She	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  material	   part	   of	   our	   sexed	   bodies,	   but	  
insists	   that	  we	   read,	   categorise,	   and	  make	   sense	   of	   human	   bodies	   in	   a	   gendered	  
cultural	   context.	   Therefore,	   she	   argues,	   ‘[g]ender	   is	   not	   to	   culture	   as	   sex	   is	   to	  
nature;	  gender	  is	  also	  the	  discursive/cultural	  means	  by	  which	  ‘’sexed	  nature’’	  or	  ‘’a	  
natural	   sex’’	   is	   produced	   and	   established	   as	   ‘’pre-­‐discursive’’,	   prior	   to	   culture,	   a	  
politically	  neutral	  surface	  on	  which	  culture	  acts.’25	  	  
Taking	  into	  account	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  the	  distinction	  and	  relation	  between	  sex	  
and	   gender,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   third	   usage	  of	   the	   term	   sex	   in	   this	   thesis	   refers	   to	  
biological	   sexed	  bodies.	  Gender,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   refers	   to	   all	   aspects	   of	   social	  
and	  cultural	  divisions	  and	  differences	  between	  men,	  women	  and	  trans	  people26	  and	  
all	  kinds	  of	  social	  distinctions	  between	  masculinities	  and	  femininities.	  Gender	  is	  not	  
simply	   socially	   constructed	  expectations	  based	  on	  bodies,	   but	   gender	   itself	   is	   also	  
‘the	  very	  apparatus	  of	  production	  whereby	  the	  sexes	  themselves	  are	  established.’27	  
Gender	   gives	   ‘meaning	   and	   substance	   in	   the	   everyday	   actions,	   interactions	   and	  
subjective	   interpretations	   through	   which	   it	   [sex]	   is	   lived.’ 28 	  We	   read	   and	  
conceptualise	  our	  sexed	  bodies	  through	  gender	  ideologies	  and	  gendered	  categories.	  
Gender	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  mutually	  implicated	  with	  sexed	  bodies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  87.	  
25	  Butler,	  n	  16	  above,	  10.	  
26	  Trans	  is	  ‘an	  umbrella	  term	  for	  people	  whose	  sex/gender	  diverges	  in	  some	  way	  from	  the	  sex/gender	  
they	  are	  assigned	  at	  birth,’	   including	   transsexual,	   transgender	  and	   intersex	  people.	   See	  Clark,	   Ellis,	  
Peel	  and	  Riggs,	  n	  14	  above,	  270.	  
27	  Butler,	  n	  16	  above,	  10.	  
28	  Jackson,	  n	  12	  above,	  106.	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In	   summary,	   ‘sex’	   refers	   to	   three	   different	   but	   related	  meanings	   in	   this	   thesis.	   It	  
denotes	   carnal	   acts	   (erotic	   ‘sex’);	   or	   the	   general	   distinction	   between	   people	  with	  
different	   sexed	   bodies	   and	   gender;	   or,	   the	   human	   sexed	   body	   (biological	   sex).	  	  
‘Sexuality’	   refers	   to	   ‘all	   erotically	   significant	   aspects	  of	   social	   life	   and	   social	   being,	  
such	   as	   desires,	   practices,	   relationships	   and	   identities.’29	  ‘Gender’	   denotes	   social	  
and	   cultural	   difference	   and	   divisions	   between	   men,	   women	   and	   trans	   people,	  
between	   masculinities	   and	   femininities.	   Gender	   is	   also	   the	   apparatus	   by	   which	  
sexed	  bodies	  are	  established.	  ‘Sexual	  politics’	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  power	  relations	  and	  
the	  contestation	  of	  injustices	  and	  oppression	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  related	  issues.	  
‘Sexual	   justice’	   is	   about	   the	   legitimate	   and	   proper	   arrangements	   of	   entitlements,	  
respect,	  protection,	  duties	  and	  restrictions	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality.	  
2.3   Discrimination	  and	  oppression	  
The	   terms	   ‘discrimination’	   and	   ‘oppression’	  will	   be	   used	   in	   this	   thesis;	   therefore	   I	  
shall	  define	  the	  application	   in	  this	  section.	   In	  general,	  discrimination	  ‘implies	  more	  
than	  simply	  distinguishing	  among	  social	  objects,	  but	  refers	  also	  to	  inappropriate	  and	  
potentially	  unfair	   treatment	  of	   individuals	  due	  to	  group	  membership.’30	  Rosemarie	  
Tong	  defines	  sex	  discrimination	  as	  ‘the	  disadvantaging	  of	  a	  member	  or	  members	  of	  
one	  sex	  over	  a	  member	  or	  members	  of	  the	  other	  because	  of	  their	  sex.’	  31	  I	  find	  this	  
definition	   of	   sex	   discrimination	   useful	   and	   will	   apply	   this	   to	   my	   definition	   of	   the	  
concepts	   of	   sex/gender/sexuality	   discrimination.	   In	   this	   thesis	   sex,	   gender	   and	  
sexuality	  discrimination	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  follows:	  discrimination	  due	  to	  (biological)	  
sex,	   gender	   or	   sexuality	   is	   the	  wrongful	   or	   unjust	   disadvantaging	   of	   a	  member	   or	  
members	  of	  one	  (biological)	  sex,	  gender	  or	  sexuality	  over	  a	  member	  or	  members	  of	  
the	  other	  because	  of	  their	  (biological)	  sex,	  gender	  or	  sexuality.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid.	  
30	  John	  F.	  Dovidio,	  Miles	  Hewstone,	  Peter	  Glick,	  and	  Victoria	  M.	  Esses,	   ‘Prejudice,	  Stereotyping	  and	  
Discrimination:	  Theoretical	  and	  Empirical	  Overview’,	  in	  The	  Sage	  Handbook	  of	  Prejudice,	  Stereotyping	  
and	  Discrimination	  (London:	  Sage,	  2010),	  8.	  
31	  Rosemarie	  Tong,	  ‘Gender	  and	  Sexual	  Discrimination’,	  in	  Hugh	  LaFollette	  ed.,	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  
of	  Practical	  Ethics	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  219.	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Subordination	   feminist	   Iris	  Marion	   Young	   develops	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘oppression’	   based	   on	   structural	   injustices	   towards	   social	   groups.	   For	   her,	  
oppression	  is	  primarily	  a	  structural	  concept	  that	  denotes	  systematic	  and	  often	  taken	  
for	  granted	  constraints	  on	  members	  of	   social	  groups.	  She	  argues	   that	   ‘[i]ts	   causes	  
are	   embedded	   in	   unquestioned	   norms,	   habits	   and	   symbols,	   in	   the	   assumptions	  
underlying	   institutional	   rules	   and	   the	   collective	   consequences	   of	   following	   those	  
rules.’32	  	   She	   aims	   to	   emphasise	   that	   oppression	   is	   not	   primarily	   a	   concept	   of	  
individual	  moral	  wrong	  and	  individual	  injury,	  but	  a	  concept	  of	  institutional	  injustices	  
and	  collective	  disadvantages.	  Therefore,	  oppression	  in	  this	  sense	  refers	  to	  injustices	  
and	   disadvantages	   caused	   by	   widely	   held	   unquestioned	   social	   stereotypes,	  
prejudices,	  norms	  and	  practices	  and	   institutionalised	  rules,	  policies	  and	   ideologies.	  
She	  contends	  that	  oppression	  can	  be	  categorised	  into	  five	  major	  forms:	  exploitation,	  
marginalisation,	   powerlessness,	   cultural	   imperialism	   and	   violence. 33 	  I	   find	   her	  
articulation	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   oppression	   useful	   and	   inspiring;	   I	   will	   also	   define	  
oppression	   as	   institutional,	   systematic	   and	   collective	   injustices	   caused	   by	   social	  
stereotypes,	   bias,	   norms,	   and	   practices	   and	   by	   institutional	   rules,	   policies,	   and	  
ideologies.	  However,	  in	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  I	  also	  illustrate	  the	  problems	  and	  biases	  in	  
Young’s	   feminist	   theory	   of	   justice	   and	   oppression.	   I	   argue	   that	   Young	   herself	  
unjustly	  marginalizes	  and	  stereotypes	  certain	  groups	  or	  voices	  in	  her	  feminist	  justice	  
theory.	  Sexuality	  and	  gender	  theories	  and	  proposals	  based	  on	  her	  idea	  could	  be	  at	  
risk	   of	   producing	   and	   reiterating	   some	   unjust	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms	   and	  
ideologies	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  
2.4   Subordination	  feminism	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  explain	  how	  I	  use	  the	  term	  and	  concept	  of	  ‘subordination	  feminism’	  
as	   an	   analytic	   tool	   to	   critically	   review	   one	   of	   the	   most	   influential	   feminist	  
approaches	  in	  contemporary	  legal	  and	  political	  theory	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Iris	  Marion	   Young,	   Justice	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	   Difference	   (New	   Jersey:	   Princeton	  University	   Press,	  
1990),	  41.	  
33	  Ibid.,	  48-­‐65.	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There	   are	   various	   feminisms	   and	   there	   are	   different	   ways	   to	   categorise	   various	  
feminist	  theories.34	  The	  kind	  of	  feminist	  approaches	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  focus	  on	  and	  
to	  critically	  examine,	  I	  categorise	  as	  ‘subordination	  feminism’.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  is	  
inspired	   by	   queer	   legal	   theorist	   Janet	   Halley’s	   analysis	   of	   modern	   feminism.	   She	  
finds	  strong	  tendencies	   in	  contemporary	   feminist	  scholarship	   in	   the	  U.S.	   that	  base	  
feminist	  projects	  on	  certain	  subordination	  theories	  of	  women	  or	  femininity.	  	  Despite	  
the	  many	  similarities,	  the	  crucial	  difference	  between	  her	  critiques	  and	  my	  critiques	  
of	  subordination	  feminism	  will	  be	  elaborated	  when	  I	  discuss	  and	  analyse	  her	  theory	  
further	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
Here,	  ‘subordination	  feminism’	  refers	  to	  normative	  feminist	  projects	  that	  state	  that	  
currently	  men	  or	  (male)	  masculinity	  are	  systematically	  and	  institutionally	  privileged,	  
while	  women	  or	  (female)	  femininity	  are	  systematically	  and	  institutionally	  oppressed	  
and	   disadvantaged,	   which	   furthermore	   holds	   that	   gender	   oppression	   is	   overall	  
unilateral	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  women	  or	  femininity	  are	  oppressed	  or	  subordinated	  by	  
men	   or	   masculinity.	   Normatively,	   these	   gender	   justice	   projects,	   consciously	   or	  
unconsciously,	   tend	   to	   prioritise	   the	   gender	   oppression	   of,	   and	   gender	   injustices	  
towards,	  women	  or	  femininity.	  	  
There	   are	   three	   main	   reasons	   to	   focus	   on	   critically	   reviewing	   contemporary	  
subordination	   feminism	   and	   its	   approaches	   to	   sexual	   justice	   and	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  	  
Firstly,	  subordination	  feminism	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dominant	  and	  influential	  schools	  
of	   thought	   in	   contemporary	   law	   and	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	  
equality,	   so	   their	   projects	   are	   worth	   in-­‐depth	   re-­‐examination	   and	   reflection.	  
Subordination	   feminism	   is	   so	   visible,	   powerful	   and	   influential	   in	   contemporary	  
normative	   feminist	   legal	   and	   political	   scholarship	   that	   some	   feminist	   scholars	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  For	  examples	  of	  some	  popular	  ways	  to	  categorise	  different	  feminist	  theories	  in	  jurisprudence	  see	  
Emily	   Jackson,	  and	  Nicola	  Lacey,	   ‘Introducing	  Feminist	   Legal	  Theory’,	   in	   James	  Penner,	  David	  Schiff	  
and	  Richard	  Nobles	  eds,,	  Introduction	  to	  Jurisprudence	  and	  Legal	  Theory:	  Commentary	  and	  Materials	  
(London:	   Butterworths,	   2002),779-­‐854.	   Also,	   see	   Hilaire	   Barnett,	   Introduction	   to	   Feminist	  
Jurisprudence	  (London:	  Cavendish,	  1998),	  121-­‐210.	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suggest	  that	  subordination	  feminist	  thinking,	  beliefs	  and	  implications	  are	  the	  central	  
theme	   or	   overarching	   concerns	   in	   modern	   normative	   feminist	   theories	   in	   law,	  
politics	  and	  ethics.	  Feminist	  political	  theorist	  Susan	  James	  illustrates	  this	  point:	  
‘Feminism	  is	  grounded	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  women	  are	  oppressed	  or	  
disadvantaged	  by	  comparison	  with	  men,	  and	  that	  their	  oppression	  is	  in	  
some	  way	  illegitimate	  or	  unjustified.	  Under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  this	  general	  
characterization	  there	  are,	  however,	  many	  interpretations	  of	  women	  and	  
their	  oppression,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  of	  feminism	  as	  a	  single	  
philosophical	  doctrine,	  or	  as	  implying	  an	  agreed	  political	  programme.’35	  
Here,	   Susan	   James	   outlines	   the	   general	   belief	   and	   ideology	   of	   the	   subordination	  
feminist	   approach	  and	   thinks	   that	   this	   is	   the	  overall	   belief	   and	   concern	   shared	  by	  
various	  feminisms	  in	  contemporary	  scholarship	  of	  feminist	  political	  theory.	  
Similarly,	   liberal	   and	   humanist	   feminist	   legal	   scholar	   Nancy	   Levit	   argues	   that	  
subordination	   and	   oppression	   of	   women	   is	   the	   core	   concern	   in	   most	   modern	  
feminist	  legal	  theories.	  She	  holds	  that	  ‘feminism	  maintains	  that	  culturally,	  politically,	  
economically,	  and	  legally,	  women	  have	  been,	  and	  still	  are,	  subordinated,	  oppressed,	  
degraded,	  and	  ignored.’36	  	  
Feminist	   legal	   theorists	   Emily	   Jackson	  and	  Nicola	   Lacey	  also	   contend	   that	   feminist	  
legal	   theory	   generally	   holds	   that	   women	   are	   the	   disadvantaged	   gender	   in	   law.	  
Ethically	  and	  politically,	   legal	   feminisms	  aim	   to	  challenge	  such	  oppression.	  Gender	  
differentiation	   between	   men	   and	   women,	   male	   and	   female	   or	   masculine	   and	  
feminine	  in	  law	  overall	  means	  the	  oppression	  of,	  and	  discrimination	  against,	  women	  
in	  law.	  	  They	  argue	  that,	  compared	  to	  men,	  ‘[l]egal	  sex	  differentiation,	  in	  short,	  on	  
the	  whole	  disadvantages	  women.’37	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Susan	  James,	  ‘Feminism’,	  in	  E.	  Craig	  ed.,	  Routledge	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  
1998).(Accessed	  12	  December,	  2011).	  http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N022	  	  
36	  Nancy	  Levit,	  The	  Gender	  Line:	  Men,	  Women,	  and	  the	  Law	   (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  
1998),	  189.	  
37	  Jackson	  and	  Lacey,	  n	  34	  above,	  785.	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Similarly,	   feminist	   political	   theorists	   Jane	  Mansbridge	   and	   Susan	  Moller	  Okin	   hold	  
that	   ‘feminism	   has	   one	   obvious,	   simple	   and	   overarching	   goal	   −	   to	   end	   men’s	  
systematic	  domination	  of	  women.	  Feminist	  theory	  also	  has	  one	  overarching	  goal	  -­‐	  to	  
understand,	   explain,	   and	   challenge	   that	   domination.’38	  They	   point	   out	   that	   the	  
overarching	   normative	   principle	   in	   mainstream	   feminist	   political	   theory	   is	  
subordination	  feminism’s	  opposition	  to	  women’s	  oppression	  and	  male	  domination.	  	  
As	   the	   foregoing	   analysis	   shows,	   it	   would	   not	   be	   an	   overstatement	   to	   state	   that	  
subordination	  feminist	  ways	  of	  thinking	  and	  approach	  is	  one,	  if	  not	  the	  most	  visible	  
and	   influential,	   strand	   of	   feminism	   in	   contemporary	   feminist	   legal	   and	   political	  
theory.	  	  
The	   influence	   of	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   and	   approaches	   can	   also	   be	  
found	  in	  formal	  and	  institutionalised	  legal	  policies,	  institutions,	  power	  and	  practices.	  
For	   example,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   influential	   gender	   equality	   approaches	   adopted	   in	  
public	   international	   law	  of	  gender	   justice	   is	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  perspective	  
in	  international	  law,	  a	  perspective	  that	  crudely	  categorises	  women	  as	  the	  oppressed	  
gender	  group	  and	  men	  as	   the	  privileged	  gender	  group	   in	   law.	  Following	  the	  crude	  
distinction	   between	   privileged	   men	   and	   oppressed	   women,	   the	   laws	   and	   the	  
international	   institutions	   then	   focus	   their	   gender	   justice	   law	   and	   policies	   on	  
women’s	  needs	  and	  sufferings.39	  
For	  instance,	  international	  law	  scholars	  have	  observed	  the	  wide	  institutionalisation	  
of	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies,	  proposals	  and	  approaches	  in	  international	  law	  
documents	   and	   human	   rights	   instruments	   and	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   CEDAW	  
Convention	  and	  the	  General	  Recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  CEDAW	  Committee.40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  and	  Susan	  Moller	  Okin,	  ‘Feminism’,	  in	  Goodin,	  Robert	  E.,	  Pettit,	  Philip,	  and	  Pogge,	  
Thomas,	  eds.,	  A	  Companion	  to	  Contemporary	  Political	  Philosophy.	  2nd	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2007),	  
332.	  
39	  Sylvia	  Chant,	  and	  Matthew	  Gutmann,	  Mainstreaming	  Men	  into	  Gender	  and	  Development:	  Debates,	  
Reflections,	  and	  Experiences	   (Oxford:	  Oxfom,	  2000),	  1-­‐23;	  Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  20-­‐22,	  31-­‐35;	  Dianne	  
Otto,	   ‘Exile	   of	   Inclusion:	   Reflections	   on	   Gender	   Issues	   in	   International	   Law	   over	   the	   Last	   Decade’,	  
Melbourne.	  Journal	  of	  International	  l	  Law,	  10,	  no.1	  (2009),11-­‐26;	  Darren	  Rosenblum,	  ‘Unsex	  CEDAW,	  
Or	  What's	  Wrong	  With	  Women's	  Rights’,	  Colum.	  J.	  Gender	  &	  L.	  20,	  no.	  2	  (2011),	  98-­‐194.	  
40	  See	  Otto,	  ibid.;	  Rosenblum,	  ibid.	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As	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  the	  area	  of	  gender	  justice	  
and	  equality,	  and	  being	  the	  primary	  UN	  treaty	  devoted	  entirely	  to	  sex	  discrimination	  
and	   gender	   equality,	   the	   CEDAW	   Convention	   takes	   the	   subordination	   feminist	  
approach	  of	  gender	  justice	  by	  only	  narrowly	  focusing	  upon	  and	  targeting	  inequality	  
of,	  and	  discrimination	  against,	   ‘women.’41	  Violence	  against	  women	  is	  the	  only	  type	  
of	   gender	   violence	   covered	   and	   addressed	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   CEDAW	  
jurisprudence.42 	  Violence	   against	   men,	   including	   violence	   against	   gay	   men,	   is	  
unaddressed	  and	  excluded	  from	  protection	  by	  subordination	  feminist	  gender	  justice	  
approach	   in	   international	   human	   rights	   law.	   While	   violence	   against	   lesbians	   is	  
covered	   and	   addressed	   by	   CEDAW	   jurisprudence	   and	   its	   gender	   justice	   legal	  
systems,	  violence	  against	  gay	  men,	  bi	  men,	  or	   trans	  men	  are	  not	  protected	  under	  
this	  most	   important	   international	   treaty	  devoted	  exclusively	   to	  gender	   justice	  and	  
sex	  discrimination.	  	  
Also,	   since	   the	  CEDAW	  Convention	  has	  been	  widely	   ratified	  by	  most	  of	   the	  global	  
community	  and	  since	  the	  member	  states	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  file	  reports	  to	  the	  CEDAW	  
Committee	   about	   their	   progress	   and	   effort	   in	   promoting	   gender	   justice	   towards	  
women,	  its	  women-­‐exclusive	  gender	  justice	  approach	  has	  a	  deep	  influence	  in	  many	  
countries’	   domestic	   law	   and	   policies	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	   equality.43	  It	   is	  
crucial	   to	   critically	   examine	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   of	   such	   an	   influential	   women-­‐
exclusive	  gender	  justice	  and	  gender	  violence	  approach.	  
Furthermore,	   many	   international	   institutions	   and	   organizations	   such	   as	   the	   UN,	  
treat	   the	   concept	   and	   issues	   of	   gender	   equality	   as	   synonymous	   with	   issues	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  See	  Alice	   Edwards,	  Violence	   against	  Women	  under	   International	  Human	  Rights	   Law	   (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2011),	   154;	  Marsha	   A.	   Freeman,	   Beate	   Rudolf,	   and	   Christine	   Chinkin,	  
eds.,	   The	   UN	   Convention	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   All	   Forms	   of	   Discrimination	   against	   Women:	   A	  
Commentary	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  52-­‐70.	  
42	  See	  Christine	  Chinkin,	   ‘Violence	  Against	  Women’,	   in	  The	  UN	  Convention	  on	   the	  Elimination	  of	  All	  
Forms	   of	   Discrimination	   against	   Women:	   A	   Commentary,	   edited	   by	   Marsha	   A.	   Freeman,	   Beate	  
Rudolf,	  and	  Christine	  Chinkin,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  443-­‐474.	  
43	  Leilani	   Farha,	   ‘Committee	   on	   the	   Elimination	   of	   Discrimination	  Against	  Women’,	   in	   Social	   Rights	  
Jurisprudence:	  Emerging	  Trends	  In	  International	  And	  Comparative	  Law,	  edited	  by	  Malcolm	  Langford,	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  553.	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equality	   for	   women. 44 	  As	   feminist	   international	   law	   scholar	   Alice	   Edwards	  
articulates,	  in	  public	  international	  law:	  
‘Commonly	  the	  term	  ‘woman’	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  ‘sex’	  
and/or	  ‘gender’.	  For	  example,	  sex	  discrimination	  and	  gender	  
discrimination	  are	  used	  interchangeably	  to	  refer	  to	  discrimination	  
against	  women.	  Similarly	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  has	  been	  interpreted	  as	  
applying	  to	  violence	  perpetrated	  solely	  or	  disproportionately	  against	  
women.’45	  	  
Scholar	   R.	   Charli	   Carpenter	   finds	   that	   ‘the	   concept	   of	   gender-­‐based	   violence	   has	  
been	   linked	   almost	   exclusively	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   in	   the	  
humane	   security	   sector.’ 46 	  By	   treating	   the	   concept	   of	   gender	   equality	   as	  
synonymous	  with	  the	  equality	  of	  women,	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  international	  institutions	  
such	  as	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  tend	  to	  reduce	  gender	  injustice	  issues	  
to	  only	  issues	  of	  injustice	  towards	  women.47	  	  
As	   queer	   theorist	   Janet	   Halley	   articulates,	   in	   many	   developed	   societies	   and	   in	  
international	   organizations	   and	   bodies,	   subordination	   feminism	   has	   made	   great	  
progress	  in	  taking	  power	  and	  making	  laws.	  Subordination	  feminism	  is	  far	  from	  just	  
an	  underground	  operation	  as	  before,	  it	  is	  now	  also	  ‘running	  things’	  and	  holds	  power	  
in	   shaping	   many	   formal	   legal	   and	   public	   policies	   and	   informal	   social	   norms	   and	  
ideologies	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality.	   She	   calls	   these	   institutionalised	   subordination	  
feminist	  projects	  and	  politics,	  ‘governance	  feminism.’48	  
Since	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   and	   perspectives	   are	   influential	   and	   have	  
real	   regulatory	  and	  governing	  power	  over	  our	  everyday	  social	   lives	   in	   the	   law	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  For	  example,	  the	  recently	  founded	  UN	  entity	  responsible	  for	  gender	  equality	   issues	   is	  named	  the	  
‘United	  Nations	  Entity	  for	  Gender	  Equality	  and	  the	  Empowerment	  of	  Women’,	  often	  to	  be	  known	  and	  
shorthanded	  as	  ‘UN	  Women’.	  The	  UN	  Women	  tends	  to	  interpret	  and	  understand	  the	  problems	  and	  
phenomena	  of	  gender	  inequalities	  almost	  exclusively	  from	  discriminations	  against	  women	  and	  girls.	  
See	   the	   information	   from	   their	   web	   site:	   http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/daw/index.html	  
(Accessed	  20	  June,	  2014).	  Also,	  see	  Freeman,	  Rudolf,	  and	  Chinkin,	  eds.,	  n	  41	  above,	  27.	  
45	  	  Edwards,	  n	  41	  above,	  18.	  
46	  R.	  Charli	  Carpenter,	  ‘Recognizing	  Gender-­‐based	  Violence	  Against	  Civilian	  Men	  and	  Boys	  in	  Conflict	  
Situations’,	  Security	  Dialogue	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  86.	  
47	  Ibid.,	  86.	  
48	  Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  31.	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politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	   it	   is	   also	   very	   important	   to	   subject	   their	   sexual	  
justice	  and	  gender	  equality	  projects	  and	  ideologies	  to	  a	  critical	  examination,	  just	  as	  
we	  will	   agree	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   subject	  mainstream	   liberal	   or	   socialist	   ideologies	   into	  
critical	   examination.	   In	   this	   thesis	   I	   particularly	   focus	   on	   exploring	   subordination	  
feminism’s	  legal	  and	  political	  approach	  to	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  its	  implications	  
for,	  and	  impact	  on,	  men,	  gay	  men	  in	  particular.	  
The	  second	  reason	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  review	  of	  subordination	  feminisms	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  
that,	  in	  spite	  of	  some	  valuable	  post-­‐structuralist	  and	  queer	  reflections	  and	  critiques	  
on	  subordination	   feminist	   theories,	   there	  are	  still	   some	  problems	   in	  subordination	  
feminist	  legal	  theories	  that	  have	  not	  been	  generally	  covered,	  sufficiently	  addressed,	  
or	  systematically	  explored	  in	  queer/post-­‐structualist	  scholarship.	  I	  will	  elaborate	  the	  
point	   in	   my	   review	   of	   queer	   theories	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   heteronormativity	   in	  
Chapter	  4.	  
The	   third	   point	   is	   that	   subordination	   feminist	   thinking	   and	   perspectives	   have	   a	  
strong	  influence	  over	  other	  emancipatory	  or	  critical	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	  
projects,	   a	   point	   also	   mentioned	   by	   Janet	   Halley.49	  For	   example,	   we	   can	   find	   a	  
significant	   influence	  of	  subordination	  feminist	   thinking	  and	   ideologies	  on	  early	  gay	  
liberationist	   theories50	  and	   on	   some	   visible	   modern	   liberal	   gay	   rights	   theories,51	  
especially	   their	   theory	   on	   gender.	   Some	   queer-­‐oriented	   projects,	   such	   as	   some	  
queer	   feminist	   projects,	   also	   adopt	   or	   endorse	   some	   subordination	   feminist	  
ideologies	   of,	   and	   approaches	   towards,	   gender	   in	   their	   projects. 52 	  Since	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Halley,	  ibid.,	  106.	  
50	  For	  example,	   see	  Carl	  Wittman,	   ‘A	  Gay	  Manifesto’,	   in	  Karla	   Jay	  and	  Allen	  Young	  eds.,	  Out	  of	   the	  
Closets:	   Voices	   of	   Gay	   Liberation	   (London:	   GMP,	   1992),	   330-­‐341;	   Altman	   Dennis,	   Homosexual	  
Oppression	  and	  Liberation	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  90-­‐94,	  215-­‐226.	  
51	  For	  example	  see	  Kaplan,	  n	  7	  above,	  6;	  David	  A.	  J.	  Richards,	  Women,	  Gays,	  and	  the	  Constitution:	  The	  
Grounds	  for	  Feminism	  and	  Gay	  Rights	  in	  Culture	  and	  Law	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1998),	  
199-­‐287;	   David,	   A.	   J.	   Richards,	   Identity	   and	   the	   Case	   for	   Gay	   Rights:	   Race,	   Gender,	   Religion	   as	  
Analogies	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago,	  1999),39-­‐83	  ;	  Carlos	  A.	  Ball,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Gay	  Rights:	  An	  
Exploration	  in	  Political	  Philosophy	  (	  London:	  Routledge,2003).	  75-­‐138.	  	  
52	  For	   example,	   queer	   scholar	   Janet	  Halley	   has	   pointed	  out	   that	   some	  post-­‐modern	   feminist,	   post-­‐
structuralist	  and	  queer	  feminist	  projects	  such	  as	  Judith	  Bulter’s	  work	  still	  hold,	  imply,	  or	  rely	  on	  some	  
gender	   subordination	   thesis.	   See	  Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  18-­‐20,	  29-­‐30,149-­‐150,247-­‐253,	  273-­‐276.	   I	  will	  
discuss	  Butler	  queer	  feminism	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  and	   ideologies	  have	  a	  visible	   impact	  upon	  and	  
close	   link	  with	  gay	  and	  queer	   theories,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  critically	   review	   the	  pros	  
and	  cons	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  projects	  on	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  discuss	  early	  gay	  
liberationist	   theories	   in	   the	   next	   chapter.	   The	   deliberation	   on	  modern	   liberal	   gay	  
rights	   theories	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Chapter	   5,	   and	   a	   discussion	   of	   queer	   theory	   and	  
queer	  feminism	  is	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
Many	   visible	   feminist	   legal	   and	   political	   theorists	   take	   or	   imply	   some	   kinds	   of	  
subordination	  feminist	  approaches	  in	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	  projects.	  For	  
example,	  according	  to	  Iris	  Marion	  Young	  and	  Susan	  Moller	  Okin’s	  feminist	  theories	  
of	  social	  justice,	  men	  as	  a	  social	  group	  are	  regarded	  as	  an	  unjustly	  dominant	  gender	  
group	  while	  women	  as	  a	  social	  group	  are	  regarded	  as	  an	  unjustly	  oppressed	  group	  in	  
family	   relations.	   Men	   qua	   men	   are	   systematically	   privileged	   while	   women	   qua	  
women	   are	   systematically	   oppressed	   in	   the	   family	   according	   to	   their	   theories.53	  
Influential	   men’s	   studies	   scholar	   R.	   W.	   Connell	   also	   endorses	   the	   subordination	  
gender	   thesis	   in	   his	   theory	   and	   argues	   that	   men	   as	   a	   gender	   group	   ‘are	   not	  
oppressed	   or	   disadvantaged.’54	  In	   power	   relations	   some	   subordination	   feminists	  
claim	  that	  ‘men	  as	  a	  group	  have	  power	  over	  women	  as	  a	  group.’55	  
It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  although	  subordination	  feminisms	  share	  the	  claim	  and	  
assumption	   that	   in	   current	   society	   women,	   femaleness	   or	   femininity	   remain	  
subordinated	  by	  men	  or	  masculinity,	  there	  are	  various	  subordination	  feminisms	  and	  
they	  often	  disagree	  with	  one	  another	  on	  the	  roots	  of,	  or	  on	  the	  strategies	  against,	  
the	   oppression	   of	  women	   and	   the	   domination	   of	  men.	   Some	  hold	   that	   the	   social	  
construction	  of	  sexuality	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  women’s	  oppression	  and	  male	  domination,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  See	   Iris	   Marion	   Young,	   Intersecting	   Voices:	   Dilemmas	   of	   Gender,	   Political	   Philosophy	   and	   Policy	  
(Princeton:	   Princeton	   University	   Press,	   1997),	   95-­‐113;	   Susan	  Moller	   Okin,	   Justice,	   Gender	   and	   the	  
Family	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1989),	  134-­‐186.	  
54	  R	  .W.	  Connell,	  The	  Men	  and	  The	  Boys	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2000),	  209.	  
55	  Ann	   C.	  McGinley,	   and	   Frank	   Rudy	   Cooper,	   ‘Introduction:	  Masculinities,	  Multidimensionality,	   and	  
the	  Law:	  Why	  They	  Need	  One	  Another’,	   in	  Masculinities	  And	  The	  Law:	  A	  Multidimensional	  Approach	  
(New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  3.	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like	  MacKinnon’s	   sexual-­‐subordination	   feminist	   theory.56	  Some	   claim	   that	  material	  
and	  economic	  inequality	  is	  the	  root	  of	  women’s	  subordination,	   like	  materialist	  and	  
socialist	   subordination	   feminisms. 57 	  Violence	   against	   women	   approaches	   to	  
feminism	   want	   to	   highlight	   oppression	   by	   focusing	   on	   the	   problems	   of	   gender	  
violence	  against	  women	  and	  claim	  that	  gender	  violence	  and	  family	  violence	  ought	  to	  
be	   addressed	   as	   the	   problem	   of	   male	   power	   and	   control	   over	   women. 58	  
Subordination	   feminist	   theories	   of	   family	   law	   and	   family	   justice	   argue	   that	   the	  
family	   is	   the	  core	   site	  and	   regime	  of	  male	  domination	  and	   female	  oppression	  and	  
the	   laws	   and	   institutions	   of	   marriage	   and	   family	   are	   overall	   male-­‐privileged	   and	  
female-­‐subordinated.59	  The	  kinds	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  I	  would	  like	  
to	   concentrate	   on	   particularly	   in	   this	   thesis	   are	   subordination	   feminist	   legal	   and	  
political	   theories	   on	   family-­‐related	   issues.	   I	   argue	   that	   subordination	   feminist	  
perspectives	   are	   not	   always	   able	   to,	   suitable	   for,	   or	   willing	   to	   unravel,	   see,	   and	  
address	  some	  of	  the	  kinds	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  injustices	  in	  family	  relations,	  such	  
as	   gender	   injustices	   towards	  men.	   	   To	   overcome	   the	   limitations,	  we	   also	   need	   to	  
consider	  and	  incorporate	  other	  valuable	  perspectives,	  such	  as	  queer	  humanist	  men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  For	   example,	   see	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	   ‘Feminism,	  Marxism,	  Method,	   and	   the	   State:	   Toward	  
Feminist	  Jurisprudence’,	  Signs	  8,	  no.	  4	  (1983),	  635-­‐658;	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Toward	  a	  Feminist	  
Theory	  of	  the	  State	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1989).	  
57	  For	  example	  see	  Jackson,	  and	  Lacey,	  n	  34	  above,	  811-­‐813.	  
58	  For	  example,	   see	  Edwards,	  n	  41	  above;	  Bontina	  Meyersfeld,	  Domestic	  Violence	  and	   International	  
Law,	   (Oxford:	   Hart,	   2010);	   Michelle	   Madden	   Dempsey,	   ‘What	   Counts	   as	   Domestic	   Violence-­‐	   A	  
Conceptual	   Analysis’,	  Wm.	   &	   Mary	   J.	   Women	   &	   L.	   12,	   no.	   2	   (2005),	   301-­‐333;	   Michelle	   Madden	  
Dempsey,	  ‘Toward	  a	  Feminist	  State:	  What	  Does	  ‘Effective’	  Prosecution	  of	  Domestic	  Violence	  Mean?’,	  
The	  Modern	   Law	  Review	   70,	   no.	   6	   (2007),	   908-­‐935;	   Liz	   Kelly,	   ‘What	  Does	   the	   Speaking	   Profit	  Us?:	  
Reflections	   on	   the	   Challenges	   of	   Developing	   Feminist	   Perspectives	   on	   Abuse	   and	   Violence	   by	  
Women’,	   in	  Marianne	  Hester,	   Liz	   Kelly,	   and	   Jill	   Radford,	   eds.,	  Women,	   Violence,	   And	  Male	   Power:	  
Feminist	   Activism,	   Research,	   And	   Practice	   (Buckingham:	   Open	   University	   Press,	   1996),	   34-­‐48;	   Jill	  
Radford,	   and	   Elizabeth	   A.	   Stanko,	   ‘Violence	   Against	   Women	   and	   Children:	   The	   Contradictions	   of	  
Crime	   Control	   under	   Patriarchy’,	   in	   by	   Marianne	   Hester,	   Liz	   Kelly,	   and	   Jill	   Radford	   eds.,	  Women,	  
Violence,	  And	  Male	  Power:	  Feminist	  Activism,	  Research,	  And	  Practice	  (Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  
Press,	   1996),	   65-­‐80;	   Russel	   P.	   Dobash.,	   R.	   Emerson	   Dobash,	  Margo	  Wilson,	   and	  Martin	   Daly,	   ‘The	  
Myth	  of	  Sexual	  Symmetry	  in	  Marital	  Violence’,	  in	  Claire	  M.	  Renzetti	  and	  Raquel	  Kennedy	  Bergen	  eds.,	  
Violence	  Against	  Women	  (Lanbam:	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2005),	  31-­‐52.	  
59	  See	   for	   example	  Okin,	   n	   53	   above,	   134-­‐186;	  Martha	   Albertson	   Fineman,	   ‘Fatherhood,	   Feminism	  
and	  Family	  Law’,	  McGeorge	  Law	  Review,	  32,	  no.	  4	  (2001),1031-­‐1049;	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman,	  the	  
Autonomy	   Myth:	   a	   Theory	   of	   Dependency	   (New	   York:	   the	   New	   Press,	   2004);	   Martha	   Albertson	  
Fineman,	   ‘The	   sexual	   family,’	   in	  Martha	  Albertson	   Fineman,	   Jack	   E.	   Jackson,	   and	  Adam	  p.	   Romero	  
eds.,Feminist	   and	  Queer	   Legal	   Theory:	   Intimate	   Encounters,	  Uncomfortable	   Conversations,	   (Surrey:	  
Ashgate,2009),	  45-­‐64;	  Young,	  n	  53	  above,	  95-­‐113;	  Young,	  n	  32	  above,	  50-­‐51,	  64-­‐65.	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and	  masculinities	  studies	  perspectives	  in	  thinking	  about	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  issues	  
in	  family	  law	  and	  family	  justice	  projects.	  
The	   subtle	   distinction	   between	   the	   terms	   ‘subordination	   feminism’	   and	   ‘sexual-­‐
subordination	   feminism’	   is	   noteworthy.	   Sexual-­‐subordination	   feminism	   is	   a	   term	  
used	  by	  queer	  legal	  scholar	  Janet	  Halley	  to	  refer	  to	  those	  feminisms	  that	  claim	  that	  
(hetero)	   sexuality	   is	   oppressive	   to	  women	   in	   current	   patriarchal	   societies	   and	   the	  
social	   construction	   of	   male	   and	   female	   sexuality	   is	   the	   major	   cause	   of	   male	  
domination	   and	   female	   subordination.	   She	   has	  Mackinnon’s	   power	   feminism	   and	  
cultural	  feminism	  in	  mind.60	  
Sexual-­‐subordination	   feminism	   is	   also	   labelled	   ‘sex-­‐negative	   feminism’	   because	   of	  
the	   tendency	   towards	   sexual	   conservativism,	   structural	   and	   stereotyped	   female	  
victimised	   status,	   and	   state-­‐interventionist	   sexual	   policies	   and	   sex-­‐censorship	  
laws.61	  	   Feminist	   theorist	   Gayle	   S.	   Rubin	   argues	   that	   this	   sex-­‐negative	   feminist	  
approach	  ‘has	  considered	  sexual	  liberalisation	  to	  be	  inherently	  a	  mere	  extension	  of	  
male	  privilege.	   This	   tradition	   resonates	  with	   conservative,	   anti-­‐sexual	   discourse.’62	  
Sex-­‐negative	   feminism	   generally	   criticises	   ‘deviant’	   sex	   such	   as	   pornography,	  
commercial	   sex	   and	   S/M	   sex	   as	   they	   are	   viewed	   as	   examples,	   expressions	   or	  
products	  of	  patriarchy	  and	  male	  domination.	  	  By	  contrast	  ‘sex-­‐positive	  feminism’	  (or	  
‘pro-­‐sex	  feminism’)	  is	  more	  willing	  to	  see	  and	  to	  celebrate	  the	  possible	  pleasure	  of	  
sexuality	   and	   to	   assert	   and	   defend	   the	   agency	   of	   female	   sexuality	   in	   sexual	  
relations.63 	  They	   want	   to	   see	   both	   the	   possible	   danger	   and	   the	   pleasure	   in	  
sexuality. 64 	  They	   oppose	   MacKinnon’s	   structural	   and	   totalising	   sex-­‐negative	  
assertion	  that	  in	  the	  current	  patriarchal	  and	  male	  dominant	  culture	  female	  sexuality	  
is	  inevitably	  victimised	  and	  oppressed	  by	  male	  sexuality	  and	  male	  power	  in	  everyday	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  27-­‐79.	  
61	  See	  Halley,	   ibid.,	  29-­‐30;	  Gayle	  S.	  Rubin	  ‘Thinking	  Sex:	  Notes	  for	  a	  Radical	  Theory	  of	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Sexuality’,	   in	   Henry	   Abelove,	   Michele	   Aina	   Barale	   and	   David	   M.	   Halperin	   eds.,	   Lesbian	   and	   Gay	  
Studies	  Reader,	  Volume	  I	  	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  3-­‐44.	  
62	  Rubin,	  ibid.,	  28.	  
63	  See	   Janet	   Halley,	   n	   15	   above,	   29-­‐30;	   Wendy	   Brown,	   States	   of	   Injury	   (Princeton:	   Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1995),	  87-­‐95,	  130-­‐133.	  	  
64	  See	   Judith	   Butler,	   ‘Against	   Proper	   Objects’,	   in	   Elizabeth	  Weed	   and	   Naomi	   Schor	   eds.,	   Feminism	  
Meets	  Queer	  Theory	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  10.	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sex	  practice	   and	   sex	   culture.65	  They	  are	   also	   sceptical	   of	   the	   sex-­‐negative	   feminist	  
tendency	   towards	   conservative	   and	   moralistic	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sex-­‐censorship	  
laws	   and	   policies. 66 	  They	   question	   this	   sex-­‐negative	   feminist	   monolithic	   and	  
reductionist	  view	  of	  commercial	  sex,	  pornography	  and	  S/M	  sex	  as	  the	  production	  of	  
male	  domination	  and	  male	  power.67	  They	  criticise	  the	  crude	  overgeneralisation	  and	  
structuralising	  of	  women’s	  subordination	  status,	  of	  stereotyping	  and	  normalisation	  
of	  female	  passivity	  and	  vulnerability,	  and	  of	  compromising	  women’s	  agency	  in	  issues	  
of	  sexuality.68	  
To	  be	   clear,	   the	   term	   ‘subordination	   feminism’	   is	   used	  as	   a	  broader	   concept	   than	  
the	  narrower	  concept	  of	  ‘sexual-­‐subordination	  feminism’	  and	  while	  they	  are	  related,	  
they	   are	   not	   treated	   as	   identical	   concepts	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Whereas,	   all	   sexual-­‐
subordination	   feminism	   theories	   are	   a	   kind	   of	   subordination	   feminism,	   not	   all	  
subordination	  feminisms	  can	  be	  classed	  as	   ‘sexual-­‐subordination	  feminism’.	  This	   is	  
because,	  as	  I	  argue	  above,	  subordination	  feminisms	  do	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  hold	  
that	   sexuality	   is	   the	   root	   of	   the	   oppression	   of	  women	   or	   that	   female	   sexuality	   is	  
inevitably	  oppressed.	  Therefore,	  not	  all	  subordination	  feminisms	  equate	  to	  sexual-­‐
subordination	   feminism	   in	   this	   sense.	   Materialist	   and	   socialist	   subordination	  
feminism,	   for	   example,	   focuses	   on	   how	   material	   inequalities	   or	   socio-­‐economic	  
structures	  disadvantage	  women	  and	  often	  claims	  that	  material	  inequality	  is	  the	  root	  
cause	   of	   women’s	   oppression	   and	   men’s	   domination. 69 	  They	   are	   primarily	  
materialist	   and	   socialist	   subordination	   feminism	   in	   this	   sense,	   rather	   than	   ‘sexual-­‐
subordination	   feminism’,	   which	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   a	   sub-­‐group	   of	  
subordination	  feminisms.	  	  
Following	   this	   point,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   further	   suggest	   that	   while	   some	   pro-­‐sex	  
feminists	  refute	  the	  sexual-­‐subordination	  feminist	  approach	  in	  sexuality	  issues,	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  See	  MacKinnon,	  ‘Feminism,	  Marxism,	  Method,	  and	  the	  State:	  Toward	  Feminist	  Jurisprudence’,	  n	  56	  
above,	  635-­‐658;	  MacKinnon,	  Toward	  a	  Feminist	  Theory	  of	   the	  State,	  n	  56	  above,	  126-­‐153,171-­‐183;	  
Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  41-­‐58.	  
66	  See	  Halley,	  ibid.,	  29-­‐30.	  
67	  Rubin,	  n	  61	  above,	  23-­‐34.	  
68	  Butler,	  n	  64	  above,	  9-­‐14.	  
69	  See	  for	  example	  Jackson,	  and	  Lacey,	  n	  34	  above,	  811-­‐813.	  
57	  
	  
might	  still	  hold	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  subordination	  feminist	  approach,	  especially	  in	  issues	  
other	   than	   sexuality.	   Socialist	   subordination	   feminist	   theory	   argues	   that	   the	  
subordinate	   status	   of	   women	   is	   based	   on	   social	   economic	   systems,	   but	   not	  
sexuality,	   can	   be	   an	   example.	   There	   can	   be	   feminist	   projects	   that	   hold	   both	   the	  
characteristics	   of	   ‘sex-­‐positive’	   feminist	   perspectives	   and	   the	   characteristics	   of	  
subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  can	  take	  
an	  overall	   sex-­‐positive	  view	  on	  sexuality	   issues	  but	  still	   claim	  that	   the	  subordinate	  
status	  of	  women	  or	  femininity	  on	  grounds	  other	  than	  oppressed	  female	  sexuality.	  	  
Gayle	   Rubin’s	   pro-­‐sex	   feminism	   is	   an	   example.	   Her	   feminist	   analysis	   incorporates	  
both	   pro-­‐sex	   feminist 70 	  and	   socialist	   subordination	   feminist	   orientations	   and	  
approaches.71	  She	  presents	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘political	  economics	  of	  sex’	  and	  holds	  
that	  gender	  is	  hierarchical	  and	  women	  are	  the	  oppressed	  and	  subordinated	  gender	  
in	   the	   sex/gender	   system.72	  The	   origin	   of	  women’s	   oppression	   is	   highly	   related	   to	  
the	  gender	  division	  of	  labour.73	  She	  points	  out	  an	  ‘assumption	  that	  gender	  involves	  
masculine	  dominance	  and	   feminine	  oppression	  or	   inequality.’74	  She	  maintains	   that	  
feminism	   is	   a	   theory	   of	   analysing	   and	   addressing	   gender	   hierarchy,	   women’s	  
oppression	   and	   gender	   injustices	   and	   that	   feminism	   has	   explanatory	   power	   on	  
gender	  justice	  issues.75	  	  
However,	  while	  she	  suggests	  that	  feminism	  has	  explanatory	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  
gender	  issues,	  she	  also	  argues	  that	  sexual	  politics	  should	  not	  be	  dominated	  only	  by	  
(subordination)	   feminist	   assumptions	   and	   viewpoints	   of	   gender	   hierarchy	   and	  
women’s	   oppression.	   This	   is	   not	   because	   she	   believes	  women	   are	   not	   oppressed	  
because	  of	  their	  gender.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  she	  does	  argue	  that	  women	  are	  the	  
oppressed	   gender	   group	   in	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   systems.	   	   This	   is	   rather	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Rubin,	  n	  61	  above,	  3-­‐44.	  
71	  Gayle	  S.	  Rubin,	   ‘The	  Traffic	   in	  Women:	  Notes	  on	  the	  ‘’Political	  Economy’’	  of	  Sex’,	   in	  Deviations:	  A	  
Gayle	  Rubin	  Reader	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  33-­‐65.	  
72	  Ibid.	  
73	  Jonathan	  Ned	  Katz,	  The	  Invention	  of	  Heterosexuality	   (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007),	  
133-­‐135.	  
74	  Halley,	  n	  15	  above,	  118.	  
75	  Rubin,	  n	  61	  above,	  28,	  32-­‐34.	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because	   she	   thinks	   that	   not	   all	   oppression	   in	   sexuality	   can	   be	   analysed	   from	  
subordination	  feminist	  perspectives.76	  She	  argues	  that:	  
‘Feminist	  conceptual	  tools	  were	  developed	  to	  detect	  and	  analyse	  gender-­‐
based	  hierarchies.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  overlap	  with	  erotic	  
stratifications,	  feminist	  theory	  has	  some	  explanatory	  power.	  But	  as	  
issues	  become	  less	  those	  of	  gender	  and	  more	  those	  of	  sexuality,	  feminist	  
analysis	  becomes	  misleading	  and	  often	  irrelevant.	  Feminist	  thought	  
simply	  lacks	  angles	  of	  vision	  which	  can	  fully	  encompass	  the	  social	  
organization	  of	  sexuality.’77	  
She	  argues	  that	  sexuality	  oppression	  and	  erotic	   injustices	  are	  not	  always	  reducible	  
to	  gender	  oppression	  and	  gender	  injustices.	  Therefore,	  in	  some	  erotic	  injustice	  cases	  
it	  is	  not	  suitable	  to	  resort	  to	  a	  subordination	  feminist	  lens	  when	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  
related	  to	  gender.	  She	  warns	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  sexuality	  justice	  issues	  to	  largely	  
gender	   hierarchy	   issues	   is	   dangerous.	   Rubin	   thinks	   that	   sexual-­‐subordination	  
feminist	   ideologies	   and	   proposals	   sometimes	   perpetuate	   erotic	   injustices	   by	  
maintaining	   violent	   sexual	   stratification	   and	   sexual	   hierarchy	   based	   on	   some	  
problematic	  moralist,	  conservative	  and	  regulatory	  projects	  and	  ideologies	  of	  sexual	  
justice	  and	  sexual	  ethics.	  Marginal	  erotic	  practices	  such	  as	  S&M,	  fetish,	  promiscuity	  
or	   commercial	   sex	   are	   easily	   stigmatised.	   She	   urges	   us	   to	   develop	   a	   relatively	  
autonomous	   theory	   and	   a	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   that	   is	   not	   solely	   premised	   on	  
subordination	  feminist	  analyses	  of	  gender.78	  	  She	  thinks	  subordination	  feminisms	  of	  
gender	   hierarchy	   and	   oppression	   does	   have	   authority	   in	   gender	   injustice	   cases;	  
however,	  she	  also	  argues	  that	  not	  all	  sexuality	  injustice	  cases	  are	  directly	  related	  to,	  
or	   indeed	   belong	   to,	   gender	   injustice	   issues.	   Thus,	   they	   ought	   not	   to	   always	   be	  
addressed	  and	  proceeded	  from	  a	  subordination	  feminist	  gender	  hierarchy	  approach.	  
Therefore,	  her	  theory	  shares	  both	  subordination	  feminist	  characteristics	  on	  gender	  
hierarchy	  and	  women’s	   subordination	  and	  sex-­‐positive	   feminist	   thinking	  on	   sexual	  
freedom.	  	  She	  claims	  that	  ‘[i]n	  the	  long	  run,	  feminism’s	  critique	  of	  gender	  hierarchy	  
must	   be	   incorporated	   into	   a	   radical	   theory	   of	   sex,	   and	   the	   critique	   of	   sexual	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  Ibid.,	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oppression	  should	  enrich	  feminism.	  But	  an	  autonomous	  theory	  and	  politics	  specific	  
to	   sexuality	  must	   be	   developed.’79	  Here	   she	   implies	   that	   a	   subordination	   feminist	  
gender	  hierarchy	  approach	  still	  has	  the	  authority	  over	  gender	  justice	  issues.	  	  
There	   are	   both	   significant	   contributions	   and	   limitations	   to	   Rubin’s	   sexual	   justice	  
project.	  She	   rightly	  criticises	   the	  conservative	  moralist	  and	   totalising	   tendencies	   in	  
many	   sexual-­‐subordination	   feminisms	   on	   erotic	   justice	   issues.	   She	   is	   also	   right	   to	  
claim	   that	   gender	   perspective	   is	   not,	   and	   ought	   not	   to	   be,	   the	   only	   overarching	  
perspective	  when	  thinking	  about	  law	  and	  sexuality.	  However,	  it	  can	  be	  problematic	  
to	   boldly	   assume	   and	   imply	   that	   subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   are	   always	  
useful	  and	  proper	   in	  thinking	  about	  gender	   justice	   issues.	  She	  seems	  to	   imply	  that	  
subordination	   feminist	  perspectives	  and	  viewpoints	  have	   the	  ultimate	  authority	   in	  
gender	  justice	  analyses.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  gender	  relations	  and	  the	  issues	  of	  gender	  
injustices,	  however,	  are	  much	  more	  complicated	  than	  what	  subordination	  feminist	  
theories	   hold.	  Although	   subordination	   feminist	   approaches	   to	   gender	   justice	   have	  
their	  value	  and	  contribution,	  they	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  the	  only	  authority	   in	  
gender	  justice	  projects,	  a	  point	  I	  shall	  elaborate	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  
In	   summary,	   subordination	   feminist	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics	   projects	   are	  
premised	   on,	   hold,	   or	   imply	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   current	   system	   and	   culture	   is	  
patriarchal	  and	  male-­‐dominant80	  and	  that	  men	  or	  masculinity	  are	  overall	  valued	  and	  
prioritised	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   women	   or	   the	   devaluation	   of	   femininity,	   and	   the	  
oppression	   is	   overall	   unilateral.	   	   Their	   normative	   gender	   justice	   projects	   are	  
informed	  by	  the	  above	  belief	  and	  premise	  and	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  addressing	  gender	  
injustices	  and	  oppression	  towards	  women	  or	  femininity.	  
The	  problem	  of	   subordination	   feminist	   legal	   and	  political	  projects	   is	  not	   that	   they	  
deny	   the	   existence	  of	   any	   disadvantages	   of	   or	   injuries	   to	   any	  man.	   Subordination	  
feminisms	  do	  not	  necessarily	  hold	  an	  absolute	  claim	  that	  all	  men	  are	  always	  equally	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  Ibid.,	  34.	  
80	  See	  Øystein	  Gullvåg	  Holter,	  ‘Social	  Theories	  for	  Researching	  Men	  and	  Masculinities:	  Direct	  Gender	  
Hierarchy	  and	  Structural	  Inequality’,	  in	  Michael	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  Kimmel,	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  and	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  Connell,	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Handbook	  of	  Studies	  on	  Men	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powerful	   and	   dominant	   in	   society	   or	   never	   experience	   any	   sex/gender	  
discrimination	   or	   disadvantage.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   by	   adopting	   subordination	  
feminist	   ways	   of	   thinking,	   scholars,	   politicians	   and	   policy	   makers	   tend	   to	   easily,	  
consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  trivialise,	  marginalise	  or	  individualise	  sexual	  injustices	  
towards	  men	  in	  their	  normative	  projects	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  	  	  
There	   are	   several	   typical	   strategies	   or	   models	   usually	   found	   or	   deployed	   in	  
subordination	   feminisms	   on	   issues	   of	   gender	   oppression	   of	   and	   gender	   injustices	  
towards	  men	   in	  heteronormative	   society.	   	   The	   first	   is	   that	   they	  might	  explicitly	  or	  
implicitly	  deny,	  ignore	  or	  question	  the	  existence	  of	  certain	  sexual	  injustices	  towards	  
men	  or	  assume	  the	   insignificance	  of	  certain	  sexual	   injustices	   towards	  men	   in	   their	  
projects.	  For	  example,	  radical	  feminist	  MacKinnon	  suggests	  that	  men	  are	  not	  victims	  
of	  domestic	  violence,	  rape,	  sexual	  violence	  and	  sexual	  harassment	  except	  in	  prisons	  
and	   in	   child	   abuse	   cases.	   She	   implies	   that	   adult	   men	   are	   not	   victimised	   and	  
assaulted	  by	  women	  in	  domestic	  violence,	  sexual	  violence	  and	  sexual	  harassment.81	  
Here	   she	   holds	   a	   heteronormative	   belief	   and	   myth	   (men	   are	   aggressive	   and	  
invulnerable/women	  are	  harmless	  and	  vulnerable)	   in	  domestic	  violence	  and	  sexual	  
violence	  jurisprudence	  and	  is	  sceptical	  of	  the	  realities	  that	  ‘ordinary’,	  ‘normal’	  men	  
can	   be	   victimised	   in	   intimate	   and	   sexual	   relations.	   	   However,	   as	   I	   will	   soon	  
elaborate,	  family	  violence	  affects	  not	  only	  heterosexual	  women,	  but	  also	  gay	  men,	  
lesbians	  and	  heterosexual	  men.	  MacKinnon	  holds	  an	  inappropriate	  heteronormative	  
myth	   and	   ideology	   of	   family	   violence	   and	   sexual	   violence.	   Rather	   than	   promoting	  
sexual	  justice,	  her	  theory	  in	  fact	  is	  likely	  to	  produce	  and	  perpetuate	  oppressive	  and	  
biased	  ideologies,	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  	  
Subordination	   feminism	   may	   also	   acknowledge	   the	   existence	   of	   certain	   sexual	  
injustices	  towards	  men	  but	  nevertheless	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously	   individualise	  
or	   trivialise	   them	   by	  maintaining	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   injustices	   are	   rare,	   are	   only	  
individual	   cases,	   are	   not	   systematic	   social	   injustices,	   or	   are	   generally	   insignificant	  
and	  not	  worth	  serious	  consideration	  and	  protection	  in	  law	  and	  politics.	  For	  example,	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family	  law	  scholar	  Michael	  Freeman	  argues	  that	  ‘[t]here	  is	  domestic	  violence	  against	  
men…But	   it	  must	  be	   stressed	   that	   the	  social	  problem	   is	  domestic	  violence	  against	  
women.’82	  	  Also,	  for	  instance,	  some	  subordination	  feminists	  question	  whether	  there	  
can	   be	   real	   male	   domestic	   victimisation	   by	   women	   in	   the	   context	   of	   current	  
patriarchal	  and	  male	  dominant	  culture.83	  They	  may	  also	  tend	  to	  trivialise	  the	  harm	  
and	   injustice	  of	   female	  violence	  against	  men.84	  I	  will	   critically	  evaluate	   this	  kind	  of	  
subordination	  feminist	  approach	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
Some	  subordination	  feminists	  hold	  that	  the	  disadvantages	  men	  experience,	  such	  as	  
the	  burden	  of	   the	   role	  of	  breadwinner,	  are	  only	   costs	   for	  men	   to	  pay	   to	  maintain	  
their	  male	  dominance	  and	  privileges.	   	  They	   insist	  that	  the	  disadvantages	  men	  may	  
experience	  are	   just	  costs	  and	  are	  only	  the	  by-­‐products	  of	  male	  privileges.	   In	  other	  
words,	   their	  experiences	  are	  not	   treated	  and	  viewed	  as	  gender	  oppression	  per	  se.	  
They	  tend	  to	  view	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  women	  as	  unfair	  gender	  discrimination	  and	  
gender	  oppression,	  but	  think	  the	  disadvantages	  of	  men	  are	  only	  costs	  that	  men	  pay	  
for	   their	  power.85	  The	  problem	  of	   this	   kind	  of	   subordination	   feminism	   is	   that	   they	  
already	  wear	  a	  stereotypical	  and	  prejudicial	   lens	   in	   interpreting	  gender	  oppression	  
of	  men	  and	  women.	  They	  implicitly	  assume	  heteronormative	  stereotypes	  of	  men’s	  
invulnerability	   and	  women’s	   vulnerability	   in	   thinking	   about	   gender	   oppression.	   By	  
doing	   so,	   they	   are	   actually	   repeating	   and	   reproducing	   a	   heteronormative	   gender	  
dichotomy	   by	   constructing	  men’s	   disadvantages	   as	   costs	   and	   by	   perpetuating	   the	  
myths	  that	  only	  women	  experience	  gender	  oppression.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  approach	  of	  
queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   offers	   a	   more	   nuanced	   and	  
multifaceted	  concept	  of	  gender	  oppression.	   I	  hold	   that	   the	  employment	  of	   such	  a	  
concept	   of	   gender	   oppression	  may	   reveal	  more	   realities	   of	   gender	   injustices	   than	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  example,	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the	   oversimplified	   gender	   oppression	   concept	   held	   by	   some	   subordination	  
feminists.	   The	  multifaceted	   concept	   of	   gender	   oppression	   could	   be	   an	   important	  
analytic	   tool	   to	   dispel	   some	   myths	   and	   biases	   in	   the	   regimes	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  
Or	  subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  may	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  variations	   in	  men	  
and	  not	  all	  sub-­‐groups	  of	  men	  are	  equally	  powerful.	  Nevertheless,	  overall,	  men	  are	  
still	   the	  privileged	  and	  dominant	  gender	  group	  and	  therefore	  gender	  oppression	   is	  
still	  overall	  unilateral.86	  By	  emphasising	  the	  importance	  of	  identity	  intersection,	  they	  
often	  imply	  that	  although	  men	  are	  privileged	  because	  of	  their	  sex/gender,	  they	  can	  
be	   subordinated	   by	   other	   identities	   such	   as	   sexuality,	   class	   or	   race.	   For	   example,	  
they	  might	   argue	   that	   gay	  men	   are	   simultaneously	   privileged	   and	   disadvantaged.	  
Gay	   men	   are	   privileged	   because	   of	   their	   male	   gender,	   but	   socially	   oppressed	  
because	   of	   their	   sexuality.87	  I	   will	   respond	   to	   this	   kind	   of	   perspective	   in	   a	   later	  
chapter.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   intersectionality	   concerns,	   although	   very	  
helpful	  and	  important	  in	  some	  aspects,	  are	  incapable	  of	  fundamentally	  overcoming	  
the	   limitations	  of	   simplified	  and	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  perspective	  of	  gender	   in	   some	  
subordination	  feminisms.	  
Some	  subordination	   feminist	  approaches	  claim	  that,	  unlike	  women’s	   interests,	   the	  
needs	   and	   interests	   of	  men	   are	   already	   well	   represented	   and	   covered	   in	   current	  
patriarchal	   and	  male	   dominant	   society.88	  They	   argue	   that	   since	   the	   resources	   for	  
promoting	  gender	  justice	  are	  limited,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  adopt	  a	  subordination	  feminist	  
approach	   in	   gender	   justice	   projects	   by	   prioritising	   and	   privileging	  women’s	   needs	  
and	   women’s	   concerns.89	  I	   argue	   that	   this	   way	   of	   thinking	   not	   only	   neglects	   and	  
marginalises	   gender	   constraints	   of	   men	   too	   easily,	   but	   also	   fails	   to	   distinguish	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Michael	   Kimmel,	  Misframing	   Men:	   The	   Politics	   of	   Contemporary	   Masculinities	   (New	   Brunswick:	  
Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  215-­‐216.	  
87	  See	  for	  example,	  Jackson,	  n	  9	  above,	  68-­‐77.	  Also,	  Wittman,	  n	  50	  above,	  330-­‐341.	  
88	  For	   example,	   see	   Kenneth	   Clatterbaugh,	   ‘Men’s	   Liberation’,	   in	   Michael	   Flood,	   Judith	   Kegan	  
Gardiner,	   Bob	   Pease,	   and	   Keith	   Pringle	   eds.,	   International	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Men	   and	  Masculinities	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  416.	  
89	  For	   example,	   see	   liberal	   feminist	   Nancy	   Levit’s	   outline	   of	   such	   kind	   of	   arguments	   in	   Levit,	   n	   36	  
above,	  200-­‐201.	  Also,	  Chant	  and	  Gutmann,	  n	  39	  above,	  16-­‐23.	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between	   patriarchal	   thinking	   and	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  masculinities	   studies.	  
Patriarchal	   thinking	  about	  gender	  maintains	  conservative	  and	   traditionalist	  gender	  
stereotypes	   and	   ideologies.	   In	   modern	   societies	   there	   are	   two	   major	   forms	   of	  
traditionalist	   patriarchal	   thinking	   in	   gender:	   sexism	   against	  women	   and	   chivalry.90	  
Queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  oppose	  both	  traditionalist	  sexist	  and	  
chivalrous	  ideologies	  of	  gender/sexuality.	  I	  argue	  that	  patriarchal	  ideologies,	  sexism	  
and	  chivalry,	  do	  not	  really	  represent	  either	  men	  or	  women’s	  real	   interests	  and	  are	  
harmful	   and	   oppressive	   to	   both	  men	   and	   to	  women.91	  So	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   are	  
more	  male	  politicians	  than	  female	  politicians	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  men’s	  
critical	  interests	  are	  well	  represented,	  understood	  and	  addressed	  in	  law	  and	  politics.	  
If	   most	  male	   politicians	   still	   hold	   sexist	   or	   chivalrous	   beliefs,	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	  
properly	   represent	   and	   promote	   the	   real	   interests	   of	   both	   men	   and	   women.	  
Unfortunately,	  many	  male	   politicians	   do	   hold	  manifest	   traditionalist	   or	   chivalrous	  
ideologies	  of	   gender/sexuality.	   In	   these	   circumstances	  patriarchal	  male	  politicians,	  
judges	  and	  policy	  makers	  may	   impose	  problematic	  gender	  norms	  on	  both	  women	  
and	   men,	   especially	   on	   lower	   status	   men,	   such	   as	   the	   imposition	   of	   compulsory	  
military	  service.92	  So	  it	  is	  a	  myth	  to	  claim	  that	  because	  the	  majority	  of	  politicians	  are	  
men,	  men’s	  interests	  are	  necessarily	  well	  represented,	  promoted	  and	  addressed.	  	  
Furthermore,	  some	  feminist	  projects,	  especially	  queer	  feminisms,	  may	  adopt	  a	  more	  
nuanced,	  more	  helpful	  and	  in	  many	  respects	  a	  welcome	  perspective	  by	  taking	  more	  
seriously	  the	  voices	  and	  experiences	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minorities93.	  This	  kind	  of	  
feminist	   argument	   partially	   overcomes	   the	   limitations	   of	   other	   subordination	  
feminist	   approaches.	   However,	   they	   are	   sometimes	   still	   restricted	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Pasi	   Malmi.	   Discrimination	   Against	   Men:	   Appearance	   and	   Causes	   In	   The	   Context	   of	   a	   Modern	  
Welfare	  State.	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  Lapland,	  2009),	  237-­‐240.	  
91	  See	   my	   discussions	   of	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   in	   section	   4.1	   in	   Chapter	   4.	  
Humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   patriarchal,	   traditionalist,	   and	  
chivalrous	  thinking	  and	  ideologies	  actually	  harm	  men	  (and	  women).	  
92	  Not	  only	  several	  European	  states	  still	  keep	  the	  system	  of	  compulsory	  military	  service	  but	  also	  do	  
countries	   in	  East	  Asia	  such	  as	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea.	  These	  countries	  still	   require	  all	  adult	  young	  
men,	  but	  not	  women	  to	  serve	  1	  to	  2	  years	  civil	  or	  military	  services.	  See	  my	  discussion	  of	  compulsory	  
military	  service	  and	  normative	  masculinity	  in	  section	  4.1	  in	  Chapter	  4.	  
93	  For	   example	   see	   Butler	   n	   16	   above.	   Also,	   Mimi	   Marinucci,	   Feminism	   Is	   Queer:	   The	   Intimate	  
Connection	  Between	  Queer	  And	  Feminist	  Theory	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2011).	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subordination	  gender	  thesis	  and	  are	  not	  totally	  immune	  from	  the	  limitations	  we	  find	  
in	  subordination	  feminisms.	  They	  argue	  that	  not	  only	  women,	  but	  also	  a	  minority	  of	  
sexual	  and	  gender	  non-­‐conformity	  men	  such	  as	  gay	  men,	  bi	  men,	  feminine	  men,	  and	  
trans	  people	  are	  victimized	  by	  dominant	  gender	  norms	  and	  patriarchal	  culture.	  Like	  
women	  (as	  a	  gender	  group)	  who	  are	  oppressed	  by	  dominant	  gender	  norms,	   these	  
sexual	   and	   gender	   non-­‐conformity	   men	   are	   also	   oppressed	   in	   heteronormative	  
culture	   and	   should	   be	   protected	   by	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	   equality	   projects.94	  
They	  wish	  to	  highlight	  that	  not	  only	  women	  can	  suffer	  from	  gender	  oppression,	  but	  
also	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minority	  men.	  However,	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  they	  
generally	   still	   imply	   in	   their	   projects	   that	   those	   men	   who	   suffer	   from	   gender	  
oppression	  are	  only	  minorities,	  are	  exceptional,	  and	  are	  oppressed	  because	  of	  their	  
deviation	  from	  standard	  gender	  norms.	  They	  imply	  that	  generally	  men	  (as	  a	  group)	  
do	   not	   experience	   systematic	   gender	   oppression.	   Gender	   relations	   between	  men	  
and	  women	  (or	  between	  masculinity	  and	  femininity)	  are	  still	  hierarchal	  and	  remain	  
a	   topic	   of	   unilateral	   female	   oppression.95	  This	   belief	   system	   has	   some	   important	  
breakthroughs	  because	   it	  goes	  beyond	  pure	  women-­‐centred	  and	  women-­‐exclusive	  
gender	   justice	   projects	   and	   incorporates	   some	   gay	   theories	   or	   queer	   theories’	  
concerns	   within	   their	   sexual	   justice	   projects.	   There	   are	   significant	   merits	   in	   this	  
approach.	   However,	   I	   will	   later	   contend	   in	   Chapter	   4	   that	   there	   are	   still	   major	  
limitations	  in	  this	  approach.	  	  
I	  will	  respond	  to	  the	  above	  feminist	  perspectives	  on	  sexual	   injustices	  towards	  men	  
from	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’	  perspectives	  in	  later	  chapters.	  I	  
will	  argue	  that	  while	  some	  of	  the	  above	  accounts	  are	  helpful	  to	  some	  extent,	  overall	  
they	  might	  not	  always	  be	  able	  to	  fundamentally	  overcome	  the	  major	  limitations	  of	  
subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   and	   projects	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	  
and	   gender.	   I	   will	   use	   family	   justice	   and	   family	   violence	   issues	   as	   examples	   to	  
critically	  examine	  subordination	  feminist	  approaches	  to	  sexual	  justice.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  For	  example,	  see	  Butler,	  n	  23	  above,	  6-­‐7.	  Also,	  Rubin,	  n	  61	  above,	  3-­‐44.	  
95	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  6-­‐7;	  Butler,	  n	  64	  above,	  23-­‐24.;	  Rubin,	  ibid.,	  3-­‐44.	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I	   would	   like	   to	   contend	   that	   although	   having	   supplied	   a	   great	   contribution,	  
subordination	  feminist	  projects	  do	  not	  capture,	  unravel	  or	  address	  the	  full	  picture	  of	  
sexual	   injustices	   and	   gender	   oppression.	   Furthermore,	   some	   of	   their	   ideologies,	  
assumptions	   and	   proposals	   might	   be	   at	   risk	   of	   producing,	   reproducing	   and	  
perpetuating	   certain	   old	   and	   new	   forms	   of	   sexual	   injustices,	   hierarchies	   and	  
exclusion.	   	   I	   will	   illustrate	   and	   critically	   analyse	   subordination	   feminism	   and	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   later	  
chapters.	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Chapter	  3   Sexual	  Politics,	  Sexual	  Justice,	  Gender	  Oppression,	  and	  the	  
Critiques	  of	  Normative	  Heterosexuality	  in	  Gay	  
Liberationist	  Studies,	  Subordination	  Feminism,	  and	  
Subordination-­‐feminist	  Men	  and	  Masculinities	  Studies	  
3.1   Introduction	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  the	  usage	  of	  some	  key	  terms	  and	  concepts	  were	  elaborated	  
upon	  and	  clarified	  within	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis.	  In	  the	  following	  three	  chapters,	  I	  
will	   critically	   review	   how	   issues	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   sexual	   justice	   and	  
gender	   oppression	   are	   reflected,	   understood	   and	   debated	   in	   contemporary	  
progressive	  or	  critical	  legal	  and	  political	  theories	  about	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   start	   with	   reviewing	   some	   high	   profile	   gay	   liberationist	   theories,	  
subordination	  feminisms,	  and	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’	  
arguments	  about	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  How	  
effective	   are	   their	   projects	   in	   unsettling	   heteronormativity?	   What	   kinds	   of	  
perspectives	  might	   be	   underdeveloped	   and	  worth	   further	   research?	   I	   identify	   the	  
works	  and	  approaches	   in	  need	  of	   further	  development	   in	   this	   area.	   I	   suggest	   that	  
one	  of	  the	  major	  academic	  gaps	  in	  contemporary	  legal	  and	  political	  research	  on	  the	  
critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  sexual	  justice	  is	  that	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  
attention	   paid	   to	   the	   research	   and	   investigations	   into	   how	   systematic	   and	  
institutional	  gender	  oppression	  might	  constrain,	  oppress	  and	  disadvantage	  men	  by	  
unjust	  and	  biased	  gender	  norms,	  stereotypes,	  practices	  and	  ideologies	  in	  normative	  
heterosexuality.	   I	  will	  contend	  that	  more	  research	  ought	  to	  be	  conducted	   in	  these	  
areas	   to	   help	   us	   better	   understand	   and	   further	   challenge	   the	   institutions,	  
assumptions,	  stereotypes,	  practices	  and	  culture	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  
As	   stated	   in	   chapter	  one,	  normative	  heterosexuality	  denotes	   social	   structures	  and	  
social	  orders	  that	  privilege	  and	  normalise	  the	  systems,	  culture,	  rules,	  assumptions,	  
practices	   and	   ideologies	   of	   heterosexuality.	   Lesbian	   and	   radical	   feminists,	   gay	  
liberationists,	  and	  later	  queer	  theorists	  are	  among	  the	  main	  theoretical	  contributors	  
to	   the	   reflection	   on,	   and	   critiques	   of,	   compulsory	   and	   normative	   heterosexuality.	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Overall	  they	  find	  that	  heterosexuality	  is	  not	  just	  about	  personal	  sexual	  preference	  or	  
practice,	  but	  is	  also	  about	  an	  oppressive	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  conforming	  systems,	  
regimes	  and	  cultures.	  	  
The	   origin	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   the	   critiques	   of	  
heterosexuality	  as	  an	  unjust	  social	  order	  can	  be	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  
last	   century	   when	   some	   early	   lesbian	   and	   radical	   feminists	   and	   gay	   liberationists	  
began	  to	  question	  the	  institution	  of	  heterosexuality	  and	  to	  contest	  the	  gender	  and	  
sexuality	   order	   they	   found	   problematic	   in	   dominant	   heterosexuality.1	  Since	   then	  
scholars	   have	   used	   several	   different	   but	   related	   terms	   for	   their	   critiques	   of	   the	  
hegemonic	   system	   and	   culture	   of	   heterosexuality,	   such	   as	   the	   concepts	   of	  
‘heterosexual	   imaginary,’ 2 	  ‘heterosexual	   matrix,’	   ‘heterosexual	   contract,’ 3	  
‘compulsory	  heterosexuality,’4	  and	  ‘hetero-­‐patriarchy.’5	  For	  example	  queer	  feminist	  
Judith	   Butler	   labels	   the	   compulsory	   coherence	   among	   sexed	   bodies,	   gender	   and	  
sexual	   desires	   in	   the	   culture	   of	   heterosexuality	   as	   ‘the	   heterosexual	   matrix.’	   She	  
argues	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  heterosexual	  matrix	  can	  be	  understood	  as:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  see	  Chrys	  
Ingraham,	   ‘Heterosexuality:	   It’s	   Just	   Not	   Natural!’,	   in	   Diane	   Richardson	   and	   Steven	   Seidman	   eds.,	  
Handbook	   of	   Lesbian	   and	   Gay	   Studies	   (London:	   Sage,	   2002),	   74-­‐7;	   Chrys	   Ingraham,	   ‘The	   Thinking	  
Straight,	  and	  Acting	  Bent:	  Heteronormativity	  and	  Homosexuality’,	  in	  Davis	  et	  al.	  eds.,	  The	  Handbook	  
of	   Gender	   and	   Women	   Studies	   (London:	   Sage,	   2006),	   313-­‐318;	   Steven	   Seidman,	   ’Critique	   of	  
Compulsory	  Heterosexuality’,	  in	  Lena	  Martinsson	  and	  Eva	  Reimers	  eds.,	  Norm-­‐struggles:	  Sexuality	  in	  
Contentions	   (Newcastle:	   Cambridge	   Scholars	   Publishing,	   2010),	   191-­‐208;	   Also,	   Jonathan	   Ned	   Katz,	  
The	  Invention	  of	  Heterosexuality	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007),	  113-­‐166.	  
2	  Ingraham	   argues	   that	   heterosexual	   imaginary	   is	   a	   ‘way	   of	   thinking	   that	   relies	   on	   romantic	   and	  
sacred	  notions	  of	  heterosexuality.’	  This	  kind	  of	  ideology	  and	  thinking	  organises	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  
orders	   in	   societies	   while	   also	   helping	   to	   maintain	   racial	   and	   class	   hierarchies.	   She	   argues	   that	  
‘[t]hrough	   the	   use	   of	   the	   heterosexual	   imaginary,	  we	   hold	   up	   the	   institution	   of	   heterosexuality	   as	  
timeless,	  devoid	  of	  historical	  variation,	  and	  as	  “just	  the	  way	  it	  is”	  while	  creating	  social	  practices	  that	  
reinforce	  the	   illusion	  that	  as	   long	  as	  one	  complies	  with	  this	  prevailing	  and	  naturalized	  structure,	  all	  
will	   be	   right	   in	   the	   world.’	   See	   Chrys	   Ingraham,	   ‘Heterosexual	   Imaginary’,	   In	   George	   Ritzer	   ed.,	  
Blackwell	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Sociology	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2007).Blackwell	  Reference	  Online.	  (Accessed	  
10	  August,	  2014).	  	  
http://www.sociologyencyclopedia.com/subscriber/tocnode.html?id=g9781405124331_yr2013_chu
nk_g978140512433114_ss1-­‐26	  	  	  
See	  also	  Chrys	  Ingraham,	  ‘The	  Heterosexual	   Imaginary:	  Feminist	  Sociology	  and	  Theories	  of	  Gender’,	  
Sociological	  Theory	  12,	  no.	  2	  (1994),	  203-­‐19.	  	  
3	  Monique	  Wittig,	  The	  Straight	  Mind	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1992),	  34.	  
4	  Adrienne	  Rich,	  ‘Compulsory	  Heterosexuality	  and	  Lesbian	  Existence’,	  in	  Henry	  Abelove,	  Michele	  Aina	  
Barale	   and	  David	  M.	  Halperin	   eds.,	   Lesbian	   and	  Gay	   Studies	   Reader	   Volume	   I	   (London:	   Routledge,	  
1993),	  232-­‐239.	  
5	  Francisco	  Valdes,	   ‘Unpacking	  Hetero-­‐patriarchy:	  Tracing	   the	  Conflation	  of	   Sex,	  Gender	  and	  Sexual	  
Orientation	  to	  Its	  Origins’,	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  Law	  &	  the	  Humanities	  8,	  no.1	  (1996),	  161-­‐209.	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‘[t]hat	  grid	  of	  cultural	  intelligibility	  through	  which	  bodies,	  genders,	  and	  
desires	  are	  naturalized….a	  hegemonic	  discursive/epistemic	  model	  of	  
gender	  intelligibility	  that	  assumes	  that	  for	  bodies	  to	  cohere	  and	  make	  
sense	  there	  must	  be	  a	  stable	  sex	  expressed	  through	  a	  stable	  gender	  
(masculine	  expresses	  male,	  feminine	  expresses	  female)	  that	  is	  
oppositionally	  and	  hierarchically	  defined	  through	  the	  compulsory	  
practice	  of	  heterosexuality.’6	  
Critical	   sexual	   theorist	   and	   sociologist,	   Steven	   Seidman	   suggests	   the	   phrase	  
‘institutionalized	  normative	  heterosexuality’	  to	  denote	  both	  gender	  normativity	  and	  
sexuality	   normativity	   in	   the	   institutions	   and	   culture	   of	   heterosexuality.7	  Feminist	  
Chrys	   Ingraham,	   uses	   the	   term	   ‘heterosexual	   imaginary’	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   ‘way	   of	  
thinking	   that	   conceals	   the	   operation	   of	   heterosexuality	   in	   structuring	   gender	   and	  
closes	  off	  any	  critical	  analysis	  of	  heterosexuality	  as	  an	  organizing	  institution.’8	  	  
Overall	   among	   the	   different	   terminologies	   used,	   ‘normative	   heterosexuality’	   or	  
‘heteronormativity’	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  popular	  when	  referring	  to	  the	  hegemonic,	  
privileged,	   unmarked	   and	   naturalised	   institutions	   and	   culture	   of	   heterosexuality.9	  
The	   term	   ‘heteronormativity’	   is	   first	  used	  by	  queer	   scholar	  Michael	  Warner	   in	   the	  
early	  1990s,10	  while	  ‘normative	  heterosexuality’	  first	  appeared	  early	  lesbian	  feminist	  
works.11	  Warner	   himself	   acknowledges	   that	   his	   concept	   of	   heteronormativity	   is	  
inspired	  by	   lesbian	   feminist	  Monique	  Wittig’s	   idea	  of	   the	   ‘heterosexual	   contract’12	  
and	  her	  critiques	  of	  heterosexuality.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  Judith	  Butler,	  Gender	  Trouble:	  Feminism	  and	  the	  Subversion	  of	   Identity	   (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  
1999),	  208.	  
7	  See	  Seidman,	  n	  1	  above,	  192	  and	  205-­‐208.	  
8	  Ingraham,	   ‘The	   Thinking	   Straight	   and	   Acting	   Bent:	   Heteronormativity	   and	   Homosexuality’,	   n	   1	  
above,	  311.	  
9	  Ingraham,	   ibid,	   311,	   315;	   Gregory	   M.	   Herek,	   ‘Beyond	   “Homophobia”:	   Thinking	   about	   Sexual	  
Prejudice	  and	  Stigma	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐first	  Century’,	  Sexuality	  Research	  &	  Social	  Policy	  1,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  
16.	  
10	  Michael	   Warner	   is	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   queer	   theorists	   to	   popularise	   the	   use	   of	   the	   term	  
heteronormativity	  in	  queer	  critiques	  of	  dominant	  heterosexual	  culture.	  See	  Michael	  Warner,	  Fear	  of	  
a	  Queer	  Planet:	  Queer	  Politics	  and	  Social	  Theory	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993),	  
xxi-­‐xxv.	  
11	  Ingraham,	   ‘The	   Thinking	   Straight	   and	   Acting	   Bent:	   Heteronormativity	   and	   Homosexuality’,	   n	   1	  
above,	  313.	  
12	  Wittig,	  n	  3	  above,	  34.	  
13	  Warner,	  n	  10	  above,	  xxi.	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In	   this	   thesis	   I	   use	   the	   terms	   ‘normative	   heterosexuality’	   and	   ‘heteronormativity’	  
interchangeably 14 	  to	   denote	   the	   normalisation,	   standardisation,	   privilege	   and	  
hegemony	  of	  certain	  body,	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  norms	  and	  practices	  based	  on	  the	  
ideologies	  and	  culture	  of	  heterosexuality.	  	  	  
3.2   Lesbian	  feminism	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  sexual	  
justice	  and	  gender	  oppression	  
The	  criticisms	  of	  heterosexuality	  as	  a	  normative,	  constraining	  and	  unjust	  social	  order	  
and	  institution	  was	  started	  from	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  by	  a	  number	  of	  lesbian	  
and	   radical	   feminists	  and	  gay	   liberationists.	  Although	  generally	   lesbian	  and	   radical	  
feminists	  and	  gay	  liberationists	  all	  maintain	  that	  heterosexuality	  is	  an	  institution	  and	  
ideologies	  consist	  of	  both	  gender	  oppression	  and	  sexuality	  oppression,15	  they	  tend	  
to	  emphasise	  different	   critiques	  of	  heterosexuality.16	  Lesbian	  and	   radical	   feminists	  
present	   a	   version	   of	   a	   subordination	   feminist	   critique	   of	   heterosexuality.	   They	  
highlight	  the	  problem	  of	  male	  domination	  over	  women	  in	  challenging	  the	  institution	  
of	   heterosexuality.17	  As	   feminist	   theorist	   Gayle	   S.	   Rubin	   has	   pointed	   out:	   ‘lesbian	  
feminist	   ideology	   has	  mostly	   analysed	   the	   oppression	   of	   lesbians	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
oppression	  of	  women.’18	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  male	  domination	  over	  women	   is	  
the	   fundamental	   problem	   and	   the	   fundamental	   injustice	   within	   the	   system	   of	  
heterosexuality.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   gay	   liberationists,	   while	   also	   echoing	   lesbian	  
feminists,	   claim	   that	   in	   the	   institution	   of	   heterosexuality	   gender	   relations	   are	  
hierarchal	   and	  oppressive	   to	  women,	  and	   they	   tend	   to	   focus	  more	  on	  challenging	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  There	  are	  also	  some	  other	  critical	  sexual	  theorists	  who	  also	  generally	  use	  the	  two	  terms	  ‘normative	  
heterosexuality’	  and	  ‘heteronormativity’	  interchangeably.	  For	  example,	  see	  Herek,	  n	  9	  above,	  16.	  
15	  	  Seidman,	  n	  1	  above,	  192.	  
16	  	  Ibid.,	  191-­‐208.	  
17	  Seidman,	  ibid.,	  193-­‐197;	  Katz.	  n	  1	  above,	  113-­‐166;	  Stevi	  Jackson,	  ‘Sexual	  Politics:	  Feminist	  Politics,	  
Gay	   Politics	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Heterosexuality’,	   in	   Terrell	   Carver	   and	   Veronique	   Mottier	   eds.,	  
Politics	   of	   Sexuality	   (Oxford:	   Routledge,	   1998),	   68-­‐78;	   Also,	   Annamarie	   Jagose,	   Queer	   Theory	  
(Victoria:	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  44-­‐57.	  
18	  See	  Gayle	  S.	  Rubin,	  ‘Thinking	  Sex:	  Notes	  for	  a	  Radical	  Theory	  of	  the	  Politics	  of	  Sexuality’,	  in	  Henry	  
Abelove,	  Michele	  Aina	  Barale	  and	  David	  M.	  Halperin	  eds.,	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Studies	  Reader,	  Volume	  I	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  33.	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the	   harm	   and	   injustice	   of	   sexuality	   oppression	   of	   gay	   men	   and	   lesbians	   in	   the	  
institution	  of	  heterosexuality.19	  	  	  
Scholars	   in	  early	   lesbian	   feminist	   group,	  The	  Purple	  September	  Staff,	   and	   feminist	  
Charlotte	  Bunch,	  were	  among	  the	  first	  to	  argue	  that	  heterosexuality	  is	  normative	  in	  
the	  sense	  of	  the	  normalisation	  of	  women’s	  subordinate	  roles	  and	  status	  to	  men	  in	  
societies.20	  Lesbian	   feminist	   Coletta	   Reid	   also	   argues	   that	   ‘heterosexuality	   as	   an	  
institution	   operates	   for	   the	   benefits	   of	   men.’21	  For	   these	   early	   lesbian	   feminists,	  
heterosexuality	   is	   a	   system	  of	   naturalising	   and	   normalising	  male	   domination	   over	  
women.	   ‘They	   maintain	   that	   heterosexuality	   is	   really	   a	   normalized	   power	  
arrangement	  that	  limits	  options	  and	  privileges	  men	  over	  women	  and	  reinforces	  and	  
naturalizes	  male	  dominance.’22	  	  
Furthermore,	   their	   critiques	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   already	   go	   beyond	   the	  
sexuality	  part.	  They	  already	  note	   that	   ‘the	  assumptions	  of	  heterosexuality’	   govern	  
not	  only	  women’s	  erotic	   lives,	  but	  also	  their	  gendered	  social	   life.	  They	  notice	  how	  
broadly	   and	   pervasively	   women’s	   lives	   are	   constrained	   by	   heterosexual	  
assumptions.	   As	  Margaret	   Small	   contends,	   assumptions	   of	   heterosexuality	   almost	  
cover	  ‘everything	  that	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  relationships	  between	  men	  and	  women,’	  
including	   the	   ‘assumptions	   about	   the	   family,	   about	  marriage,	   about	  motherhood,	  
about	   housework,	   about	   childrearing,	   about	   rape,	   about	   illegitimacy,	   about	  
spinsterhood.’23	  Thus,	  early	   lesbian	   feminist	   critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  
are	  not	  just	  about	  criticisms	  of	  oppression	  of	  female	  sexuality	  in	  heterosexuality,	  but	  
also	   about	   the	   subordination	   of	   the	   female	   gender	   in	   normative	   heterosexual	  
society.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  For	  example,	  see	  Seidman,	  n	  1	  above,	  193-­‐197.	  	  
20	  Ingraham,	   ‘The	   Thinking	   Straight	   and	   Acting	   Bent:	   Heteronormativity	   and	   Homosexuality’,	   n	   1	  
above,	  313.	  
21	  Coletta	   Reid,	   ‘Coming	   Out	   in	   the	  Women’s	  Movements’,	   in	   Nancy	  Myron,	   and	   Charlotte	   Bunch	  
eds.,	  Lesbianism	  and	  the	  Women's	  Movement	  (Baltimore:	  Diana	  Press,	  1975),	  101.	  
22	  Ingraham,	  ‘Heterosexuality:	  It’s	  Just	  Not	  Natural!’,	  n	  1	  above,	  74.	  
23	  Margaret	  Small,	  ‘Lesbians	  and	  the	  Class	  Position	  of	  Women’,	  in	  Nancy	  Myron,	  and	  Charlotte	  Bunch	  
eds.,	  Lesbianism	  and	  the	  Women's	  Movement	  (Baltimore:	  Diana	  Press,	  1975),	  59-­‐60.	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One	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  lesbian	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  is	  
Adrienne	  Rich’s	   feminist	   theory.	  Like	  most	  other	  early	   lesbian	   feminists,	   she	  bases	  
her	   critique	   of	   heterosexuality	   on	   subordination	   feminist	   ideology.	   She	   uses	   the	  
concept	  ‘compulsory	  heterosexuality’	  to	  highlight	  her	  claim	  that	  heterosexuality	  is	  a	  
male	   dominated	   institution	   imposed	   upon	   women.24	  She	   holds	   that	   compulsory	  
heterosexuality	   is	   ‘the	   enforcement	   of	   heterosexuality	   for	   women	   as	   a	  means	   of	  
assuring	   male	   right	   of	   physical,	   economic,	   and	   emotional	   access.’25	  For	   her,	   the	  
fundamental	   injustice	   of	   heterosexuality	   is	   rooted	   in	   its	   subordination	   of	   women	  
and	  its	  privileges	  for	  men.	  
From	   the	   perspective	   of	   sexual	   politics,	   Rich	   argues	   that	   heterosexuality	   is	   ‘a	  
political	   institution	  which	   disempowers	  women.’26	  She	   urges	  women	   and	   feminist	  
politics	   to	   adopt	   a	   ‘woman	   identification’27	  approach	   and	   politics	   to	   resist	   ‘male	  
tyranny’28	  in	   compulsory	   heterosexuality.	   She	   uses	   the	   terms	   ‘lesbian	   continuum’	  
and	  ‘lesbian	  existence’	  to	  denote,	  not	  only	  the	  erotic	  experience	  between	  women,	  
but	   also	   the	  non-­‐erotic	  women-­‐identified	   experience	   among	  women,	   such	   as	   ‘the	  
sharing	   of	   a	   rich	   inner	   life,	   the	   bonding	   against	   male	   tyranny,	   the	   giving	   and	  
receiving	  of	  practical	  and	  political	  support.’29	  She	  broadens	  the	  meaning	  of	   lesbian	  
by	   ‘naming	  all	  women-­‐identified	  women	  as	   lesbian.’30	  Lesbianism	   is	  not	   just	  about	  
personal	  sexual	  preference,	  but	  also	  a	  political	  affiliation	  of	  women	   in	  her	  system.	  
To	   her,	   ‘gender	   not	   sexuality,	   is	   the	   primary	   identificatory	   category.’31	  	   Similar	   to	  
some	   other	   lesbian	   feminists	   such	   as	   Sheila	   Jeffreys	   and	   Marilyn	   Frye,	   who	   are	  
critical	  and	  sceptical	  of	  a	   lesbian	  alliance	  with	  gay	  men,32	  Rich	   thinks	   that	   ‘women	  
[rather	  than	  gay	  men]	  are	  the	  natural	  allies	  of	   lesbians.	  Gay	  men,	   in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Rich,	  n	  4	  above,	  232-­‐239.	  
25	  Ibid.,	  238.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  227.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  244-­‐245.	  
28	  Ibid.,	  239.	  
29	  Ibid.,	  239,	  245.	  
30	  Ibid.,	  227.	  
31	  Jagose,	  n	  17	  above,	  50.	  
32	  See	   Sheila	   Jeffreys,	   ‘The	  Queer	   Disappearance	   of	   Lesbians:	   Sexuality	   in	   the	   Academy’,	  Women’s	  
Studies	  International	  Forum	  17,	  no.	  5	  (1994),	  459-­‐472.	  Also,	  Marilyn	  Frye,	  ‘Lesbian	  Feminism	  and	  Gay	  
Rights	  Movement:	  Another	  View	  of	  Male	  Supremacy,	  Another	  Separatism’,	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  Reality:	  
Essays	  in	  Feminist	  Theory	  (New	  York:	  Crossing	  Press,	  1983),	  128-­‐151.	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are	   men,	   are	   part	   of	   an	   oppressive	   social	   structure	   which	   lesbian	   feminism	   is	  
committed	   to	   overthrowing.’33	  Are	   such	   lesbian	   feminist	   critiques	   of	   gay	   men	  
convincing?	  I	  will	  argue	  that,	  while	  some	  of	  their	  concerns	  are	  legitimate,	  some	  are	  
nevertheless	  problematic.	  	  
Rich’s	   concept	   of	   compulsory	   heterosexuality	   significantly	   contributes	   to	   the	  
scholarship	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   by	   highlighting	   how	   female	   gender	   and	  
female	   sexuality	   are	   imposed	   upon	   women	   through	   the	   institution	   of	  
heterosexuality.	  However,	   there	   are	   also	  major	   limitations	   and	  weaknesses	   in	   her	  
theory.	   	   For	   example,	   her	   critique	   of	   heterosexuality	   as	   an	   institution	   of	   male	  
domination	  over	  women	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  full	  picture	  of	  injustice	  and	  violence	  
in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Some	  serious	  injustices	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  
such	  as	  the	  oppression	  of	  gay	  men	  and	  trans	  people,	  are	  generally	  not	  addressed	  in	  
her	   critique	   of	   the	   institution	   of	   heterosexuality.	   She	   also	   does	   not	   consider	   how	  
men	   and	   those	   with	   the	   male	   gender	   might	   also	   be	   unjustly	   constrained	   and	  
regulated	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	   	   I	  argue	  that	  the	  lesbian	  feminist	  approach	  
alone	   is	   not	   sufficient	   in	   exposing,	   explaining	   and	   challenging	   the	   injustices	   of	  
normative	   heterosexuality.	   We	   also	   need	   other	   useful	   perspectives	   to	   better	  
understand	  and	  unsettle	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  
One	   of	   the	   core	   problems	   in	   Rich’s	   analysis	   is	   her	   tendency	   to	   adhere	   to	   an	  
essentialist,	   totalising	   and	   stereotypical	   articulation	   of	   male	   gender	   and	   female	  
gender	   and	   her	   one-­‐dimensional	   understanding	   of	   gender	   power	   relationships	   in	  
which	   only	   men	   dominate	   women.	   Female	   gender	   is	   generally	   interpreted	   as	  
victimised	   and	   oppressed	   by	   a	   domineering	   male	   gender	   in	   a	   compulsorily	  
heterosexual	  social	  life	  and	  culture.	  With	  this	  overarching	  assumption	  and	  premise,	  
family	  violence	   in	   the	  home	   is	  generally	  viewed	  as	   the	  product	  and	  result	  of	  male	  
power	  over	  women	  in	  the	  family	  and	  is	  therefore	  generally	  stereotypically	  portrayed	  
and	   reduced	   to	   male	   violence	   against	   women	   and	   girls. 34 	  Through	   this	  
oversimplified	  presentation	  of	  family	  and	  sexual	  violence,	  many	  victims	  who	  do	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Jagose,	  n	  17	  above,	  50.	  
34	  Rich,	  n	  4	  above,	  233,	  236-­‐238.	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fit	   into	   the	   ‘female	   victim	   paradigm’	   can	   be	   easily	   and	   unfairly	   marginalised.	  
However,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  more	  detail,	  in	  issues	  of	  family	  and	  gender	  violence,	  more	  
and	  more	   empirical	   and	   qualitative	   research	   indicates	   that	   the	   reality	   is	   far	  more	  
complicated	  than	  her	  stereotypical	  description.35	  Stereotypical	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  
normative	   heterosexuality	   such	   as	   Rich’s,	   are	   not	   only	   unable	   to	   reflect	   the	  
complicated	   reality	   of	   violence	   and	   power	   relations	   in	   the	   home,	   but	   also	   might	  
contribute	   to	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   stereotypical	   and	   oppressive	   heteronormative	  
norms	   and	   bias	   in	   family	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   By	   tending	   to	   totalise	   and	   over-­‐
generalise	  compulsory	  heterosexuality	  as	  male	  tyranny	  over	  women,	  victims	  who	  do	  
not	  conform	  to	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  violence	  paradigm	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  marginalised.	   In	  
this	  circumstance,	  some	  form	  of	  unfortunate	  heteronormative	  stereotypes	  are	  likely	  
to	  be	  produced,	  reproduced	  and	  reinforced.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  the	  findings	  in	  review	  articles	  of	  empirical	  family	  violence	  studies	  in	  the	  
past	  20	  years	  by	  family	  violence	  scholars,	  there	  are	  significant	  domestic	  violence	  victimisation	  rates	  
for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  Men	  and	  women	  also	  perpetrate	  comparable	   rates	  of	   intimate	  physical	  
and	   emotional	   violence/abuse.	   Intimate	   partner	   violence	   exists,	   not	   only	   in	   heterosexual	  
relationships,	   but	   also	   affects	   same	   sex	   relationships.	   Children	   witness	   similar	   rates	   of	   father	   to	  
mother	  violence	  and	  mother	  to	  father	  violence	  at	  home.	  However,	  the	  legal	  justice	  system	  generally	  
treats	   men	   less	   favourably	   than	   women	   in	   family	   violence	   cases.	   See	   Sarah	   L.	   Desmarais,	   Kim	   A.	  
Reeves,	  Tonia	  L.	  Nicholls,	  Robin	  P.	  Telford,	  and	  Martin	  S.	  Fiebert,	  ‘Prevalence	  of	  Physical	  Violence	  in	  
Intimate	   Relationships,	   Part	   1:	   Rates	   of	   Male	   and	   Female	   Victimization’,	   Partner	   Abuse	   3,	   no.	   2	  
(2012),	  140-­‐169;	  Sarah	  L.	  Desmarais,	  Kim	  A.	  Reeves,	  Tonia	  L.	  Nicholls,	  Robin	  P.	  Telford,	  and	  Martin	  S.	  
Fiebert,	  ‘Prevalence	  of	  Physical	  Violence	  in	  Intimate	  Relationships,	  Part	  2:	  Rates	  of	  Male	  and	  Female	  
Perpetration’,	   Partner	   Abuse	   3,	   no.	   2	   (2012),	   170-­‐198;	   Jennifer	   Langhinrichsen-­‐Rohling,	   Candice	  
Selwyn,	  and	  Martin	  L.	  Rohling,	  ‘Rates	  of	  Bidirectional	  versus	  Unidirectional	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  
across	  Samples,	  Sexual	  Orientations,	  and	  Race/ethnicities:	  A	  Comprehensive	  Review’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  
3,	  no.	  2	  (2012),	  199-­‐230;	  Deborah	  M.	  Capaldi,	  Naomi	  B.	  Knoble,	  Joann	  Wu	  Shortt,	  and	  Hyoun	  K.	  Kim,	  
‘A	  Systematic	  Review	  of	  Risk	  Factors	   for	   Intimate	  Partner	  Violence’,	  Partner	  Abuse	   3,	  no.	  2	   (2012),	  
231-­‐280;	   Michelle	   Mohr	   Carney,	   and	   John	   R.	   Barner,	   ‘Prevalence	   of	   Partner	   Abuse:	   Rates	   of	  
Emotional	   Abuse	   and	   Control’,	  Partner	   Abuse	   3,	   no.	   3	   (2012),	   286-­‐335;	   Carolyn	  M.	  West,	   ‘Partner	  
Abuse	  in	  Ethnic	  Minority	  and	  Gay,	  Lesbian,	  Bisexual,	  and	  Transgender	  Populations’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  3,	  
no.	   3	   (2012),	   336-­‐357;	  Melissa	   L.	   Sturge-­‐Apple,	  Michael	  A.	   Skibo,	   and	  Patrick	   T.	  Davies,	   ‘Impact	   of	  
Parental	  Conflict	  and	  Emotional	  Abuse	  on	  Children	  and	  Families’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  3,	  no.	  3	  (2012),	  379-­‐
400;	  Erika	  Lawrence,	  Rosaura	  Orengo-­‐Aguayo,	  Amie	  Langer,	  and	  Rebecca	  L.	  Brock,	   ‘The	   Impact	  and	  
Consequences	   of	   Partner	   Abuse	   on	   Partners’,	   Partner	   Abuse	   3,	   no.	   4	   (2012),	   406-­‐428;	   Jennifer	  
Langhinrichsen-­‐Rohling,	   Adrianne	   McCullars,	   and	   Tiffany	   A.	   Misra,	   ‘Motivations	   for	   Men	   and	  
Women's	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  Perpetration:	  A	  Comprehensive	  Review’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  3,	  no.	  4	  
(2012),	   429-­‐468;	   Stan	   Shernock,	   and	   Brenda	   Russell,	   ‘Gender	   and	   Racial/ethnic	   Differences	   in	  
Criminal	  Justice	  Decision	  Making	  in	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  Cases’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  3,	  no.	  4	  (2012),	  
501-­‐530;	   Esteban	   Eugenio,	   Esquivel-­‐Santoveña,	   Teri	   L.	   Lambert,	   and	   John	   Hamel.,	   ’Partner	   Abuse	  
Worldwide’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  4,	  no.	  1	  (2013),	  6-­‐75.	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Another	   important	  critique	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  comes	  from	  the	  works	  of	  
lesbian	   feminist	   Monique	  Wittig.	   She	   uses	   the	   concept	   ‘the	   category	   of	   sex’	   and	  
‘heterosexual	  contract’	  to	  label	  heterosexuality	  as	  a	  political	  regime	  where	  women	  
are	   oppressed	   and	   dominated	   by	   male	   power	   under	   a	   mandatory	   ‘heterosexual	  
contract.’36	  She	  provides	  a	  similar	  contribution	  to	  that	  of	  Rich	  as	  she	  highlights	  how	  
women	   as	   a	   sex	   group	   are	   constrained	   and	   forced	   to	   enter	   into	   an	   oppressive	  
‘heterosexual	  contract.’	  But	  she	  also	  suffers	  similar	  drawbacks	  to	  Rich’s	  work	  by	  her	  
use	  of	   stereotypical	  observations	  of	  gender	   injustice	   in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  
Another	  major	  problem	  of	  her	  critique	  of	  heterosexuality	   is	  what	  Katz	  has	  pointed	  
out:	   Wittig	   ‘presents	   no	   adequate	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘’sexual,’’	   erotic	   half’	   of	   the	  
institution	   and	   culture	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality.37	  Her	   critiques	   focus	   almost	  
exclusively	   on	   the	   oppression	   of	   women	   and	   femininity	   but	   leaves	   oppression	   of	  
non-­‐standard	  sexuality	  largely	  unchecked.	  	  Queer	  theorist	  Warner	  acknowledges	  his	  
concept	   of	   heteronormativity	   is	   inspired	   by	   Wittig’s	   critique	   of	   the	   heterosexual	  
contract.38	  However,	   in	   contrast	   to	   Wittig,	   Warner	   focuses	   more	   on	   sexuality	  
oppression	  in	  his	  critique	  of	  heteronormativity.	  I	  will	  discuss	  his	  analysis	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter.	  
A	  point	  worth	  further	  reflection	  is	  that	  unfortunately	  some	  lesbian	  feminist	  theories	  
show	   bias	   and	   prejudices	   against	   men	   (gay	   and	   straight)	   and	   masculinities.	   	   For	  
example,	   lesbian	   feminist	  Marilyn	   Frye	   criticises	   effeminate	   gay	  men	   by	   accusing	  
them	   of	   making	   ‘a	   casual	   and	   cynical	   mockery	   of	   women.’39	  She	   claims	   that	   ‘gay	  
men’s	   effeminacy	   and	   donning	   of	   feminine	   apparel	   displays	   no	   love	   of	   or	  
identification	   with	   women	   or	   the	   womanly.’40	  She	   argues	   that	   ‘[w]hat	   gay	   male	  
affection	  of	   femininity	   seems	   to	  me	   to	  be	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   serious	   sport	   in	  which	  men	  
may	  exercise	  their	  power	  and	  control	  over	  the	  feminine.’41	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Wittig,	  n	  3	  above,	  1-­‐8,	  40.	  
37	  Katz,	  n	  1	  above,	  159.	  
38	  Warner,	  n	  10	  above,	  xxi.	  
39	  Frye,	  n	  32	  above,	  137.	  
40	  Ibid.	  
41	  Ibid.	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According	   to	   Frye,	   most	   effeminate	   gay	   men	   perform	   femininity	   out	   of	   their	  
contempt	   towards	   women	   and	   femininity	   and	   their	   desire	   to	   claim	   male	  
supremacy. 42 	  To	   her,	   these	   effeminate	   gay	   men	   are	   not	   feminine	   and	   their	  
femininity	   is	   only	   secondary	   to,	   and	   in	   imitation	   of,	   the	   ‘real’	   femininity	   in	   ‘real’	  
women.	  I	  argue	  that	  Frye	  implies	  problematic	  heteronormative	  coherence	  between	  
biological	   female	   sex	   and	   female	   gender.	   She	   problematically	   prioritises	   and	  
normalises	  biological	  women’s	  femininity	  over	  others’,	  such	  as	  trans	  and	  gay	  men’s,	  
femininity.	   Real	   femininity	   seems	   to	   belong	   only	   to	   biological	   women	   in	   her	  
ideology.	   She	   implies	   that	   feminine	   gay	  men	   do	   not	   have	   real	   femininity	   and	   can	  
only	   mock	   and	   imitate	   femininity;	   gay	   men’s	   femininity	   is	   not	   authentic	   and	   is	  
interpreted	   as	   offensive	   to	   women.	   I	   challenge	   this	   kind	   of	   assumption	   of	   rigid	  
connection	   and	   coherence	   between	   biological	   body	   and	   gender	   expression,	   from	  
queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   inspired	   perspectives.	   Queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   problematise	   Frye’s	   assumption	   of	   the	  
exclusiveness	  of	  femininity	  to	  biological	  women.	  By	  implicitly	  presupposing	  that	  only	  
biological	  women	  have	  authentic	  and	  legitimate	  femininity,	  Frye	  implicitly	  suggests	  
that	   men	   or	   transgender	   people	   who	   perform	   femininity	   are	   portraying	   an	  
unorthodox	   female	   gender.	   She	   cannot	   see	   the	   femininities	   of	   feminine	   gay	  men	  
could	  also	  be	  femininities	  that	  are	  no	  less	  feminine	  and	  no	  less	  authentic	  than	  the	  
femininities	   of	   biological	   women.	   By	   reducing	   feminine	   gay	   men’s	   femininity	   to	  
nothing	   more	   than	   mockery,	   contempt,	   imitation	   or	   even	   hatred	   of	   women,	   she	  
closes	  with	  an	  essentialist	  view	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	  that	  naturalises	  and	  prioritises	  a	  
heteronormative	  order	  of	   the	   coherence	  of	   the	   sexed	  body	   and	   certain	  dominant	  
gender	  expressions.	  As	  a	  result,	  her	  arguments	  become	  ultimately	  inconsistent	  with	  
her	  original	  aim	  of	  subverting	  the	   institution	  of	  heterosexuality.	  Her	  feminism	  is	   in	  
danger	  of	  reinforcing	  a	  heteronormative	  order	  of	  sex	  and	  gender.43	  	  
Furthermore,	  Frye	  claims	  that	  the	  reason	  that	  many	  gay	  men	  do	  not	  have	  sex	  with	  
women	  is	  because	  they	  are	  ‘woman-­‐hating.’	  She	  argues	  that:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Ibid.,	  137-­‐138.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  128-­‐151.	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‘In	  many	  cases	  they	  [gay	  men]	  are	  loathe	  to	  do	  their	  duty	  [have	  sex	  with	  
women]	  only	  because	  they	  have	  learned	  all	  too	  well	  their	  lessons	  in	  
woman-­‐hating.	  Their	  reluctance	  to	  play	  out	  this	  part	  of	  manhood	  is	  due	  
only	  to	  an	  imbalance,	  where	  the	  requisite	  women-­‐hating	  has	  taken	  a	  
form	  and	  intensity	  which	  puts	  it	  in	  tension	  with	  this	  other	  requirement	  of	  
manhood.’44	  	  
She	   holds	   that	   because	  many	   gay	  men	   develop	   a	   strong	   hatred	   towards	  women,	  
these	  gay	  men	  are	  reluctant	  to	  have	  intimate	  sex	  with	  women.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
she	  also	  claims	  that	  heterosexual	  sex	  is	  ‘a	  ritual	  enactment’	  of	  men’s	  subordination	  
of	  women.45	  Therefore,	  men	  are	  woman-­‐hating	  not	  only	  because	  they	  have	  sex	  with	  
women	  as	  heterosexual	  men,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  refuse	  to	  have	  sex	  with	  women,	  
such	   as	   gay	  men.	   In	   her	   analysis,	   heterosexual	  men	  who	   desire	   sex	   with	   women	  
perpetuate	  male-­‐supremacy	  and	   control	   over	  women,	  while	   gay	  men	  who	  do	  not	  
desire	   heterosexual	   sex	   are	   regarded	   as	   women-­‐haters.46	  This	   kind	   of	   lesbian	  
feminism	   is	   problematic.	   By	   viewing	   heterosexual	   sex	   as	   fundamentally	   and	  
structurally	  men’s	   subordination	   and	   control	   of	   women,47	  Frye	   has	   a	   tendency	   to	  
view	   women	   as	   being	   structurally	   powerless	   and	   passive	   in	   sexuality	   without	  
agency.	  She	  also	  tends	  to	  ignore	  the	  joy,	  pleasure	  and	  adventure	  of	  sex.	  By	  labelling	  
gay	  men	  as	   ‘woman-­‐hating’	   for	   simply	  not	  desiring	  heterosexual	   sex	  with	  women,	  
on	  this	  biased	  and	  unfounded	  view	  she	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  heterosexual	  desire	  
is	   the	   supposed	   normal	   desire,	   while	   male	   homosexual	   desire	   is	   exceptional	   and	  
abnormal.	   Her	   lesbian	   feminism	   reinforces	   a	   kind	   of	   compulsory	   heterosexual	  
oppression	   upon	   gay	   men	   by	   dogmatically	   degrading	   and	   stigmatising	   gay	   male	  
sexuality	   and	  gay	  male	   sexual	   autonomy.	   I	   challenge	   this	   kind	  of	   essentialism	  and	  
stigmatisation	   in	   lesbian	   feminism.	   By	   relying	   on	   hostile	   and	   discriminatory	  
stigmatisation	  of	  gay	  male	  sexuality,	  Frye’s	  lesbian	  feminism	  not	  only	  would	  not	  be	  
able	   to	  destabilise	   certain	  aspects	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  but	  would	   further	  
reproduce	  and	  reinforce	  them.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  140.	  
45	  Ibid.,	  140.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  140-­‐141.	  
47	  Ibid.,	  129,	  140.	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In	  sum,	  lesbian	  feminism	  contributes	  significantly	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  critique	  
and	   critical	   review	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   sexual	   injustices.	   Lesbian	  
feminist	   theories	   tend	   to	   focus	  on	  challenging	  gender	   injustice	   towards	  women	   in	  
their	   critiques	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality,	   and	   this	   is	   their	   major	   area	   of	  
contribution.	   However,	   although	   combating	   gender	   oppression	   of	   women	   is	  
certainly	   one	   of	   the	   important	   areas	   of	   concern	   in	   the	   critiques	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality,	  it	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  whole	  picture	  of	  sexual	  injustice	  in	  normative	  
heterosexuality.	   Furthermore,	   some	   lesbian	   feminist	   theories	   tend	   to	   essentialise	  
certain	   gender	   prejudices	   and	   stereotypes	   and	   are	   at	   risk	   of	   further	   perpetuating	  
some	  forms	  of	  sexual	  injustice	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  We	  therefore	  also	  need	  
other	  perspectives	  and	  approaches	  to	  fully	  critique	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  
3.3   Gay	  liberationist	  theory	  on	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  sexual	  justice	  
Early	   gay	   liberationists	   such	   as	   Carl	   Wittman	   and	   Dennis	   Altman	   echo	   lesbian	  
feminist	  beliefs	  and	  arguments	  whereby	  women	  are	  the	  oppressed	  gender	  group	  in	  
the	   institution	  of	   heterosexuality.48	  	  Nonetheless,	   they	  do	  not	  want	   to	   reduce	   the	  
sexuality	   oppression	   of	   gay	  men	   and	   lesbians	   to	   just	   a	   by-­‐product	   of	   the	   gender	  
oppression	   of	   women	   and	   femininity.49	  	   They	   show	   deep	   concern	   over	   injustices	  
connected	  to	  sexuality	  in	  the	  institution	  of	  heterosexuality.	  	  	  
Carl	  Wittman’s	  gay	   liberationist	  theory	  about	  heterosexuality	  and	  gender	   is	   largely	  
informed	  by	  a	  radical	   feminist	   idea	  of	  male	  domination	  and	  female	  subordination.	  
To	  him,	  compulsory	  heterosexuality	  means	  the	  stigmatisation	  of	  homosexuality	  and	  
the	  oppression	  of	  women	  in	  sex,	  marriage	  and	  society.50	  He	  rightly	  summarises	  the	  
forms	  of	  homophobic	  oppression	  of	  gay	  men	  and	   lesbians	   in	  heterosexual	  society.	  
He	  argues	  that	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  are	  oppressed	  and	  injured	  by	  physical	  attacks,	  
psychological	   injuries,	   internal	   homophobia	   and	   institutional	   oppression.51	  He	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  Carl	  Wittman,	  ‘A	  Gay	  Manifesto’,	  in	  Karla	  Jay	  and	  Allen	  Young	  eds.,	  Out	  of	  the	  Closets:	  Voices	  of	  
Gay	   Liberation	   (London:	   GMP,	   1992),	   330-­‐341.	   Also,	   Dennis	   Altman,	  Homosexual	   Oppression	   and	  
Liberation	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  90-­‐94,	  215-­‐226.	  
49	  Seidman,	  n	  1	  above,	  191-­‐195.	  	  
50	  Wittman,	  n	  48	  above,	  330-­‐341.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  335-­‐336.	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sceptical	   and	   critical	   of	   the	  moral	   value	  of	   heterosexual	   relations.	  He	   implies	   that	  
exclusive	  heterosexual	  relations	  suggest	  homophobia	  and	  heterosexual	  sex	  denotes	  
the	  oppression	  of	  women.	  He	  argues	  that:	  
‘Exclusive	  heterosexuality	  is	  fucked	  up.	  It	  reflects	  a	  fear	  of	  people	  of	  the	  
same	  sex.	  It’s	  anti-­‐homosexual…Heterosexual	  sex	  is	  fucked	  up	  too;	  ask	  
women’s	  liberation	  about	  what	  straight	  guys	  are	  like	  in	  bed.’52	  	  
Although	  he	  rightly	  points	  out	  that	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians	  are	  oppressed	  by	  physical	  
violence,	  emotional	  abuse,	   internal	  homophobia	  and	   institutional	  discrimination	   in	  
the	   institution	   of	   heterosexuality,	   his	   tendency	   to	   label	   exclusive	   heterosexual	  
relations	   as	   homophobic	   is	   questionable	   and	   might	   not	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	  
principle	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  and	  sexual	  agency,	  a	  principle	  defended	  and	  adopted	  
by	  liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice.53	  	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  sexual	  autonomy	  
and	  sexual	  agency	  require	  us	  to	  respect	  and	  to	  secure	  a	  proper	  space	  for	  individuals	  
to	   decide	   upon	   their	   own	   preferences	   and	   expressions	   of	   sexuality.	   Homosexual	  
relations	  should	  be	  protected	  and	  respected.	  Similarly,	  heterosexuals	  who	  choose	  to	  
live	  in	  exclusive	  heterosexual	  relations	  should	  have	  the	  sexual	  freedom	  to	  do	  so	  and	  
deserve	   others’	   respect.	   It	   is	   inappropriate	   to	   suggest	   that	   all	   those	   in	   exclusive	  
heterosexual	   relations	   are	   homophobic	   in	   essence.	   	   His	   tendency	   to	   essentialise	  
gender	   in	   heterosexual	   sex	   and	   heterosexual	   relations	   as	   male	   oppression	   over	  
vulnerable	  women	  is	  also	  problematic.	  As	  I	  argue	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  this	  kind	  of	  
over-­‐generalisation	   and	   over-­‐simplification	   of	   gender	   in	   the	   critique	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality	  is	  questionable	  and	  could	  blind	  us	  to	  the	  complexities	  and	  multiple	  
faces	   of	   various	   sexual	   injustices	   in	   the	   systems	   and	   culture	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  	  
Another	   leading	   gay	   liberationist	   scholar	   Dennis	   Altman	   develops	   his	   gay	  
liberationist	  critique	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sex	  roles	  theory.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Ibid.,	  331-­‐332.	  
53	  Liberal	   theorist	   Nicholas	   Bamforth	   provides	   one	   of	   the	   most	   convincing	   and	   sophisticated	  
arguments	   for	   the	   principle	   of	   sexual	   autonomy.	   I	   will	   discuss	   his	   liberal	   theory	   of	   gay	   rights	   and	  
sexual	  justice	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  See	  Nicholas	  Bamforth,	  Sexuality,	  Morals	  and	  Justice:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Lesbian	  
and	  Gay	  Rights	  Law	  (London,	  Washington	  D.C.:	  Cassell,	  1997),	  235-­‐271.	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Sex	  roles	  theory	  holds	  that	  ‘being	  a	  man	  or	  a	  woman	  means	  enacting	  a	  general	  set	  
of	   expectations	  which	  are	   attached	   to	  one’s	   sex―the	   ‘‘sex	   role’’.’54	  In	   this	   theory,	  
masculinity	  and	  femininity	  are	  ‘interpreted	  as	  internalized	  sex	  roles,	  the	  products	  of	  
social	   learning	  or	   ‘’socialization’’.’55	  Altman	  believes	   that	   the	  expected	  and	  socially	  
imposed	  sex	  and	  gender	  roles	  are	  the	  roots	  of	  oppression	  of	  gay	  people	  and	  women	  
in	  heterosexuality.	  He	  argues	  that	  both	  gay	  people	  and	  women	  are	  constrained	  by	  
socially	   imposed	   masculine	   and	   feminine	   roles,	   the	   binary	   gender	   roles	   that	   are	  
constructed	  under	  the	  nuclear	   family	   ideologies	   in	  normative	  heterosexuality.56	  He	  
thinks	  that	  the	  central	  oppression	  of	  women	  is	  their	  expected	  domestic	  sex	  role	  and	  
the	   corresponding	   consequence	   of	   women’s	   inferior	   economic	   situation.	   For	   gay	  
people	   the	   central	   difficulty	   is	   the	   social	   stigma	   of	   their	   deviation	   of	   expected	  
gender	  roles	  in	  sexuality.57	  	  
One	   point	   worth	   mentioning	   is	   that	   he	   also	   agrees	   with	   the	   observation	   men’s	  
liberationist	   theory	   that	   imposed	   sex/gender	   roles	   in	   heterosexuality	   not	   only	  
disadvantage	  women	  but	  also	  harm	  men.	  Inspired	  by	  early	  men’s	  liberation	  studies,	  
he	  argues	  that	  men	  are	  socialised	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  men	  and	  are	  conditioned	  
into	   a	   violent	   and	   competitive	   masculine	   identity.58	  On	   sexuality	   he	   holds	   that	  
human	  beings	   are	   in	   essence	   androgynous	   and	  bisexual	   but	   are	   forced	   to	   repress	  
their	   innate	  homosexual	  desires	  by	  following	  rigid	  and	  binary	  sex	  roles	  assigned	  to	  
them.59	  He	   suggests	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   male	   violence	   is	   largely	   related	   to	   the	  
compulsory	  repression	  of	  male	  homosexual	  desires	  and	  the	  compulsory	  rejection	  of	  
male	  bonds	  in	  heterosexist	  culture.60	  Men	  are	  forced	  to	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  
and	   are	   barred	   from	   developing	   male	   bonds	   and	   male	   love	   in	   the	   institution	   of	  
heterosexuality.	  Male	   violence	   is	   highly	   related	   to	   the	   compulsory	   socialisation	   of	  
men	   into	   constant	   competition	   with,	   and	   hostility	   towards,	   other	   men	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  See	  R.	  W.	  Connell,	  Masculinities	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2005),	  22.	  
55	  Ibid.,	  22.	  
56	  Altman,	  n	  48	  above,	  225-­‐226.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  226.	  
58	  Ibid.,	  233-­‐236.	  
59	  Ibid.,	  102-­‐103.	  
60	  Ibid.,	  98-­‐99.	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heterosexual	  society.61	  He	  therefore	  suggests	  that	  men	  also	  need	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  
rigid	   heterosexual	   desires	   and	   sex	   roles.	   He	   argues	   for	   the	   need	   for	   not	   only	   gay	  
liberation	   and	   women’s	   liberation	   movements,	   but	   also	   the	   need	   for	   men’s	  
liberation	  movements.	  For	  example,	  he	  indicates	  that	  a	  men’s	  liberation	  movement	  
would	   liberate	   men	   from	   compulsory	   competitiveness	   among	   men	   and	   would	  
encourage	   warmer	   relationships	   not	   only	   between	   men	   and	   women,	   but	   also	  
among	  men	  themselves.62	  	  
One	   of	   the	   significant	   strengths	   of	   Altman’s	   gay	   liberation	   theory,	   I	   argue,	   is	   his	  
observation	  that	  men	  also	  need	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  rigid	  sex	  roles	  and	  his	  implication	  
that	  there	  could	  be	  an	  alliance	  and	  cooperation	  between	  gay	  liberation	  movements	  
and	  men’s	  liberation	  movements.	  However,	  he	  does	  not	  explore	  this	  topic.	  Nor	  does	  
he	   elaborate	   upon	   the	   proposed	   relationship	   between	   gay	   liberation	   and	   men’s	  
liberation.	  I	  further	  investigate	  and	  develop	  this	  topic	  from	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies	  inspired	  perspectives	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  also	  some	  limitations	  in	  Altman’s	  theory.	  For	  example,	  his	  claim	  
of	  essential	  bisexuality	  of	  human	  beings	  could	  be	  questioned	  from	  perspectives	  of	  
contemporary	   social	   constructionist	   and	  queer	   theories.63	  His	   claim	   that	  economic	  
difficulty	  is	  the	  main	  cause	  of	  women’s	  oppression	  could	  be	  contested	  by	  feminists	  
who	   claim	   that	   women’s	   oppression	   depends	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   other	   main	  
causes.64	  His	   arguments	   that	   the	   roots	  of	  male	   violence	  are	   sexual	   repression	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ibid.,	  233-­‐236.	  
62	  Ibid.	  
63	  For	  example,	  see	  Jagose,	  n	  17	  above,	  41-­‐43.	  
64	  For	  example,	  both	  Iris	  M.	  Young	  and	  Nancy	  Fraser	  insist	  that	  although	  material	   injustice	  is	  one	  of	  
the	   core	   roots	   of	   women’s	   oppression,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   only	   major	   cause	   of	   women’s	   subordination.	  
Young	  presents	  a	  theory	  of	  five	  faces	  of	  oppression	  to	  elaborate	  the	  oppression	  of	  women.	  See	  Iris	  
Marion	  Young,	   Justice	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Difference	   (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  
50-­‐65.	   Fraser	   argues	   that	   both	   material	   inequality	   and	   inequality	   in	   recognition	   are	   central	   to	  
women’s	  subordination.	  She	  contends	  that	  gender	  justice	  projects	  ought	  to	  address	  both	  economic	  
inequality	  and	  cultural	  inequality	  of	  women.	  	  See	  Nancy	  Fraser,	  ‘Social	  Justice	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Identity	  
Politics:	   Redistribution,	   Recognition,	   and	   Participation’,	   in	   Larry	   J.	   Ray	   and	  Andrew	   R.	   Sayer	   eds.,	  
Culture	   and	   Economy	   after	   the	   Cultural	   Turn	   (London:	   Sage,	   1999),	   25-­‐52.	   Also,	   Nancy	   Fraser,	  
‘Feminist	  Politics	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Recognition:	  A	  Two-­‐dimensional	  Approach	  to	  Gender	  Justice’,	  Studies	  
in	  Social	  Justice	  1,	  no.	  1,	  (2007),	  23-­‐35.	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assigned	   sex	   roles	   of	   men	   may	   also	   be	   oversimplified.65	  His	   tendency	   to	   equate	  
sexism	  with	  sexism	  against	  women	  is	  also	  problematic;	  this	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  I	  explore	  
in	  the	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  contemporary	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.66	  
One	  of	  the	  major	   limitations	  of	  Altman’s	  theory	   is	  his	  reliance	  on	  sex/gender	  roles	  
theory	   in	   his	   sexual	   liberation	   theory.	   Sex	   roles	   theory	   itself	   has	   some	   internal	  
weaknesses.	   For	   example,	   sex	   roles	   theory	   tends	   to	   hold	   relatively	   static	   and	  
singular	   concepts	   of	  masculinity	   and	   femininity.	  67	  Its	   concepts	   and	   articulation	   of	  
masculine	  roles	  and	   feminine	  roles	  are	  also	  generally	  based	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  
white,	   middle	   class	   people.68	  Sex	   role	   theory	   thus	   fails	   to	   adopt	   more	   fluid	   and	  
diverse	   concepts	   of	   gender	   by	   overlooking	   the	   complexities	   and	   existence	   of	  
multiple	  masculinities	   and	   femininities.	   	  Moreover,	   sex	   roles	   theory	   tends	   to	   view	  
gender	   as	  mainly	   static	   rules	   of	   social	   expectations	  without	   highlighting	   the	   point	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Family	   conflict	   theory	   and	   feminist	   gender	   violence	   theory	   are	   two	   of	   the	   major	   theories	   in	  
contemporary	  family	  violence	  scholarship.	  Although	  they	  hold	  different	  opinions	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  
dynamics	   of	   family	   violence,	   both	   theories	   disagree	  with	  Altman’s	   elaboration	  of	   the	   root	   of	  male	  
violence.	   Feminists	   argue	   that	   the	   root	   of	  male	   violence	   is	  male	   domination	   and	  male	   power	   and	  
control	  over	  women.	  See	  for	  example,	  Bontina	  Meyersfeld,	  Domestic	  Violence	  and	  International	  Law	  
(Oxford:	  Hart,	  2010);	  Michelle	  Madden	  Dempsey,	  ‘What	  Counts	  as	  Domestic	  Violence-­‐A	  Conceptual	  
Analysis’,	  Wm.	  &	  Mary	  J.	  Women	  &	  L.	  12,	  no.	  2	  (2006),	  301-­‐333;	  Michelle	  Madden	  Dempsey,	  ‘Toward	  
a	  Feminist	  State:	  What	  Does	  ‘Effective’	  Prosecution	  of	  Domestic	  Violence	  Mean?’,	  The	  Modern	  Law	  
Review	  70,	  no.	  6	  (2007),	  908-­‐935;	  Liz	  Kelly,	   ‘When	  Does	  the	  Speaking	  Profit	  Us?	  	  Reflections	  on	  the	  
Challenges	   of	   Developing	   Feminist	   Perspectives	   on	   Abuse	   and	   Violence	   by	   Women’,	   in	   Marianne	  
Hester,	   Liz	   Kelly,	   and	   Jill	   Radford	   eds.,	   Women,	   Violence,	   and	   Male	   Power:	   Feminist	   Activism,	  
Research,	  and	  Practice	  (Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  34-­‐48;	  Jill	  Radford,	  and	  Elizabeth	  
A.	   Stanko,	   ‘Violence	   against	   Women	   and	   Children:	   the	   Contradictions	   of	   Crime	   Control	   under	  
Patriarchy’,	   in	  Marianne	  Hester,	  Liz	  Kelly,	  and	  Jill	  Radford	  eds.,	  Women,	  Violence,	  and	  Male	  Power:	  
Feminist	  Activism,	  Research,	  and	  Practice	   (Buckingham:	  Open	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  65-­‐80;	  Russel	  
P.	  Dobash.,	  R.	  Emerson	  Dobash,	  Margo	  Wilson,	  and	  Martin	  Daly,	   ‘The	  Myth	  of	  Sexual	  Symmetry	   in	  
Marital	  Violence’,	   in	  Claire	  M.	  Renzetti	   and	  Raquel	  Kennedy	  Bergen	  eds.,	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  
(Lanbam:	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  2005),	  31-­‐52.	  
	  	  	  	  Family	  conflicts	  theorists	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  would	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  causes	  of	  male	  
violence	   in	   families	   and	   would	   reject	   one	   simplified	   and	   overarching	   answer.	   See	   for	   example,	  
Capaldi,	  Knoble,	  Shortt,	  and	  Kim.	  n	  35	  above,	  231;	  Langhinrichsen-­‐Rohling,	  McCullars,	  and	  Misra,	  n	  
35	   above,	   429-­‐468.	   Also,	   Donald	   G.	   Dutton,	  Rethinking	   Domestic	   Violence	   (Vancouver:	   UBC	   Press,	  
2011).	   I	   agree	   with	   family	   conflicts	   theory’s	   viewpoint	   that	   a	   reductionist	   explanation	   of	   male	  
violence	  would	   be	   oversimplified	   and	   inadequate.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   issues	   of	   gender	   violence	   and	  
family	  violence	  more	  in	  later	  sections.	  
66	  Altman,	  n	  48	  above,	  216-­‐226.	  
67	  Michael	  A.	  Messner,	   ‘The	  Limits	  of	  “The	  Male	  Sex	  Role’’	  An	  Analysis	  of	   the	  Men's	  Liberation	  and	  
Men's	  Rights	  Movements'	  Discourse’,	  Gender	  &	  Society	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1998),	  258.	  
68	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above.	  26.	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that	  gender	  is	  also	  about	  real	  practices	  and	  performances	  and	  is	  performative.69	  Due	  
to	  sex	   roles	   theory’s	   relatively	  static	  understanding	  of	  sex	  and	  gender	   roles,	   it	  has	  
difficulties	   in	   capturing	   the	   constant	   resistance,	   conflicts,	   and	   power	   struggles	  
within	  gender	  relations.70	  	  Since	  Altman	  relies	  on	  sex	  roles	  theory	  to	  develop	  a	  gay	  
liberation	   argument,	   his	   theory	  nevertheless	   suffers	   from	   those	   similar	   limitations	  
that	  we	  find	  in	  sex	  roles	  theory.	  	  	  
Furthermore,	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  constraints	  of	  the	  sex/gender	  roles	  of	  men	  as	  a	  
social	   group	   too	  narrowly	   focuses	  on	   the	  harm	  of	   aggressive	  male	   identity.	   There	  
exist	   much	   wider	   restrictive	   and	   oppressive	   gender	   norms	   of	   men	   that	   are	   not	  
addressed	   and	   considered	   in	   his	   liberation	   theory.	   He	   also	   does	   not	   clearly	   and	  
sufficiently	   elaborate	   upon	   the	   relations	   between	   promoting	   gay	   liberation	   and	  
men’s	  liberation.	  Why	  is	  it	  crucial	  and	  beneficial	  for	  gay	  people	  to	  support,	  not	  only	  
women’s	   liberation,	   but	   also	  men’s	   liberation?	  What	   does	  men’s	   liberation	  mean	  
and	  what	  does	  the	  liberation	  require?	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  men’s	  liberation	  
in	  the	   law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender?	  He	  seems	  to	  assert	  the	  need	  for	  a	  
sexual	  politics	  of	  men’s	   liberation,	  but	  does	  not	   fully	  elaborate	   its	   implications	   for	  
gay	   liberation	  and	  gay	  rights	  politics,	  especially	   its	   implications	  for	  gay	  men.	  These	  
questions	   are	   not	   sufficiently	   and	   clearly	   addressed	   and	   answered	   in	   his	   gay	  
liberation	   theory.	  Nor	  has	  he	  explicitly	  acknowledged	  and	  declared	  that	   restrictive	  
and	  constraining	  gender	  roles	  for	  men	  are	  also	  an	  issue	  of	  sexual	  injustice.	  He	  is	  not	  
clearly	   aware	   of	   the	   existence	   and	   the	   harm	   of	   sexism	   against	   men	   as	   he	   treats	  
sexism	   as	   synonymous	   with	   sexism	   against	   women.	   A	   thorough	   and	   systematic	  
investigation	   and	   analysis	   of	   the	   harm	   of	   sexism	   and	   the	   injustice	   of	   gender	  
oppression	  against	  men	  are	   lacking	   in	  his	   theory.	  Therefore,	  although	  he	   is	  one	  of	  
the	   very	   early	   gay	   theorists	   who	   notices	   and	   partially	   anticipates	   the	   possible	  
cooperation	  and	  benefits	  between	  gay	  liberation	  and	  men’s	  liberation,	  there	  are	  still	  
many	  insufficiencies	  in	  his	  gay	  liberationist	  theory.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Queer	  feminist	  Judith	  Butler	  uses	  the	  concept	  ‘gender	  performativity’	  to	  ‘describe	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
gender	   is	   produced	   as	   an	   effect	   of	   a	   regulatory	   regime	   that	   requires	   the	   ritualised	   repetition	   of	  
particular	   forms	   of	   behaviour.’	   See	   Tamsin	   Spargo,	   Foucault	   and	   Queer	   Theory	   (Cambridge:	   Icon	  
books,	  1999),	  75;	  Butler,	  n	  6	  above,	  xv.	  
70	  Messner,	  n	  67	  above,	  258.	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The	   major	   contribution	   from	   lesbian	   feminist	   and	   gay	   liberationist	   critiques	   of	  
normative	  heterosexuality	  is	  that	  these	  sexual	  theorists	  do	  not	  view	  heterosexuality	  
as	   just	   a	   personal	   sexual	   preference	  or	   only	   a	  matter	   of	   individual	   sexual	   identity	  
anymore.	  They	  argue	   that	  heterosexuality	   should	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  problematic	  
institution	   in	   which	   unjust	   and	   oppressive	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   norms	   and	  
arrangements	   are	   institutionalised	   in	   law,	   politics	   and	   social	   structures.	   They	   also	  
highlight	  how	  women	  and	  gay	  people	  are	  harmed	  in	  the	  problematic	   institution	  of	  
heterosexuality.	   Furthermore,	   lesbian	   feminism	   note	   and	   contend	   that	   normative	  
heterosexuality	   is	   not	   just	   about	   sexuality	   oppression	   of	   women,	   but	   is	   also	   an	  
institution	  of	  oppression	  of	  women	  in	  almost	  every	  aspect	  of	  gender	  relations	  and	  
gender	   life.	   	   Their	   insights	   about	   heterosexuality	   that	   it	   is	   more	   than	   just	   sexual	  
expression,	  but	  also	  an	   institution	  of	   sexuality	  and	  gender	   injustices,	   inspires	   later	  
feminist	  and	  queer	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  also	  
illustrated	  earlier,	   there	  are	   several	  major	   limitations	   in	  early	   lesbian	   feminist	  and	  
gay	   liberationist	   critiques	   with	   respect	   to	   normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   sexual	  
justice.	   	   One	   of	   the	   major	   problems	   is	   their	   interpretation	   and	   understanding	   of	  
gender	  oppression.	  They	  tend	  to	  hold	  oversimplified	  ideas	  of	  gender	  oppression	  and	  
gender	   injustices	   by	   viewing	   female	   gender	   as	   the	   only	   gender	   oppressed	   and	  
constrained	   unjustly	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   Contemporary	   subordination	  
feminist	   projects	   developed	   later	   provide	   more	   nuanced	   accounts	   of	   gender	  
oppression	  as	   illustrated	   in	   the	  next	   section.	  However,	   I	  will	   argue,	  while	   some	  of	  
the	   adjustments	   are	   helpful,	   they	   do	   not	   overcome	   the	   major	   limitation	   in	  
subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   and	   approaches.	   In	   subsequent	   sections	   I	  
discuss	   the	   views	   of	   contemporary	   subordination	   feminisms	   on	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  I	  critically	  review	  contemporary	  subordination	  feminist	  projects	  on	  
law,	  family,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  argue	  that	  at	  least	  in	  family	  law	  and	  family	  
justice,	   it	   is	  not	  always	  unproblematic	  to	  adopt	  subordination	  feminist	  approaches	  
in	  thinking	  about	  sexual	  justice,	  law	  and	  families.	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3.4   Contemporary	  subordination	  feminisms	  on	  sexual	  politics,	  gender	  
oppression,	  law,	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality	  
The	   idea	   of	   early	   lesbian	   and	   radical	   feminism	   that	   normative	   and	   compulsory	  
heterosexuality	   is	   primarily	   an	   institution	   of	   male	   domination	   over	   women	  
continues	   to	   have	   a	   great	   impact	   on	   contemporary	   feminist	   projects	   on	   sexual	  
justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  Many	  contemporary	  subordination	  feminists	  expand	  and	  
modify	   this	   early	   feminist	   belief	   and	   idea.	   They	   continue	   to	   develop	   arguments	  
about	  why	  women	  and	  femininity	  are	  subordinated	  and	  disadvantaged	  in	  normative	  
heterosexual	   society,	   and	   how	   women’s	   subordination	   can	   be	   eliminated.	   For	  
example,	   sexual-­‐subordination	   feminists	   such	   as	   MacKinnon	   hold	   that	   the	   social	  
construction	   of	   female	   sexuality	   is	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   women’s	   oppression	   while	  
men’s	  domination	  is	  largely	  rooted	  in	  and	  perpetuated	  by	  socially	  constructed	  male	  
sexuality.71	  Subordination	  feminist	  family	  law	  and	  family	  justice	  theorists	  argue	  that	  
the	   law	   and	   institutions	   of	   marriage	   and	   family	   tend	   to	   privilege	   men	   and	  
subordinate	   women;	   marital	   and	   family	   relations	   are	   unequal,	   and	   women	   are	  
oppressed	  and	  discriminated	  against	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  men.72	  The	  feminist	  violence	  
against	  women	  approach	  argues	  that	  gender	  violence	  and	  family	  violence	  ought	  to	  
be	  understood	  and	  addressed	  as	  issues	  of	  male	  power	  and	  control	  over	  women	  and	  
children	  in	  the	  family	  and	  in	  society.73	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   primarily	   concentrate	   on	   examining	   critically	   contemporary	  
subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   and	   theories	   on	   family	   justice	   and	   family	  
violence	   jurisprudence.	   I	   argue	   that	   some	   dimensions	   and	   problems	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  See	   Catharine	   A.	   MacKinnon,	   ‘Feminism,	   Marxism,	   method,	   and	   the	   State:	   Toward	   Feminist	  
Jurisprudence’,	  Signs	  8,	  no.	  4	  (1983),	  635-­‐658;	  Catharine	  A.	  MacKinnon,	  Toward	  a	  Feminist	  Theory	  of	  
the	   State	   (Cambridge:	   Harvard	   University	   Press,	   1989);	   Catharine	   A.	   MacKinnon,	  Women’s	   Lives,	  
Men’s	  Laws	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  2005).	  
72	  See	  for	  example	  Susan	  Moller	  Okin,	  Justice	  Gender	  and	  the	  Family	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
1997),	  134-­‐186;	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman,	  ‘Fatherhood,	  Feminism	  and	  Family	  Law’,	  McGeorge	  Law	  
Review	   32,	   no.	   4	   (2000),	   1031-­‐1049;	  Martha	  Albertson	   Fineman,	   the	  Autonomy	  Myth:	   a	   Theory	  of	  
Dependency	   (New	  York:	   the	  New	  Press,	   2004)	   ;	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman,	   ‘The	  Sexual	   Family’,	   in	  
Martha	   Albertson	   Fineman,	   Jack	   E.	   Jackson,	   and	   Adam	   p.	   Romero	   eds.,	   Feminist	   and	   Queer	   Legal	  
Theory:	  Intimate	  Encounters,	  Uncomfortable	  Conversations	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  45-­‐64.	  
73	  For	  example,	  see	  Alice	  Edwards,	  Violence	  against	  Women	  under	   International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  
(Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  Meyersfeld,	  n	  65	  above;	  Dempsey,	  n	  65	  above;	  Kelly,	  
n	  65	  above;	  Radford	  and	  Stanko,	  n	  65	  above;	  Dobash,	  Dobash,	  Wilson,	  and	  Daly,	  n	  65	  above.	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heteronormative	   gender	   norms	   and	   injustices	  might	   be	   generally	  marginalised	   or	  
trivialised	  in	  subordination	  feminist	  legal	  and	  political	  theory.	  Furthermore,	  some	  of	  
their	  legal	  projects	  and	  proposed	  policies	  not	  only	  rely	  on,	  but	  also	  have	  a	  tendency	  
to	   perpetuate,	   certain	   problematic	   norms	   and	   ideologies	   of	   heteronormative	  
sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
Recently,	  feminist	  sociologist	  Stevi	  Jackson	  presented	  one	  of	  the	  clearest	  and	  most	  
eloquent	   arguments	   from	   subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   on	   why	  
heterosexuality	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  simply	  a	  dominant	  sexual	  orientation	  and	  
why	  heteronormativity	  is	  not	  just	  about	  sexuality	  oppression.	  	  She	  holds	  that:	  
‘Heterosexuality,	  however,	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  simply	  a	  form	  of	  
sexual	  expression.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  a	  key	  site	  of	  intersection	  between	  gender	  
and	  sexuality,	  but	  also	  one	  that	  reveals	  the	  interconnections	  between	  
sexual	  and	  non-­‐sexual	  aspects	  of	  social	  life.	  Heterosexuality	  is,	  by	  
definition,	  a	  gender	  relationship,	  ordering	  not	  only	  sexual	  life	  but	  also	  
domestic	  and	  extra-­‐domestic	  divisions	  of	  labour	  and	  resources…	  Thus	  
heterosexuality,	  while	  depending	  on	  the	  exclusion	  or	  marginalisation	  of	  
other	  sexualities	  for	  its	  legitimacy,	  is	  not	  precisely	  coterminous	  with	  
heterosexual	  sexuality.	  Heteronormativity	  defines	  not	  only	  a	  normative	  
sexual	  practice	  but	  also	  a	  normal	  way	  of	  life.’74	  	  	  	  
Here	  she	  summarises	  why	  both	  sexuality	  constraints	  and	  gender	  constraints	  ought	  
to	  be	   taken	   into	  account	   and	  addressed	  within	   research	   in	  heteronormativity	   and	  
sexual	   politics,	   an	   approach	   some	   feminists	   insist	   upon,	   but	   something	   not	  
necessarily	  shared	  and	  adopted	  by	  gay	  studies	  or	  queer	  theories	  in	  their	  critiques	  of	  
heteronormativity. 75 	  She	   argues	   that	   heterosexuality	   is	   not	   just	   about	   sexual	  
preference	   towards	   the	   opposite	   sexes	   but	   is	   also	   an	   institution	   of	   sexuality	   and	  
gender	   conformity.	   She	   draws	   a	   subtle	   distinction	   between	   the	   concepts	   of	  
(normative)	   ‘heterosexuality’	   and	   ‘heterosexual	   sexuality’.	   The	   former	   is	   an	  
institution	  and	  regime	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  normativity,	  while	  the	  latter	  denotes	  
a	  kind	  of	  sexual	  preference	  and	  sexual	  practice	  between	  opposite	  sexes.	  She	  argues	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  Jackson,	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that	   scholarship	  of	   sexual	  politics	   and	  heteronormativity	   should	  not	  only	   focus	  on	  
criticising	   sexuality	   constraints	   in	   heterosexuality,	   but	   should	   also	   address	   gender	  
oppression	  (of	  women)	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.76	  	  
Jackson	  further	  claims	  that	  gender	  divisions	  and	  gender	  norms	  are	  male-­‐dominant,	  
female-­‐oppressive,	   hierarchical	   and	   unequal	   in	   the	   institution	   and	   culture	   of	  
normative	  heterosexuality,	  as	  subordination	  feminists	  generally	  claim.	  77	  She	  argues	  
that	   both	   sexuality	   injustices	   and	   gender	   injustices	   (of	  women)	   should	   be	   kept	   in	  
view	   in	   the	   critiques	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   This	   is	   because	   ‘women’s	  
oppression	   and	   the	   oppression	   of	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   men	   are	   interconnected,	   that	  
both	   are	   sustained	   by	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   gender,	   in	   which	   male	   domination	   is	  
sustained	  in	  part	  through	  the	  heterosexual	  contract.’78	  Based	  on	  this	  line	  of	  thinking,	  
she	   argues	   that	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   should	   target	   both	   the	   oppression	   of	  
women	   and	   the	   oppression	   of	   lesbians	   and	   gay	   men	   because	   they	   are	   both	  
oppressed	   and	   victimised	   by	   unequal	   gender	   hierarchy	   and	   male	   domination	   in	  
heteronormative	   society.	   She	   contends	   that	   the	   oppression	   of	   women	   and	   LGBT	  
people	   share	   the	   same	   roots:	   an	  unjust	   gender	   hierarchy	   that	   privileges	  men	   and	  
masculinity	  while	  degrading	  women	  and	  femininity.	  She	  criticises	  gay	  rights	  projects	  
that	   do	   not	   prioritise	   and	   incorporate	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   and	  
concerns	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  women.	  For	  her	  a	  proper	   sexual	  politics	  project	  
against	   normative	   heterosexuality	   ought	   to	   address	   both	   the	   oppression	   and	  
constraints	  of	  women	  and	  the	  oppression	  and	  constraints	  of	  non-­‐heterosexuals.79	  	  	  
Moreover,	   she	   revitalises	   some	   early	   lesbian	   feminist	   arguments	   and	   argues	   that	  
gay	   men	   and	   lesbians	   are	   not	   similarly	   oppressed	   and	   situated	   in	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	   This	   is	   because	   ‘heterosexuality	   is	   a	   fundamentally	   gendered	  
institution,’80	  in	   which	   men	   are	   privileged	   while	   women	   are	   subordinated.	   She	  
suggests	  that	  although	  gay	  men	  are	  victimised	  because	  of	  their	  sexuality,	  their	  male	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gender	  is	  however	  privileged	  in	  heteronormative	  society.	  Lesbians,	  unlike	  gay	  men,	  
experience	  both	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  subordination.81	  She	  argues	   that	  gay	  politics	  
needs	  to	  tackle	  both	  heterosexual	  privileges	  and	  male	  privileges.	  She	  suggests	  that	  a	  
gender	   neutral	   notion	   of	   gay	   politics	   is	   insufficient	   in	   sexual	   politics	   projects.	   For	  
example,	   she	   argues	   that	   the	   needs	   and	   specific	   situations	   of	   lesbian	   mothers	  
cannot	   be	   properly	   grasped	   by	   gender	   neutral	   perspectives	   in	   gay	   politics.82	  She	  
suggests	   therefore	  a	  gender-­‐specific	  approach	   to	  gay	  politics	   is	  needed	  to	  address	  
the	  gendered	  experiences	  and	  needs	  of	  lesbians.	  
I	   agree	  with	   Jackson	   and	   some	   lesbian	   feminists’	   claims	   that	   gender	   injustice	   and	  
gender	  oppression	  ought	  to	  be	  examined	  and	  tackled	  along	  with	  sexuality	  injustice	  
within	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  sexual	  justice	  research.	  I	  also	  agree	  that	  queer	  
and	  gay	  theories	  should	  not	  limit	  their	  critiques	  and	  challenge	  of	  heteronormativity	  
to	   only	   sexuality	   related	   issues.	   Furthermore,	   I	   concur	   with	   the	   claim	   that	  
subordination	  of	  women	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  But	  is	  
it	  an	  appropriate,	  efficient,	  and	  balanced	  approach	  to	  gender	   justice	   to	   focus	  only	  
upon	   challenging	   the	   oppression	   of	   women	   in	   heteronormativity?	   Can	  
subordination	  feminists	  see	  the	  existence	  and	  the	  harm	  of	  the	  gender	  oppression	  of	  
men	  in	  normative	  heterosexual	  societies	  and	  culture?	  Jackson’s	  reductionist	  idea	  of	  
gender	  oppression,	  as	  held	  by	  many	  other	  subordination	  feminist	  projects,	  has	  the	  
actual	   effect	   of,	   and	   practical	   implications	   for,	   generally	   reducing	   the	   problem	   of	  
gender	  oppression,	   gender	   injustices	   and	   sexism	   to	   simply	   a	   problem	  of	  women’s	  
oppression,	   injustices	   towards	  women,	   and	   sexism	   against	  women.	   Is	   this	   kind	   of	  
reductionist	   concept	   of	   gender	   injustice	   and	   gender	   oppression	   appropriate	   in	  
thinking	  about	  sexual	   justice	  and	  heteronormativity?	   I	  challenge	  the	  subordination	  
feminist	  tendency	  of	  crudely	  equating	  issues	  of	  gender	  injustices	  with	  only	  issues	  of	  
injustices	  towards	  women	  in	  their	  projects.	   I	  argue	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  queer	  
men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	   that,	   while	   subordination	   feminisms	   rightly	   expose	  
some	  aspects	  of	   injustices	  and	  constraints	   in	  normative	  heterosexuality,	   there	  are	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other	   important	   dimensions	   that	   might	   be	   largely	   marginalised	   in	   subordination	  
feminist	   sexual	   justice	   systems	   and	   ideologies.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   I	   use	   family	  
violence	   jurisprudence	   as	   an	   example	   to	   critically	   evaluate	   the	   strengths	   and	  
weaknesses	   of	   the	   subordination	   feminist	   women-­‐centred	   approach	   in	   sexual	  
justice	  projects.	  	  	  	  	  
In	   respect	  of	  gay	  politics	  and	  gay	   rights,	   I	   agree	  with	   Jackson’s	   claim	   that	   lesbians	  
may	   face	   gender	   specific	   problems	   and	   difficulties.	   Sometimes	   gender	   sensitive	  
perspectives	   in	   sexuality	   are	   needed	   for	   lesbians,	   for	   instance,	   in	   cases	   of	   lesbian	  
mothers.	   	   	  However,	  my	  question	  is	  can	  we	  also	  see	  that	  there	  are	  gender	  specific	  
needs	  and	  gender	  specific	  obstacles	  and	  discrimination	  that	  gay	  men	  experience,	  for	  
example,	  in	  gay	  fathers’	  cases?	  	  Can	  we	  appreciate	  that	  gay	  men	  sometimes	  also	  are	  
not	   only	   disadvantaged	   and	   discriminated	   against	   because	   of	   their	   sexuality,	   but	  
also	   because	   of	   their	   male	   sex/male	   gender?	   	   Take	   gay	   fathers	   as	   an	   example;	  
research	   indicates	   that	   gay	   fathers	   sometimes	   suffer	   from	   double	   prejudice	   and	  
intersectional	  stereotyping	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  in	  parenting	  issues.83	  On	  the	  one	  
hand,	   gay	   fathers	   and	   their	   children	   sometimes	   experience	   general	   heterosexist	  
discrimination	   and	   homophobic	   hostility	   from	   conservative	   professionals,	   service	  
providers	   or	   the	   general	   public.84	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   gay	   fathers	   sometimes	   also	  
suffer	   from	   sexist	   discrimination	   and	   gendered	   biases	   against	   men	   and	  
masculinity.85 	  For	   instance,	   the	   family	   welfare	   systems	   and	   children’s	   service	  
providers	  are	  largely	  women-­‐centred	  and	  female-­‐oriented.	  Gay	  fathers	  report	  being	  
marginalised	   and	   trivialised	   by	   family	   and	   children’s	   service	   providers	   and	  
professionals	   not	   only	   because	   of	   their	   homosexuality	   but	   also	   because	   they	   are	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men.86	  In	   child	   residence/custody	   cases,	   gay	   fathers	   are	   likely	   to	   face	   double	  
discrimination	   and	   intersectional	   disadvantage	   from	   the	   intersection	   of	   a	   court’s	  
heterosexist	   attitude	   towards	   gay	   parents	   and	   a	   court’s	   maternal	   preference	   for	  
female	   parents. 87 	  Therefore,	   not	   only	   do	   lesbians	   sometimes	   face	   gendered	  
obstacles	   in	   social	   life,	   but	   gay	  men	  also	  often	  experience	   gendered	   constraints.	   I	  
argue	   that	   in	   sexual	   politics	   projects	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   we	   not	   only	   attend	   to	   the	  
gender	   specific	  needs	  of	   lesbians,	   it	   is	   important	   that	  we	  also	  address	   the	  gender	  
specific	  needs	  for	  gay	  men.	  
I	   argue	   that	   for	   gay	   rights	   and	   gay	   justice	   issues,	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  will	  not	  only	   limit	   themselves	   to	   investigating	  and	  addressing	  
the	  gender	  oppression	  of	  women	  but	  will	  also	  attend	  to	  gender	  oppression	  of	  trans	  
people	  and	  oppression	  of	  men	  qua	  men.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  approach	  to	  sexual	  
justice/sexual	  politics	  could	  help	  us	  better	  understand,	  unravel	  and	  address	  some	  of	  
the	   gender	   specific	   oppression	   and	   constraints	   gay	   men	   experience	   but	   that	   are	  
generally	   not	   taken	   seriously	   enough	   by	   subordination	   feminism	   or	   some	   gay	  
theories.	  	  
The	   central	   theme	   and	   overarching	   premise	   in	   subordination	   feminist	   critiques	   of	  
normative	   heterosexuality	   is	   the	   oppressive	   gender	   order	   in	   heteronormative	  
institutions	   in	   which	   women	   are	   disadvantaged	   and	   dominated	   by	   men.	   Some	  
subordination	   feminists	   and	   subordination-­‐feminist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	  
respond	   to	   the	   critiques	  of	   their	   binary	   and	   stereotypical	   distinction	  of	   gender	  by	  
claiming	   that	  men	  can	  be	  victims	  as	   individuals	   in	   the	   family	  or	   in	  social	   relations,	  
but	   insist	   that	  men	  as	  a	  gender	  group	  per	  se	   should	  be	  regarded	  as	   the	  privileged	  
gender	  when	   thinking	  of	   sexual	   justice.88	  This	   is	  mainly	  because,	   in	   their	  view,	   the	  
whole	  of	  heteronormative	  society	   still	   largely	   rewards	  and	  privileges	  men	  as	  men.	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  Mallon,	  ibid.,	  124-­‐125.	  
87	  Lamb,	   n	   83	   above,	   327;	   Patterson,	   n	   83	   above,	   1057;	   Salgueiro	   da	   Silva	   Mouta	   v	   Portugal,	   31	  
E.H.R.R.	  47	  (2001).	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Men	   as	   the	   gender	   group	   collectively	   enjoy	   the	   ‘patriarchal	   dividend’.89	  	   Some	  
subordination	  feminists	  argue	  for	  the	  need	  to	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  variations	  
among	   different	   sub-­‐groups	   of	   men	   and	   therefore	   to	   be	   more	   sensitive	   to	   the	  
intersection	  of	  multiple	  group	  identities	  in	  sexual	  politics	  such	  as	  the	  intersection	  of	  
sexuality,	  class	  and	  race	  with	  gender.90	  They	  argue	  that	  although	  men	  are	  privileged	  
because	  of	   their	  male	  gender,	   some	  groups	  of	  men	  may	  be	  oppressed	  because	  of	  
their	   other	   disadvantaged	   identities.	   For	   example,	   they	   argue	   that	   while	   working	  
class	   men	   are	   privileged	   because	   of	   their	   male	   gender,	   they	   are	   also	   oppressed	  
because	   of	   their	   class.91	  Furthermore	   some	   subordination	   feminists	   are	   willing	   to	  
acknowledge	  that	   there	  are	   ‘costs’	   for	  men	  to	  pay	   for	  male	  domination.	  However,	  
these	  subordination	  feminist	  scholars	  refuse	  to	  treat	  these	  ‘costs’	  for	  men	  as	  unjust	  
gender	  discrimination	  and	  oppression	  of	  men	  per	  se	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.92	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   although	   some	   subordination	   feminists	   have	  modified	   their	   rigid	   and	  
stereotypical	  understanding	  of	  gender	  by	  the	  above	  ways	  and	  the	  modifications	  are	  
generally	   helpful,	   the	   fundamental	   limits	   of	   their	   structuralist	   understanding	   of	  
gender	  injustices	  and	  gender	  oppression	  may	  still	  exist.	  	  
3.5   Constructing	  heteronormativity	  in	  the	  family:	  violence	  against	  women	  
feminism	  on	  family	  violence,	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
In	   this	  section	   I	  use	   the	   jurisprudence	  developed	  by	  subordination	   feminist	   theory	  
regarding	  family	  violence	  as	  an	  example	  to	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  a	  
subordination	   feminist	   approach	   to	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics.	   I	   argue	   that	  
despite	  its	  contribution,	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  approach	  to	  family	  violence	  has	  
a	   tendency	   of	   producing	   and	   perpetuating	   certain	   unjust	   heteronormative	  myths,	  
discrimination	  and	  prejudices	  in	  their	  construction	  of	  family	  violence.	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  
need	  to	  utilise	  other	  perspectives	  in	  family	  violence	  jurisprudence	  such	  as	  the	  queer	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’	  approach	  to	  family	  violence.	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  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  79;	  R.	  W.	  Connell,	  Gender	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2002),	  142-­‐143.	  
90	  Messer,	  n	  88	  above,	  89-­‐110.	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  Michael	   Kimmel,	  Misframing	   Men:	   The	   Politics	   of	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   Masculinities	   (New	   Brunswick:	  
Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  215-­‐216.	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  3-­‐
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The	  dominant	   feminist	   approach	   to	  domestic	   and	   family	   violence	   is	   subordination	  
feminism’s	   violence	   against	   women	   approach. 93 	  This	   approach	   contends	   that	  
domestic	  violence	  should	  be	  analysed	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   institutional	  gender	  
inequality	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  addressed	  under	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  violence	  against	  
women	   jurisprudence.94 	  They	   argue	   that	   the	   roots	   of	   domestic	   violence	   are	  
patriarchy	  and	  institutional	  male	  power	  and	  the	  main	  pattern	  of	  domestic	  violence	  
surrounds	  male	  control	  and	  dominance	  over	  women.95	  	  Domestic	  violence	  is	  gender	  
violence	   against	   women	   in	   the	   family.	   They	   generally	   assume	   the	   male	  
perpetrator/female	   victim	   dichotomy	   in	   their	   construction	   of	   domestic	   violence.96	  
Gender	   is	   generally	   polarised,	   crudely	   categorised	   and	   stereotyped	   in	   violence	  
against	  women	  feminism’s	  analysis	  of	  family	  violence.	  	  
Subordination	   feminism’s	   theory	   and	   construction	   of	   domestic	   violence	   has	  
significant	  influence	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  and	  legal	  practice	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  At	  
an	   international	   level,	   the	   subordination	   feminist	   construction	   dominates	  
international	   institutional	   official	   policies	   regarding	   domestic	   violence. 97 	  For	  
example,	   in	   international	   law	   theory	   and	   practices,	   feminist	   international	   law	  
generally	   defines	   and	   treats	   family	   violence	   as	   a	   problem	   of	   institutional	   male	  
dominance	  and	  violence	  over	  women.	   Issues	  of	  domestic	  violence	   in	   international	  
law	   are	   generally	   addressed	   as	   an	   issue	   of	   violence	   against	  women	   and	   are	   dealt	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  (London:	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   Jackson,	  Martin	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   eds.,	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   Reproduction	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   Family	  
(Oxford:	   Hart	   Publishing,	   2009),	   40-­‐48;	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   n	   65	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   Krisana	   M.	   Hodges,	   ‘Trouble	   in	  
Paradise:	  Barriers	  to	  Addressing	  Domestic	  Violence	  in	  Lesbian	  Relationships’,	  Law	  &	  Sexuality	  Review,	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  Gay,	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  &	  Transgender	  Legal	  issues	  9	  (1999),	  325-­‐326;	  Donald	  G.	  Dutton,	  and	  Tonia	  L.	  
Nicholls,	   ‘The	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  Paradigm	   in	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  Research	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  6	  (2005),	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   and	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   (Oxford:	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   2010);	   Christine	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  ‘Violence	  Against	  Women’,	  in	  Marsha	  A.	  Freeman,	  Beate	  Rudolf,	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  eds.,	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  UN	  Convention	  on	  the	  Elimination	  of	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  Forms	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  Women:	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with	  under	  the	  violence	  against	  women	   legal	   framework.98	  In	  an	  official	  UN	  report	  
on	  domestic	   violence,	   Radhika	  Coomaraswamy,	   the	   former	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	  
violence	  against	  women	  appointed	  by	  the	  UN	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  claims	  
that	   ‘domestic	   violence	   is	   gender-­‐specific	   violence	   directed	   against	   women,	  
occurring	   within	   the	   family	   and	   within	   interpersonal	   relationships.’ 99 	  The	  
subordination	  feminist	  construction	  of	  domestic	  violence	  is	  also	  widely	  adopted	  by	  
local	  legal	  and	  social	  service	  providers.	  For	  example,	  feminist	  ‘power/control	  wheel’	  
model	  is	  widely	  used	  and	  institutionalised	  by	  domestic	  violence	  service	  providers	  to	  
elaborate	   the	   dynamics	   of	   domestic	   violence.	   The	   power/control	   wheel	   model	  
argues	  that	  the	  root	  of	  domestic	  violence	  is	  men’s	  power	  and	  control	  over	  women	  
in	   the	   family.	  Physical,	  psychological,	   financial,	  emotional	  and	   sexual	   coercion	  and	  
violence	  are	   the	  main	   forms	  of	   violence	  men	  use	   to	  dominate	  women	   in	   intimate	  
relations.100	  
Under	   the	   feminist	   framework	   of	   violence	   against	   women	   the	   construction	   of	  
domestic	  violence,	  family	  violence	  against	  men,	  including	  family	  violence	  against	  gay	  
men,	   bi	   men	   or	   trans	   people	   are	   generally	   marginalised	   and	   often	   invisible.	   A	  
heterosexual	  female	  victim	  paradigm	  is	  generally	  assumed	  and	  prioritised	  under	  this	  
approach.101	  By	   adopting	   this	   kind	  of	  monolithic	   understanding	  of	   family	   violence,	  
violence	   against	   women	   feminism	   has	   difficulties	   in	   properly	   responding	   and	  
attending	  to	  the	  complex	  dimensions,	  relations	  and	  factors	  of	  abuse	  and	  violence	  in	  
the	   family.	   Victims	   of	   same-­‐sex	   intimate	   partner	   violence,	   for	   instance,	   are	   often	  
trivialised	   in	   the	   jurisprudence	  of	  mainstream	   feminist	   theories	  of	   family	  violence.	  
Although	  heterosexual	  men’s	  violence	  in	  the	  family	  is	  a	  serious	  problem	  in	  need	  of	  
urgent	   legal	  and	  political	  effort	  to	  address	  the	   issue,	   it	   is	  nevertheless	  problematic	  
for	   subordination	   feminism	  to	  homogenise	   family	  violence	   into	  a	  male	  dominance	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model	   while	   leaving	   other	   forms	   and	   realities	   of	   family	   violence	   generally	  
marginalised.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  violence	  against	  women	  approach	  to	  domestic	  violence	  argues	  that	  
female-­‐to-­‐male	  violence	  is	  not	  real	  domestic	  violence	  or	  is	  only	  domestic	  violence	  in	  
a	  ‘weak	  sense’.102	  This	  is	  because,	  firstly,	  some	  of	  them	  argue	  that	  patriarchal	  power	  
is	  a	  necessary	  element	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  Female-­‐to-­‐male	  violence	  always	   lacks	  
this	   element	   and	   context	   because	   women	   do	   not	   have	   the	   same	   level	   of	   social	  
power	   as	   men.103	  They	   claim	   that	   since	   women’s	   violence	   does	   not	   perpetuate	  
patriarchy	  and	  structural	  gender	  inequality	  and	  since	  women	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  
social	  power	  as	  men,	   female-­‐to-­‐male	  violence	   in	   intimate	   relationships	   should	  not	  
be	  treated	  as	  domestic	  violence.104	  Secondly,	  some	  others	  argue	  that	  only	  domestic	  
violence	   that	   involves	   the	  element	  of	  patriarchal	  power	  and	  control	   is	   strong;	   it	   is	  
the	  core	  sense	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  Since	  female-­‐to-­‐male	  and	  same	  sex	  domestic	  
violence	   is	   violence	  without	   the	   support	   of	   the	  wider	   context	   of	   systematic	  male	  
power,	  women’s	  violence	   in	   the	   family	   is	  only	  a	  weak	  sense	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  
They	  argue	  that	  the	  law	  and	  the	  state	  ought	  to	  focus	  on	  addressing	  and	  prosecuting	  
the	   strong	   sense	   of	   domestic	   violence,	   that	   is,	   the	   male-­‐to-­‐female	   violence	   in	  
heterosexual	   relationships. 105 	  	   Under	   such	   kinds	   of	   subordination	   feminist	  
ideologies,	   female-­‐to-­‐male	   and	   same	   sex	   domestic	   violence	   are	   either	   excluded	  
from	  the	  definition	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  or	  are	   treated	  as	  only	  a	  weak	  sense	  and	  
trivial	   type	   of	   domestic	   violence	   that	   deserve	   only	   secondary	   concern.	   	   Men	   are	  
implicitly	   assumed	   and	   constructed	   as	   heterosexual,	   violent,	   dominant,	   powerful	  
and	   invulnerable	   while	   women	   are	   assumed	   as	   heterosexual,	   harmless,	  
subordinated,	  powerless	  and	  victimised	  in	  feminist	  violence	  against	  women	  projects	  
of	  domestic	  violence.	  These	  kinds	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  approaches	  to	  domestic	  
violence	   and	   family	   violence,	   I	   argue,	   are	   at	   risk	   of	   perpetuating	   worrying	   and	  
oversimplified	   heteronormative	   norms	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	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  Reece,	  n	  95	  above,	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  Dempsey,	  ‘Toward	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  State:	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  Prosecution	  
of	  Domestic	  Violence	  Mean?’,	  n	  65	  above,	  908-­‐935.	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  Reece,	  ibid.;	  Kelly,	  n	  65	  above,	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  Dempsey,	  ibid.,	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  Reece,	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  Dempsey,	  ibid.,	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They	   tend	   to	   construct,	   perpetuate	   and	   institutionalise	   unjust	   and	   discriminatory	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  myths	  and	  prejudices.	  
Much	   research	  on	   family	  violence,	  however,	  points	  out	   that	   family	  violence	   is	  not	  
just	  a	  problem	  of	  male	  violence	  over	  women	  and	  children.106	  Family	  studies	  scholars	  
find	  in	  their	  empirical	  research	  that	  partner	  violence	  is	  not	  unilateral	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  
violence	   as	   many	   subordination	   feminists	   assume.	   As	   leading	   family	   researcher	  
Murray	  A.	  Straus	  indicates:	  	  
‘[S]everal	  studies,	  including	  large	  and	  nationally	  representative	  samples,	  
have	  found	  that	  Female-­‐Only	  violence	  is	  as	  prevalent	  as	  or	  more	  
prevalent	  than	  Male-­‐Only	  violence,	  and	  that	  the	  most	  prevalent	  pattern	  
is	  bidirectional	  violence;	  i.e.,	  both	  partners	  are	  violent.’107	  	  
Numerous	  family	  violence	  and	  conflict	  research	  projects	  and	  surveys	  point	  out	  that	  
family	  violence	  is	  far	  from	  simply	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  heterosexual	  male	  domination	  
and	   abuse	   over	   heterosexual	   women	   and	   children	   in	   families.108	  For	   example,	  
according	  to	  the	  latest	  National	  Intimate	  Partner	  and	  Sexual	  Violence	  Survey	  2010	  in	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  no.	  11	  (2006),	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  European	  Journal	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  (2007),	  227-­‐232;	  M.	  A.	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   International	   Dating	   Violence	   Research	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   ‘Prevalence	   of	   Violence	   against	   Dating	  
Partners	   by	   Male	   and	   Female	   University	   Students	   Worldwide’,	   Violence	   against	   Women	   10,	   no.7	  
(2004),	  790-­‐811;	  M.	  A,	  Straus	  and	  Kristi	  L.	  Gozjolko.	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  Journal	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   (2014),	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   22,	  
no.	  6	  (1996),	  401-­‐415;Terrie	  E.	  Moffitt,	  Richard	  W.	  Robins,	  and	  Avshalom	  Caspi,	   ‘A	  Couples	  Analysis	  
of	  Partner	  Abuse	  with	  Implications	  for	  Abuse-­‐prevention	  Policy’,	  Criminology	  &	  Public	  Policy	  1,	  no.	  1	  
(2001),	  5-­‐36;	   Ko	  Ling	  Chan,	  and	  Murray	  A.	  Straus,	  ‘Prevalence	  and	  Correlates	  of	  Physical	  Assault	  on	  
Dating	   Partners’,	  	  Family	   &	   Intimate	   Partner	   Violence	   Quarterly,	   3	   no.	   3	   (2008),	   5-­‐14;	   Collins	   W.	  
Andrew,	   Deborah	   P.	   Welsh,	   and	   Wyndol	   Furman,	   ‘Adolescent	   Romantic	   Relationships’,	  Annual	  
Review	  of	  Psychology	  60	  (2009),	  640;	  David	  M.	  Fergusson,	  L.	  John	  Horwood,	  and	  Elizabeth	  M.	  Ridder,	  
‘Partner	  Violence	  and	  Mental	  Health	  Outcomes	  in	  a	  New	  Zealand	  Birth	  Cohort’,	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  of	  marriage	  
and	   family	  67,	   no.	   5	   (2005),	   1103-­‐1119;	   Jennifer	   Katz,	   Stephanie	   Washington	   Kuffel,	   and	   Amy	  
Coblentz,	   ‘Are	   There	   Gender	   Differences	   in	   Sustaining	   Dating	   Violence?	   An	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Frequency,	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  17,	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271;	   Kirsten	   Robertson,	   and	   Tamar	   Murachver,	   ‘Women	   and	   Men's	   Use	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   in	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  Violence’,	  Violence	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  26,	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  (2011),	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the	  US,	  men	   report	   similar	  or	   slightly	  higher	   rates	  of	   victimisation	  of	  physical	   and	  
psychological	   abuse	   in	   intimate	   relationships	   than	  women.	   About	   4%	  women	   and	  
4.7%	  men	   report	   experiencing	   physical	   violence	   by	   an	   intimate	   partner	   in	   the	   12	  
months	  prior	   to	   taking	   the	  survey.	   In	   respect	  of	  psychological	  aggression,	  a	  higher	  
percentage	   of	   men	   (18.1%)	   over	   women	   (13.9%)	   report	   being	   victims	   of	  
psychological	  aggression	  by	  an	  intimate	  partner	  in	  the	  12	  months	  prior	  to	  taking	  the	  
survey.	  The	  same	  survey	  also	  reports	  non-­‐negligible	  figures	  of	  male	  victimisation	  of	  
sexual	   violence	   in	   intimate	   relationships.109	  Also,	   empirical	   research	   indicates	   that	  
there	   exists	   a	   similar	   prevalence	   of	   intimate	   partner	   violence	   between	   LGBT	  
intimate	  relations	  and	  heterosexual	  intimate	  relations.110	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  	  significant	  percentage	  of	  female	  perpetrators	  of	  intimate	  
relationship	   violence,	   which	   is	   undeniable	   and	   supported	   by	   more	   and	   more	  
empirical	   research,	   some	   subordination	   feminists	   further	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	  
distinguish	   two	   types	   of	   domestic	   violence:	   the	   ‘intimate	   terrorism’	   and	   the	  
‘situational	   couple	   violence.’111 	  The	   first	   type	   of	   intimate	   partner	   violence	   is	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381-­‐405;	   Catherine	   Donovan,	  Marianne	   Hester,	   Jonathan	   Holmes,	   &	  Melanie	  McCarry,	  Comparing	  
Domestic	  Abuse	   in	   Same	  Sex	  and	  Heterosexual	  Relationships,	   Initial	   report	   from	  a	   study	   funded	  by	  
the	   Economic	   &	   Social	   Research	   Council,	   2006;	   Anne	   Sullivan,	   and	   Kristen	   Kuehnle,‘Lesbian	  
Battering’,	   in	  Nicky	  Ali	   Jackson	  ed.,	   Encyclopaedia	  of	  Domestic	  Violence	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   Don	   Faggiani,	   and	   Helen	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   Carolyn	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   Journal	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   no.	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   Stonewall,	   London	   (2012).	   (Accessed	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   2014)	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  (2004).	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  Women’,	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motivated	   by	   the	   desire	   to	   control	   and	   dominate,	   and	   involves	   one	   partner	   using	  
control	  tactics	  over	  the	  other	  in	  their	  relationship.	  The	  latter	  form	  does	  not	  involve	  
the	   motivation	   and	   tactics	   of	   control	   and	   domination	   and	   is	   only	   in	   response	   to	  
intimate	   terrorism	   or	   occasional	   non-­‐severe	   conflicts.	   Intimate	   terrorism	   (or	  
patriarchal	  terrorism)	   ‘is	  defined	  by	  the	  attempt	  to	  dominate	  one’s	  partner	  and	  to	  
exert	  general	  control	  over	  the	  relationship,	  domination	  that	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  use	  
of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   power	   and	   control	   tactics.’112	  The	   tactics	   include	   emotional	  
abuse,	   isolation,	   using	   children	   as	   a	   threat,	   economic	   or	   physical	   abuse. 113	  	  
Situational	   couple	   violence	   ‘is	   defined	   as	   intimate	   partner	   violence	   that	   is	   not	  
embedded	   in	   such	  a	  general	  pattern	  of	   controlling	  behaviours.’114	  They	  argue	   that	  
the	   majority	   of	   intimate	   terrorism	   in	   the	   family	   is	   perpetrated	   by	   men	   against	  
women	  while	  women’s	  violence	  towards	  men	  is	  generally	  non-­‐controlling.115	  	  
However,	  	  their	  conclusion	  that	  intimate	  terrorism	  is	  perpetrated	  almost	  exclusively	  
by	  men	  against	  women	  relies	  on	  selecting	  samples	  of	  	  heterosexual	  female	  victims	  
only	   and	   excluding	   samples	   of	   others	   in	   terms	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   groups	   in	  
their	  studies	  of	   intimate	  terrorism.116	  Their	   research	  collects	  and	  considers	  data	  of	  
female	   victims	   only,	   from	   agency	   samples	   from	   social	   and	   legal	   service	   providers	  
such	   as	  women’s	   shelters,117	  or	   use	   large	   scale	   surveys,	  which	   only	   ask	   about	   the	  
experience	  of	  female	  victimisation.118	  They	  do	  not	  include	  and	  consider	  samples	  and	  
data	   of	   male	   and	   LGBT	   victims	   or	   large	   scale	   survey	   results	   that	   also	   record	   the	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   Janel	  M.	  Leone,	   ‘The	  Differential	  Effects	  of	   Intimate	  Terrorism	  and	  Situational	  Couple	  Violence	  
Findings	  from	  the	  National	  Violence	  against	  Women	  Survey’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  26,	  no.	  3	  (2005),	  
322-­‐349.	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  and	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  ibid.,	  323.	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  Ibid.	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  Ibid.,	  324.	  
115	  Johnson,	   n	   111	   above,	   287,	   291-­‐293;	   Michael	   P.	   Johnson,	   ‘Domestic	   Violence:	   It's	   Not	   About	  
Gender—Or	  Is	  It?’,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  Family	  67,	  no.	  5	  (2005),	  1128.	  
116	  Straus,	   ‘Future	   Research	   on	   Gender	   Symmetry	   in	   Physical	   Assaults	   on	   Partners’,	   n	   108	   above,	  
1090;	  Straus	  ‘Processes	  Explaining	  the	  Concealment	  and	  Distortion	  of	  Evidence	  on	  Gender	  Symmetry	  
in	  Partner	  Violence,’	  n	  108	  above,	  228-­‐229.	  
117	  For	  example,	  Johnson,	  n	  111	  above,	  283-­‐294.	  Researches	  find	  most	  of	  the	  social	  and	  legal	  services	  
providers	  of	  domestic	  violence	  adopt	  subordination	  feminist	  ideology	  and	  generally	  assume	  domestic	  
violence	  is	  perpetrated	  by	  male	  abusers	  against	  female	  victims.	  For	  the	  heterosexual	  female	  victims’	  
paradigm	  in	  social	  and	  legal	  service	  providers	  and	  agencies	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  see	  Ron	  Wallance,	  
‘Identifying	   Potential	   Challenges	   to	   Providing	   Emergency	   Advocacy	   Services	   to	   Male	   Victims	   of	  
Intimate	  Partner	  Violence’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  5,	  no.	  1	  (2014),	  58-­‐68.	  Also,	  Ristock,	  n	  93	  above,	  99-­‐123.	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experiences	   of	   male	   and	   LGBT	   victims.	   So	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   subordination	  
feminist	  scholars	  conclude	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  intimate	  terrorism	  is	  perpetrated	  by	  
men	  by	  only	  focusing	  on	  surveying	  and	  collecting	  experiences	  from	  cases	  of	  female	  
victimisation.	  
Similarly,	   some	   subordination	   feminist	   theorists	   such	   as	   Russell	   P.	   Dobash	   and	   R.	  
Emerson	  Dobash	  claim	  that	  the	  nature,	   intentions	  and	  pattern	  of	  male	  and	  female	  
intimate	  partner	  violence	  are	  different.	  They	  claim	  that	  mostly,	  women’s	  violence	  is	  
not	   controlling,	   is	   not	   severe,	   is	   self-­‐protective	   and	   is	   not	   physically	   or	  
psychologically	   damaging	   while	   men’s	   violence	   is	   controlling,	   coercive	   and	  
harmful.119	  Again,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  weaknesses	  of	  their	  studies	  is	  that	  their	  findings	  
rely	  on	  only	  selecting	  and	  considering	  agency	  samples	  of	  female	  victimisation	  cases	  
and	   male	   offenders	   convicted	   of	   domestic	   violence.120	  They	   do	   not	   include	   and	  
consider	   samples	   and	   experiences	   of	   male	   victims	   or	   examples	   from	   the	   LGBT	  
community.	   By	   excluding	   the	   experiences	   and	   perspectives	   of	   male	   and	   LGBT	  
victimisation,	  they	  over-­‐generalise	  their	  findings	  by	  concluding	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  
intimate	   partner	   violence	   is	   primarily	   male	   to	   female. 121 	  	   Male	   and	   LGBT	  
victimisation	   of	   domestic	   violence	   are	   too	   lightly	   trivialised	   and	   the	   problem	   of	  
domestic	  violence	  is	  too	  easily	  reduced	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  male	  to	  female	  violence	  
within	  the	  family.	  	  
The	   above	   kinds	   of	   subordination	   feminist	   research	   and	  methodologies	   of	   family	  
violence	   are	   unbalanced,	   biased	   and	   discriminatory	   because	   they	   already	   use	   a	  
heteronormative	  lens	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  in	  their	  studies.	  Although	  it	  is	  crucial	  
to	   investigate	   and	   address	   heterosexual	   women’s	   victimisation	   in	   intimate	  
relationships,	   it	   can	   be	   problematic	   to	   assume	   an	   oversimplified	   heterosexual	  
female	  victim	  paradigm	  in	  domestic	  violence	  studies.	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  n	  65	  above,	  38-­‐39;	  Dobash,	  Dobash,	  Wilson	  and	  Daly,	  n	  65	  above,	  45;	  Russell	  P.	  Dobash,	  and	  
R.	   Emerson	   Dobash.	   ‘Women's	   Violence	   to	   Men	   in	   Intimate	   Relationships	   Working	   on	   a	   Puzzle’,	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  44,	  no.	  3	  (2004),	  324-­‐349;	  Rebecca	  Emerson	  Dobash,	  Russell	  P.	  Dobash,	  
Kate	  Cavanagh,	  and	  Ruth	  Lewis,	  Changing	  Violent	  Men	  (London:	  Sage,	  1999).	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  Dobash	  and	  Dobash,	  ibid.,	  333-­‐334;	  Dobash,	  Dobash,	  Cavanagh	  and	  Lewis,	  ibid.,	  72-­‐76.	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Research	  from	  survey	  data	  and	  experiences	  from	  service	  providers	  for	  male	  victims	  
find	   that	   most	   male	   victims	   seeking	   help	   suffer	   from	   intimate	   terrorism	   by	   their	  
female	  partner.122	  For	  example,	  through	  their	  research	  of	  male	  victims	  seeking	  help	  
from	  service	  providers,	  D.	  A.	  Hines	  and	  E.	  M.	  Douglas	  find	  that:	  
‘contrary	  to	  many	  assumptions	  about	  these	  men,	  the	  IPV	  [intimate	  
partner	  violence]	  they	  sustain	  is	  quite	  severe	  and	  both	  mentally	  and	  
physically	  damaging;	  their	  most	  frequent	  response	  to	  their	  partner’s	  IPV	  
is	  to	  get	  away	  from	  her;	  and	  they	  are	  often	  blocked	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  
leave,	  sometimes	  physically,	  but	  more	  often	  because	  of	  strong	  
psychological	  and	  emotional	  ties	  to	  their	  partners	  and	  especially	  their	  
children.’123	  
Empirical	   research	   that	   surveys	   the	   experiences	   of	   both	   men	   and	   women	   also	  
reports	   non-­‐negligible	   rates	   of	  male	   victimisation	   of	   intimate	   terrorism	   or	   similar	  
percentages	   of	   male	   and	   female	   intimate	   terrorism	   perpetrators.124	  Research	   of	  
same	   sex	   domestic	   violence	   also	   suggests	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   intimate	   terrorism	  
type	  of	   family	   violence	   in	   same	  sex	   relationships.125	  Furthermore,	   researchers	   find	  
that	   there	  are	   significant	  numbers	  and	  comparable	  percentages	  of	  both	  male	  and	  
female	  perpetrators	  exerting	  coercive	  controlling	  tactics	  and	  displaying	  motives	  and	  
intentions	   for	   control	   and	   coercion	   when	   perpetrating	   family	   violence.126	  These	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  Journal	  of	  Aggression,	  Conflict,	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  (2010),	  36-­‐56;	  D.	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  Hines	  and	  
E.	  M.	  Douglas,	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  Look	  at	  Men	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  Sustain	  Intimate	  Terrorism	  by	  Women’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  1,	  
no.	   3	   (2010),	   286-­‐	   313;	   Sotirios	   	   Sarantakos,	   ‘Deconstructing	   Self-­‐defence	   in	   Wife-­‐to-­‐husband	  
Violence’,	   The	   Journal	   of	   Men's	   Studies	   12,	   no.	   3	   (2004),	   277-­‐296;	   Todd	   A.	   Migliaccio,	   ‘Abused	  
Husbands:	  A	  Narrative	  Analysis’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  23,	  no.1	  (2002),	  26-­‐52.	  
123	  Hines	   and	  Douglas,	   ‘A	   Closer	   Look	   at	  Men	  Who	   Sustain	   Intimate	   Terrorism	   by	  Women’,	   ,n	   122	  
above,	  28	  
124	  Straus	   and	   Gozjolko,	   n	   108	   above;	   Denis	   Laroche,	  Aspects	   of	   the	   Context	   and	   Consequences	   of	  
Domestic	  Violence:	  Situational	  Couple	  Violence	  and	   Intimate	  Terrorism	   in	  Canada	   in	  1999	   (Québec:	  
Institut	  de	  la	  statistique	  du	  Québec,	  2005).	  
125	  Ristock,	   n	   93	   above,	   49-­‐78;	   Claire	   M.	   Renzetti,	   Violent	   Betrayal:	   Partner	   Abuse	   in	   Lesbian	  
Relationships	  (Sage:	  London,	  1992),	  115-­‐117.	  
126	  Fred	   Buttell	   and	   Emily	   Starr,	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   the	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   Foundations	   for	   a	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   Partner	   Violence’,	   in	   Brenda	   L.	   Russell	   ed.,	   Perceptions	   of	   Female	   Offenders:	   How	  
Stereotypes	  and	  Social	  Norms	  Affect	  Criminal	  Justice	  Responses,	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	  126-­‐131;	  
Robertson	   and	   Murachver,	   n	   108	   above,	   208-­‐217;  Richard	   B.	   Felson,	   and	   Maureen	   C.	   Outlaw,	  	  
‘Control	   Motive	   and	   Marital	   Violence’,	   Violence	   and	   Victims,	   22,	   no.	   4	   (2007),	   387-­‐407;  Carrado,	  
George,	  Loxam,	  Jones,	  and	  Templar,	  n	  108	  above,	  401-­‐415;  Straus	  and	  Gozjolko,	  n	  108	  above,	  51-­‐65;	  
J.	  Stets,	  and	  S.	  A.	  Hammond,	  ‘Gender,	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  and	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  Commitment’,	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  of	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  Issues	  23,	  
no.	  1	  (2002),	  3–25;	  M.	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examples	  of	  empirical	   research	   indicate	   that	   the	   realities	  and	  patterns	  of	   intimate	  
terrorism	  and	  domestic	  violence	  are	  much	  more	  heterogeneous	  than	  subordination	  
feminist	  family	  violence	  theories	  assume.	  Intimate	  terrorism	  and	  domestic	  violence	  
cannot	  be	  generally	  reduced	  to	  just	  male	  to	  female	  violence	  in	  the	  family.	  	  
Studies	   of	   intimate	   partner	   violence	   between	   heterosexual	   and	   same-­‐sex	   couples	  
also	  indicate	  that	  the	  breadwinner	  or	  financially	  better	  off	  party	  in	  a	  relationship	  is	  
not	   necessarily	   the	   party	   that	   perpetrates	   family	   violence;	   a	   myth	   held	   and	  
perpetuated	   by	   violence	   against	   women	   feminist	   theories	   of	   family	   violence.	  
Sometimes	  perpetrators	  are	  the	  party	  that	  earns	  less	  in	  a	  relationship.	  For	  instance,	  
Claire	  M.	  Renzetti	  finds	  in	  her	  research	  into	  lesbian	  family	  violence	  that	  ‘it	  appears	  
violence	  in	  lesbian	  relationships	  occurs	  at	  about	  the	  same	  frequency	  as	  violence	  in	  
heterosexual	   relationships.’127	  She	   finds	   that	   abusers’	   sexual	   jealousy	   and	   their	  
psychological	   ‘dependency’	   on	   their	   partners	   (that	   is,	   their	   desire	   for	   emotional	  
control	   and	   their	   possessiveness	   over	   their	   partners)	   are	   strongly	   associated	  with	  
their	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  their	  partner.128	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  financially	  and	  
socially	  better	  off	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  victimised	  by	  their	  partners	  in	  her	  research.	  
Her	   research	   does	   not	   support	   subordination	   feminism’s	   monolithic	   claim	   that	  
domestic	  violence	   is	  about	   the	   financially	  better	  off	  party	  coercing	  and	  controlling	  
their	   economically	   less	   endowed	   partner	   by	   power	   and	   violence	   in	   family.129	  Her	  
research	   questions	   such	   monolithic	   constructions	   of	   power	   relations	   in	   family	  
relationships.	  Instead,	  she	  suggests	  that	  power	  in	  intimate	  relationships	  is	  complex	  
and	   multifaceted.	   Her	   research	   also	   indicates	   that	   various	   controlling	   tactics	   are	  
widely	  used	  by	  perpetrators	  with	  the	  intention	  to	  control	  and	  dominate	  in	  same	  sex	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of	   Intimate	   Partner	   Violence.	   Why	   the	   Overwhelming	   Evidence	   on	   Partner	   Physical	   Violence	   by	  
Women	   Has	   Not	   Been	   Perceived	   and	   Is	   Often	   Denied’,	  Journal	   of	   Aggression,	   Maltreatment	   &	  
Trauma,	   18,	   no.	   6	   (2009),	   555-­‐556.In	   their	   review	   article,	   Langhinrichsen-­‐Rohling,	   McCullars	   and	  
Misra	  find	  that	  ‘studies	  that	  considered	  the	  most	  frequent	  motivations	  for	  perpetration	  reported	  by	  
men	  and	  women	  often	  generated	  similar	  motives.’	  See	  Langhinrichsen-­‐Rohling,	  McCullars	  and	  Misra,	  
n35	   above,	   459.	   Kar	   and	  O’Leary	   find	   that	  women	   have	   higher	   levels	   of	   psychological	   aggression,	  
dominance	   and	   jealousy	   in	   intimate	   relations.	   See	  Heidi	   L.	   Kar,	   and	  K.	  Daniel	  O’Leary,	   ‘Patterns	   of	  
Psychological	  Aggression,	  Dominance,	  and	  Jealousy	  within	  Marriage’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Violence,	  28,	  
no.	  2	  (2013),	  109-­‐119.	  
127	  Renzetti,	  n	  125	  above,	  115.	  
128	  Ibid.,	  116-­‐117.	  
129	  Ibid.,	  117.	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domestic	   violence. 130 	  	   Therefore,	   her	   study	   suggests	   that	   the	   coercive	   and	  
controlling	  types	  of	  domestic	  violence	  do	  not	  only	  exist	  in	  male	  to	  female	  domestic	  
violence	  as	  many	  subordination	  feminists	  assume	  in	  their	  family	  violence	  theory.	  	  
The	   heteronormative	   and	   traditional	   ‘heterosexual	   female	   victim	   paradigm’	   of	  
domestic	   violence	   is	   dominant	   and	   influential	   in	   both	   public	   culture131	  and	   in	   the	  
communities	   of	   the	   legal	   enforcement	   system	   and	   service	   providers.	   132 	  	   As	  
reported:	  ‘[t]he	  presumption	  that	  all	  men	  are	  potential	  abusers	  and	  women	  the	  only	  
victims	   of	   IPA	   (intimate	   partner	   abuse)	   permeates	   victims	   advocacy,	   the	   criminal	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   P.	   Seelau,	   ‘Gender-­‐role	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   Journal	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   and	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   78-­‐96;	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   Russell,	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  Case	  of	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   Evaluating	   Legal	   Decisions’,	   Journal	   of	   Family	   Violence	   27,	   no.	   7	   (2012),	   659-­‐670;	   Xiying	  
Wang,	  and	  Sik	  Ying	  Ho	  Petula,	   ‘My	  Sassy	  Girl	  A	  Qualitative	  Study	  of	  Women's	  Aggression	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  Dating	  
Relationships	   in	   Beijing’,	  Journal	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   Violence,	   22,	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   (2007),	   623-­‐638;	   Amanda	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Schmesser,	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   Domestic	   Violence:	   Bias	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Application	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  Review,	  58,	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  (2007),	  196;	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   Leung,	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  (2009),	  447-­‐462.	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  (2007),	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  Henry	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  Wolfer,	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  against	  Female	  
Intimate	  Partners’,	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  2,	  no.	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  (2011),	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  Steve	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   (2005),	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  Schmesser,	   ibid.;	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   the	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  The	  Journal	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  no.	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  (1994),	  137-­‐159;	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   (El	   Paso:	   Lfb	   Scholarly	   Pub,	   2009),	   161-­‐164;	   Debra	   L	  
Oswald	   and	   Lucie	   Holmgreen,	   ‘Female	   Sexual	   Aggression	   on	   College	   Campuses:	   Prevalence,	  
Correlates,	   and	   Perceptions’,	   in	   Brenda	   L.	   Russell	   ed.,	   Perceptions	   of	   Female	   Offenders:	   How	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  Social	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  Responses,	   (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	  77-­‐92;	  
Michelle	   Davies,	   ‘Effects	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   Sexuality	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   Perceptions	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   in	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  L.	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  ed.,	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  of	  Female	  Offenders:	  How	  Stereotypes	  
and	  Social	  Norms	  Affect	  Criminal	  Justice	  Responses,	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	  93-­‐100;	  Katherine	  R.	  
White,	   and	   Donald	   G.	   Dutton,	   ‘Perception	   of	   Female	   Perpetrators’,	   in	   Brenda	   L.	   Russell	   ed.,	  
Perceptions	   of	   Female	   Offenders:	   How	   Stereotypes	   and	   Social	   Norms	   Affect	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   Justice	  
Responses,	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2013),	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justice	  professionals	  systems,	  and	  society	  as	  a	  whole.’133	  	  For	  example,	  as	  elaborated	  
above,	  the	  heteronormative	  ‘power	  and	  control	  wheel	  model’	  is	  widely	  adopted	  by	  
domestic	   violence	   service	   providers.134	  The	   result	   is	   that	   violence	   perpetrated	   by	  
heterosexual	  women	  in	  the	  family	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  trivialised	  and	  excused,	  while	  
male	  and	  LGBT	  victimisation	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  or	  	  become	  visible	  
under	  the	  heteronormative	  construction	  of	  domestic	  violence.	  
Under	  the	  dominant	  heterosexual	  female	  victim	  paradigm,	  abused	  men	  by	  women	  
are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   issued	   a	   protection	   order	   by	   court	   even	   in	   similar	   abusive	  
cases.135	  A	  study	  finds	  that:	  
‘male	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  were	  not	  afforded	  the	  same	  
protections	  as	  their	  female	  counterparts.	  This	  gender	  inequality	  in	  court	  
response	  occurred	  even	  though	  male	  and	  female	  plaintiffs	  were	  similarly	  
victimized	  by	  their	  opposite	  gender	  defendants.’136	  	  	  
Moreover,	  abused	  fathers	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  secure	  temporary	  and	  permanent	  
custody/residence	   orders	   of	   their	   children	   compared	   to	   abused	   mothers,	   while	  
abusive	   mothers	   are	   still	   more	   likely	   to	   keep	   children	   in	   their	   custody.137	  	   The	  
findings	  are	  worrying.	  Indeed,	  this	  could	  mean	  that	  many	  young	  children	  are	  left	  to	  
live	   under	   the	   sole	   custody	   of	   their	   abusive	   mothers.	   This	   also	   echoes	   findings	  
whereby,	   because	   of	   the	   gender	   bias	   and	   stereotypes	   against	   men	   within	   family	  
violence	   legal	   systems,	   and	   because	   of	   the	   de	   facto	  maternal	   preference	   in	   child	  
residence/custody	  cases,	  many	  abused	  fathers	  fear	  to	  report	  their	  victimisation	  and	  
choose	   to	   stay	   in	   abusive	   relationships	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   still	   live	   with	   their	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  Reeves,	  Desmarais,	  Nicholls,	  and	  Douglas,	  ibid.,	  10.	  
134	  Ristock,	  n	  93	  above,	  147-­‐151.	  
135	  Muller,	  Desmarais,	  and	  Hamel,	  n	  132	  above;	  Mele,	  Roberts,	  and	  Wolfer,	  n	  132	  above;	  Basile,	  n	  132	  
above;	  Brown,	  n	  132	  above.	  
136	  Basile,	  ibid.,	  178.	  
137	  Mele,	  Roberts,	  and	  Wolfer.	  n	  132	  above,	  61-­‐75;	  Basile,	  ibid.,	  171-­‐178.	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children,	  to	  protect	  their	  children	  and	  to	  avoid	  losing	  contact	  with	  their	  children.138	  
As	  Steven	  Basile	  finds:	  
‘many	   male	   victims	   of	   domestic	   violence	   who	   are	   parents	   and	   who	   are	  
locked	   into	   violent	   relationships	  because	   they	   fear	   the	   court	  will	   not	   grant	  
them	  custody	  of	   their	  minor	  children	  and	  may	  even	   lose	  contact	  with	  their	  
children	  if	  their	  female	  abuser	  files	  a	  counterclaim	  against	  them.’139	  	  	  
Similarly,	  Hines	  and	  Douglas	  find	  that	  commitment	  to	  the	  children	  and	  marriage	  and	  
the	   fear	   of	   losing	   contact	  with	   children	   are	   among	   the	  main	   reasons	  why	   abused	  
fathers	  still	  stay	  in	  abusive	  relationships.140	  	  
Studies	  also	  find	  that	  legal	  enforcement	  professionals	  such	  as	  the	  police,	  judges	  and	  
prosecutors	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  heteronormative	  gender	  role	  stereotypes	  and	  myths	  in	  
deciding	   and	   identifying	   the	   (primary)	   perpetrators	   in	   domestic	   violence.141	  For	  
example,	  police	  or	   judges	   tend	   to	   identify	   the	  abuser	  by	   relying	  on	  stereotypes	  of	  
biological	   sex	  and	  gender.	   In	  heterosexual	   relationships,	  police	  and	   judges	   tend	  to	  
assume	   that	   the	   biological	   man	   is	   the	   primary	   perpetrator. 142 	  In	   same	   sex	  
relationships,	   they	   tend	   to	   assume	   the	   more	   ‘masculine’	   partner	   is	   the	   primary	  
abuser.	   For	   instance,	   in	   lesbian	   domestic	   violence	   cases,	   Krisana	  M.	   Hodges	   finds	  
that:	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   ‘Police	  Officers’	   Judgements	  of	  Blame	   in	  Family	  Violence:	  The	  
Impact	  of	  Gender	  and	  Alcohol’,	  Sex	  Roles	  37,	  No.	  11-­‐12	   (1997),	  921-­‐933;	  Michelle	  Aulivola,	   ‘Outing	  
Domestic	   Violence’,	   Family	   Court	   Review	   42,	   no.	   1	   (2004),	   167;	   Hodges,	   n	   95	   above,	   328;	   Stan	  
Shernock	   and	   Brenda	   Russell,	   ‘Gender	   and	   Racial/ethnic	   Differences	   in	   Criminal	   Justice	   Decision	  
Making	  in	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  Cases’,	  Partner	  Abuse	  3,	  no.	  4	  (2012),	  501-­‐530.	  Hamilton,	  n	  129	  
above;	  Brown,	  n	  132	  above.	  
142	  Brown,	  ibid.	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‘When	  police	  and	  judges	  seek	  to	  understand	  same-­‐sex	  domestic	  violence	  
under	  the	  lens	  of	  ‘’domestic	  violence	  as	  male	  dominance	  of	  women,’’	  
they	  may	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘’who	  is	  the	  abuser’’	  with	  the	  
heteronormative	  question	  ‘‘who	  is	  the	  man?’’	  In	  this	  way,	  lesbians	  who	  
appear	  more	  masculine	  are	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  misidentification	  as	  
abusers	  when	  they	  seek	  legal	  help	  as	  battered	  women.	  Lesbian	  battered	  
women,	  especially	  women	  who	  appear	  more	  masculine,	  risk	  
misidentification	  as	  abuser	  in	  a	  way	  that	  heterosexual	  women	  do	  not.’143	  
Similarly,	  Michelle	  Aulivola	  reports	  that	  the	  police	  often	  rely	  on	  gender	  stereotypes	  
to	  decide	  the	  primary	  perpetrator	  in	  same	  sex	  domestic	  abuse	  disputes.144	  Research	  
also	  finds	  that	  because	  of	  the	  pervasive	  and	  deeply	  held	  gender	  role	  stereotypes	  in	  
society	   and	   in	   the	   culture	   of	   legal	   professionals,	   biological	   men	   and	   masculine	  
lesbians	  are	  at	  significant	   risk	  of	  being	   falsely	  accused	  as	  perpetrators	   in	  domestic	  
violence	  disputes.145	  	  By	  relying	  on	  a	  stereotyping	  subordination	  feminist	  model	  of	  
family	   violence,	   the	   legal	   systems	   of	   domestic	   violence	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   perpetuating	  
oppressive	  and	  unjust	  heteronormative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  norms	  and	  biases.	  	  
With	   the	   pervasive	   heteronormative	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   prejudices	   in	   family	  
violence	  jurisprudence	  and	  legal	  practice,	  research	  indicates	  that	  male	  victims	  have	  
less	  confidence	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  for	  domestic	  violence	  and	  are	  far	  less	  likely	  than	  
female	   victims	   to	   report	   their	   victimisation	   to	   the	   police	   or	   to	   seek	   other	  
professional	  help	  from	  service	  providers.146	  When	  men	  do	  report	  their	  victimisation,	  
police,	  prosecutors	  and	  other	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  are	  significantly	  less	  likely	  to	  
arrest,	   charge	   or	   prosecute	   female	   offenders	   than	   to	   charge	   and	   to	   prosecute	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143	  Hodges,	  n	  95	  above,	  328.	  
144	  Aulivola,	  n	  141	  above,	  167.	  
145	  Dena	   Hassouneh,	   and	   Nancy	   Glass,	   ‘The	   Influence	   of	   Gender	   Role	   Stereotyping	   on	   Women's	  
Experiences	   of	   Female	   Same-­‐sex	   intimate	   Partner	   Violence’,	   Violence	   Against	   Women,	   14,	   no.	   3	  
(2008),	  321-­‐323;	  Ristock,	  n	  93	  above,	  99-­‐102;	  Hines	  and	  Douglas,	  ‘A	  Closer	  Look	  at	  Men	  Who	  Sustain	  
Intimate	   Terrorism	  by	  Women’,	   n	   122	   above,	   297-­‐300.	   Sarantakos,	   n	   122	   above,	   277-­‐296;	   Joanna	  
Reed,	   ‘Anatomy	  of	  the	  Breakup:	  How	  and	  Why	  Do	  Unmarried	  Couples	  with	  Children	  Break	  Up?’,	   in	  
Paula	   England	   and	   Kathryn	   Edi	   neds.,	   Unmarried	   Couples	   with	   Children	   (New	   York:	   Russell	   Sage,	  
2007),	  148-­‐149.	  
146	  For	   example,	   J.	   Stets,	   and	   M.	   A.	   Straus,	   ‘’Gender	   Differences	   in	   Reporting	   Marital	   Violence’,	  
Physical	  Violence	  in	  American	  Families	  (New	  Brunswick:	  NJ7	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1992),	  151-­‐166;	  
Suzanne	   K.	   Steinmetz,	   ‘Battered	   Husbands’,	   in	   Nicky	   Ali	   Jackson	   ed.,	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Domestic	  
Violence	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  53-­‐59;	  Drijber,	  Reijnders,	  and	  Ceelen,	  n	  138	  above;	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comparable	  male	   offenders.147	  In	   a	   study	   of	   the	   judicial	   construction	   of	   domestic	  
violence,	  scholars	  find	  there	  are	  gendered	  expectations	  of	  male	  violence	  and	  female	  
vulnerability	  in	  judicial	  constructions	  of	  domestic	  violence.148	  (Heterosexual)	  women	  
are	   implicitly	   assumed	   as	   the	   legitimate	   victims	   deserving	   of	   state	   protection.	   In	  
cases	   involving	   female	   violence,	   the	   court	   tends	   to	   minimise	   (heterosexual)	  
women’s	  violence.149	  Male	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  frequently	  report	  suffering	  
from	   institutional	   biases	   and	   trivialisation	   from	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   law	  
enforcement	  professionals.	   ‘Police	  officers	   refused	   to	   arrest	   the	  wives	  of	   some	  of	  
the	   respondents	  merely	   because	   they	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   accept	   that	   a	   husband	  
could	  be	  abused.’150	  
Gay	  men,	   lesbians	  and	  transgender	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  are	  also	  at	  risk	  of	  
being	   re-­‐victimized	   by	   the	   legal	   system	   because	   of	   the	   heterosexist	   approach	   to	  
domestic	  violence.151	  
Not	  only	  are	  there	  heteronormative	  biases	  against	  men	  and	  LGBT	  people	  in	  the	  legal	  
system	   for	   domestic	   violence,	   the	   biases	   can	   also	   be	   found	   in	   the	   beliefs	   and	  
ideologies	   of	   service	   providers	   or	   professionals.	   The	   heterosexual	   female	   victim	  
paradigm	   is	  widely	  assumed	  and	  adopted	  by	  many	  service	  providers	  and	  by	   some	  
professionals.152	  As	  a	  study	  of	  LGBT	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  indicates:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Brown,	  n	  132	  above,	  106-­‐07;	  Emily	  M.	  Douglas,	  and	  Denise	  A.	  Hines,	  ‘The	  Helpseeking	  Experiences	  
of	   Men	   Who	   Sustain	   Intimate	   Partner	   Violence:	   An	   Overlooked	   Population	   and	   Implications	   for	  
Practice’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Violence	  26,	  no.	  6	  (2011),	  473,	  480-­‐481.	  
148	  Haamilton.	  n	  132	  above,	  161.	  
149	  Ibid.,	  161-­‐164.	  
150	  Migliaccio,	  n	  122	  above,	  44.	  
151	  See	  Hodges,	  n	  95	  above,	  311-­‐330;	  Brian	  Dempsey,	  n	  110	  above,	  381-­‐405.	  
152	  Wallace,	   n	   117above,	   58-­‐68;	   Douglas	   and	   Hines,	   n	   147	   above,	   473-­‐485;	   Davis	   and	   Glass,	   n	   93	  
above,	  16-­‐17;	  Ristock,	  n	  93	  above,	  146-­‐151;	  Diane	  R.	  Follingstad,	  Dana	  D.	  DeHart,	  and	  Eric	  P.	  Green,	  
‘Psychologists'	   Judgments	   of	   Psychologically	   Aggressive	   Actions	   When	   Perpetrated	   by	   a	   Husband	  
versus	  a	  Wife’,	  Violence	  and	  Victims	  19,	  no.	  4	  (2004),	  435-­‐452.	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‘Domestic	  abuse	  is	  understood	  in	  Britain	  and	  by	  our	  respondents	  as	  a	  
problem	  largely	  of	  heterosexual	  women	  being	  physically	  abused	  by	  their	  
male	  partners.	  In	  consequence,	  most	  respondents	  had	  not	  understood	  
their	  experience	  at	  the	  time	  as	  domestic	  abuse	  and	  it	  had	  not	  occurred	  to	  
most	  of	  them	  to	  report	  their	  experiences	  to	  any	  agency.’153	  	  
Men	  and	  LGBT	  people	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  marginalised	  and	  experience	  discriminatory	  
treatment	  by	  service	  providers.154	  Studies	  find	  that	  both	  LGBT	  and	  male	  victims	  are	  
less	  likely	  to	  report	  domestic	  abuse	  to	  professionals	  in	  comparison	  to	  heterosexual	  
women.155	  	  
Some	   male	   victims	   avoid	   identifying	   themselves	   as	   victims	   and	   try	   to	   overlook,	  
trivialise,	   deny	   or	   rationalise	   the	   violence	   they	   suffered	   in	   order	   to	   meet	   social	  
expectations	  and	  requirements	  of	  normative	  masculinity.	  This	   is	  partly	  due	  to	  men	  
being	  socialised	  from	  very	  early	  childhood	  to	  suppress	  the	  expression	  of	  their	  pain,	  
fear	  and	  sufferings.156	  This	  is	  also	  related	  to	  a	  greater	  social	  stigma	  attaches	  to	  male	  
victims	  of	  partner	  violence.157	  	  
Gay	  and	  bisexual	  male	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  suffer	  from	  double	  burdens	  and	  
intersectional	   discrimination.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   gay	   men	   are	   constrained	   by	  
normative	  masculinity,	  which	   discourages	  men	   to	   express	   their	   suffering	   and	   fear	  
and	  to	  seek	  help.158	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  gay	  men	  are	  further	  constrained	  by	  the	  fear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  C	  Donovan	  et	  al,	  Comparing	  Domestic	  Abuse	   in	  Same	  Sex	  and	  Heterosexual	  Relationships	   (Initial	  
report	  from	  a	  study	  funded	  by	  the	  Economic	  &	  Social	  Research	  Council.	  2006),	  19.	  
154	  Renzetti,	  n	  125	  above,	  118;	  Wallace,	  n	  117	  above,	  58-­‐68;	  Douglas	  and	  Hines,	  n	  147	  above,	  473-­‐
485..	  
155	  For	  example,	  see	  Amy	  Roch	  et	  al.,	  Out	  of	  Sight,	  Out	  of	  Mind?:	  Transgender	  People's	  Experiences	  of	  
Domestic	  Abuse	  (LGBT	  Youth	  Scotland	  &	  Equality	  Network,	  2010);	  Donovan,	  n	  153	  above;	  Steinmetz,	  
n	  146	  above,	  57;	  Douglas	  and	  Hines,	  ibid.,	  479-­‐483.	  
156	  Elizabeth	   A.	   Stanko,	   and	   Kathy	   Hobdell,	   ‘Assault	   on	  Men:	   Masculinity	   and	  Male	   Victimization’,	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  33,	  no.	  3	  (1993),	  400-­‐415;	  Stephen	  M.	  Glomb,	  and	  Dorothy	  L.	  Espelage,	  
‘The	   Influence	   of	   Restrictive	   Emotionality	   in	   Men's	   Emotional	   Appraisal	   of	   Sexual	   Harassment:	   A	  
Gender	   Role	   Interpretation’,	   Psychology	   of	   Men	   &	   Masculinity	   6,	   no.	   4	   (2005),	   241-­‐243;.Maria	  
Tempenis	   Shelly,	   Taking	   It	   Like	   A	  Man:	   A	   Study	   of	  Men’s	   Emotion	   Culture	   (PhD	   Thesis,	   Vanderbilt	  
University,	  2007),	  95-­‐168.	  
157	  Brown,	  n	  132	  above,	  6-­‐7.	  
158	  Tod	   W.	   Burke	   and	   Stephen	   S.	   Owen,	   ‘Gay	   and	   Bisexual	   Male	   Domestic	   Violence’,	   in	   Nicky	   Ali	  
Jackson	  ed.,	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Domestic	  Violence	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  335.	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of	   being	   reluctantly	   outed	   if	   they	   seek	   help	   or	   of	   being	   neglected	   or	   ridiculed	   by	  
heterosexist	  service	  providers.159	  	  
Family	   violence	   is	   a	   social	   problem	   influencing	  many	   people’s	   lives,	   regardless	   of	  
their	   gender	   or	   sexual	   orientation.	   However,	   in	   a	   society	   where	   a	   heterosexual	  
female	   victim	   myth	   of	   domestic	   violence	   is	   generally	   and	   traditionally	   assumed,	  
male	   and	   sexual	   minority	   people	   are	   too	   easily	   marginalised,	   ignored	   or	   even	  
discriminated	   against	   by	   not	   only	   the	   general	   public	   but	   also	   by	   legal	   and	   social	  
service	   professionals	   of	   domestic	   violence.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   violence	   against	  
women	   feminist	   construction	   of	   domestic	   violence	   further	   marginalises	   and	  
stereotypes	  men	  and	  LGBT	  people,	   rather	   than	  assist	   them.	   Instead	  of	  challenging	  
heteronormative	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   prejudices	   of	   domestic	   violence,	  
subordination	  feminism	  further	  perpetuates	  the	  unjust	  heteronormative	  biases	  and	  
myths	   of	   family	   violence	   and	   cannot	   properly	   address	   and	   respond	   to	   the	   social	  
problem	  of	  family	  violence.	  
Some	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  oppression	  in	  the	  family,	  as	  illuminated,	  are	  trivialised	  in	  
the	  mainstream	   subordination	   feminist	   family	   violence	   approach.	  Victims	  of	   same	  
sex	   domestic	   violence	   or	   male	   victims	   of	   female	   violence	   in	   the	   family	   are	  
marginalised	   by	   service	   providers	   and	   legal	   professionals	   under	   this	  
heteronormative	   heterosexual	   women	   victim	   paradigm	   in	   the	   violence	   against	  
women	   approach	   to	   family	   violence.	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   perspectives	   will	   oppose	   this	   kind	   of	   heteronormative	   approach	   to	  
family	  violence.	  Queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  will	  not	  only	  want	  to	  
address	   the	   problem	   of	   violence	   against	   heterosexual	   women,	   but	   also	   violence	  
against	   same	   sex	   partner	   or	   male	   partner	   in	   the	   family.	   Similarly,	   not	   only	   child	  
abuse	   violated	   by	  men	   should	   be	   addressed	   but	   also	   child	   abuse	   perpetrated	   by	  
women.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   heteronormative	   gender	   myths	   of	   child	   abuse	   in	   my	  
critique	  of	  Richard	  Collier’s	  family	  law	  theory.	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  Ibid.	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3.6   Subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  on	  sexual	  justice	  
and	  normative	  heterosexuality	  
In	  the	  following	  sections	  I	  critically	  evaluate	  the	  approach	  of	  subordination-­‐feminist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  to	  sexual	  justice	  in	  the	  family.	  I	  argue	  that,	  although	  a	  
contribution,	   their	   theories	   nevertheless	   tend	   to	   assume	   and	   perpetuate	   certain	  
heteronormative	  gender	  biases.	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  more	  balanced	  approaches	  
to	  men	  and	  masculinity	  studies.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  strands	  of	  contemporary	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  
is	   the	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies;	   not	   only	   is	   this	   the	  
‘dominant	  perspective	  within	  men’s	  studies	  in	  the	  academy,’160	  but,	  their	  ideologies	  
and	  perspectives	  have	  also	  been	  formally	  adopted	  by	  an	  official	  UN	  gender	  equality	  
report	   on	   men	   and	   boys.161	  They	   often	   label	   themselves	   as	   ‘feminist’	   or	   ‘pro-­‐
feminist’	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies. 162 	  However,	   since	   their	   theories	   are	  
premised	   on	   the	   over-­‐arching	   beliefs	   and	   claims	   that	   men	   (as	   a	   group)	   are	   the	  
dominant	  gender,	  not	  an	  oppressed	  gender	  group,163	  and	  ‘all	  men	  are	  privileged	  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	   women’;164	  the	   kind	   of	   ‘feminism’	   they	   identify	   with	   and	   adopt	   is	   actually	   a	  
version	  of	   strong	   subordination	   feminist	   perspectives.	   Therefore,	   I	   argue	   that	   it	   is	  
more	  appropriate	  and	  accurate	   to	  describe	  and	   label	   this	  kind	  of	  men’s	  studies	  as	  
‘subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinity	  studies’	  rather	  than	  ‘feminist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies’	  or	   ‘pro-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’.	  Hence,	   I	  use	  
the	  phrase	   ‘subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’	   to	  refer	   to	  their	  
men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  and	   to	  distinguish	   them	   from	  other	   strands	  of	  men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  Kenneth	  Clatterbaugh,	  ‘Literature	  of	  the	  US	  Men's	  Movements’,	  Signs	  25,	  no.3	  (2000),	  887.	  
161	  Division	  for	  the	  Advancement	  of	  women,	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  UN,	  The	  Role	  
of	   Men	   and	   Boys	   in	   achieving	   gender	   equality,	   United	   Nations,	   Division	   for	   the	   Advancement	   of	  
women,	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  (Accessed:	  25	  September,	  2014).	  
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2000/W2000%20Men%20and%20Boys%20E%20we
b.pdf	  	  
162James	   P.	   Sterba,	   ‘Profeminism’,	   in	  Michael	   Flood,	   Judith	   Kegan	   Gardiner,	   Bob	   Pease,	   and	   Keith	  
Pringle,	  eds.,	  International	  Encyclopaedia	  of	  Men	  and	  Masculinities	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  505-­‐
508.	  
163	  Connell.	  n	  92	  above,	  209.	  
164	  Kimmel,	  n	  91	  above,	  216.	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and	  masculinities	   studies,	   such	   as,	   conservative	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies,	   or	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  	  
Just	   as	   there	   are	   different	   strands	   of	   subordination	   feminism,	   there	   are	   also	  
different	   focuses	   in	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   For	  
example,	   some	   of	   them	   follow	   the	   perspectives	   of	   sexual-­‐subordination	   feminism	  
and	   argue	   that	   male	   sexual	   violence	   is	   ‘the	   lotus	   of	   men’s	   oppression	   over	  
women.’165	  Others	  may	  focus	  more	  on	  investigating	  male	  power	  and	  male	  privileges	  
in	   the	   family.166	  The	   major	   contribution	   of	   their	   theories	   is	   their	   application	   of	  
subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   into	   research	   of	   men	   and	   masculinities.	  
Subordination	   feminism,	  while	  being	   critical	   of	  male	  domination	  and	  male	  power,	  
traditionally	  focuses	  more	  on	  women	  in	  their	  theory.167	  Subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  
and	  masculinities	   studies	   instead	  direct	   their	   research	   to	   focused	  studies	  of	   issues	  
about	  men	  and	  masculinities.	  What	  are	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  such	  kinds	  of	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies	   in	  the	   law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender?	  What	  are	  the	  
limits	   of	   their	   approaches	   and	   theories?	   I	   will	   critically	   comment	   on	   two	   leading	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   projects.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   their	  
approaches,	  although	  a	  great	   contribution,	  nevertheless	   suffer	   from	  several	  major	  
limitations	   or	   biases.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   approach	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  could	  address	  some	  of	  the	  insufficiencies	  and	  shortcomings	  in	  
subordination	  feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies’	  approaches	  to	  sexual	   justice	  
and	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  	  
Before	   critically	   commenting	   on	   theories	   of	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  first	  critically	  examine	  two	  other	  strands	  of	  men	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Messner,	  n	  88	  above,	  55.	  
166	  For	  example,	  see	  Richard	  Collier,	  Masculinity,	  Law	  and	  the	  Family	  (London,	  Routledge,	  1995).	  Also,	  
Michele	  Adams	  and	  Scott	  Coltrane,	  ‘Boys	  and	  Men	  in	  Families:	  The	  Domestic	  Production	  of	  Gender,	  
Power,	   and	   Privilege’,	   in	   Kimmel,	  Michael	   S.,	   Jeff	   R.	   Hearn,	   and	   R.	  W.	   Connell,	   eds.,	  Handbook	   of	  
studies	  on	  men	  and	  masculinities	  (London:	  Sage,	  2004),	  230-­‐248.	  
167	  Ann	   C.	  McGinley	   and	   Frank	   Rudy	   Cooper,	   ‘Introduction:	  Masculinities,	  Multidimensionality,	   and	  
the	   Law:	   Why	   They	   Need	   One	   Another’,	   in	   Frank	   Rudy	   Cooper	   and	   Ann	   C.	   McGinley	   eds.,	  
Masculinities	  and	  the	  Law:	  A	  Multidimensional	  Approach	  (New	  York:	  NYU	  Press,	  2012),	  3.	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and	  masculinities	  studies:	  conservative	  men’s	  studies	  and	  men’s	  liberationist	  theory.	  	  
They	  are	  both	  criticised	  by	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  theorists.	  
Conservative	   men’s	   movements	   and	   studies	   hold	   and	   promote	   conservative,	  
traditionalist,	  heterosexist,	  and	  binarist	  gender	  practices	  and	  gender	  roles	  between	  
men	  and	  women,	   such	  as	   the	  Promise	  Keepers	  movement.168	  They	  often	  promote	  
and	  naturalise	  the	  ideology	  of	  a	  traditionalist	  gender	  division	  of	  labour	  such	  as	  men	  
as	  the	  breadwinner	  and	  women	  as	  the	  carer	  in	  the	  (heterosexual)	  family.	  They	  tend	  
to	   assume	   an	   unproblematic	   coherence	   between	   one’s	   gender	   roles	   and	   one’s	  
biological	  sex.	  They	  also	  tend	  to	  think	  uncritically	  that	  the	  heterosexual	  family	  and	  
heterosexual	  marriage	  define	  the	  meanings	  and	  essence	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  family	  
and	  marriage.	  This	  kind	  of	  biological	  essentialist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  is	  not	  
only	   problematic	   but	   also	   restrictive	   and	   oppressive.	   Scholars	   have	   already	  
elaborated	   the	   problems	   and	   limitations	   of	   such	   essentialist	   thinking	   of	   sex	   and	  
gender	  in	  conservative	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.169	  	  A	  very	  convincing	  rejection	  
of	  conservative	  traditionalist	   thinking	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  can	  also	  be	  found	   in	  
liberal	  sexual	  justice	  theories,	  such	  as	  Bamforth’s	  liberal	  theory	  of	  sexual	  autonomy,	  
which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5.170	  	  	  	  
Conservative	   men’s	   studies	   have	   been	   criticised	   by	   both	   subordination-­‐feminist	  
men’s	   studies	   and	   liberationist	   men’s	   studies.	   They	   both	   reject	   and	   question	   the	  
traditionalist	   ideologies	   of	   gender	   adopted	   by	   conservative	   theories.	   They	   both	  
oppose	   the	   essentialist	   idea	   that	   we	   have	   natural,	   unchanging,	   fixed	   and	   binary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  John	   P.	   Bartkowski,	   The	   Promise	   Keepers:	   Servants,	   Soldiers,	   and	   Godly	   Men	   (New	   Brunswick:	  
Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  45-­‐66.	  
169	  For	  example,	  see	  Messner,	  n	  88	  above,	  16-­‐35.	  
170	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  clearly	  articulates	  the	  ‘sexual	  autonomy’	  or	  the	  ‘empowerment’	  arguments	  for	  
progressive	   and	   liberal	   sexual	   justice	   politics	   and	   law.	   He	   also	   points	   out	   why	   conservative	   and	  
traditionalist	  sexual	  morality	  such	  as	  the	  sexual	  morality	  promoted	  by	  the	  New	  Natural	  Law	  theory	  is	  
faulty,	  unjust	  and	  oppressive.	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  his	  liberal	  sexual	  autonomy	  arguments	  to	  elaborate	  the	  
queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   approaches	   I	   proposed.	   See	   Nicholas	   Bamforth,	  
Sexuality,	  Morals	   and	   Justice:	   A	   Theory	   of	   Lesbian	   and	  Gay	   Rights	   Law	   (London,	  Washington	  D.C.:	  
Cassell,	   1997)	   148-­‐267;	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	   and	  David	  A.	   J.	   Richards,	  Patriarchal	   Religion,	   Sexuality,	  
And	  Gender:	  A	  Critique	  of	  New	  Natural	  Law	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  190-­‐278.	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gender	   roles	   based	   on	   our	   biological	   body.171	  However,	   there	   are	   also	   significant	  
disagreements	  between	   them.	  The	  major	  accusation	   subordination-­‐feminist	  men’s	  
studies	   have	   made	   against	   men’s	   liberation	   studies	   is	   that	   the	   subordination	  
feminist	   approach	   to	  men’s	   studies	   accuse	  men’s	   liberationist	   theory	   of	   failing	   to	  
notice	   and	   address	   the	   power	   relations	   in	   gender.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   first	   outline	  
men’s	   liberationist	   theory	   and	   critically	   evaluate	   its	   strengths	   and	   shortcomings.	  
Then	   I	   critically	   analyse	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
projects	  and	  their	  critiques	  of	  men’s	  liberationist	  theory.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  although	  both	  
strands	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  have	   their	   respective	  contributions,	  both	  
strands	  also	  have	  major	   limitations.	   I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  new	  version	  of	  men	  and	  
masculinities	   studies	   that	   can	   incorporate	   their	   insights	   while	   also	   avoiding	   their	  
limitations.	  	  
Liberationist	   men’s	   studies	   are	   theories	   that	   argue	   for	   men’s	   liberation	   from	  
traditional	   sex	   roles.	   They	   contend	   that	  both	  men	  and	  women	  are	   constrained	  by	  
compulsory	  sex	  roles.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  sex	  roles	  theory	  holds	  that	  ‘being	  a	  
man	  or	  a	  woman	  means	  enacting	  a	  general	  set	  of	  expectations	  which	  are	  attached	  
to	   one’s	   sex―the	   ‘‘sex	   role’’.’172	  Masculinity	   and	   femininity	   are	   ‘interpreted	   as	  
internalised	   sex	   roles,	   the	  products	  of	   social	   learning	  or	   ‘’socialisation’’	   in	   sex	   role	  
theory.173	  Men’s	   liberation	   theorists	   argue	   that	   the	   traditional	   scripts	   of	  male	   sex	  
roles	  are	  unhealthy,	  constricting	  and	  harmful	  to	  men	  and	  urge	  men	  to	  be	  liberated	  
from	   the	   compulsory	   requirements	   of	   macho	  male	   identities	   and	   images.174	  They	  
find	   the	   dominant	   male	   sex	   roles	   such	   as	   ‘no	   sissy	   stuff’,	   ‘the	   big	   wheel	   [being	  
breadwinner	  and	  successful]’,	   ‘the	  sturdy	  oak	  [being	  tough	  and	  unemotional]’,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  Kenneth	   Clatterbaugh,	   ’Men’s	   Liberation’,	   in	   Michael	   Flood,	   Judith	   Kegan	  Gardiner,	   Bob	   Pease,	  
and	   Keith	   Pringle	   eds.,	   International	   Encyclopaedia	   of	  Men	   and	  Masculinities	   (London:	   Routledge,	  
2007),	  415-­‐417.	  
172	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  22.	  
173	  Ibid.	  
174	  Maureen	  Baker	  and	  JI	  Hans	  Bakker,	  ‘The	  Double-­‐Bind	  of	  the	  Middle	  Class	  Male:	  Men's	  Liberation	  
and	   the	   Male	   Sex	   Role’,	   Journal	   of	   Comparative	   Family	   Studies	   11,	   no.	   4	   (1980),	   548,	   551-­‐552;	  
Messner,	  n	  67	  above,	  260-­‐261.	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‘give	   ‘em	   hell	   [being	   aggressive	   and	   competitive]’	   are	   actually	   damaging	   to	   both	  
individual	  men	  and	  women,	  and	  also	  to	  the	  society	  as	  a	  whole.175	  	  	  
On	   the	  one	  hand,	  men’s	   liberation	   theories	   are	   very	   inspiring	  and	   insightful.	   They	  
rightly	   remind	   us	   that	   men	   are	   not	   just	   the	   privileged	   gender	   group	   as	   early	  
subordination	   feminist	   theory	   generally	   assumes,	   but	   a	   gender	   group	   that	   faces	  
imposed	  sex	  roles	  in	  normative	  heterosexual	  societies.	  However,	  as	  already	  argued	  
in	   the	   gay	   liberationist	   theory	   section,	   there	   are	   several	   major	   limitations	   in	   sex	  
roles	   theory,	   the	   theory	   that	   men’s	   liberation	   theories	   generally	   rely	   on.	   	   Men’s	  
liberation	  theory	  inevitably	  suffers	  from	  the	  general	  limitations	  of	  sex	  roles	  theory.	  
Furthermore,	   men’s	   liberation	   projects	   often	   uncritically	   assume	   heterosexual	  
men’s	  experiences	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  men’s	  sex	  roles	  and	  constrains.	  Similarly,	  in	  
talking	  about	  women’s	  sex	  roles	  they	  also	  generally	  assume	  heterosexual	  women’s	  
experiences	  as	  representative.176	  I	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  
studies	  perspectives	  oppose	  this	  kind	  of	  heterosexist	  approach	  in	  thinking	  of	  gender	  
role	  liberation.	  	  
Subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   also	   challenge	   men’s	  
liberation	   projects’	   reliance	   on	   the	   problematic	   sex	   roles	   theory	   as	   theoretical	  
grounds	  for	  men’s	  liberation	  projects.177	  	  Their	  major	  criticism	  of	  men’s	  liberationist	  
theory,	   however,	   is	   related	   to	   the	   overarching	   belief	   and	   principle	   adopted	   by	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   theory:	   their	   insistence	   and	   belief	  
that	   men	   as	   a	   group	   are	   the	   dominant	   gender	   group,	   not	   an	   oppressed	   gender	  
group, 178 	  and	   that	   ‘all	   men	   are	   privileged	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   women.’ 179 	  Subordination-­‐
feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   argue	   that	   sex	   role	   theory	   should	   be	  
replaced	   by	   gender	   power	   relationship	   theory,	   which	   argues	   that	   gender	  
relationships	   and	   gender	   order	   in	   contemporary	  Western	   societies	   still	   show	   ‘the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Baker	  and	  Bakker,	  ibid.,	  550-­‐551;	  Clatterbaugh,	  n	  171	  above,	  415.	  
176	  Warren	  Farrell,	  The	  Myth	  of	  Male	  Power:	  Why	  Men	  are	  the	  Disposable	  Sex	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  
Schuster,	  1993).	  
177	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  21-­‐27;	  Messner,	  n	  67	  above,	  255-­‐276.	  
178	  Connell,	  n	  92	  above,	  209.	  
179	  Kimmel,	  n	  91	  above,	  216.	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overall	   subordination	   of	   women	   and	   dominance	   of	   men.’180	  In	   other	   words,	   they	  
argue	   that	   gender	   justice	   and	   gender	   politics	   projects	   ought	   to	   be	   based	   on	   the	  
descriptive	  observation	  of	  the	  subordination	  of	  women	  and	  the	  domination	  of	  men	  
and	  the	  normative	  commitment	  to	  eliminate	  the	  subordination	  of	  women.	  Thus,	  the	  
gender	  relationship	  approach	  they	  propose	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  way	  
of	   thinking.181	  They	   generally	   adopt	   the	   top-­‐down,	   or,	   domination-­‐subordination	  
model	   of	   power.	   Therefore,	   they	   claim	   that	   ‘[t]he	   main	   axis	   of	   power	   in	   the	  
contemporary	  Europe/US	  gender	  order	   is	   the	  overall	  subordination	  of	  women	  and	  
dominance	  of	  men.’182	  They	  argue	  that	  ‘as	  a	  group,	  men	  have	  power	  over	  women	  as	  
a	  group.’183	  To	  them,	  ‘[m]en,	  as	  a	  group,	  enjoy	  institutional	  privileges	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	   women,	   as	   a	   group.’184	  Their	   idea	   of	   gender	   oppression	   is	   also	   unilateral.	  
According	  to	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies,	  ‘men	  are	  viewed	  
as	   a	   category	   of	   people	   who	   systematically	   oppress―and	   benefit	   from	   the	  
oppression	  of―another	   category	  of	  people,	  women.’185	  Gender	  oppression	   is	   thus	  
overall	  unilateral,	  that	  is,	  the	  oppression	  of	  women	  (as	  a	  group)	  by	  men	  (as	  a	  group).	  
They	  adopt	  a	  unilateral	  male	  domination	  and	  female	  subordination	  model	  of	  power	  
relationship	   in	   thinking	   about	   gender,	   justice	   and	   politics.	   	   They	   criticise	   men’s	  
liberation	   projects	   for	   failing	   to	   adopt	   this	   kind	   of	   male	   domination/female	  
subordination	  power	  relations	  model	  in	  thinking	  about	  gender	  issues.186	  	  	  
I	   agree	   with	   some	   of	   the	   critiques	   that	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  scholars	  make	  of	  sex	  roles	  theory	  and	  men’s	  liberation	  theory,	  
such	  as	  criticism	  of	  the	  static	  and	  unitary	  concept	  of	  masculinity	  or	  femininity	  in	  sex	  
roles	   theory.	   I	   also	   totally	   agree	   with	   their	   rejection	   of	   conservative	   and	  
traditionalist	   men’s	   studies	   and	   movement.	   However,	   I	   do	   not	   agree	   that	   by	  
rejecting	   conservative	  men’s	   studies	   and	   by	   pointing	   out	   the	   limitations	   of	  men’s	  
liberation	  studies	  and	  sex	  roles	   theory,	   the	  subordination	   feminist	  approach	   is	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  74.	  
181	  Connell,	  n	  92	  above,	  23-­‐25.	  
182	  Ibid.,	  24.	  
183	  McGinley	  and	  Cooper,	  n	  167	  above,	  5.	  
184	  Messner,	  n	  88	  above,	  5.	  
185	  Messner,	  n	  67	  above,	  271.	  
186	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  24-­‐27;	  Messner,	  ibid.,	  270-­‐272.	  
113	  
	  
only	  approach	  we	  ought	  to	  take	  and	  adopt	  in	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  I	  argue	  
that	   there	   are	   also	   major	   insufficiencies	   in	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   perspectives	   and	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   could	   be	   avoided	   or	  
overcome	  by	  considering	  the	  insights	  and	  arguments	  from	  the	  queer	  humanist	  men	  
and	  masculinities	  studies	  I	  defend	  and	  propose	  in	  this	  thesis.	   	   I	  suggest	  that	  taking	  
more	  seriously	  the	  perspectives	  inspired	  by	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  
studies	   in	   thinking	   about	   sexual	   justice,	   gender	   oppression	   and	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  
I	   also	   disagree	   with	   their	   tendencies	   to	   adopt	   a	   reductionist	   idea	   of	   power	  
relationships	   in	   gender	   and	   their	   unilateral	   and	   one-­‐dimensional	   accounts	   and	  
concept	  of	  gender	  oppression.	  Nor	  do	  I	  agree	  with	  their	  broad	  claim	  that	  in	  issues	  of	  
gender	   justice	   we	   ought	   to	   adopt	   a	   subordination	   feminist	   perspective	   of	   power	  
relationships	   in	   gender	   by	   crudely	   categorising	  men	   as	   the	   dominant	   gender	   and	  
women	  as	  the	  subordinated	  group.187	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  reality,	  power	  relationships	  in	  
gender	  life	  are	  much	  more	  complicated	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional	  than	  the	  reductionist	  
model	  they	  hold.	  By	  taking	  a	  simplified	  power	  relationship	  of	  gender	  they	  tends	  to	  
perpetuate	  and	  institutionalise	  some	  heteronormative	  gender	  myths	  and	  ideologies	  
by	   defining	   women	   and	   femininity	   as	   vulnerable	   and	   harmless,	   while	   men	   and	  
masculinity	   as	   invulnerable	   and	   dangerous.	   For	   example,	   in	   their	   family	   violence	  
theories	   they	   tend	   to	   largely	   reduce	   the	   problem	   of	   domestic	   violence	   and	   child	  
abuse	   to	  generally	   just	  problems	  of	  male	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  children.188	  
Instead,	   I	   suggest	   adopting	   a	   Foucauldian	   thinking	   of	   power	   relationships	   and	   a	  
more	   multi-­‐directional	   model	   of	   power	   relationships	   and	   oppression	   in	   analysing	  
power	  and	  oppression	  in	  gender	  and	  in	  family	  lives.	  	  	  
According	   to	   Foucault,	   a	   power	   relation	   is	   not	   just	   a	   relationship	   of	   unilateral	  
domination	   and	   subordination.	   Instead,	   ‘power	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   matter	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187	  Collier,	  n	  166	  above,	  11-­‐12.	  
188	  For	   example,	   see	   Collier,	   ibid.,	   215-­‐251.	   And	   Richard	   Collier,	   ‘A	   Father’s	   ‘’Normal’’	   Love?:	  
Masculinities,	   Criminology	   and	   the	   Family’,	   in	   R.	   Emerson	   Dobash,	   Russell	   P.	   Dobash	   and	   Lesley	  
Noaks	  eds.,	  Gender	  and	  Crime	  (Cardiff:	  University	  of	  Wales,	  1995),	  202-­‐226.	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complex	  relationships	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  property	  inherent	  in	  a	  particular	  individual	  or	  
class.’189	  Power	   relations	   exist	   in	   almost	   every	   relation	  when	   ‘one	   person	   tries	   to	  
control	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   other,’190	  but	   ‘there	   is	   necessarily	   the	   possibility	   of	  
resistance’ 191 	  in	   power	   relationships.	   Foucault	   suggests	   power	   relations	   are	  
everywhere	   and	   inescapable	   in	   human	   relations,	   but	   power	   relationships	   are	   not	  
just	   repressive	   but	   also	   productive.	   The	   possibility	   of	   resistance,	   contestation,	  
challenges	   and	   conflicts	   co-­‐exist	  with	   the	   control,	   suppression	   and	   surveillance	   in	  
power	  relations,	  so	  power	  relationships	  are	  not	  fixed	  and	  static	  but	  are	  mobile	  and	  
constantly	   contested.192	  He	   argues	   that	   ‘if	   there	   are	   relations	   of	   power	   in	   every	  
social	   field,	   this	   is	  because	   there	   is	   freedom	  everywhere.’193	  So	   in	  Foucault’s	  mind	  
power	   relations	   are	   endless	   struggles,	   conflicts	   and	   confrontations.	   There	   exists	   a	  
disciplining	   and	   regulatory	   force,	   but	   there	   is	   always	   resistance,	   subversion	   and	  
transformation.	  Halley	  summarises	  that	  Foucault’s	   idea	  of	  power	   is	  not	   ‘an	  eternal	  
violence	   or	   a	   top-­‐down	   imposition	   but	   as	   an	   open-­‐ended	   series	   of	   reciprocally	  
constitutive	  relations.’194	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  idea	  of	  power	  relationships	  is	  more	  appropriate	  and	  useful	  
in	  explaining	  and	  capturing	  the	  complex	  power	  relationships	  and	  power	  struggles	  in	  
gender	   relations	   and	   in	   family	   lives.	   Gender	   relationships	   and	   family	   power	  
relationships	  are	  far	  more	  complicated	  and	  multifaceted	  than	  the	  simplified	  ‘men	  as	  
the	   dominant	   gender/women	   as	   the	   oppressed	   gender’	   model	   insisted	   upon	   by	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   theories.	   I	   suggest	   more	   nuanced,	  
complicated	   and	   multi-­‐layered	   ideas	   of	   gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   power	  
relations	  are	  needed	  for	  analysing	  and	  reflecting	  on	  issues	  of	  sexual	   justice,	  sexual	  
politics,	  gender	  oppression	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Also,	  I	  contend	  that	  one	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  Spargo,	  n	  69	  above,	  16.	  
190	  Michel	  Foucault,	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Concern	  for	  the	  Self	  as	  a	  Practice	  of	  Freedom’,	  in	  Paul	  Rabinow	  ed.,	  
Ethics,	  Subjectivity	  and	  Truth:	  The	  Essential	  Works	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984	  (New	  York:	  The	  New	  
Press,	  1997).	  291.	  
191	  Ibid.,	  292.	  
192	  Spargo,	  n	  69	  above,	  20-­‐21.	  
193	  Foucault,	  n	  190	  above,	  292.	  
194	  Janet	  Halley,	   Spilt	  Decisions:	  How	  and	  Why	   to	  Take	  a	  Break	   from	  Feminism?	   (Oxford:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2006),	  120.	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of	   the	   core	   insights	   of	   the	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	  
perspectives	   is	   the	   abandonment	   of	   the	   unilateral	   and	   reductionist	   concept	   of	  
gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   power	   relationships	   adopted	   by	   subordination	  
feminist	   projects.	   Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   view	   power	  
relationships	   and	   gender	   oppression	   in	   family	   lives	   as	   multi-­‐dimensional	   and	  
complex,	   not	   just	   about	   male	   domination	   and	   female	   subordination.	   Gender	  
oppression	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  only	  a	  unilateral	  concept	  of	  oppression,	  but	  
rather,	  	  as	  complicated	  and	  multifaceted.	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  taking	  a	  multifaceted	  and	  
complicated	   view	   of	   gender	   oppression	   in	   family	   lives	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   see	  
oppression,	   injustices	  and	   injuries	  not	  generally	  appreciated,	  noticed	  or	  addressed	  
by	  the	  mainstream	  perspectives	  on	  sexual	  justice	  and	  the	  family.	  I	  also	  contend	  that	  
a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  model	  of	  gender	  power	  relationships	  and	  gender	  oppression	  is	  
a	   very	   important	   theoretical	   tool	   to	   destabilise	   and	   unravel	   heteronormative	  
ideologies	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   in	   sexual	   justice	   projects.	   Too	  
often,	   unjust	   and	   oppressive	   heteronormative	   norms	   and	   discrimination	   are	  
produced	   and	   reproduced	   via	   the	   reductionist	   and	   totalising	   thinking	   of	   sexuality	  
and	  gender.	  	  	  
3.7   Connell	  and	  her	  subordination	  –feminist	  theory	  of	  men,	  masculinities,	  
and	  gender	  
In	   the	   following	   two	   sections,	   I	   critically	   examine	   the	   theories	   of	   two	   leading	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   scholars:	   sociologist	   R.	   W.	  
Connell	  and	  legal	  scholar	  Richard	  Collier.	  I	  contend	  that	  despite	  great	  contributions,	  
there	  are	  also	  limitations	  in	  their	  systems.	  The	  limitations	  in	  their	  theories	  are	  highly	  
related	  to	  the	  monolithic	  subordination	  feminist	  model	  of	  gender	  power	  and	  gender	  
oppression	  they	  adopt	  in	  their	  systems.	  	  
Connell	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	   influential	   theorists	   in	   subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies.	  Her	  idea	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  has	  been	  widely	  used	  as	  an	  
analytic	   tool	   in	  exploring	   issues	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	   in	   scholarship	  of	   gender	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and	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.195	  She	   insists	   that	   men	   as	   a	   group	   ‘are	   not	  
oppressed	  or	  disadvantaged’	  and	  ‘men	  in	  general	  gain	  a	  patriarchal	  dividend.’196	  Her	  
concept	  of	  gender	  as	  structural	  and	  patterned	  social	  practices	  and	  relations	  based	  
on	   our	   human	   bodies	   is	   partially	   inspired	   by	   Butler’s	   concept	   of	   gender	  
performativity.197	  Butler	   claims	   that	   gender	   is	   performative198	  and	   we	   are	   ‘doing’	  
gender	  within	  ‘a	  scene	  of	  constraint’	  in	  everyday	  life.199	  Similar	  to	  Butler	  who	  argues	  
that	   gender	   is	   about	   ‘doing’,	   about	   human	   practices	   and	   performances,	   Connell	  
argues	  that	  ‘[g]ender	  is	  a	  way	  in	  which	  social	  practice	  is	  ordered.	  In	  gender	  process,	  
the	  everyday	  conduct	  of	  life	  is	  organized	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  reproductive	  area,	  defined	  
by	  the	  bodily	  structures	  and	  process	  of	  human	  reproduction.’200	  In	  other	  words,	  she	  
wants	   to	  emphasise	   that	  gender	   is	   the	  structure	  and	  arrangement	  of	  ordered	  and	  
patterned	  social	  practices	  based	  on	  the	  reproductive	  distinctions	  of	  human	  bodies.	  
Gender	  refers	  to,	  not	  only	  how	  we	  are	  expected	  to	  behave	  according	  to	  our	  sexed	  
bodies,	  but	  also	  to	  what	  we	  actually	  do.	  	  
According	   to	   Connell,	   masculinity	   is	   the	   configurations	   and	   patterns	   of	   social	  
practices	   that	   ‘refers	   to	  male	  body,	   but	   is	   not	  determined	  by	  male	  biology.’201	  On	  
the	   one	   hand	   she	   argues	   that	   masculinities	   are	   plural;	   not	   all	   masculinities	   are	  
equally	  powerful	  and	  privileged.	  She	  contends	  that	  not	  only	  are	  gender	  relationships	  
between	   men	   and	   women	   hierarchal,	   but	   also	   masculinities	   themselves	   are	  
hierarchal.202	  One	  the	  other	  hand,	  she	  argues	  that	  in	  society	  there	  is	  a	  dominant	  and	  
normative	   masculinity	   for	   all	   men	   to	   look	   up	   to	   and	   to	   follow:	   the	   hegemonic	  
masculinity.	   Hegemonic	   masculinity	   is	   the	   normative,	   ideal	   and	   dominant	  
masculinity	   and	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   masculinity	   that	   has	   a	   policing,	   governing	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  R.	  W.	   Connell,	   ‘Hegemonic	  Masculinity:	   Rethinking	   the	   Concept’,	  Gender	   and	   Society	   19,	   no.	   6	  
(2005),	  829-­‐830.	  
196	  Connell,	  n	  92	  above,	  209.	  
197	  Judith	   Butler	   uses	   the	   concept	   ‘gender	   performativity’	   to	   ‘denote	   the	   way	   in	   which	   gender	   is	  
produced	   as	   an	   effect	   of	   a	   regulatory	   regime	   that	   requires	   the	   ritualised	   repetition	   of	   particular	  
forms	  of	  behaviour.’	  See	  Spargo,	  n	  69	  above,	  75;	  Butler,	  n	  6	  above,	  xv.	  
198	  Butler,	  ibid.	  
199	  Judith	  Butler,	  Undoing	  Gender	  (Routledge:	  London,	  2004),	  1.	  
200	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  71.	  
201	  Connell,	  n	  92	  above,	  29.	  
202	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  76-­‐81.	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regulatory	   power	   and	   effects	   all	   men	   as	   a	   group.203	  Hegemonic	   masculinity	   is	  
normative	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   ‘it	   requires	   all	   other	   men	   to	   position	   themselves	   in	  
relation	   to	   it.’204	  Furthermore	   she	   argues	   that	   the	   aim	   and	   essence	   of	   hegemonic	  
masculinity	   is	   to	   maintain	   a	   gender	   structure	   of	   male	   dominance	   and	   female	  
subordination.	  Hegemonic	  masculinity	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  male	  practice	  that	  aims	  to	  secure	  
male	   dominance	   and	   power.	   It	   is	   not	   only	   the	   socially	   expected,	   prescribed	   and	  
respected	  men’s	  gender	  practices	  but	  also	  is	  the	  norms	  and	  practices	  that	  serve	  to	  
guarantee	   ‘the	   dominant	   position	   of	   men	   and	   the	   subordination	   of	   women.’205	  
Hegemonic	   masculinity	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   pattern	   of	   gender	   practices	   that	   produces,	  
reproduces	  and	  maintains	  men’s	  power	  and	  privileges	  over	  women.	  She	  thinks	  that	  
this	  kind	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  is	  the	  current	  normative,	  approved	  and	  admired	  
type	  of	  gender	  norms	  and	  practices	   for	  men.	  Not	  all	  men	  are	   capable	  of	  enacting	  
and	  doing	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  but	  almost	  all	  men	  gain	  patriarchal	  dividends	  from	  
the	   existence	   and	   social	   force	   of	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   in	   society.	   As	   Carrie	  
Paechter	   points,	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   ‘confers	   considerable	   power,	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
women,	  not	  just	  on	  the	  hegemonically	  masculine	  but	  on	  all	  men,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	   standing	   as	   an	   ideal	   type	   against	  which	   various	  ways	   of	   ‘doing	  man’	   can	   be	  
constructed	  and	  performed.’206	  
Connell	  further	  argues	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  can	  be	  applied	  on	  
three	   different	   levels:	   global,	   regional	   (nation-­‐state	   level),	   and	   local	   (families,	  
companies,	  local	  communities,	  and	  organisations).	  So	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  hegemonic	  
masculinity	   in	   international	   politics,	   in	   state	   law,	   or	   in	   families,	   in	   different	   racial	  
groups,	   in	   education	   institutions,	   in	   prisons,	   or	   in	   different	   classes	   or	   occupation	  
groups.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  Connell,	  n	  195	  above,	  832-­‐833.	  
204	  Ibid.,	  832.	  
205	  ;	  Connell,	  ibid.,	  832,	  840-­‐849;	  Connell,	  n	  54	  above,	  71,	  77.	  
206	  Carrie	  F.	  Paechter,	  ‘Masculine	  Femininities/Feminine	  Masculinities:	  Power,	  Identities	  and	  Gender’,	  
Gender	  and	  Education	  18,	  no.	  3,	  (2006),	  255.	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However,	   she	   also	   insists	   that	   there	   is	   no	   ‘hegemonic	   femininity’	   but	   only	  
‘emphasized	  femininity’207	  because	  she	  believes	  that	  the	  gender	  power	  relationship	  
is	  asymmetrical.	  No	  form	  of	  femininity	  is	  hegemonic,	  dominant	  or	  powerful	  enough	  
for	  her	  to	  be	  able	  to	  label	  as	  ‘hegemonic	  femininity’.	  She	  argues:	  	  
‘[a]ll	  forms	  of	  femininity	  in	  this	  society	  are	  constructed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	  overall	  subordination	  of	  women	  to	  men.	  For	  this	  reason,	  there	  is	  no	  
femininity	  that	  holds	  among	  women	  the	  position	  held	  by	  hegemonic	  
masculinity	  among	  men.’208	  	  
She	   thus	   holds	   that	   no	   femininities	   or	   patterned	   female	   gender	   practices	   are	  
powerful	  or	  dominant	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  be	  labelled	  ‘hegemonic	  femininity’,	  even	  
in	  local	  levels	  such	  as	  in	  families,	  schools	  or	  local	  communities.	  So,	  according	  to	  her	  
theory,	  we	  can	  only	  legitimately	  use	  the	  idea	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  in	  families,	  
but	  there	  is	  no	  hegemonic	  femininity	  in	  families,	  because,	  she	  suggests,	  femininity	  is	  
simply	  not	  hegemonic	  or	  a	  powerful	  gender	  practice.	  	  
There	   are	   already	   some	   criticisms	   on	   her	   articulation	   and	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  
hegemonic	  masculinity.	  For	  example,	  one	  frequent	  criticism	   is	   that	   it	   is	   too	  vague,	  
too	  ambiguous,	  and	  very	  often	  includes	  conflicting	  norms	  and	  practices.209	  	  She	  does	  
not	  clearly	  articulate	  what	  the	  norms	  and	  content	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  entail,	  
although	  she	  frequently	  mentions	  men’s	  violence	  as	  a	  key	  practice	  and	  example	  of	  
hegemonic	   masculinity.210	  	   Also	   she	   is	   criticised	   for	   tending	   to	   highlight	   only	   the	  
negative	   attributes	   and	   practices	   of	   masculinity	   such	   as	   male	   violence	   while	  
neglecting	   the	  positive	   side	   in	  her	  elaboration	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity.211	  I	   think	  
all	   the	   above	   challenges	   to	   this	   theory	   of	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   are	   very	  
persuasive.	  Her	  idea	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	  is	  too	  vague.	  She	  does	  not	  properly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  According	   to	   Connell	   ‘emphasized	   femininity’	   is	   socially	   approved,	   accepted	   and	   encouraged	  
femininity	  which	  shows	  compliance	  to	  patriarchy	  and	  male	  domination.	   	  See	  Connell,	  n	  195	  above,	  
848.	  
208	  R.	  W.	  Connell,	  Gender	  and	  Power	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  1987),	  187.	  
209	  Tony	   Jefferson,	   ‘Subordinating	  Hegemonic	  Masculinity’,	  Theoretical	   Criminology	   6,	   no.	   1	   (2002),	  
69-­‐70.	  
210	  R.	   W.	   Connell,	   ‘On	   Hegemonic	   Masculinity	   and	   Violence	   Response	   to	   Jefferson	   and	   Hall’,	  
Theoretical	  Criminology	  6,	  no.	  1	  (2002),	  93-­‐97.	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  Jefferson,	  n	  209	  above,	  70.	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explain	   how	   to	   distinguish	   the	   attributes	   and	   practices	   of	   hegemonic	   masculinity	  
from	   those	   in	   other	   types	   of	   masculinities.	   Also,	   when	   thinking	   of	   hegemonic	  
masculinity,	   she	   tends	   to	   lump	   together	   a	   group	   of	   negative	   attributes	   and	  
problematic	   practices	   of	   some	  men	   and	  misleadingly	   thinks	   they	   could	   represent	  
hegemonic	  masculinity,	  even	  when	  these	  attributes	  or	  practices	  are	  actually	  widely	  
socially	   condemned.	   For	   example,	   Connell	   suggests	   that	   violence	   against	   women	  
and	   children	   is	   the	   practice	   and	   norm	   of	   hegemonic	   masculinity.212	  However,	   as	  
Tony	  Jefferson	  points	  out:	  
‘wife/partner	  batterers	  are	  not	  cultural	  heroes…Far	  from	  being	  a	  man,	  
the	  resort	  to	  violence	  against	  women	  is	  commonly	  regarded	  as	  a	  failure	  
of	  manhood(certainly	  in	  my	  experience	  of	  growing	  up	  male)	  since	  it	  
displays	  both	  a	  (feminine)	  inability	  to	  control	  emotions	  and	  cowardice	  in	  
attacking	  someone	  (usually)	  weaker	  than	  oneself.’213	  	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  some	  men	  perpetrate	  abuse	  and	  violence	  against	  women	  and	  children	  
in	  the	  family	  and	  this	  kind	  of	  male	  violence	  in	  families	  is	  an	  urgent	  and	  serious	  social	  
problem.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  unproblematic	  to	  suggest	  that	  domestic	  violence	  against	  
women	   and	   children	   are	   the	   prescribed,	   honoured,	   respected	   and	   admired	  
hegemonic	   masculine	   norms	   and	   practices	   in	   modern	   society.	   Empirical	   studies	  
suggest	   men’s	   violence	   against	   women	   receives	   very	   low	   social	   approval. 214	  
Moreover,	  empirical	  studies	  suggest	  that	  in	  reality	  in	  modern	  Western	  societies	  it	  is	  
women’s	  violence	  (against	  men)	  which	  is	  more	  socially	  tolerated,	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
ignored,	  and	  less	  harshly	  judged	  than	  men’s	  violence	  against	  women,	  either	  by	  legal	  
enforcement	  systems	  and	  professionals,215	  or	  by	   the	  general	  public.216	  	   So	   it	   is	  not	  
unproblematic	   for	  Connell	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  widely	   condemned	  men’s	  domestic	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  Connell,	  n	  210	  above,	  93-­‐94.	  	  
213	  Jefferson,	  n	  209	  above,	  71.	  
214	  For	  example,	  see	  M.	  J.	  Mattingly	  and	  M.	  A.	  Straus,	  Violence	  Socialization	  and	  Approval	  of	  Violence:	  
A	   World	   Perspective	   on	   Gender	   Differences	   and	   American	   Violence.	   Paper	   presented	   at	   the	   60th	  
annual	  American	  Society	  of	  Criminology	  meeting,	  St.	  Louis,	  2008.	  
215	  See	  n	  132,	  n	  141	  and	  n	  152	  above.	  Also,	  S.	  Okamoto,	  and	  M.	  Chesney-­‐Lind,	   ‘Girls	  and	  Relational	  
Aggression:	   Beyond	   the	   “Mean	  Girl”	   Hype’,	   Family	   &	   Intimate	   Partner	   Violence	  Quarterly	   1,	   no.	   3	  
(2009),	  283-­‐4;	  Brenda	  Russell,	  Laurie	  Ragatz,	  and	  Shane	  W.	  Kraus,	  ‘Expert	  Testimony	  of	  the	  Battered	  
Person	  Syndrome,	  Defendant	  Gender,	  and	  Sexual	  Orientation	   in	  a	  Case	  of	  Duress:	  Evaluating	  Legal	  
Decisions’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Violence	  27,	  no.	  7	  (2012),	  659-­‐670.	  
216	  See	  n	  131	  above.	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violence	  against	  women	  is	  the	  socially	  approved,	  respected,	  honoured	  and	  admired	  
normative	  masculinity:	  that	  is,	  	  hegemonic	  masculinity.	  	  	  
I	  further	  hold	  that	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  problems	  in	  Connell’s	  theory	  of	  hegemonic	  
masculinity	   that	   have	   not	   been	   addressed	   by	   the	   existing	   critiques.	   First,	   as	  
mentioned	   above,	   Connell	   insists	   we	   cannot	   legitimately	   use	   the	   concept	   of	  
hegemonic	   femininity	   because	   currently	   women	   as	   a	   group	   are	   subordinated	   by	  
men	  as	  a	  group	   in	  societies	  and	  therefore	  no	  pattern	  of	   femininity	  could	  have	  the	  
power	   and	   dominance	   to	   be	   labelled	   as	   the	   hegemonic	   femininity.	   Femininity,	   in	  
other	  words,	  is	  never	  hegemonic	  in	  current	  societies	  according	  to	  her	  system,	  even	  
at	   the	   local	   level.	   She	   argues	   that	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   is	   global,	   national	   and	  
local.	   At	   local	   level	   we	   can	   legitimately	   talk	   about	   and	   identify,	   for	   example,	  
hegemonic	   masculinity	   in	   working	   class	   men	   in	   the	   work	   place,	   or	   hegemonic	  
masculinity	   in	   the	   family.	  But	  her	   rejection	  of	   the	  possibility	  and	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  
concept	   of	   hegemonic	   femininity	   altogether	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   no	   hegemonic	  
femininity	   even	   at	   local	   level.	   	   So	   her	   gender	   theory	   implies	   that,	   while	   there	   is	  
powerful	  hegemonic	  masculinity	   in	  families,	  we	  cannot	   legitimately	   imagine	  or	  say	  
there	  is	  also	  powerful	  hegemonic	  femininity	  in	  families.	  Therefore,	  the	  implications	  
of	   her	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   theory	   are	   that	   in	   current	   societies	   there	   are	   only	  
dominant	   and	   powerful	   men’s	   practices	   and	   gender	   in	   family	   lives,	   but	   women’s	  
practices	   and	   gender	   in	   families	   can	   never	   be	   labelled,	   judged	   and	   viewed	   as	  
dominant	  and	  hegemonic.	  	  
I	  think	  this	  kind	  of	  thinking	  and	  distinction	  of	  men’s	  gender	  and	  women’s	  gender	  in	  
the	   family	   and	   in	   intimate	   relationships	   is	   misleading,	   problematic	   and	  
heteronormative.	   It	   adopts	   a	   problematic	   either/or	   model	   in	   thinking	   of	   gender,	  
power	   and	   the	   family.	   And	   the	   either/or	  model	   is	   based	   on	   the	   heteronormative	  
gender	   myth	   and	   stereotype	   that	   assumes	   that	   only	   masculinity	   is	   powerful	   and	  
dominant.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   approach	   to	   gender	   is	   inadequate	   and	   is	   likely	   to	  
perpetuate	   constraining	   gender	   norms	   for	   men,	   women,	   and	   trans	   people	   in	  
heteronormative	   society.	   I	   argue	   that	   instead	   we	   need	   a	   more	   nuanced	   and	  
multidimensional	  perspective	  in	  analysing	  family,	  power	  and	  gender.	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Family	   power	   relations	   are	   complex	   and	   multidimensional	   and	   there	   are	   various	  
measurements	  and	  criteria	   for	  evaluating	  and	   thinking	  about	  power	   in	   the	   family.	  
However,	  too	  often	  scholars	  like	  Connell	  rely	  on	  only	  ‘masculinised’	  measurements,	  
such	  as	  economic	   resources,	   formal	  political	  power	  or	  physical	   strength	   in	   judging	  
and	  evaluating	  family	  power.	  	  They	  therefore	  conclude	  with	  a	  binary	  dichotomy	  by	  
suggesting	  that	  men	  are	  the	  powerful	  and	  dominant	  gender,	  while	  women	  are	  the	  
powerless	  and	  vulnerable	  gender	  in	  the	  family.	  	  I	  contend	  that,	  nevertheless,	  power	  
relationships	   in	   the	   family	   are	   much	   more	   complicated	   and	   there	   are	   significant	  
factors	  other	   than	  economic	  or	   formal	  political	  power	   factors	   that	  are	   crucial	   and	  
relevant	  in	  understanding	  power	  relations	  in	  the	  family.	  For	  instance,	  one	  important	  
factor	   influences	   the	   balance	   and	   execution	   of	   familial	   power	   is	   the	   parental	  
relationships	   with	   children.	   Many	   parents,	   fathers	   or	   mothers,	   value	   highly	   their	  
relationships	   with	   their	   children.	   For	   many	   parents	   in	   modern	   society,	   their	  
relationships	  with	   their	   children	  are	  one	  of	   the	  most,	   if	   not	   the	  most,	   valued	  and	  
meaningful	   aspects	   of	   lives.217	  However,	   it	   is	   biological	   mothers,	   no	   matter	   in	  
homosexual	  or	  heterosexual	  relationships,	  that	  generally	  have	  greater	  opportunities	  
and	  familial	  power	  to	  play	  maternal	  gatekeeping	  roles	  by	  restricting	  or	  deciding	  the	  
range	  of	  involvement	  and	  contact	  the	  other	  partner	  or	  other	  people	  can	  have	  with	  
the	  child.218	  For	  example,	  a	  study	  of	  lesbian	  families	  finds	  that:	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  Ulrich	  Beck	  and	  Elisabeth	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  (Oxford:	  Polity	  Press,	  1995),	  
102-­‐139;	   Rob,	  Palkovitz,	  Marcella	  A.	  Copes,	  and	  Tara	  N.	  Woolfolk,	   ‘“It's	   Like...	  You	  Discover	  a	  New	  
Sense	  of	  Being”	  Involved	  Fathering	  as	  an	  Evoker	  of	  Adult	  Development’,	  Men	  and	  Masculinities	  4,	  no.	  
1	  (2001),	  49-­‐69.	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  Mignon	   R.	  Moore,	   ’Gendered	   Power	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   among	  Women:	   A	   study	   of	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Making	   in	   Black,	   Lesbian	   Stepfamilies’,	   American	   Sociological	   Review	   73,	   no.	   2	   (2008),	   335-­‐356;	  
Marsha	  Kline	  Pruett,	  Lauren	  A.	  Arthur,	  and	  Rachel	  Ebling,	  ‘The	  Hand	  That	  Rocks	  the	  Cradle:	  Maternal	  
Gatekeeping	   after	   Divorce’,	   Pace	   Law	   Review	   27,	   no.4	   (2006),	   709-­‐739;Jay	   Fagan,	   and	   Marina	  
Barnett,	  ‘The	  Relationship	  between	  Maternal	  Gatekeeping,	  Paternal	  Competence,	  Mothers'	  Attitudes	  
about	  the	  Father	  Role,	  and	  Father	  Involvement’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  24,	  no.	  8	  (2003),	  1020-­‐1043;	  
Sarah	  M.	   Allen,	   and	   Alan	   J.	   Hawkins,	   ‘Maternal	   Gatekeeping:	  Mothers'	   Beliefs	   and	   Behaviors	   that	  
Inhibit	   Greater	   Father	   Involvement	   in	   Family	  Work’,	   Journal	   of	  Marriage	   and	   the	   Family	  61,	   no.	   1	  
(1999),	  199-­‐212.;	  Marion	  L.	  Kranichfeld,	   ‘Rethinking	  Family	  Power’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  8,	  no.	  1	  
(1987),	  42-­‐56;	  Naomi	  Segal,	  ‘Why	  Can’t	  A	  Good	  Man	  Be	  Sexy?	  Why	  Can’t	  A	  Sexy	  Man	  Be	  Good?’,	  in	  
David	  Porter	  ed.,	  Between	  Men	  and	  Feminism	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  37,	  40-­‐41.	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‘[b]iological	  mothers	  also	  have	  more	  say	  because	  in	  the	  event	  of	  split	  in	  a	  
relationship,	  they	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  decide	  whether	  and	  how	  much	  
visitation	  their	  partners	  can	  have	  with	  the	  children.	  In	  a	  relationship	  
where	  two	  people	  are	  raising	  children	  and	  the	  partner	  becomes	  
emotionally	  attached,	  the	  partner	  has	  a	  serious	  disadvantage	  in	  a	  society	  
that	  gives	  her	  no	  resources	  after	  the	  relationship	  ends.’219	  	  
Scholars	  question	   the	  over-­‐generalised	  powerless	  mothers	   and	  wives	  assumptions	  
in	   heterosexual	  marriage	   and	   intimate	   relationships.	   They	   find	   that	   some	  women	  
‘exercise	  their	  familial	  power	  and	  authority…by	  controlling	  the	  actions	  of	  fathers	  or	  
other	  persons	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  children.’220	  Studies	  also	  find	  that	  in	  residence/child	  
custody	   negotiation,	   fathers	   often	   report	   a	   lack	   of	   bargaining	   power	   and	   feeling	  
powerless.221	  For	  example,	  a	   study	  about	  child	   residence	  negotiation	  process	   finds	  
that:	  	  
‘Whether	  or	  not	  fathers	  had	  played	  an	  equal	  part	  in	  the	  care	  and	  
upbringing	  of	  their	  children	  or	  indeed	  been	  the	  primary	  carer…Fathers	  
often	  felt	  mothers	  were	  able	  to	  act	  arbitrarily	  and	  that	  their	  own	  
relationships	  with	  their	  children	  were	  now	  somewhat	  dependant	  on	  the	  
mother's	  goodwill.’222	  
Scholars	   also	   problematise	   the	   myth	   that	   higher	   earning	   ability	   necessarily	  
translates	   into	   greater	   familial	   power.223	  They	   find	   power	   relationships	   in	   families	  
are	   actually	   highly	   multidimensional.	   Male	   figures	   are	   not	   necessary	   the	   only	  
members	   in	   the	   family	   with	   power.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   female	   figures	   can	  
sometimes	   have	   real	   power	   and	   authority	   over	   children	   and	  men	   in	   families.	   For	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  Moore,	  ibid.,	  349.	  
220	  Pruett,	  Arthur	  and	  Ebling,	  n	  218	  above,	  716.	  	  
221	  Alexander	   Masardo,	   ‘Negotiating	   Shared	   Residence:	   The	   Experience	   of	   Separated	   Fathers	   in	  
Britain	   and	   France’,	   in	   Jo	   Bridgeman,	   Heather	   Keating	   and	   Graig	   Lind	   eds.,	   Regulating	   Family	  
Responsibilities	   (Farnham:	   Ashgate,	   2011),	   127-­‐129;	   Joyce	   A.	   Arditti,	   and	   Katherine	   R.	   Allen,	  
‘Understanding	   Distressed	   Fathers’	   Perceptions	   of	   Legal	   and	   Relational	   Inequalities	   Post-­‐divorce’,	  
Family	  Court	  Review	   31,	  no.	  4	   (1993),	  461-­‐476;	   Edward	  Kruk,	   ‘Psychological	   and	  Structural	   Factors	  
Contributing	  to	  the	  Disengagement	  of	  Noncustodial	  Fathers	  after	  Divorce’,	  Family	  Court	  Review	  30,	  
no.	  1	  (1992),	  81-­‐101;	  A	  study	  of	  unmarried	  fathers	  finds	  these	  fathers	  feel	  particularly	  powerless	  and	  
they	   sometimes	   suffer	   from	   physical	   abuses	   and	   sexual	   coercion	   from	   ex-­‐partner	   when	   seeking	  
access	  to	  their	  children.	  See	  Charlie	  Lewis,	  Amalia	  Papacosta,	  Jo	  Warin,	  Cohabitation,	  Separation	  and	  
Fatherhood	  (York:	  York	  Publishing	  Services	  for	  Joseph	  Rowntree	  Foundation,	  2002),	  31-­‐45.	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example,	  research	  finds	  that	  children	  in	  separate	  families	  report	  high	  percentages	  of	  
desires	  and	  wishes	  of	  more	  frequent	  contact	  and	  higher	  involvement	  with	  the	  non-­‐
resident	   parent	   (usually	   non-­‐resident	   father)	   and	   these	   children	   report	   their	   non-­‐
resident	   fathers	   also	   have	   the	   same	   desires	   and	   wishes	   for	   more	   contact	   and	  
involvement	  with	   their	   children.224	  However,	   these	   children	   often	   report	   that	   it	   is	  
their	   mothers	   who	   generally	   do	   not	   want	   them	   to	   spend	   more	   time	   with	   their	  
fathers	  and	  have	  the	  power	  to	  intervene	  father-­‐child	  involvement.	  	  
‘The	  more	  time	  they	  wanted	  with	  their	  fathers,	  the	  more	  they	  perceived	  
their	  mothers	  interfering	  with	  that	  time.	  They	  saw	  mothers’	  desire	  to	  
have	  the	  children	  with	  her	  as	  a	  primary	  reason	  they	  do	  not	  have	  more	  
time	  with	  their	  fathers.’225	  	  
In	  the	  above	  research,	  children	  report	  that	  their	  resident	  mothers	  have	  the	  power	  
to	  play	  a	  maternal	   gatekeeping	   role	  by	   restricting	  or	  blocking	   the	   father’s	   contact	  
and	   involvement	   with	   their	   children.	   By	   implying	   that	   there	   is	   only	   hegemonic	  
masculinity	   in	   the	   family	   but	   no	   hegemonic	   femininity,	   Connell	   essentialises	   and	  
overgeneralises	   complicated	   gender	   power	   dynamics	   and	   fails	   to	   appreciate	   and	  
address	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  aspects	  of	  gender	  and	  power	  in	  family	  lives.	  	  
The	   second	   problematic	   implication	   of	   Connell’s	   arguments	   of	   hegemonic	  
masculinity	   is	   the	   possible	   tendency	   to	   unjustly	   discredit,	   disbelieve	   and	   devalue	  
fathering	   and	   fathers.	  As	   already	   illustrated	  above,	   she	   suggests	   that	   the	   aim	  and	  
ultimate	   purpose	   of	   hegemonic	   masculinity	   is	   to	   sustain	   male	   dominance,	   male	  
privilege	  and	  patriarchy.	  She	  argues	   that	   ‘the	  concept	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	   is	  
based	   on	   practice	   that	   permits	   men’s	   collective	   dominance	   over	   women	   to	  
continue.’226	  	   	  She	   further	  argues	  that	   ‘being	  a	   father’	  and	   ‘bringing	  home	  a	  wage’	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Parenting	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are	   both	   part	   of	   gender	   practices	   of	   hegemonic	  masculinity.227	  By	   insisting	  men’s	  
practice	  of	  hegemonic	  masculinity	   is	  primarily	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  male	  domination	  
and	  male	  privilege,	  and	  by	  suggesting	  that	  ‘being	  a	  father’	  is	  a	  masculine	  practice	  of	  
hegemonic	  masculinity,	  she	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  fathering	  behaviours	  are	  ultimately	  
and	  primarily	  designed	  for	  guaranteeing	  male	  dominance,	  male	  privilege	  and	  male	  
power.	  She	  seems	  to	  implicitly	  suggest	  an	  essentialised	  negative	  image	  and	  purpose	  
of	  fathering	  and	  fathers	  as	  ultimately	  and	  inevitably	  selfish	  and	  patriarchal.	  	  But	  do	  
we	   really	   need	   to	   see	   a	   father’s	   motives,	   love	   and	   fathering	   in	   this	   kind	   of	  
essentialist	  and	  sceptical	  way?	  	   Is	  this	  a	  fair	  and	  balanced	  interpretation	  of	  fathers	  
and	  fathering?	  No	  doubt	  there	  are	  abusive,	  controlling,	  violent	  and	  selfish	  fathers,	  
just	  as	  there	  are	  also	  abusive,	  controlling,	  violent	  and	  selfish	  mothers,	  but	  there	  are	  
also	  many	  responsible,	  caring,	  protecting	  and	  devoted	  mothers	  and	   fathers.	  There	  
are	   various	  ways	  of	   parenting	   and	   various	   types	  of	   parent.	   To	   imply	   that	   ‘to	  be	   a	  
father’	   generally	   suggests	   men	   seeking	   dominance	   over	   women	   and	   children	   is	  
crudely	   essentialising	   and	   unjustly	   degrades	   various	   practices,	   motivations	   and	  
emotions	   of	   fathers	   and	   fathering	   towards	   their	   family.	   This	   kind	   of	   reductionist,	  
biased	   and	   discriminatory	   perspective	   of	   fathers	   and	   fathering	   is	   not	   helpful	   and	  
productive	   in	   understanding	   the	   complicated	   and	   multifaceted	   relations	   and	  
practices	   of	   parenting,	   children,	   family	   and	   gender.	   	   Since	   Connell’s	   masculinity	  
theory	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   producing	   and	   reproducing	   certain	   unjust	   heteronormative	  
gender	  norms	  and	  prejudices,	  a	  more	  balanced	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  men	  and	  
masculinities	   is	   needed.	   I	   suggest	   considering	   the	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  approach	  to	  men’s	  studies.	  	  
3.8   Richard	  Collier	  on	  men,	  masculinity,	  family	  and	  law	  
In	   family	   law	   jurisprudence,	   legal	   scholar	   Richard	   Collier	   brings	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies	  into	  legal	  research,	  especially	   in	  family	  law.	  His	   legal	  research	  
on	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	   is	  mainly	   informed	  and	  shaped	  by	  subordination	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feminist	  ideologies	  and	  approaches.228	  Since	  he	  is	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  scholars	  in	  law	  
and	  masculinity	  studies,	  I	  critically	  evaluate	  his	  theory	  of	  law,	  masculinity	  and	  family	  
in	  this	  section.	  
Collier	  criticises	  the	  new	  ‘family	  men’	  and	  the	  ‘new	  father’	  ideology	  in	  contemporary	  
family	  law	  and	  family	  policies.229	  He	  contends	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  new	  father	  that	  is	  
promoted	   in	  modern	   family	   law	   is	   still	   largely	   heteronormative.	   New	   fatherhood,	  
according	   to	   him,	   is	   a	   kind	   of	  modern	   ideology	   of	   fatherhood	   and	   fathering	   that	  
encourages	   fathers	   to	  be,	  not	  only	  economically	   responsible	   for	   children,	  but	  also	  
actively	  and	  psychologically	   involved	  with	  children.	   In	  other	  words,	  modern	   family	  
men	  and	  new	  fatherhood	  ideologies	  require	  fathers	  not	  only	  to	  continually	  play	  the	  
major	  breadwinner	  role	  for	  their	  families	  but	  also	  expect	  fathers	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  
active	  and	  involved	  parenting.	  Under	  this	  kind	  of	  ideology,	  gender	  neutral	  family	  law	  
and	   policies	   are	   promoted.	   For	   example,	   the	   traditional	   maternal	   preference	  
principle	   in	   child	   custody/child	   residence	   law	  has	  been	   replaced	  by	   formal	   gender	  
neutral	  principles	  such	  as	  the	  child	  welfare	  principle.230	  	  
Collier	   criticises	   this	   kind	   of	   new	   fatherhood	   image	   and	   ideology	   as	   largely	   just	  
rhetoric	  without	  the	  backing	  of	  real	  action	  from	  fathers.231	  He	  argues	  that	  modern	  
fathers	   still	   prioritise	   their	   own	   career	   over	   child	   caring	   and	   refuse	   to	  make	   real	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  Journal	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   and	   Social	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   in	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   and	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   eds.,	  
Changing	   Family	   Values,	   (London:	   Routledge,	   1999),	   38-­‐58;	   	   Richard	   Collier,	   ‘A	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   Time	   to	   Be	   a	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  the	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  Law,	  Policy,	  and	  Family	  (Practices)’,	  n	  228	  above,	  526-­‐
545;	  Richard	  Collier,	  Men,	  Law	  and	  Gender:	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  on	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   Law(London:	  Routledge,	  2010),	  
128-­‐151.	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   and	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  Press,	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  715-­‐775.	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change	  by	  becoming	  more	  engaged	  in	  child	  caring	  and	  in	  the	  children’s’	  lives.232	  He	  
argues	   that	   gender	   neutral	   family	   law	   does	   not	   take	   into	   account	   the	   gendered	  
unequal	   and	   hierarchal	   power	   relationships	   and	   job	   divisions	   in	   the	   family.233	  
Perhaps,	   the	   core	   of	   his	   criticisms	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  modern	   fathers	   and	  modern	  
family	  men,	  are	  related	  to	  his	  disbelief	  and	  distrust	  of	  modern	  fathers’	  devotion	  and	  
commitment	  to	  children.	  He	  suggests	  that	  these	  new	  fathers	  do	  not	  really	  want	  to	  
share	  the	  responsibility	  for	  child	  caring.234	  He	  holds	  that	  elite	  and	  middle	  class	  men	  
construct	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   image	   of	   respectable	   and	   safe	   family	   man	  
with	   the	   image	   of	   irresponsible	   and	   dangerous	   errant	   father.	   But	   in	   reality,	   he	  
argues,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  fathers.	  For	  Collier,	  
both	   groups	   of	   men	   share	   the	   same	   problem:	   ‘their	   lack	   of	   any	   involvement	   in	  
childcare.’235	  Both	   lack	   real	   interest	   in	   child	   care	  and	   involving	   themselves	   in	   child	  
life.	   	   They	   are	   content	   to	   leave	   the	   caring	   role	   to	   women	   and	   pursue	   their	   own	  
career.	  He	  quotes	  Suzanne	  Moore’s	  words	  by	   suggesting:	   ‘[a]ll	   kinds	  of	  men	   think	  
children	  basically	  belong	  to	  women,	  that	  their	  part	   in	  the	  process	  ends	  as	  soon	  as	  
they	  put	  their	  trousers	  on.’236	  Here	  Collier	  develops	  a	  family	  law	  theory	  on	  fathering,	  
mothering	  and	  children	   similar	   to	   those	  proposed	  by	   some	  subordination-­‐feminist	  
family	  law	  theorists	  such	  as	  by	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman.237	  	  	  
Collier’s	  claims	  that	  fathers’	  lack	  of	  interests	  and	  real	  action	  in	  getting	  more	  involved	  
in	  children’s	  lives	  is	  biased	  and	  misleading.	  Empirical	  studies	  on	  modern	  fathers	  do	  
show	   that	   modern	   fathers	   are	   generally	   much	   more	   involved	   with	   their	   children	  
than	  the	  previous	  generation.	  For	  example,	  research	  in	  the	  UK	  finds	  that	  ‘there	  was	  
a	  200	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  the	  time	  that	  fathers	  are	  actively	  engaging	  with	  children	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between	   1974	   and	   2000.’238	  Research	   also	   indicates	   that	   many	   fathers	   have	   a	  
profound	  emotional	   involvement	  with	  their	  children	  and	  often	  want	  to	  participate	  
more	  in	  caring	  and	  in	  children’s	  lives	  more	  generally,	  although	  they	  are	  still	   largely	  
constrained	  by	  the	  gendered	  norms	  of	  being	  the	  primary	  provider	  for	  their	  family.239	  
Furthermore,	  research	  finds	  that	  despite	  the	  formal	  gender	  neutral	  language	  used	  in	  
some	  areas	  of	  modern	   family	   law,	   the	   judiciary	  system	  and	  the	   legal	  professionals	  
still	  often	  hold	  de	  facto	  gendered	  biases	  and	  prejudices	  against	  fathers.240	  	  In	  other	  
words,	   there	   are	   institutional	   and	   structural	   gender	   injustices	   and	   biases	   against	  
fathers	  in	  law	  and	  in	  general	  culture.	  Collier	  generally	  trivialises	  and	  depoliticises	  the	  
structural	  obstacles	  and	  discrimination	  fathers	  face	  in	  his	  family	  law	  theory.	  
Collier	  also	  addresses	   issues	  of	  family	  violence,	  child	  abuse	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  
family	  man.	  However,	   in	  his	   system,	   family	   violence	  and	  child	  abuse	  are	  generally	  
reduced	   to	   issues	   of	   dangerous	   family	   men’s	   violence	   against	   women	   and	  
children.241	  He	   argues	   that	   the	   safe	   and	   respectable	   family	   man	   image	   actually	  
diverts	  our	  attention	  away	   from	   ‘dangerous	  qualities	  of	   familial	  masculinity.’242	  He	  
echoes	  feminist	  criticisms	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  safe	  family	  man	  ideology	  by	  law	  
and	  wants	  to	  challenge	  the	  conception	  that	  ‘men	  as	  fathers	  are,	  a	  priori,	  safe.’243	  	  He	  
uses	   child	   sexual	   abuse	   and	   domestic	   violence	   against	   women	   as	   examples	   to	  
challenge	  the	  safe	  and	  natural	  concept	  of	  good	  father	  and	  family	  man.	  	  He	  suggests	  
that	   the	  proper	   response	   to	   issues	  of	   child	   sex	   abuse	   and	  domestic	   violence	   is	   to	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address	   institutional	  male	  authority,	  male	  power	  and	  the	  myths	  of	   the	  safe	   family	  
man	   in	   heterosexual	   families.244	  He	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   deconstruct	   the	  
assumed	  and	  naturalised	  idea	  of	  the	  safe	  family	  man	  and	  good	  father	  in	  family	  law	  
and	  policies.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  he	  is	  absolutely	  right	  to	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  safe	  and	  natural	  family	  
man	   and	   the	   natural	   good	   father	   images	   and	   ideologies.	   He	   is	   also	   right	   in	  
highlighting	   the	   problems	   of	   male	   violence	   in	   the	   family.	   	   I	   also	   agree	   that	   child	  
abuse	  and	  domestic	  violence	  are	  urgent	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  taken	  seriously.	  
However,	  I	  also	  challenge	  his	  reduction	  of	  issues	  of	  family	  violence,	  child	  abuse,	  and	  
intimate	   relationship	   violence	   to	  male	   violence	   against	   ‘women	   and	   children.’	   He	  
oversimplifies	   the	   problems	   of	   child	   abuse	   (especially	   child	   sexual	   abuse)	   and	  
domestic	  violence	  by	  reducing	  them	  to	  just	  problems	  of	  male	  violence	  in	  the	  family.	  
He	   frequently	   contrasts	   the	   term	   ‘men’	  with	   the	   term	   ‘women	   and	   children’	   and	  
depicts	  men	  as	  violent	  perpetrators	  against	   ‘women	  and	  children’	   in	  the	  family.	  245	  	  
He	   constantly	   bonds	   the	   term	   ‘children’	   uncritically	  with	   the	   term	   ‘women’	   in	   his	  
arguments	  of	  family	  violence	  as	  if	  they	  are	  naturally	  bonded	  with	  and	  always	  have	  
identical	   interests.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  never	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘children	  and	  men’.	  
He	   implicitly	   uncritically	   assumes	   that	   children	   and	   women	   always	   have	   identical	  
interests	  in	  families	  and	  their	  interests	  are	  jointly	  threatened	  by	  dangerous	  fathers.	  
He	  never	   considers	   and	  addresses	   the	  problems	  of	   female	  members	   and	  mothers	  
who	  perpetrate	   family	   violence,	   such	   as	   child	   physical	   and	  emotional	   abuse,	   child	  
sexual	  abuse,	  and	  domestic	  violence	  against	  men.	  	  He	  seems	  to	  uncritically	  assume	  
that	   family	   violence	   equates	   to	  male	   violence.	   However,	   this	   kind	   of	   reductionist	  
thinking	   is	   biased,	   unjust	   and	   unhelpful.	   Victims	   of	   female	   violence	   and	  maternal	  
child	  abuse,	   including	  maternal	   sexual	  abuse	  are	  unfairly	   trivialised	  and	   ignored	   in	  
his	  family	  law	  theory.	  
His	   theory	   neglects,	   ignores,	   and	   marginalises	   female	   perpetrated	   violence	   and	  
victims	  of	  the	  female	  perpetrator	  in	  the	  home.	  This	  is	  an	  unbalanced	  and	  insufficient	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viewpoint	  on	  family	  violence.	  Take	  parental	  violence	  and	  abuse	  against	  children	  as	  
an	   example.	   Empirical	   research	   shows	   that	   mothers	   and	   fathers	   commit	   similar	  
rates	   of	   physical	   and	   emotional	   abuse	   against	   children.246	  However,	   compared	   to	  
paternal	  violence,	  maternal	  violence	  and	  abuse	  against	  children	  are	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  
be	   noticed,	   to	   be	   taken	   seriously,	   or	   to	   be	   reported	   to	   law	   officers	   and	   child	  
protection	  professionals.247	  A	  large	  scale	  survey	  in	  Britain	  shows	  that	  young	  men	  are	  
more	   likely	   than	   young	   women	   to	   experience	   parental	   physical	   violence	   in	   the	  
families.	   Mothers	   are	   slightly	   more	   likely	   than	   fathers	   to	   use	   physical	   violence	  
against	   children	   in	   the	   family.248	  In	   East	   Asian	   societies	   mothers	   and	   fathers	  
perpetuate	   similar	   rates	   of	   child	   abuse,	   including	   similar	   rates	   of	   physical	   and	  
psychological	   abuse,	   according	   to	   a	  household	   survey	   conducted	   in	  Hong	  Kong.249	  
Research	  also	  finds	  that	  LGBT	  children	  experience	  higher	  rates	  of	  family	  abuse	  from	  
both	  fathers	  and	  mothers.	  Both	  parents	  commit	  a	  significantly	  higher	  percentage	  of	  
child	   abuse	   against	   LGBT	   children.250	  Overall,	   child	   abuse	   is	   not	   just	   a	   problem	   of	  
paternal	  abuse	  of	  children	  as	  Collier	  describes.	  	  
Moreover,	   although	   men	   are	   the	   main	   perpetrators	   of	   child	   sexual	   abuse	   in	   the	  
family,	   it	   is	   unjust	   and	   inappropriate	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   problems	   and	   harm	   of	  
female-­‐perpetrated	   child	   sexual	   abuse	   in	   the	   family	   are	   ignorable	   or	   insignificant.	  
While	   child	   sexual	   abuse	   by	   men	   is	   a	   serious	   social	   problem	   and	   ought	   to	   be	  
addressed	  urgently,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  victims	  and	  harms	  of	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  by	  
women	  are	  trivial.	  The	  exact	  extent	  of	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  by	  women	  in	  the	  family	  is	  
hard	   to	   be	   known	   but	   research	   indicates	   that	   female	   offenders	   do	   exist	   and	   the	  
cases	   are	   largely	   underreported	   and	   unnoticed	   by	   either	   the	   general	   public	   or	   by	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  of	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  Chan,	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  The	  
University	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  Hong	  Kong,	  2005).	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  no.	  2	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legal	   and	   social	   service	   professionals.251	  This	   is	   mainly	   because	   of	   the	   traditional	  
disbelief	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   sexual	   abuse	   of	   children	   by	   women,	   the	   dominant	  
subordination	   feminist	   ideology	   that	   assumes	   male	   domination	   over	   women	   and	  
children	   in	   the	   family,	   and	   the	   pervasive	   patriarchal	   and	   heteronormative	   gender	  
stereotypes	   of	   caring	   and	   harmless	   women	   and	   femininity	   in	   society.252	  Not	   only	  
subordination	   feminism	   informed	   scholars	   such	   as	   Richard	   Collier	   marginalise	  
female	  offenders	   in	   child	   sexual	  abuse,	   traditionalist	  patriarchal	   scholars	  also	  hold	  
and	  perpetuate	  heteronormative	   gender	   stereotypes	  by	   claiming	   that	   child	   sexual	  
abuse	  by	  females	  is	  so	  rare	  that	  it	  is	  almost	  insignificant.253	  	  However,	  according	  to	  
Childline	   statistics	   2005-­‐2006	   in	   the	   UK,	   of	   those	   children	   who	   reported	   being	  
sexually	  abused,	  5%	  of	  girls	  and	  44%	  of	  boys	  stated	  that	  their	  abuser	  was	  female.254	  
Also	  Deborah	   S.	   Boroughs	   indicates	   that	   ‘the	   sexual	   abuse	  of	   children	  by	  women,	  
primarily	  mothers,	  once	  thought	  to	  be	  so	  rare	  it	  could	  be	  ignored,	  constituted	  25%	  
(approximately	  36,000	  children)	  of	  the	  sexually	  abused	  victims.’255	  	  
Research	   finds	   that	   police,	   prosecutors	   and	   social	   workers	   generally	   do	   not	   treat	  
female-­‐perpetrated	   sexual	   abuse	   cases	   as	   seriously	   as	  male-­‐perpetrated	   cases.	   In	  
child	  sexual	  abuse	  cases,	  research	  finds	  that	  child	  protection	  professionals:	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  no.	  3	  (2003),	  303-­‐314.	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‘did	  not	  consider	  female-­‐perpetrated	  abuse	  to	  be	  as	  serious	  as	  male-­‐
perpetuated	  abuse.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  victims	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  
perpetuated	  by	  a	  woman	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  receive	  the	  protection	  
afforded	  victims	  of	  male-­‐perpetuated	  abuse.’256	  	  
Studies	  also	  find	  that	  female	  perpetrators	  of	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  
arrested,	   prosecuted	   or	   jailed	   compared	   with	   male	   offenders. 257 	  Female-­‐
perpetrated	   child	   sexual	   abuse	   victims	   often	   face	   negative	   responses	   such	   as	  
disbelief,	  minimisation,	  or	  discomfort	  from	  professionals	  when	  they	  reveal	  that	  their	  
abusers	  are	  female.258	  	  	  
Also,	  research	   indicates	  that	  child	  abuse	  victims	  of	  female	  offenders	  usually	  face	  a	  
great	   taboo	   of	   disclosing	   female	   sex	   offending.259	  Child	   sexual	   abuse	   by	   females,	  
especially	  by	  mothers,	  is	  regarded	  as	  the	  ultimate	  taboo	  and	  the	  most	  hidden	  aspect	  
of	  life	  for	  many	  victims.	  This	  is	  related	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘while	  all	  disclosures	  of	  sexual	  
abuse	  are	   inherently	  difficult,	  disclosures	  of	   female-­‐perpetrated	   sexual	  abuse	  may	  
have	   an	   added	   complexity	   given	   that	   these	   cases	   transgress	   the	   norm	   and	   defy	  
traditional	  sexual	  scripts.’260	  As	  a	  male	  victim	  of	  maternal	  child	  sexual	  abuse	  reports:	  
‘[i]t’s	  more	  difficult	   for	  me	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   [female	  perpetrated]	   incest	   than	   the	  
incest	  by	  my	  father.	  It	  was	  really	  hard	  to	  come	  forward	  and	  say	  that	  I	  was	  sexually	  
abused	   by	   a	   woman.’261	  	   Actually	   research	   finds	   that	   the	   ‘male	   sexual	   abuser	  
paradigm’	   is	   so	  dominant	   in	   legal	   and	   social	   services	   responses	   to	   sexual	   violence	  
that	  some	  victims	  of	  female	  sex	  abusers	  feel	  pressured	  to	  say	  their	  abusers	  are	  male	  
in	  order	  to	  get	  help	  and	  to	  avoid	  being	  dismissed	  and	  disbelieved	  by	  legal	  and	  social	  
service	  professionals.262	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256	  Jacquie	  Hetherton	   and	   Lynn	   Beardsall,	   ‘Decisions	   and	  Attitudes	   Concerning	   Child	   Sexual	   Abuse:	  
Does	   the	   Gender	   of	   the	   Perpetrator	   Make	   a	   Difference	   to	   Child	   Protection	   Professionals?’,	   Child	  
Abuse	  &	  Neglect	  22,	  no.	  12	  (1998),	  1265-­‐1283.	  
257	  Denov,	  n	  251	  above,	  311.	  
258	  Myriam	  S.	  Denov,	  ‘To	  a	  Safer	  Place?	  Victims	  of	  Sexual	  Abuse	  by	  Females	  and	  Their	  Disclosures	  to	  
Professionals’,	  Child	  Abuse	  &	  Neglect	  27,	  no.	  1	  (2003),	  54-­‐55;  Banning.	  n	  251	  above,	  563-­‐570.	  
259	  Denov,	  ibid.,	  52.	  
260	  Denov,	  n	  251	  above,	  311.	  
261	  Denov,	  n	  258	  above,	  52.	  
262	  Denov,	  n	  251	  above,	  311.	  
132	  
	  
The	  heteronormative	  gender	  myths	  and	  stereotypes	  of	  harmless,	  gentle	  and	  caring	  
female	  images,	  especially	  harmless	  and	  caring	  maternal	  images	  in	  the	  family,	  often	  
prevent	   professionals	   and	   public	   from	   seeing	   and	   taking	   female	   sex	   offenders	   of	  
child	   abuse	   seriously.	   As	   Myriam	   S.	   Denov	   states:	   ‘[t]raditional	   sexual	   scripts,	  
particularly	   the	   societal	   perceptions	   of	   females	   as	   sexually	   passive	   and	   innocent,	  
may	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  under-­‐recognition	  and	  underreporting	  of	  female	  
sex	  offending.’263	  She	  further	  argues	  that	   ‘the	  denial	  of	  women	  as	  potential	  sexual	  
aggressors	   has	   not	   only	   been	   accepted	   and	   affirmed	   in	   the	   beliefs	   of	   the	   general	  
population	   but	   has	   also	   been	   cemented	   in	   everyday	   practices	   of	   law.’264	  Some	  
ideologies	  and	  policies	  proposed	  and	  promoted	  by	  subordination	  feminists	  in	  sexual	  
violence	  and	  family	  violence	  law	  and	  politics,	  do	  not	  challenge	  the	  heteronormative	  
gender	  myths	  of	  harmless	  femininity	  in	  the	  family,	  and	  could	  further	  perpetuate	  and	  
cement	   the	   heteronormative	   gender	   myths	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   masculinity	   and	  
femininity	  in	  law	  and	  in	  society.	  	  
Collier	  oversimplifies	  the	  complex	  realities	  of	  child	  abuse	  in	  the	  family	  by	  implicitly	  
equating	  it	  with	  fathers’	  violence	  against	  children.	  By	  doing	  so,	  he	  trivialises	  victims	  
of	   female	   violence	   in	   the	   family	   and	   also	   reinforces	   a	   heteronormative	   gender	  
stereotype	  and	  myth	  of	  violent	  men	  and	  harmless	  women	  in	  the	  family.	  Although	  he	  
is	  right	  to	  question	  the	  uncritical	  assumption	  of	  the	  safe	  family	  man	  and	  safe	  father	  
images	  in	  family	  law	  and	  family	  policies,	  he	  fails	  to	  question	  the	  ideologies	  of	  safe,	  
caring	   and	   harmless	   women	   and	   mothering	   in	   the	   family.	   He	   uncritically	   implies	  
harmless	   and	   caring	   maternal	   roles	   in	   his	   theory	   of	   family	   law.	   However,	   as	   I	  
elaborate,	   this	   kind	   of	   assumption	   fails	   to	   address	   the	   complex	   realities	   of	  
mothering	  and	  mother-­‐child	  relationships.	  Fathers	  and	  mothers	  in	  many	  families	  are	  
the	   greatest	   sources	   of	   love	   and	   safety;	   however,	   in	   some	   families,	   fathers	   and	  
mothers	  can	  be	  sources	  of	  oppression	  and	  abuse.	  By	  not	  denying	  the	  contributions	  
of	  many	   devoted	   and	   caring	   fathers	   and	  mothers,	  we	  must	   not	   assume	   also	   that	  
fathering	  or	  mothering	  are	  always	  harmless	   and	   caring.	  Queer	  humanist	  men	  and	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masculinities	   studies	   oppose	   the	   oversimplified	   approach	   on	   either	   fathering	   or	  
mothering	   in	   family	   jurisprudence.	  Queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  
also	   argue	   for	   recognising	   and	   addressing	   the	   complex	   roots	   and	   forms	   of	   child	  
abuse	   in	   the	   family.	   Experiences	   and	   needs	   of	   victims	   of	   either	   male	   or	   female	  
perpetrators	  should	  not	  be	  marginalised	  or	  ignored.	  	  
However,	  Collier	  does	  imply	  some	  adjustments	  in	  his	  later	  works	  by	  appealing	  for	  a	  
relatively	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  legal	  studies	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities.265	  This	  
is	   a	   welcome	   change	   and	   revision,	   but	   it	   is	   questionable	   whether	   he	   can	  
fundamentally	  avoid	  the	  limitations	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies	  if	  he	  keeps	  
adopting	  and	  assuming	  a	  monolithic,	  subordination	  feminist	  model	  of	  social	  power,	  
gender	  oppression	  and	  gender	  power.266	  Also,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  far	  he	  is	  willing	  to	  
use	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  understand	  and	  to	  explore	  issues	  of	  power,	  gender	  
oppression	  and	  the	  family.	  	  	  	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   critically	   evaluated	   the	   pros	   and	   cons	   of	   early	   lesbian	  
feminism,	   gay	   liberation	   theory,	   contemporary	   subordination	   feminism,	   and	  
subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   and	   their	   approaches	   to	   issues	   of	  
normative	  heterosexuality	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   Lesbian	   feminism	  and	   gay	   liberation	  
theory	  points	  out	  that	  heterosexuality	  is	  not	  just	  personal	  sexual	  expression	  but	  also	  
an	   institution	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   injustices.	   	   They	   also	   highlight	   how	  women	  
and	  gay	  people	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  heterosexuality.	  
One	  of	  the	  major	  problems	  in	  their	  theory	  of	  sexual	  justice	  is	  their	  general	  reduction	  
of	   gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   injustices	   to	   just	   the	   oppression	   of	   women.	  
Similarly,	  although	  contemporary	  subordination	   feminist	  approaches	  contribute	  by	  
highlighting	  some	  structural	  injustices	  towards	  women,	  their	  approach	  nevertheless	  
tends	   to	   produce,	   reproduce,	   perpetuate	   and	   cement	   some	   problematic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  Richard	  Collier,	  ‘Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  and	  the	  Subject(s)	  of	  Men:	  Questions	  of	  Text,	  Terrain	  and	  
Context	  in	  the	  Politics	  of	  Family	  Law	  and	  Gender’,	   in	  Diduck,	  Alison,	  and	  Katherine	  O'Donovan,	  eds.	  
Feminist	   Perspectives	   on	   Family	   Law	   (London:	   Routledge,	   2007),	   235-­‐258;	   Collier,	  Men,	   Law	   and	  
Gender:	  Essays	  on	  the	  ‘Man’	  of	  Law,	  n	  229	  above.	  
266	  Collier,	  ‘Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  and	  the	  Subject(s)	  of	  Men:	  Questions	  of	  Text,	  Terrain	  and	  Context	  
in	  the	  Politics	  of	  Family	  Law	  and	  Gender’,	  n	  265	  above,	  248-­‐251.	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heteronormative	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  discrimination	  and	  prejudices.	  Some	  forms	  of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  injustices	  could	  be	  too	  easily	  marginalised	  and	  trivialised	  under	  
this	   heterosexual-­‐women	   centred	   perspective.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   critically	  
evaluate	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   and	   queer	   theory.	   They	   provide	   two	   different	  
valuable	   perspectives	   on	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   other	   than	   this	  
mainstream	   subordination	   feminist	   approach.	   The	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	  
these	  two	  approaches	  will	  be	  critically	  elaborated.	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Chapter	  4   Humanist	  Men	  and	  Masculinities	  Studies	  and	  Queer	  
Theory	  on	  Sexual	  Justice,	  Sexual	  politics,	  Gender	  
Oppression	  and	  Heteronormativity	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   I	   critically	   evaluated	   how	   issues	   of	   sexual	   justice,	   gender	  
oppression	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality	  are	  addressed	  in	  lesbian	  feminisms,	  early	  
gay	  liberationist	  studies,	  contemporary	  subordination	  feminisms	  and	  subordination-­‐
feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   critically	   examine	   these	  
issues	   through	   a	   lens	   derived	   from	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   and	  
queer	  theories.	  I	  argue	  that	  both	  schools	  can	  provide	  valuable	  insights	  on	  issues	  of	  
sexual	   justice,	   gender	   oppression	   and	   heteronormativity.	   Both	   schools	   are	  
important	   theoretical	   sources	   that	   I	   draw	   upon.	   However,	   limitations	   and	  
insufficiencies	  of	  these	  theories	  will	  also	  be	  discussed.	  I	  suggest	  that	  both	  humanist	  
men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	   and	   queer	   theories	   can	   benefit	   from	   incorporating	  
insights	  from	  each	  other.	  	  
4.1   The	  emergence	  and	  implications	  of	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  
studies	  
Recently	  a	  more	  balanced	  strand	  of	  studies	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  has	  emerged.	  
Because	  this	  type	  of	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  are	  premised	  on,	  and	  driven	  by,	  
humanist	  concerns	  of	  reducing	  human	  suffering	  and	  promoting	  overall	  wellbeing	  for	  
both	  men	  and	  women,1	  I	  label	  this	  approach	  to	  men’s	  studies	  as	  ‘humanist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	   studies.’2	  This	   type	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   men’s	   liberationist	   studies	  
and	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  with	  respect	  to	  rejecting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Humanism	  in	  ethics,	  law	  and	  politics	  are	  theories	  and	  projects	  that	  aim	  to	  reduce	  human	  suffering	  
and	  to	  enhance	  human	  well-­‐being.	  They	  generally	  emphasise	  the	  values	  of	  human	  dignity,	  freedom,	  
equality,	   compassion,	   respect	   and	   empathy.	   See	   Ken	   Plummer,	   ‘Critical	   Humanism	   and	   Queer	  
Theory:	   Living	   with	   the	   Tensions’,	   in	   Denzin,	   Norman	   K.,	   and	   Lincoln,	   Yvonna	   S.	   eds.,	   The	   Sage	  
Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research	  (Thousand	  Oaks:	  Sage,	  2011),	  198.	  
2	  For	  example,	  see	  Pasi	  Malmi,	  Discrimination	  Against	  Men:	  Appearance	  and	  Causes	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  
a	  Modern	  Welfare	  State	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  Lapland,	  2009).	  In	  public	  international	  law	  areas,	  
see	   Sandesh	   Sivakumaran,	   ‘Lost	   in	   Translation:	  UN	  Responses	   to	   Sexual	   Violence	   against	  Men	   and	  
Boys	  in	  Situations	  of	  Armed	  Conflict’,	  International	  Review	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  92,	  no.	  877	  (2010),	  259-­‐
277;	   R.	   Charli	   Carpenter,	   ‘Recognizing	   Gender-­‐Based	   Violence	   Against	   Civilian	   Men	   and	   Boys	   in	  
Conflict	  Situations’,	  Security	  Dialogue	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2006),	  83-­‐103.	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conservative	   men’s	   studies’	   traditionalist	   articulation	   of	   gender.	   However,	   unlike	  
men’s	   liberationist	   studies,	   they	   do	   not	   rely	   on	   the	   limited	   sex	   roles	   theory	   to	  
understand	   and	   to	   elaborate	   upon	   gender	   injustices.	   Also,	   unlike	   subordination-­‐
feminist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies,	   they	   are	   not	   bound	   by	   subordination-­‐
feminism’s	  overarching	  and	  one-­‐dimensional	   ideologies	  of	   the	  power	  relationships	  
of	  gender.	  Therefore,	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  are	  more	  capable	  of	  
seeing,	   not	   only	   gender	   oppression	   and	   injustices	   towards	   women,	   but	   also	  
systematic	   gender	   oppression	   and	   systematic	   injustices	   towards	   men.	   Finnish	  
scholar	   Pasi	   Malmi’s	   systematic	   and	   critical	   investigation	   into	   the	   causes	   and	  
patterns	  of	  discrimination	  against	  men	  in	  modern	  welfare	  states	  is,	  for	  me,	  a	  classic	  
example	   of	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.3	  	   Other	   important	   works	  
include,	   for	  example,	  some	  public	   international	   lawyers’	  critiques	  of	   the	   ignorance	  
and	   trivialisation	  of	   gender	   violence	  against	  men	   in	  mainstream	   international	   law,	  
politics,	  jurisprudence	  and	  legal	  practice.4	  
Malmi	   aims	   to	   explore	   and	   analyse	   the	   forms,	   the	   causes,	   the	   effects	   and	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   men	   in	   modern	   welfare	   states.	   His	  
empirical	  study	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  modern	  Finnish	  society.	  He	  criticises	  
the	   approaches	   of	   both	   conservative	   and	   subordination-­‐feminist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies.	   He	   criticises	   the	   former	   approach	   for	   its	   insistence	   on	   and	  
naturalisation	   of	   some	   binary	   gender	   orders	   and	   arrangements.	   He	   is	   unsatisfied	  
with	   the	   latter	   approach	   for	   its	   reluctance	   to	   question	   problematic	   female	  
behaviours	   or	   feminist	   ideologies. 5 	  	   He	   identifies	   with	   postmodern	   feminist	  
scholarship	   and	   suggests	   that	   his	   project	   of	   unravelling	   gender	   discrimination	  
against	  men	  is	  consistent	  with	  postmodern	  feminism	  by	  exploring	  the	  construction	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	  Malmi	  defines	  modern	  welfare	  states	  as	  ‘industrialized	  countries	  which	  use	  transfer	  payments	  and	  
public	  policy	  for	  securing	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  citizens,	  and	  which	  are	  characterised	  by	  public	  policies	  
towards	   the	   advancement	   of	   women’s	   status,	   women’s	   high	   level	   of	   participation	   on	   the	   labour	  
market,	  high	  level	  of	  female	  representation	  in	  parliament,	  and	  the	  low	  significance	  of	  marriage	  as	  a	  
factor	   that	  binds	  women	  to	  a	  male	  breadwinner.’	  He	  argues	   that	  his	  study	   is	  primarily	   relevant	   for	  
the	   Nordic	   countries.	   He	   contends	   that	   his	   study	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   other	   European	   and	   Anglo-­‐
American	   countries	   as	   well	   as	  many	   of	   them	   are	   approaching	   to	   reach	   the	  modern	  welfare	   state	  
status.	  See,	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above.	  35.	  	  
4	  	  Sivakumaran,	  n	  2	  above;	  Carpenter,	  n	  2	  above.	  	  
5	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  19-­‐20.	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of	   gender	   in	  modern	  welfare	   society.6	  Since	   currently	   there	  are	   very	   few	   research	  
projects,	   and	   actually	   almost	   no	   books	   that	   systematically	   study	   gender	  
discrimination	   against	   men	   within	   discrimination	   scholarship,	   he	   wants	   to	   fill	   the	  
academic	   gap	   by	   exploring	   the	   dynamics,	   phenomena	   and	   causes	   of	   gender	  
discrimination	  against	  men	  in	  modern	  	  society.7	  	  
He	  argues	   that	   the	   roots	  of	  gender	  discrimination	  exist	  across	   three	   levels	  of	   self-­‐
replicating	  structures:	  the	  mental,	  the	  cultural	  and	  the	  socio-­‐structural.8	  He	  uses	  the	  
term	   ‘memes’	   and	   ‘memeplexes’	   to	   denote	   these	   self-­‐replicating	   structures	   and	  
patterns	   or	   sets	   of	   these	   interconnected	   systems. 9 	  Sexism	   and	   racism	   are	  
memeplexes	   that	   contain	   ‘mental	   attitudes,	   prejudices	   and	   stereotypes;	   cultural	  
memes	  such	  as	  texts,	  comic	  scripts,	  acts,	  and	  policies;	  and	  a	  social-­‐structural	  meme	  
that	  shows	  the	  disadvantaged	  status	  of	  the	  group	  this	   is	  being	  faced	  with	  racist(or	  
sexist)discrimination.’ 10 	  	   He	   identifies	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   roots	   of	   gender	  
discrimination,	   including	   cognitive	   and	   social	   psychological	   gender	   bias,11	  sexism	  
(against	   men	   or	   women), 12 	  some	   feminist	   and	   masculine	   ideologies 13 	  and	  
institutional	  gender	  bias.14	  	  
With	  regard	  to	  gender	  discrimination,	  he	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  several	  major	  causes	  
and	   forms	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   men	   in	   modern	   societies.	   First,	   he	  
contends	   that	   there	   are	   sexist	   gender	   stereotypes	   that	   contribute	   to	   gender	  
discrimination	   against	   men.	   He	   contends	   that	   in	   modern	   societies,	   there	   are	   not	  
only	   traditionalist	   sexist	   stereotypes	   against	   women,15	  but	   also	   against	   men.	   For	  
example,	  some	  scholars,	   institutions,	  and	  media	  may	  stereotypically	  depict	  men	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Ibid.,	  21.	  
7	  Ibid.,	  1.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  52-­‐53.	  
9	  Ibid.	  
10	  Ibid.,53.	  
11	  Ibid.,	  133-­‐140	  
12	  Ibid.,	  232-­‐235.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  143-­‐158	  
14	  Ibid.,	  158-­‐170;	  175-­‐187.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  114-­‐187.	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‘sex	   crazed’	   and	   the	   ‘aggressive	   and	   violent’	   gender.16	  He	   finds	   that	   lower	   status	  
men	  are	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  such	  sexist	  gender	  bias	  and	  he	  suggests	  that	  the	  
construction	  of	  such	  negative	  gender	  stereotypes	  of	  lower	  status	  and	  working	  class	  
men	   is	   possibly	   related	   to	   the	   joint	   interests	   of	   higher	   status	  men	   and	  women.17	  
‘While	  women	   had	   an	   interest	   in	   ending	   the	   discrimination	   of	   women,	   the	   alpha	  
males	  had	  the	  incentive	  to	  put	  down	  other	  men	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  themselves	  
from	  the	  unsophisticated	  mob	  of	  the	  beta	  males.’18	  	  
Some	  research	  echoes	  Malmi’s	  finding	  that	  some	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  or	  ruling	  class	  
men	  sometimes	  put	  down	  or	  stereotype	  lower	  status	  men	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  
superior	  power	  and	   reputation	  and	   to	  gain	   respect	  and	  support	   from	  women.	  For	  
example,	  empirical	  research	  on	  masculinity	  and	  heteronormativity	  in	  a	  Swedish	  fire	  
service,	  elite	  and	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  men	  (the	  executives)	  tended	  to	  view	  working	  
class	   firefighting	  men	   as	   lacking	   in	   ‘naturally	   good	  manners’	   towards	  women	   and	  
therefore	   as	   having	   ‘improper	   heterosexuality.’19	  These	   upper	   class	   executives	  
tended	  to	  ‘position	  themselves	  as	  respectable	  and	  good	  men,	  while	  (male	  working	  
class)	  firefighters	  are	  constructed	  as	  representing	  a	  bad	  and	  unhealthy	  masculinity,	  
which	   needs	   to	   be	   changed.’ 20 	  Here,	   upper-­‐middle	   class	   male	   executives	  
distinguished	   themselves	   from	   male	   working	   class	   firefighters	   by	   constructing	  
themselves	  as	  respectable	  ‘new	  men’	  eager	  to	  oppose	  sexism	  (against	  women),	  and	  
for	   gender	   equality,	   who	   understand	   and	   practice	   ‘good	   manners’	   in	   gender	  
relations.21	  However,	  Ericson	  argues,	  the	  upper-­‐middle	  class	  men’s	  respectable	  new	  
men	   ideologies	   are	   often	   still	   constructed	   under	   a	   heteronormative	   gender	  
narrative	  by	  assuming	  complementary,	  binary,	  different	  and	  naturalised	  gender	  for	  
men	  and	  for	  women.22	  	  These	  kinds	  of	  gender	  equality	  ideologies	  that	  these	  upper-­‐
middle	   class	   men	   hold	   might	   actually	   be	   an	   example	   of	   a	   renewed	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Ibid.,	  233.	  
17	  Ibid.,	  170-­‐171;	  233-­‐234.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  233-­‐234.	  
19	  Mathias	  Ericson,	  ‘Good	  Manners:	  Struggles	  for	  Respectable	  Masculinities	  and	  Heteronormativities	  
in	  the	  Swedish	  Fire	  Service’,	   in	  Lena	  Martinsson	  and	  Eva	  Reimers	  eds.,	  Norm-­‐struggles:	  Sexuality	   in	  
Contentions,	  (Newcastle:	  Cambridge	  Scholars	  Publishing,	  2010),	  111.	  
20	  Ibid.,	  111.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  111-­‐112.	  
22	  Ibid.,	  99-­‐105,	  111-­‐112.	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reconstructed	  set	  of	  heteronormative	  gender	  norms	  and	  arrangements	   in	  modern	  
society.	  	  	  
I	  agree	  with	  Malmi’s	  claim	  that	  sexism	  is	  not	  just	  about	  sexism	  against	  women.	  For	  
instance,	  in	  modern	  developed	  societies,	  sexist	  speeches	  against	  men,	  just	  as	  sexist	  
speeches	  against	  women,	  exist	   in	  everyday	   life	  and	  media.	  For	  example,	   there	  are	  
books	  targeting	  female	  readers	  with	  explicit	  sexist	  (against	  men)	  titles,	  such	  as	  ‘101	  
Reasons	  Why	  a	  Cat	  is	  Better	  than	  a	  Man?’23	  or	  ‘How	  to	  Make	  Your	  Man	  Behave	  in	  21	  
Days	  or	  Less:	  Using	  the	  Secrets	  of	  Professional	  Dog	  Training.’24	  In	  the	  UK	  a	  BBC	  Two	  
programme	  ‘Bring	  Your	  Husband	  to	  Heel’,	  ‘featured	  dog	  trainer	  Annie	  Clayton	  using	  
her	   techniques	   to	   teach	   women	   how	   to	   modify	   their	   husbands'	   behaviour.’25	  
Despite	  receiving	  complaints,	  Ofcom	  insisted	  the	  programme	  was	  not	  sexist	  but	  just	  
a	   ‘humorous	   take’,	   claimed	   that	   the	   ‘battle	   of	   the	   sexes	   has	   always	   been	   part	   of	  
British	  culture	  through	  literature	  and	  other	  media’26	  and	  this	  programme	  is	  just	  part	  
of	  this	  cultural	  tradition.	  Ofcom	  could	  be	  right	  in	  finding	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  sexist	  (or	  
‘humorous’)	   degrading	   of	   men	   is	   generally	   acceptable	   and	   tolerated	   in	   modern	  
British	  culture.	  However,	  as	  some	  complaints	  have	  argued,	   ‘a	  programme	  showing	  
women	   or	   minority	   groups	   treated	   in	   the	   same	   way	   would	   never	   have	   been	  
broadcast.’27	  	  The	  broadcasting	  of	  such	  a	  sexist	  programme	  from	  BBC2	  and	  the	  claim	  
from	  the	  Ofcom	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  programme	  is	  a	  part	  of	  normal	   ‘British	  culture’	   is	  
one	  example	  suggesting	  that	  sexism	  against	  men	  is	  not	  be	  taken	  seriously	  in	  modern	  
British	  society.	  	  	  	  
Malmi	  further	  argues	  that	  while	  the	  ideology	  of	  macho	  masculinity	  is	  often	  related	  
to	  the	  devaluation	  of	  femininity	  and	  women,	  in	  fact,	  the	  norms	  and	  expectations	  of	  
macho	  men	  and	  macho	  masculinity	  could	  also	  be	  harmful	  and	  oppressive	  to	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Allia	  Zobel-­‐Nolan,	  101	  Reasons	  Why	  a	  Cat	  is	  Better	  than	  a	  Man?	  (New	  York:	  Dell,	  1995)	  
24	  Karen	   Salmansohn,	   How	   to	   Make	   Your	   Man	   Behave	   in	   21	   Days	   or	   Less:	   Using	   the	   Secrets	   of	  
Professional	  Dog	  Training	  (New	  York:	  Workman,	  1994).	  
25	  BBC	  News,	  ‘BBC	  sorry	  for	  'sexist'	  programme’, 31	  August	  2005.	  (Accessed:	  11	  November	  2014).	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/tv_and_radio/4200442.stm	  	  
26	  BBC	  News,	   ‘Husband	   trainer	   show	   'not	   sexist’,	   21	  November	  2005,	   (Accessed:	  22	  August	  2014	   ).	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/4457416.stm	  	  
27	  Ibid.	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men.	  Indeed,	  ‘Macho	  masculinity	  combines	  the	  ideas	  of	  men	  as	  tough,	  competitive,	  
self-­‐assured,	   daring	   and	   capable	   of	   violence.’28	  Macho	  masculinity	   ideology	   is	   not	  
only	   one	   of	   the	   ideologies	   sustaining	   patriarchy,	   but	   also	   arguably	   a	   source	   of	  
gender	   oppression	   against	   some	  men.	   For	   example,	   under	   this	   kind	   of	   normative	  
masculinity,	  men	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  tough,	  successful,	  strong,	  invulnerable	  and	  in	  a	  
breadwinner	  role.	  Men	  who	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  expectations	  are	  often	  and	  easily	  
ridiculed,	  not	  just	  by	  other	  men,	  but	  by	  some	  women.29	  	  
I	   think	  Malmi	   is	   right	   to	  point	  out	   that	   the	  macho	  men	  expectations	   are	   still	   very	  
influential	   in	   societies	   and	   are	   related	   to	   some	   constraining	   gender	   norms.	   For	  
example,	   several	   qualitative	   studies	   explore	   the	   gender	   norms	   of	   the	   restrictive	  
expression	   and	   disclosure	   of	   fear	   and	   vulnerability	   in	   society.30	  They	   find	   that	  
compared	   to	   women,	   men	   are	   socially	   discouraged	   to	   express,	   disclose,	   and	  
acknowledge	  their	  emotion	  of	  fear.31	  In	  violence	  cases,	  male	  victims	  of	  physical	  and	  
sexual	   abuse	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   reluctant	   to	   disclose	   or	   speak	   of	   their	   fear	   and	  
vulnerability.32	  The	   findings	   are	   important	   for	   us	   to	   better	   understand	   various	  
experiences	   and	  practices	  of	  men	  and	   the	   impact	  of	   normative	  masculinities	  over	  
men’s	   lives.	   	   From	   the	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	  
studies,	   we	   might	   need	   to	   challenge	   the	   often	   unproblematic	   acceptance	   of	   the	  
general	   ‘not	   fearful’	   stereotypes	   of	   male	   victims	   in	   criminology	   and	   in	   the	  
jurisprudence	  of	  family	  violence.33	  	  
	  Malmi	  also	  identifies	  chivalrous	  ideologies	  in	  modern	  Western	  societies	  as	  another	  
major	   source	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   men.	   The	   chivalrous	   idea	   of	   men	  
originated	  from	  the	  European	  knights’	  culture;	  women	  as	  vulnerable	  and	  dependent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  235.	  
29	  Ibid.,	  236.	  
30	  For	   example	   see	   Stephen	   M.	   Glomb,	   and	   Dorothy	   L.	   Espelage,	   ‘The	   Influence	   of	   Restrictive	  
Emotionality	   in	   Men's	   Emotional	   Appraisal	   of	   Sexual	   Harassment:	   A	   Gender	   Role	   Interpretation’,	  
Psychology	  of	  Men	  &	  Masculinity	   6,	   no.	  4	   (2005),	   240-­‐253;	   Elizabeth	  A.	   Stanko	  and	  Kathy	  Hobdell,	  
‘Assault	  on	  Men:	  Masculinity	  and	  Male	  Victimization’,	  British	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  33,	  no.	  3	  (1993),	  
400-­‐415;	   	  Maria	   Tempenis	   Shelley,	   Taking	   It	   Like	   A	  Man:	   A	   Study	   of	  Men’s	   Emotion	   Culture	   (PhD	  
Thesis,	  Vanderbilt	  University,	  2007).	  
31	  Shelley,	  ibid.,	  109-­‐115,	  136-­‐142.	  
32	  For	  example,	  see	  Glomb	  and	  Espelage,	  n	  30	  above,	  241,	  249-­‐251;	  Stanko	  and	  Hobdell,	  ibid.	  
33	  For	  example	  see	  Michael	  Freeman,	  Domestic	  Violence	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2008),	  xvii..	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on	   the	   protection	   from	   courageous	   and	   respectable	   gentlemen.	   These	   ideologies	  
emphasise	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  ‘courting	  the	  women’	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  being	  
a	  gentleman.	  	  In	  modern	  Western	  societies	  the	  chivalry	  culture	  remains	  influential	  in	  
many	  people’s	   everyday	   gendered	   lives.	   For	   example,	   ‘men	   are	   expected	   to	   open	  
doors	   for	   women,	   give	   women	   their	   seat,	   pay	   for	   dates,	   and	   sacrifice	   their	   own	  
comfort	   and	   safety	   for	   women.’34	  Chivalrous	   culture	   endorses	   the	   beliefs	   such	   as	  
‘men	  must	  protect	  women’s	  health	   and	   life	   (and	  prioritize	   them	  over	   their	   own),’	  
‘men	   must	   behave	   like	   gentlemen,’	   and	   ‘men	   must	   protect	   women	   from	   the	  
inconveniencies	   of	   life	   (and	   prioritize	   women).’	   He	   contends	   that	   chivalry	   culture	  
and	  beliefs	  are	  at	  the	  root	  of	  some	  institutional	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  men	  
because	   these	   chivalrous	   beliefs	   and	   ideologies	   are	   likely	   ‘to	   aggregate	   into	  
institutionalised	   belief	   systems,	   in	   which	  men’s	   lives	   are	   considered	   less	   valuable	  
than	  female	  lives,	  and	  men’s	  health	  and	  comfort	  are	  considered	  less	  important	  than	  
female	  health	  and	  comfort.’35	  He	  argues	  that	  conscription,	  the	  compulsory	  military	  
service	  (or	  civil	  service)	  of	  men,	  represents	  an	  institutionalised	  chivalry	  culture	  and	  
code	  (the	  belief	  of	  natural	  defense	  as	  every	  man’s	  duty)	  in	  many	  modern	  European	  
societies,	  such	  as	  Finland,	  Sweden	  and	  Germany.36	  
I	  agree	  with	  him	  that	  compulsory	  civil	  or	  military	  service	  of	  young	  men	  is	  an	  example	  
of	  the	  influence	  of	  chivalrous	  ideologies	  of	  masculinity	  in	  many	  modern	  societies.	  I	  
am	  in	  accordance	  with	  him	  that	  compulsory	  civil	  and	  military	  service	  for	  young	  men	  
is	  a	  gender	  justice	  issue.	  Not	  only	  is	  compulsory	  military	  service	  imposed	  on	  young	  
men	  in	  some	  European	  countries,	  but	  also	  in	  many	  Asian	  countries	  such	  as	  Taiwan	  
and	  South	  Korea.	  These	  countries	  still	  require	  all	  young	  adult	  men,	  but	  no	  women,	  
to	  serve	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  compulsory	  service.	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ECJ)	  
does	  not	  treat	  the	  compulsory	  military	  service	  of	  men	  as	  incompatible	  with	  the	  EU	  
treaty	   and	   directives.	   The	   ECJ	   declares	   that	   the	   unequal	   treatment	   of	   men	   and	  
women	   of	   conscription	   can	   be	   justified	   under	   the	   needs	   and	   considerations	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  237-­‐238.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  238.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  238-­‐239.	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national	  security.37	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Alexander	  Dory	  v	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland,	  the	  
German	  Government	  justified	  its	  policy	  of	  compulsory	  military	  service	  of	  young	  men	  
by	  resorting	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  national	  security.	  The	  German	  government	  claims	  that	  
compulsory	   military	   service	   of	   young	   men	   is	   important	   for	   ‘the	   democratic	  
transparency	  of	  the	  military,	  national	  integration,	  the	  link	  between	  the	  armed	  forces	  
and	   the	  population,	   and	   the	  mobilisation	  of	   the	  manpower	  needed	  by	   the	   armed	  
forces	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   conflict.’38	  In	   Taiwan	   the	   constitutional	   court	   holds	   that	  
compulsory	  military	  service	  of	  men	   is	  not	   in	  violation	  of	   the	  equality	  clause	   in	   the	  
Taiwanese	  Constitutional	  Code	  due	  to	  ‘the	  physical	  differences	  between	  males	  and	  
females	  and	  the	  derived	  role	  differentiation	  in	  their	  respective	  social	  functions	  and	  
lives.’39	  The	  above	  decisions	  and	  the	  German	  government’s	  justification	  assume	  and	  
naturalise	   certain	   chivalrous	   and	   stereotyped	   gender	   roles,	   expectations	   and	   the	  
construction	   of	   men	   and	   masculinity.	   Men	   and	   masculinity	   are	   institutionalised,	  
imposed	   and	   constructed	   by	   law	   as	   the	   gender	   more	   suited	   for	   war,	   violence,	  
combat	   and	   sacrifice.	   Some	   restricting	   gender	   norms	   for	   men	   are	   produced	   and	  
institutionalised	  under	  the	  state	  policy	  of	  compulsory	  civil	  and	  military	  service	  	  
Malmi	  also	  holds	  that	  maternal	  preferences	  and	  maternalism	  are	  causes	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   against	   men,	   especially	   in	   care,	   parenting	   and	   child	   related	   areas.	  
Maternalism	  is	  ‘the	  belief	  in	  the	  superiority	  of	  women	  in	  childcare	  and	  the	  belief	  in	  
the	   superior	   importance	  of	  mothers	   to	   children.’40	  Maternalism	   is	   a	   view	  held	  not	  
only	  by	  some	  conservative	  traditionalists,41	  but	  also	  by	  some	  feminists,	  for	  example,	  
cultural	   and	   care	   ethics	   feminists.42	  Maternalism	   is	   institutionalised	   implicitly	   or	  
explicitly	   in	   various	   formal	   institutions.	   For	   example,	   in	   social	   services	   systems,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  See	  Alexander	  Dory	  v	  Bundesrepublik	  Deutschland,	  Case	  C-­‐186-­‐01.	  
38	  Ibid.,	  para.	  37.	  
39	  See	  Interpretation	  no.	  490,	  Justice	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court,	  Judicial	  Yuan,	  R.O.C.	  
40	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  240.	  
41	  For	  example,	  modern	  new	  natural	   law	   theologian	  Germain	  Grisez	  holds	  a	   traditionalist	  maternal	  
preference	  view	  in	  gender	  and	  caring.	  He	  argues	  that	  women	  are	  more	  suited	  to	  the	  nurturing	  and	  
caring	   role	   than	  men.	   Bamforth	   and	  Richards	   criticize	  Grisez’s	   traditionalist	   ideology	   of	   family	   and	  
gender.	  See	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  and	  David	  A.	  J.	  Richards,	  Patriarchal	  Religion,	  Sexuality,	  And	  Gender:	  
A	  Critique	  of	  New	  Natural	  Law	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  232-­‐236.	  	  
42	  Janet	  Halley,	   Spilt	   Decisions:	  How	  and	  Why	   to	   Take	   a	   Break	   from	   Feminism?	   (Oxford:	   Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  2006),	  58-­‐60;	  Sara	  Ruddick,	  Maternal	  Thinking:	  Toward	  a	  Politics	  of	  Peace	  (London:	  
The	  Women’s	  Press,	  1990).	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social	  workers	  often	  focus	  on	  the	  services	  for	  mothers	  and	  ignore	  fathers.43	  Malmi	  
argues	   that	   maternalist	   ideologies	   constrain	   both	   men	   and	   women,	   but	   point	   in	  
different	  directions.	  Men	  are	  stereotyped	  as	  less	  capable	  or	  suitable	  for	  caring	  jobs.	  
Women	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   are	   regarded	   as	   naturally	   more	   suited	   for	   caring	   for	  
children.44	  	  As	  I	  elaborate	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  maternal	  preference	  assumptions	  and	  beliefs	  
do	  exist	  and	  have	  substantial	   influence	   in	   law	  and	  social	  services,	  especially	   in	   the	  
areas	   of	   family	   law	   and	   family	   policies.45	  Gender	   discrimination	   and	   stereotypes	  
sustained	  by	  maternalist	  ideologies	  need	  to	  be	  critically	  examined	  and	  challenged	  as	  
they	   contribute	   to	   the	   perpetuation	   of	   some	   oppressive	   heteronormative	  
arrangements	  and	  order	  in	  family	  life.	  	  
He	  also	  notices	   some	   (subordination)	   feminist	   ideologies	   such	  as	   the	   insistence	  of	  
women	  as	  the	  oppressed	  group	  by	  men	  and	  the	  insistence	  of	  focusing	  on	  women’s	  
needs	   in	   equality	   policy	   are	   also	   possible	   causes	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	  
men.46	  	  
I	   contend	   that	   Malmi’s	   project	   overall	   is	   very	   insightful.	   His	   project	   contributes	  
significantly	  to	  a	  systematic	  analysis,	  explanation	  and	  description	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  
forms	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   men.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	   some	  
limitations	  and	  insufficiencies;	  for	  example,	  he	  does	  not	  elaborate	  normatively	  why	  
both	   conservative	   and	   some	   subordination	   feminist	   approaches	   to	   gender	  
discrimination	   are	   unjust	   and	   oppressive.	   His	   project	   is	   generally	   a	   descriptive	  
analysis	  of	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  men.	  He	  does	  a	  great	   job	   in	   this	   respect;	  
however,	   I	   argue	   that	   in	   addition	   to	  descriptive	   research	  of	   gender	  discrimination	  
against	  men,	  we	   also	   need	   to	   explore	   and	   think	   about	   the	   normative	   and	   ethical	  
questions	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   men.	   My	   thesis	   aims	   to	   not	   just	  
‘describe’	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  but	  also	  to	  deliberate	  upon	  the	  normative	  
and	  critical	  dimensions	  of	  this	  topic.	  Another	  major	   limitation	   in	  his	  project	   is	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  241-­‐242.	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  242-­‐243.	  
45	  See	  3.3	  and	  3.7	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
46	  Malmi,	  n	  2	  above,	  247-­‐274.	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he	   does	   not	   address	   or	   elaborate	   upon	   the	   relation	   between	   normative	  
heterosexuality	  and	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  men.	  He	  also	  does	  not	  consider	  
how	   sexuality	   intersects	   with	   gender	   in	   sexual	   injustices	   towards	  men,	   especially	  
towards	   sexual	   minorities	   such	   as	   gay	   men.	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   avoid	  
heterosexist	  assumptions	   in	  thinking	  about	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  men	  and	  
rather	  consider	  the	  intersection	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality.	  Furthermore,	  he	  has	  only	  a	  
limited	   examination	   on	   the	   impacts	   of	   feminist	   projects	   on	   gender	   justice	   and	   he	  
focuses	   on	   examining	   sexual-­‐subordination	   feminist	   and	   maternalist	   feminist	  
ideologies.	   	   My	   critical	   evaluation	   of	   subordination	   feminism	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   not	  
limited	  to	  critiques	  of	  sexual-­‐subordination	  feminism	  and	  material	  feminism.	  	  
Overall,	   I	   find	   the	  perspectives	  of	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	   such	  as	  
Malmi’s	  and	  some	  international	  lawyers’47	  very	  inspiring	  and	  useful.	  I	  draw	  on	  their	  
insights	   in	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  there	  are	  two	  major	   limitations	  and	  insufficiencies	  
in	  their	  approach.	  First,	  currently	  the	  relevant	  research	  in	  this	  area	  is	  concentrated	  
on	  empirical	  research	  or	  case	  studies.	  What	  is	  lacking	  is	  a	  normative	  inquiry	  into	  and	  
a	   theoretical	   justification	   of	  why	  we	  need	   to	   eliminate	   gender	   oppression	   against	  
men	  and	  why	   sexual	   justice	  projects	  need	   to	   take	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  
seriously.	   For	   example,	   although	  Malmi	   describes	   and	   elaborates	   the	   causes	   and	  
appearance	  of	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  men	  in	  detail,	  he	  does	  not	  address	  and	  
answer	   the	   normative	   question	   of	   what	   we	   ought	   to	   do	   with	   gender	   oppression	  
against	  men.	  Is	  it	  morally	  wrong	  and	  unjustifiable?	  If	  so,	  why	  is	  it	  wrong	  and	  how	  do	  
we	  address	  it?	  	  His	  survey	  of	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men,	  as	  he	  claims,	  is	  mainly	  
a	   descriptive	   project.	   So	   the	   normative	   aspects	   and	   inquiries	   are	   generally	   not	  
covered,	   asked	   or	   addressed.	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   think	   about	   normative	  
justification	  and	  normative	  questions	  in	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	  projects.	  	  
Secondly,	   current	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   research	   tends	   to	   implicitly	  
assume	   hetero-­‐central	   experiences	   in	   their	   analyses.	   These	   projects	   also	   tend	   to	  
treat	   sex,	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   identities	   as	   relatively	   fixed,	   unproblematic,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See	  Sivakumaran,	  n	  2	  above;	  Carpenter,	  n	  2	  above.	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unchanging	   and	   natural.	   I	   argue	   that	   a	   more	   diverse	   understanding	   of	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  is	  needed	  in	  humanist	  men’s	  studies.	  
Despite	   the	   limitations,	   there	   are	   great	   contributions	   from	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   approaches	   on	   sexual	   justice	   and	   normative	   heterosexuality.	   They	  
have	  begun	  to	  address	  one	  of	  the	  often	  marginalised	  and	  ignored	  aspects	  in	  sexual	  
justice	   and	   gender	   equality	   scholarship:	   the	   gender	   injustices	   towards	   men	   and	  
gender	  discrimination	  against	  men.	  I	  argue	  that	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  do	  
exist,	  ought	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  more	  seriously.	  I	  further	  contend	  
that	  unless	  we	  are	  willing	   to	  acknowledge	  and	  address	   gender	  oppression	  against	  
men,	   we	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   successfully	   unsettle	   the	   systems	   and	   regimes	   of	  
normative	  heterosexuality.	  I	  argue	  for	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  approaches	  of	  queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   that	   draw	   upon	   queer	   theory,	   liberal	  
theories	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  in	  analysing	  
sexual	  justice,	  gender	  oppression	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  	  
4.2   	  Queer	  approaches	  to	  heteronormativity,	  law,	  sexual	  justice,	  and	  sexual	  
politics:	  	  
One	   of	   the	   central	   themes	   in	   queer	   theory	   is	   a	   critical	   reflection	   on	  
heteronormativity.48	  In	   this	   section	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   insights	   from	   queer	   critiques	  
and	  queer	  thinking	  are	  very	  important	  and	  valuable	  to	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  
sexual	   justice.	   However,	   there	   are	   also	   some	   points	   regarding	   queer	   critiques	   of	  
heteronormativity	  worth	  further	  reflection.	  	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  main	  points.	  The	  first	  is	  
about	   the	   relative	   lack	  of	   clarification	  and	  elaboration	  by	   some	  queer	   theorists	  of	  
the	   normative	   dimension	   and	   normative	   grounds	   of	   their	   queer	   projects.49	  The	  
other	  is	  that	  some	  queer	  theories	  either	  generally	  focus	  on	  sexuality	  issues	  in	  their	  
projects	   so	   have	   relatively	   less	   analysis	   on	   gender	   issues;50	  or	   they	   explicitly	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  For	   example,	   see	   Michael	   Warner,	   Fear	   of	   a	   Queer	   Planet:	   Queer	   Politics	   and	   Social	   Theory	  
(Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1993),	  xxi-­‐xxv;	  Judith	  Butler,	  Gender	  Trouble:	  Feminism	  
and	  the	  Subversion	  of	  Identity	  (Routledge:	  New	  York,	  1999).	  
49	  See	  my	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  Judith	  Butler’s	  and	  Janet	  Halley’s	  queer	  theories	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
50	  For	  example,	  see	  Michael	  Warner,	  The	  Trouble	  with	  Normal:	  Sex,	  Politics	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Queer	  
Life	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1999).	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implicitly	  adopt	  or	  assume	  problematic	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies	  in	  thinking	  
about	   gender.51	  In	   responding	   to	   the	   first	   issue,	   I	   suggest	   that	   we	   also	   need	  
reflection	   from	   theories	   of	   liberal	   sexual	   justice	   in	   our	   critiques	   of	  
heteronormativity.	   In	   response	  to	   the	  second	  question	   I	  argue	  that	  queer	  projects	  
could	   benefit	   from	   bringing	   some	   humanist	   men’s	   studies’	   concerns	   into	   queer	  
studies,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Ultimately	  in	  scholarship	  regarding	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  
justice,	  I	  value	  the	  benefits	  of	  incorporating	  the	  perspectives	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  
and	  masculinities	  studies	  that	  draw	  on	  the	  insights	  from	  queer	  theory,	  liberal	  sexual	  
justice	  theory	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  	  
4.2.1   Foucault,	  Moran,	  and	  queer	  approach:	  
I	  elaborate	  in	  Chapter	  1	  how	  I	  use	  a	  queer	  approach	  in	  this	  thesis.	  I	  maintain	  that	  a	  
queer	  approach	  is	  a	  major	  analytic	  tools	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  queer	  approach	  
is	  understood	  as	  a	  commitment	  to	  explore	  and	  to	  unravel	  the	  power	  relations,	  the	  
knowledge-­‐power	  nexus,	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
normativity.52	  	  I	  argue	  that	  queer	  thinking	  is	  significant	  for	  us	  to	  practice	  resistance	  
to	   sexual	   oppression	   and	   injustice.	   Too	   often	   do	   dominant	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
norms	   render	   some	   groups	   of	   people,	   some	   types	   of	   bodies,	   and	   some	   forms	   of	  
gender	   and	   sexuality	   performances	   unintelligible,	   illegible	   or	   unrecognisable.53	  A	  
queer	  approach	  and	  critical	   thinking	   is	  crucial	   in	  sexual	   justice	  projects	   to	  unsettle	  
these	   constraining	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms.	   It	   is	   an	   approach	   crucial	   for	   us	   to	  
learn	   and	   to	   practice	   the	   ‘techniques	  of	  management’	   to	   resist,	   to	   rework	   and	   to	  
unravel	   the	  hierarchies,	   exclusion	   and	  oppression	   in	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   areas.54	  
Queer	  theory	  is	  primarily	  understood	  and	  used	  in	  this	  thesis,	  not	  as	  a	  fixed	  identity	  
category,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  theoretical	  approach	  and	  commitment	  to	  critically	  reflect	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  For	  example,	  see	  Mimi	  Marinucci,	  Feminism	  Is	  Queer:	  The	  Intimate	  Connection	  Between	  Queer	  and	  
Feminist	  Theory	  (London:	  Zed	  Books,	  2011)	  83-­‐114.	  
52	  Judith	  Butler,	  ‘On	  Being	  Beside	  Oneself:	  On	  the	  Limits	  of	  Sexual	  Autonomy’,	  in	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  
ed.,	  Sex	  Rights:	  The	  Oxford	  Amnesty	  Lectures	  2002	  (Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  
60-­‐62.	  
53	  Judith	  Butler,	  Undoing	  Gender	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2004),	  4-­‐9,	  13-­‐14.	  
54	  Michel	  Foucault,	  ‘The	  Ethics	  of	  Concern	  for	  the	  Self	  as	  a	  Practice	  of	  Freedom’,	  in	  Paul	  Rabinow	  ed.,	  
Ethics,	  Subjectivity	  and	  Truth:	  The	  Essential	  Works	  of	  Michel	  Foucault	  1954-­‐1984	  (New	  York:	  The	  New	  
Press,	  1997),	  298.	  
147	  
	  
and	   re-­‐examine	   the	   often	   naturalised,	   assumed,	   and	   moralised	   social	   norms,	  
categories,	   ideologies,	  assumptions,	  arrangements	  and	  distinctions	  in	  sexuality	  and	  
gender.	  Queer	  thinking	  aims	  to	  trouble	  the	  coherence,	  naturalness	  and	  fixity	  of	  ‘the	  
heterosexual	  matrix’;55	  the	   assumed	   and	   imposed	   coherence	   of	   body,	   gender	   and	  
sexuality.	   	   Queer	   approaches	   thus	   aim	   to	   critically	   reflect	   on	   how	   normative	  
heterosexuality	   is	   produced,	   reproduced	   and	   reinforced	   in	   law,	   politics	   and	  
everyday	  social	   life.	   	  Queer	   theorists	  urge	  us	   to	  develop	   the	  necessary	  managerial	  
techniques	  to	  broaden	  our	  freedom	  and	  to	  mobilise	  resistance	  and	  to	  open	  up	  more	  
options	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.56	  	  
I	  also	  draw	  upon	  the	  insights	  from	  several	   important	  queer	  theorists	   in	  this	  thesis.	  
For	   example,	   I	   discuss	   Foucault’s	   idea	   of	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   sexuality,	   his	  
articulation	  of	  power	  relationships	  as	  productive,	  not	  just	  repressive,	  and	  his	  idea	  of	  
the	   possibility	   and	   need	   of	   our	   ‘practices	   of	   freedom.’57	  I	   explain	   that	   I	   draw	   on	  
queer	   legal	   theorist	   Leslie	   Moran’s	   insights	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   ‘the	   virtue	   of	  
openness’	   and	   ‘the	   ongoing	   importance	   of	   critical	   reflection’	  and	   the	   need	   to	   be	  
sensitive	  and	  attentive	  to	  small	  differences	  and	  contradictions	  in	  research	  regarding	  
sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice.58	  His	   reminder	   of	   the	   possible	   limitations	   of	   the	  
binary	  either/or	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  also	  very	  useful	  in	  analysing	  issues	  of	  safety	  and	  
justice	  in	  the	  family.59	  	  	  
Overall	   I	   draw	   on	   the	   Foucauldian	   concept	   of	   power	   relationships	   and	   the	   queer	  
approach	   to	   the	   ‘philosophy	   of	   freedom.’60	  Power	   relationships	   are	   everywhere,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Butler	   describes	   the	   heterosexual	   matrix	   as	   ‘[T]hat	   grid	   of	   cultural	   intelligibility	   through	   which	  
bodies,	   genders,	   and	   desires	   are	   naturalized…	   a	   hegemonic	   discursive/epistemic	  model	   of	   gender	  
intelligibility	   that	   assumes	   that	   for	   bodies	   to	   cohere	   and	  make	   sense	   there	   must	   be	   a	   stable	   sex	  
expressed	   through	   a	   stable	   gender	   (masculine	   expresses	  male,	   feminine	   expresses	   female)	   that	   is	  
oppositionally	   and	   hierarchically	   defined	   through	   the	   compulsory	   practice	   of	   heterosexuality.’	   See	  
Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  208.	  
56	  Foucault,	  n	  54	  above,	  282-­‐285,	  298.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  282-­‐285.	  
58	  Leslie,	  J.	  Moran,	  ‘What	  Kind	  of	  Field	  Is	  ‘Law,	  Gender	  and	  Sexuality’?	  	  Achievements,	  Concerns	  and	  
Possible	  Futures’,	  Feminist	  Legal	  Studies	  17,	  no.	  3	  (2009),	  310-­‐312.	  
59	  Leslie,	   J.	  Moran,	   ‘What's	  Home	  Got	   to	  Do	  with	   It-­‐Kinship,	  Space,	  and	   the	  Case	  of	  Family,	  Spouse	  
and	  Civil	  Partnership	  in	  the	  UK’,	  Yale	  JL	  &	  Feminism	  17	  (2005),	  267-­‐295.	  
60	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  67.	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inescapable,	   unstable	   and	   reversible,61	  power	   relationships	   can	   be	   repressive	   but	  
they	  can	  also	  be	  productive.62	  They	  have	  a	  disciplining	  and	  regulatory	  force	  but	  they	  
also	  coexist	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  resist,	  subvert	  and	  transform.	  There	  are	  constant	  
contestations,	   conflicts	   and	   struggles	   in	   power	   relationships.63	  For	   Foucault	   and	  
queer	   theorists	   such	  as	  Moran	  and	  Butler,	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   investigate	   the	  dynamics	  
and	   regulatory	   forces	   of	   power	   and	   discourses	   in	   order	   to	   ‘play	   these	   games	   of	  
power	  with	  as	  little	  domination	  as	  possible.’64	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  order	  to	  best	  resist	  
repressive	   aspects	   of	   power	   relations	   and	  open	  up	  possibilities	   and	   freedom,	   it	   is	  
crucial	  for	  us	  to	  highlight	  the	  ongoing	  importance	  of	  critical	  reflection	  in	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Therefore,	   popular	   and	   dominant	   cultural,	   social,	  
moral	   and	   institutional	   assumptions,	   boundaries,	   identities	   and	   ideologies	   are	   not	  
assumed	  as	  universal,	  normal,	  necessary,	  unproblematic,	  natural	  and	  fixed	  in	  queer	  
thinking.	   The	   power	   dynamics	   and	   struggles	   of	   diverse	   social	   forces	   and	   their	  
interaction	   with	   law	   ought	   to	   be	   constantly	   scrutinised	   and	   re-­‐examined.	   Only	  
through	  this	  kind	  of	  constant	  critical	  thinking	  and	  reflection	  can	  we	  rearticulate	  and	  
rework	   constraining	   and	   naturalised	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   norms.	   Also,	   only	   by	  
unravelling	   certain	   oppressive	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   norms	   can	   we	   open	   up	   new	  
possibilities	  and	  broaden	  our	  practices	  of	  freedom.	  	  
Foucault	  and	  Moran	   focus	   their	   research	  on	   investigating	   sexuality	  normativity.65	  I	  
argue,	  however,	  that	  many	  of	  their	  inspiring	  insights	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  research	  on	  
gender	  issues.	  Also,	  as	  I	  contend	  earlier,	  I	  agree	  with	  critical	  sexual	  theorists	  Steven	  
Seidman	   and	   Stevi	   Jackson’s	   opinion	   that	   we	   need	   to	   address	   both	   sexuality	  
normativity	   and	   gender	   normativity	   in	   the	   scholarship	   of	   sexual	   politics,	   sexual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Foucault,	  n	  54	  above,	  283,	  291-­‐292,	  298-­‐299.	  
62	  Amy	  Allen,	  ‘Feminist	  Perspectives	  on	  Power’,	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy.	  (Accessed:	  
15	  March,	  2015)	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/feminist-­‐power	  	  
63	  Ibid.	  
64	  Foucault,	  n	  54	  above,	  298.	  
65See	  Moran,	  n	  59	  above;	  Leslie	  J.	  Moran	  ,	  The	  Homosexual(ity)	  of	  Law,	   (London:	  Routledge,	  1996);	  
Leslie	  J.	  Moran	  	  and	  Beverley	  Skeggs,	  with	  Paul	  Tyrer,	  and	  Karen	  Corteen,	  Sexuality	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  
Violence	   and	   Safety,	   (London:	   Routledge,	   2004);	   Leslie	   J.	   Moran,	   ‘A	   Queer	   Case	   for	   Judicial	  
Diversity:Sexuality,	   Law	   and	   Judicial	   Studies’,	   in	   Noreen	   Giffney	   and	   Michael	   O’Rourke	   eds.,	   The	  
Ashgate	  Research	  Companion	  to	  Queer	  Theory	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  295-­‐310.	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justice	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality.66	  	  Therefore,	   I	  apply	   some	   inspiring	   insights	  
of	   Foucault	   and	   Moran	   to	   the	   investigation	   of	   gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	  
constraints,	   particularly	   those	   of	   men	   under	   the	   regimes	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  This	  is	  because	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  within	  the	  regimes	  
of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  is	  an	  area	  relatively	  less	  studied	  and	  underexplored	  in	  
queer	  theory	  and	  gay	  studies.	  I	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  academic	  gap	  in	  this	  thesis.	  I	  
argue,	  for	  example,	  Moran’s	  insights	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  either/or	  model	  is	  very	  
useful	  when	  analysing	  issues	  of	  family	  violence	  and	  gender.	  
4.2.2   Warner,	  sexual	  autonomy	  and	  queer	  theory	  
Queer	   theorist	   Michael	   Warner	   revisits	   and	   rearticulates	   feminist	   critiques	   of	  
heterosexuality	  and	  creates	  the	  term	  ‘heteronormativity’	   to	  refer	  to	  the	  privileged	  
and	  naturalised	  status	  of	  heterosexual	  culture	  in	  societies.67	  He	  reinterprets	  Wittig’s	  
concept	   and	   critiques	   of	   the	   ‘heterosexual	   contract’ 68 	  and	   uses	   the	   term	  
heteronormativity	   to	   denote	   the	   often	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   and	   moralised	  
heterosexual	   norms.	   He	   argues	   that	   ‘(h)et	   culture	   thinks	   of	   itself	   as	   the	   element	  
form	   of	   human	   association,	   as	   the	   very	   model	   of	   inter-­‐gender	   relations,	   as	   the	  
indivisible	  basis	  of	  all	  community,	  and	  as	  the	  means	  of	  reproduction	  without	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Some	   queer	   scholars	   prefer	   to	   use	   the	   concept	   heteronormativity	   more	   exclusively	   to	   refer	   to	  
sexuality	  normativity	   in	  erotic	  and	   intimate	   life.	  For	  example,	  see	  Sasha	  Roseneil,	   Isabel	  Crowhurst,	  
Tone	   Hellesund,	   Ana	   Cristina	   Santos,	   and	   Mariya	   Stoilova.	   ‘Changing	   Landscapes	   of	  
Heteronormativity:	   The	   Regulation	   and	   Normalization	   of	   Same-­‐sex	   Sexualities	   in	   Europe’,	   Social	  
Politics:	   International	   Studies	   in	   Gender,	   State	   &	   Society	   20,	   no.	   2	   (2013),	   165-­‐199.	   	   Some	   other	  
critical	  sexual	  theorists	  such	  as	  Steven	  Seidman,	  Stevi	  Jackson	  and	  Chrys	  Ingraham	  adopt	  a	  broader	  
definition	  and	  usage	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  or	  heteronormativity	  to	  include	  and	  
denote	  not	  only	   certain	   sexuality	   constraints	  but	  also	   certain	  gender	   constraints	   in	   the	   institutions	  
and	   culture	   of	   heterosexuality.	   See	   Steven	   Seidman,	   ‘Critique	   of	   Compulsory	   Heterosexuality’,	   in	  
Lena	   Martinsson	   and	   Eva	   Reimers	   eds.,Norm-­‐struggles:	   Sexuality	   in	   Contentions,	   (Newcastle:	  
Cambridge	   Scholars	   Publishing,	   2010).191-­‐231;	   Stevi	   Jackson,	   ‘Gender,	   Sexuality	   and	  
Heterosexuality:	  The	  Complexity	   (and	  Limits)	  of	  Heteronormativity’,	  Feminist	   theory	  7,	  no	  1	   (2006),	  
105-­‐121;	   Chrys	   Ingraham,	   ‘The	   Thinking	   Straight	   and	   Acting	   Bent:	   Heteronormativity	   and	  
Homosexuality’,	   in	   Davis	   et	   al,	   eds.,	   The	   Handbook	   of	   Gender	   and	  Women	   Studies	   (London:	   Sage,	  
2006),	  313-­‐318.	  I	  take	  the	  second	  approach	  in	  this	  thesis	  and	  argue	  that	  normative	  heterosexuality	  is	  
not	  just	  about	  sexuality	  constraints	  but	  also	  about	  gender	  restrictions.	  
67	  Michael	   Warner	   is	   among	   earliest	   queer	   theorists	   who	   begin	   to	   use	   and	   popularize	   the	   term	  
heteronormativity	  in	  their	  queer	  critiques	  of	  dominant	  heterosexual	  culture.	  See	  Warner,	  n	  48	  above,	  
xxi-­‐xxv.	  	  
68	  Monique	  Wittig,	  The	  Straight	  Mind	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1992),	  34.	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society	  won’t	   exist.’69	  Although	  Warner’s	   concept	   of	   heteronormativity	   is	   inspired	  
by	   lesbian	   feminist	   Wittig’s	   critiques	   of	   heterosexuality,	   they	   show	   a	   different	  
emphasis	  and	  focus	   in	  their	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Wittig	  focusses	  
on	   unravelling	   and	   challenging	   male	   domination	   over	   women	   in	   the	   system	   and	  
culture	   of	   heterosexuality.	  70As	   illustrated	   above,	   Wittig	   argues	   that	   women	   are	  
forced	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   oppressive	   heterosexual	   contract	   that	   privileges	   men	   in	  
normative	  heterosexual	   societies.	  Men	   in	   general	   are	   regarded	   as	   oppressors	   and	  
unjust	   beneficiaries	   in	   the	   regimes	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality.71	  Warner	   on	   the	  
other	   hand	   focuses	   more	   on	   questioning	   the	   exclusion	   and	   stigmatisation	   of	  
sexuality	   and	   gender	   minorities	   such	   as	   LGBT	   people	   in	   the	   culture	   of	  
heteronormativity.72	  	  
Warner	   and	  Wittig,	   however,	   do	   not	   explore	   and	   address	   how	   restrictive	   gender	  
norms	  might	  oppress	  and	  discriminate	  men	  (qua	  men)	  in	  the	  institutions	  and	  culture	  
of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  I	  argue	  that	  to	  be	  able	  to	  unsettle	  heteronormativity,	  
it	  is	  also	  crucial	  for	  us	  to	  see,	  investigate	  and	  address	  institutional	  and	  constraining	  
gender	   norms	   and	   gender	   oppression	   against	  men	  qua	  men	  within	   reflections	   on	  
sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.	  Sometimes	  gay	  men	  and	  straight	  men	  might	  both	  
suffer	   gender	   constraints	   of,	   and	   gender	   oppression	   against,	   men	   qua	   men	   in	  
heteronormative	  culture	  and	  institutions	  because	  of	  their	  maleness	  or	  male	  gender.	  
To	   illustrate	   an	   example,	   gay	   men	   and	   straight	   men	   are	   imposed	   upon	   and	   are	  
constrained	   by	   compulsory	   male	   civil	   and	   military	   services	   in	   many	   countries,	  
including	  many	  developed	  countries,	   such	  as	  Finland,	  Germany,	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  
Korea.	  Compulsory	  conscription	  is	   institutional	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  and	  
is	  produced	  and	  sustained	  under	  certain	  heteronormative	  gender	  expectations	  and	  
ideologies	   for	  all	  men.	  Men,	  no	  matter	  gay,	  bi,	   straight	  men	  or	  even	   trans	  people	  
who	  are	  categorised	  as	  biologically	  male,	  are	  all	   forced	  by	  many	  states	  to	  serve	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Warner,	  n	  48	  above.,	  xxi.	  
70	  Wittig,	  n	  68	  above,	  1-­‐8,	  40.	  
71	  Ibid.	  
72	  See	  Michael	  Warner,	  ibid.,	  vii-­‐xxxi;	  Warner,	  n	  50	  above;	  Michael	  Warner,	  ‘Beyond	  Gay	  Marriage’,	  in	  
Wendy	   Brown	   and	   Janet	   Halley	   eds.,	   Left	   Legalism/Left	   Critique,	   (Durham:	   Duke	   University	   Press,	  
2002),	  259-­‐289;	  	  	  	  Lauren	  Berlant	  and	  Michael	  Warner,	  ‘Sex	  in	  Public’,	  Critical	  inquiry	  24,	  no.2	  (1998),	  
547-­‐566.	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the	  military.	  And	   I	  argue	   that	   in	  order	   to	  be	  able	   to	  better	  unsettle	   the	  culture	  of	  
normative	   heterosexuality	   and	   understand	   more	   fully	   the	   oppression	   gay	   men	  
experience,	  we	  not	  only	  need	  to	  investigate	  the	  sexuality	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  
men	   as	   Warner	   does,	   but	   also	   to	   explore	   how	   gay	   men	   might	   be	   affected	   and	  
disadvantaged	  by	  structural	  gender	  injustices	  of	  men	  qua	  men.	  We	  need	  to	  address	  
the	   double	   discrimination	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   and	   their	   intersection	   in	   gay	  
men’s	  lives.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  rarely	  addressed	  in	  queer	  or	  gay	  studies.	  	  In	  this	  
thesis,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  significant	  issue	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  
One	  of	  the	  strengths	  in	  Warner’s	  queer	  project	  is	  that,	  together	  with	  Lauren	  Berlant,	  
they	   accurately	   summarise	   the	   central	   characteristics	   of	   heteronormative	   norms	  
and	   culture.	   They	   describe	   heteronormativity	   as	   ‘the	   institutions,	   structures	   of	  
understanding,	  and	  practical	  orientations	  that	  make	  heterosexuality	  seem	  not	  only	  
coherent—that	   is,	   organized	   as	   a	   sexuality—but	   also	   privileged.’73	  They	   state	   that	  
heteronormative	   culture	   operates	   in	   many	   ways	   in	   societies	   to	   privilege	  
heterosexual	   ways	   of	   life.	   Heteronormativity	   operates	   as	   an	   almost	   invisible	   but	  
taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  background,	  structure	  or	  set	  of	  principles	   in	  social	  and	  daily	   life;	  
presenting	  as	  the	  ‘natural’	  order	  in	  human	  life;	  the	  ‘ideal’	  or	  morally	  superior	  order	  
and	   arrangements.74	  Their	   queer	   theory	   projects	   thus	   aim	   to	   deconstruct	   the	  
disguised	   moral	   superiority,	   naturalness	   and	   unquestionableness	   of	  
heteronormative	   assumptions	   in	   everyday	   social	   life.	   Their	   analyses	   of	   the	   core	  
features	  of	  heteronormativity	  are	  very	  insightful	  and	  can	  be	  used	  as	  analytic	  tools	  to	  
unravel	   and	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   often	   invisible,	   naturalised	   and	   morally	   idealised	  
heteronormative	  norms	  and	  assumptions	  in	  sexual	  and	  gendered	  life.	  	  
One	   crucial	   point	   is	   that	   Warner	   explicitly	   argues	   for	   a	   queer	   politics	   and	   queer	  
ethics	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘sexual	   autonomy.’75	  He	   explicitly	   indicates	   that	   there	  
are	   normative	   values	   and	   concerns	   in	   his	   queer	   critique	   of	   heteronormativity.	  
However,	  he	  does	  not	  fully	  elucidate	  and	  clarify	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  normative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Berlant	  and	  Warner.	  Ibid.,	  548.	  
74	  Ibid.	  
75	  See	  Warner,	  n	  50	  above,	  1-­‐40.	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idea	   of	   sexual	   autonomy	   and	   the	   critical	   approach	   of	   queer	   theory.	   Nor	   does	   he	  
justify	   the	   normative	   idea	   of	   sexual	   autonomy	   in	   his	   queer	   theory.	   I	   argue	   that	  
Warner	   is	   right	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	  are	  normative	   concerns	  and	  values	   in	  queer	  
projects.	   He	   is	   also	   right	   to	   imply	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   sexual	   autonomy	   could	   be	   an	  
important	  moral	   ground	   for	   queer	   challenges	   of	   heteronormativity	   and	   for	   sexual	  
politics.	   I	  argue	  that	   in	  this	  respect,	  queer	  theory	  could	  draw	  on	  liberal	  theories	  of	  
sexual	  justice	  such	  as	  that	  of	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  theory	  of	  Nicolas	  Bamforth	  and	  liberal	  
justice	  theory	  of	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  to	  elucidate	  the	  normative	  grounds	  and	  concerns	  
for	  queer	  sexual	  politics	  projects.76	  I	  will	  further	  discuss	  this	  point	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
4.2.3   Butler	  and	  queer	  feminism	  on	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	  sexual	  
politics	  
Judith	   Butler’s	   queer	   feminist	   theory	   provides	   one	   of	   the	   most	   sophisticated	  
problematisations	  of	  and	  challenges	  to	  the	  naturalness	  of	  heteronormativity.	  In	  this	  
section	  I	  critically	  evaluate	  her	  queer	  feminist	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  
and	  argue	  that	  her	  critiques	  such	  as	  gender	  (and	  sexuality)	  as	  performative	  are	  very	  
insightful.77	  I	   draw	   on	   her	   arguments	   in	   the	   theory	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies.	   However,	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	  
studies,	  I	  also	  point	  out	  two	  major	  weaknesses	  of	  her	  queer	  feminist	  project.	  
Butler	  contends	  that	  in	  society	  certain	  human	  bodies	  and	  certain	  sexual	  and	  gender	  
lives	   are	   rendered	   unrecognisable	   and	   illegitimate	   by	   dominant	   heteronormative	  
norms	   of	   body,	   gender	   and	   sexuality. 78 	  Butler	   uses	   the	   concept	   ‘gender	  
performativity’	   to	   ‘describe	   the	  way	   in	  which	  gender	   is	  produced	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  a	  
regulatory	   regime	   that	   requires	   the	   ritualised	   repetition	   of	   particular	   forms	   of	  
behaviour.’79	  She	   reminds	   us	   that	   gender	   (and	   sexuality)	   is	   performative,	   that	   is,	  
produced	  and	  sustained	  through	  the	  constant	  gender	  practices	  of	   the	  citation	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  See	   Nicolas	   Bamforth,	   Sexuality,	   Morals	   and	   Justice:	   A	   Theory	   of	   Lesbian	   and	   Gay	   Rights	   Law	  
(London,	   Washington	   D.C.:	   Cassell,	   1997);	   Ronald	   Dworkin,	   Justice	   for	   Hedgehogs	   (Cambridge:	  
Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2011).	  
77	  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  xv-­‐xvi,	  34,	  185-­‐193.	  
78	  Ibid.,	  xxiii-­‐xxv.	  
79	  See	   Tamsin	   Spargo,	   Foucault	   and	  Queer	   Theory	   (Cambridge:	   Icon	   books,	   1999),	   75;	   Butler,	   n	   48	  
above,	  xv.	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repetition	  of	  certain	  constructed	  and	  imaged	  gendered	  essence.80	  	  Her	  arguments	  of	  
gender	  performativity	  ‘show	  that	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  an	  internal	  essence	  of	  gender	  
is	   manufactured	   through	   a	   sustained	   set	   of	   acts,	   posited	   through	   the	   gendered	  
stylization	  of	   the	  body.’81	  Therefore,	  gender	   is	  not	   just	  about	  being	  but	  also	  about	  
doing.	  Gender	  is	  ‘something	  one	  is	  compelled	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  be	  constituted	  as	  a	  
recognizable	   human	   subject.	   Gender	   is	   a	   culturally	   sanctioned	   performance,	   a	  
requirement	   that	   a	   body	   coheres,	   and	   continues	   to	   cohere,	   according	   to	   certain	  
norms	  of	   intelligibility.’82	  In	  current	  societies	  normative	  genders	  (and	  sexuality)	  are	  
constructed	   according	   to	   the	   culture	   and	   ideologies	   of	   heteronormativity:	   or	   as	  
Butler	  terms,	  ‘the	  heterosexual	  matrix.’83	  	  
Heteronormative	   ideologies	   and	   culture	   stabilise,	   normalise	   and	   naturalise	   the	  
binary	   and	   complementary	   gender	   order	   and	   they	   presume	   the	   natural	   and	  
compulsory	   coherence	   of	   the	   sexed	   body,	   gender	   and	   desires.	   Some	  
heteronormative	   norms	   of	   the	   human	   body,	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   produce	   and	  
perpetuate,	   for	   example,	   the	   ideal	   dimorphism,	   the	   moralised	   and	   privileged	  
heterosexual	   sex	   and	   desires,	   and	   the	   ‘ideals	   and	   rules	   of	   proper	   and	   improper	  
masculinity	   and	   femininity’. 84 	  Some	   kinds	   of	   bodies,	   gender	   expressions	   and	  
sexuality	   performances	   are	   judged	   as	   unrecognisable,	   improper,	   unintelligent,	  
unreal	   or	   unworthy	   of	   respect	   in	   the	   regimes	   of	   heteronormativity	   and	   these	  
examples	   of	   exclusion,	   hierarchy	   and	   discrimination	   can	   be	   arbitrary	   and	  
oppressive.85	  She	  emphasises	   the	   significance	  of	   critical/queer	   thinking	   in	  order	   to	  
practice	   resistance	   to	   sexual	   oppression,	   to	   mobilise	   options	   and	   to	   open	   up	  
possibilities.86	  	   	  She	  argues	   for	   the	   importance	  of	  critical/queer	   thinking	   to	   trouble	  
the	   imaged	  and	  constructed	  coherence,	  naturalness	  and	  fixity	  of	   ‘the	  heterosexual	  
matrix’,	   the	   compulsory	   sexuality	   normativity	   and	   gender	   normativity	   imposed	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  xv.	  
81	  Ibid.	  
82	  Anita	  Brady,	  and	  Tony	  Schirato,	  Understanding	  Judith	  Butler	  (London:	  Sage,	  2011),	  44-­‐45.	  
83	  See	  n	  55	  above.	  
84	  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  xxiv-­‐xxv.	  
85	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  1-­‐9;	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  56-­‐57,	  64-­‐65.	  
86	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  74.	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heteronormativity. 87 	  For	   her,	   the	   queer	   projects	   of	   mobilising	   resistance	   and	  
opening	  up	  possibilities	  are	  projects	  of	  a	  ‘philosophy	  of	  freedom.’88	  	  
One	  of	  the	  important	  points	  I	  draw	  on	  from	  Butler’s	  queer	  theory	  is	  her	  emphasis	  on	  
the	  adoption	  of	  a	  ‘double-­‐path’	  sexual	  politics.	  89	  I	  argue	  that	  her	  idea	  of	  a	  double-­‐
path	  approach	  to	  sexual	  politics	  could	  be	  read	  as	  implying	  two	  important	  points.	  
The	  first,	  is	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  queer	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  should	  not	  ignore	  
or	  deny	   the	  significance	  and	  meaningfulness	  of	   identities	  categories.	  On	  the	  other	  
hand,	   queer	   projects	   should	   emphasise	   the	   need	   for	   a	   critical	   use	   of,	   and	   critical	  
reflections	  on,	  the	  identities	  categories.	  When	  discussing	  the	  notions	  of	  the	  ‘human’	  
or	  ‘women’,	  Butler	  argues	  that:	  	  
‘we	  must	  use	  this	  language	  [identity	  categories]	  to	  assert	  an	  entitlement	  
to	  conditions	  of	  life	  in	  ways	  that	  affirm	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  sexuality	  
and	  gender	  in	  political	  life,	  and	  we	  must	  also	  subject	  our	  very	  categories	  
to	  critical	  scrutiny,	  find	  out	  the	  limits	  of	  their	  inclusivity	  and	  
translatability,	  the	  presuppositions	  they	  include,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  
must	  be	  expanded,	  destroyed	  or	  reworked	  both	  to	  encompass	  and	  open	  
up	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  human	  and	  gendered.’90	  
The	  crucial	  point	  she	  would	  like	  to	  make	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  meaning	  and	  importance	  
of	  recognition	  and	  identities	   in	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  but	  rather	  that	  by	  employing	  
these	  identity	  categories	  and	  by	  promoting	  progressive	  political	  aims,	  we	  also	  need	  
to	  remain	  self-­‐reflective	  on	  how	  the	  boundaries	  are	  drawn,	  sustained	  and	  policed;	  
why	  they	  are	  constructed	  in	  such	  ways;	  what	  the	  benefits	  might	  be,	  and	  the	  costs;	  
what	   the	   power	   relationships	   and	   possible	   violence	   in	   the	   process	   of	   such	  
categorisation	  might	  entail;	  and,	  how	  to	  open	  up	  more	  options	  and	  recognition.	  
I	   agree	   with	   Butler’s	   insights	   that	   queer	   approaches	   do	   not	   aim	   to	   suspend	   or	  
paralyse	   identities	   categories	   and	   recognition	   politics;	   nor	   do	   queer	   approaches	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Judith	  Butler,	  Bodies	  That	  Matter:	  On	  the	  Discursive	  Limits	  of	  "’’Sex’’	   (Abingdon	  Oxon:	  Routledge,	  
2011),	  173-­‐175.	  
88	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  67.	  
89	  Ibid.,	  52-­‐53,	  59-­‐60,	  69,	  75-­‐76.	  
90	  Ibid.,	  76.	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deny	  the	  needs,	  usefulness	  and	  meaningfulness	  of	  them.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  rather	  
to	  highlight	   the	   importance	  of	  ongoing	   critical	   reflection	  on	  normative	  projects	  of	  
sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  second	  important	  implication	  in	  Butler’s	  idea	  of	  a	  double-­‐path	  
sexual	  politics.	  	  She	  suggests	  that	  in	  sexual	  politics	  we	  need	  not	  only	  the	  normative	  
claims	  and	  the	  moral	  pursuits	  such	  as	  ‘self-­‐determination,’91	  ‘autonomy’92	  or	  ‘sexual	  
rights’,93	  but	  also	  a	  critical	  examination,	   reflection	  and	   reworking	  of	   the	  dynamics,	  
power	  relationships	  and	  construction	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  normativity.94	  	  	  
However,	  here	  is	  my	  first	  major	  critique	  of	  her	  queer	  feminist	  project.	  Butler	  herself,	  
despite	   her	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   significance	   and	   usefulness	   of	   some	  
normative/moral	  ideas	  and	  claims	  in	  sexual	  politics,	  focuses	  only	  on	  unravelling	  and	  
destabilising	  the	  heterosexual	  matrix	   in	  her	  project.	  She	  does	  not	  clearly	  elaborate	  
why	  certain	  constructed	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  norms	  are	  morally	  questionable,	  are	  
unjust,	   are	   inhuman,	   or	   are	   oppressive.	   Nor	   does	   she	   sufficiently	   clarify	   the	  
normative	   grounds	   to	   challenge	   and	   to	   resist	   sexual	   injustices	   and	   sexual	  
oppression.	  Why	  do	  we	  need	  to	  open	  up	  possibilities	  in	  sexual	  politics	  and	  in	  social	  
lives?	  	  Where	  is	  the	  normative	  ground	  for	  resistance,	  transformation	  and	  reworking	  
of	   heteronormative	   norms?	   Similarly,	   liberal	   legal	   theorist	   Bamforth	   notes	   that	  
although	   ‘Butler	   appears	   to	   be	   justifying	   human	   rights	   claims	   (and	   rejecting	   the	  
attacks	  launched	  on	  international	  human	  rights	  norms	  by	  cultural	  relativists)	  as	  part	  
of	  a	  broader	  project	   to	  promote	  culture	  openness’,95	  Butler	  does	  not	   clarify	   ‘what	  
role	  …	  human	  rights	  claims	  play’	  in	  sexual	  justice/sexual	  politics	  projects.	  96	  
I	  argue,	  however,	  queer	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice	  such	  as	  Butler’s	  
(or	   Foucault’s,	   Moran’s	   and	   Warner’s	   projects)	   do	   imply,	   explicitly	   or	   implicitly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  7.	  
92	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  52-­‐53.	  
93	  Ibid.,	  68-­‐69.	  
94	  Ibid.,	  58-­‐59,	  64-­‐65,	  68-­‐69,	  72-­‐73,	  77-­‐78.	  
95	  Nicholas	   Bamforth,	   ’Introduction’,	   in	   Sex	   Rights:	   The	   Oxford	   Amnesty	   Lectures	   2002	   (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  20.	  
96	  Ibid.,	  20-­‐21.	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normative	   concerns,	   values	   and	   implications.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   queer/critical	  
inquiries	  on	  the	  construction	  and	  reproduction	  of	  normative	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  
we	  also	  need	  moral	  philosophical	  analyses	  to	  explore	  the	  normative	  implications	  in	  
queer	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics.	   Therefore,	   I	   argue	   that	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   I	   share	  
Butler’s	   insight	   that	   to	   think	  critically	   is	  a	  necessary	   requirement	   for	  a	   responsible	  
ethics	   and	   social	   justice	   project;97	  normative	   sexual	   justice	   projects	   need	   critical	  
reflections.	  However,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  contend	  that	  ethical	  and	  moral	  concerns,	  
exploration	  and	  reflections	  are	  also	   indispensable	  dimensions	   in	  projects	  of	  sexual	  
politics	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   I	   argue	   that	   both	   the	   critical/queer	   inquiries	   and	   the	  
moral/normative	  investigations	  are	  necessary	  in	  our	  critiques	  of	  heteronormativity.	  	  
I	   further	  hold	  that	  Butler’s	  sexual	  politics	  project	  could	  be	  read	  as	  queer	  humanist	  
while	  promoting	  sexual	  autonomy/agency.	  Her	  queer	  project	  refers	  to,	  and	  implies	  
some,	   humanist	   values	   such	   as	   freedom98	  and	   autonomy/agency.99	  Humanism	   in	  
ethics,	  law	  and	  politics	  are	  theories	  and	  projects	  that	  aim	  to	  reduce	  human	  suffering	  
and	   to	   enhance	   well-­‐being.100	  There	   are	   profound	   normative	   dimensions,	   values,	  
aspirations,	  and	  concerns	  in	  Butler’s	  queer	  projects.	  For	  example,	  she	  holds	  that:	  
‘What	  continues	  to	  concern	  me	  most	  is	  the	  following	  kinds	  of	  question:	  
what	  will	  and	  will	  not	  constitute	  an	  intelligible	  life,	  and	  how	  do	  
presumptions	  about	  normative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  determine	  in	  
advance	  what	  will	  qualify	  as	  the	  ‘human’	  and	  the	  ‘livable’?	  In	  other	  
words,	  how	  do	  normative	  gender	  presumptions	  work	  to	  delimit	  the	  very	  
field	  of	  description	  that	  we	  have	  for	  the	  human?’101	  
Here	   she	   suggests	   that	   the	   underlying	   concerns	   behind	   her	   queer	   project	   are	  
humanist	   concerns	  of	   exploring	  what	   kinds	  of	  people	   and	   lives	   are	  excluded	   from	  
being	   recognised	  as	   ‘human’,	  as	   ‘intelligible’,	  and	  as	   ‘livable’	   lives;	   in	  other	  words,	  
they	  are	  humanist	  inquiries.	  	  She	  also	  explicitly	  states	  that	  there	  are	  normative	  tasks	  
and	  goals	  in	  her	  queer	  projects	  at	  times.	  For	  example,	  she	  argues	  that	  ‘[i]f	  there	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  78.	  
98	  Ibid.,	  67.	  
99	  Ibid.,	  52-­‐53;	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  7.	  
100	  Plummer,	  n	  1	  above,198.	  
101	  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  xxiii.	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positive	  normative	  task	  in	  Gender	  Trouble,	   it	   is	  to	  insist	  upon	  the	  extension	  of	  this	  
legitimacy	  to	  bodies	  that	  have	  been	  regarded	  as	  false,	  unreal,	  and	  unintelligible.’102	  	  
Here	  she	  suggests	  that	  the	  extension	  of	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  marginalised	  
and	   stigmatised	   bodies	   (such	   as	   the	   unrecognised	   intersex	   bodies)103	  are	   the	   core	  
normative	   aspirations	   and	   aims	   in	   her	   Gender	   Trouble	   project.	   Also,	   in	   Undoing	  
Gender	  she	  argues	  that	  ‘[w]hat	  is	  most	  important	  is	  to	  cease	  legislating	  for	  all	  lives	  
what	   is	   livable	  only	  for	  some,	  and	  similarly,	   to	  refrain	  from	  proscribing	  for	  all	   lives	  
what	   is	  unlivable	   for	  some.’104	  	  She	  elaborates	   that	   the	  normative	  purposes	  of	   the	  
queer/critical	   examination	   of	   gender	   normativity	   are	   to	  maximise	   the	   possibilities	  
for	  a	   livable	   life	  and	  to	  minimise	  the	  possibilities	  of	  an	  unbearable	   life.105	  Here	  her	  
queer	   project	   clearly	   implies	   and	   is	   in	   accordance	  with	   core	   humanist	   values	   and	  
aims:	   to	   reduce	   suffering	   and	   to	   enhance	  well-­‐being.	   Therefore,	   her	   queer	   sexual	  
politics	   projects	   could	   be	   read	   as	   possessing	   deep	   humanist	   concerns,	   values	   and	  
aspirations.	  	  
Since	   there	   are	   important	   moral/normative	   implications	   and	   profound	   humanist	  
concerns	   in	  some	  visible	  queer	  projects,	   I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  follow	  a	   ‘double-­‐
path’	   in	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	   in	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	   In	  
addition	   to	   the	   critical	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   use	   of	   identities	   categories	   and	   the	   critical	  
reflections	   on	   the	   power	   relationship	   and	   construction	   of	   dominant	   sexuality	   and	  
gender	  norms,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  explore	  and	  reflect	  on	  the	  moral	  and	  the	  normative	  
grounds	  and	  implications	  of	  our	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics.	  For	  instance,	  we	  need	  to	  
think	   about	   the	   normative/ethical	   questions	   such	   as	   why	   we	   need	   to	   open	   up	  
possibilities,	  why	  we	  need	  to	  resist	  domination,	  and,	  why	  values	  such	  as	   freedom,	  
autonomy	   or	   agency	   ought	   to	   be	   promoted	   or	   secured.	   There	   are	   moral	   and	  
normative	  implications	  behind	  queer	  projects	  and	  they	  need	  to	  be	  critically	  thought	  
about	  and	  addressed.	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  Ibid.,	  xxv.	  
103	  Brady	  and	  Schirato,	  n	  82	  above	  35-­‐39.	  
104	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  8.	  
105	  Ibid.,	  8.	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	   there	  are	  also	  critical	   reasons	  why	  normative	   legal	   theories	  of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender	  should	  also	  always	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  power	  relationships	  of	  
social	  forces	  and	  the	  possible	  exclusion,	  distinction,	  hierarchies	  and	  categories	  they	  
rely	  on	   in	  their	  normative	  systems	  and	   judgements.	  Critical	   thinking	  reminds	  us	  to	  
be	   vigilant	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  possible	   violence	  behind	  normative	  evaluation	  and	  
reminds	  us	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  ‘the	  virtue	  of	  openness’	  when	  reflecting	  on	  issues	  
in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   We	   need	   to	   keep	   our	  
moral/normative	   arguments,	   projects	   and	   judgements	   open	   to	   challenges,	  
adjustments	   and	   reinterpretation.	   Our	   moral/normative	   system	   ought	   not	   to	   be	  
treated	  as	  a	  complete,	  closed,	  static,	  total	  and	  absolute	  system.	  Instead,	  we	  need	  to	  
be	  aware	  of	  the	  inevitable	  incompleteness	  of	  our	  moral	  judgements	  and	  normative	  
projects.	  We	  need	   to	   acknowledge	   and	  be	  willing	   to	   face	   the	   inevitable	   unknown	  
aspects	  of	  humanness	  and	  the	  uncertainties	  in	  social	  life.106	  Therefore,	  we	  also	  need	  
to	  highlight	  ‘the	  ongoing	  importance	  of	  critical	  thinking’	  and	  ‘the	  virtue	  of	  openness’	  
in	  our	  normative	  projects	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.107	  
In	   accordance	  with	   the	   above	   analysis,	   I	   echo	   Butler’s	   insight	   that	   we	   need	   both	  
critical	   thinking	   and	   normative	   claims	   and	   values	   in	   sexual	   politics.	   Butler	   rightly	  
identifies	  the	  need	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  double	  path	  in	  sexual	  politics;	  however,	  she	  
mainly	  addresses	  one	  side	  of	  it	  in	  her	  queer	  project.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  queer	  humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  I	  propose	  also	  adopt	  a	  double	  path	  of	  sexual	  politics	  
and	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  that	  some	  insights	  and	  arguments	  
from	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice	   are	   very	   useful	   and	   will	   be	   drawn	   on	   in	  
thinking	   about	   the	   normative	   grounds	   of	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	  
justice.	   By	   adopting	   a	   double	   path	   in	   sexual	   justice	   issues,	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   would	   not	   deny	   the	   significance	   of	  
employing	   identity	  categories	   in	  sexual	  politics	  and	   in	  everyday	  social	   lives;	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  we	  need	  to	  use	  them	  critically.	  For	  example,	  as	  Moran	  argues,	  we	  need	  
to	   be	   attentive	   to	   peculiarities	   and	   small	   differences	   and	   be	   sensitive	   to	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  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  72-­‐73.	  
107	  Moran,	  n	  58	  above,	  312.	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contradictions,	   conflicts,	   tensions	   and	   inconsistencies	   when	   using	   these	   complex	  
notions	   of	   identity.	   Furthermore,	   I	   argue	   that	  we	   also	   need	  moral	   and	   normative	  
investigations	  and	  deliberations	  in	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  	  	  
Moreover,	   I	   argue	   that	   while	   highlighting	   the	   significance	   of	   employing	   both	  
queer/critical	   thinking	   and	   moral/normative	   analyses	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  or	  expect	  a	  utopian	  sexual	  politics	  without	  any	  
tension	  or	  contestation.	  Instead,	  tension	  and	  contestation	  are	  inevitable	  in	  lives	  and	  
in	   projects	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Instead	   of	   shying	   away	   from	   tensions	   and	  
challenges,	  I	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  should	  agree	  
with	  queer	  theorists	  such	  as	  Butler	  and	  Moran	  by	  suggesting	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  
tension	  requires	  and	  invites	  us	  to	  constantly	  reflect,	  re-­‐examine,	  revise	  and	  re-­‐think	  
our	   normative	   assumptions,	   ideologies,	   theories	   and	   judgements.108	  The	   tension	  
and	   contestation	   might	   also	   indicate	   and	   remind	   us	   that	   there	   is	   always	   some	  
uncertainty,	  unknowingness	  and	   limit	   in	  our	  projects.	   It	   is	   therefore	   important	  not	  
to	   view	   our	   projects	   as	   absolute,	   totalising,	   closed,	   complete	   and	   fixed	   systems.	  
Rather,	  they	  are	  better	  understood	  as	  projects	  with	  certain	  openness	  and	  in	  need	  of	  
endless	  reflection	  and	  re-­‐examination.	  	  
The	  second	  major	  problem	  in	  Butler’s	  queer	  feminist	  theory,	  I	  argue,	  is	  her	  idea	  and	  
understanding	  of	  gender	  oppression	  and	  her	  insistence	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  feminism	  
in	  analysing	  gender	   issues.	   I	   argue	   that	  although	   she	   correctly	  notes	  and	  criticizes	  
the	   heterosexist	   and	   essentialist	   thinking	   in	   some	   second	   wave	   feminisms,	   her	  
project	   is	   still	   significantly	   influenced	   and	   informed	   by	   the	   problematic	  
subordination	  feminist	   ideologies	  on	  gender	  oppression	  and	  gender	  hierarchy.	  The	  
consequence	   is	   that	  while	  she	  acknowledges	  and	  suggests	   that	  women	  as	  a	  group	  
are	  oppressed,	  she	  generally	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  harm	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  
men	  as	  a	  gender	  group.	  Furthermore,	  her	  tendency	  to	  equate	  gender	  analysis	  and	  
gender	  perspectives	  with	  feminism	  is	  problematic.	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Butler	   criticises	   the	   essentialist	   use	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘women’,	   the	   heterosexist	  
assumptions	   of	   sexuality	   and	   the	   marginalisation	   of	   LGBT	   people	   in	   mainstream	  
feminism.109	  She	   argues	   that	   she	   aims	   to	   ‘open	  up	   another	  possibility	   for	   feminist	  
thought,	   one	   that	  would	   overcome	   its	   complicity	   in	   heterosexist	   presuppositions,	  
and	  mark	  an	  alliance	  with	   lesbian	  and	  gay	  struggles.’110	  She	  criticises	  some	  implicit	  
or	   explicit	   assumptions	   within	   feminism	   about	   heteronormative	   ideologies	   and	  
norms	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   in	   their	   systems.	   She	   argues	   that	   these	   feminist	  
theories	   assume	   the	   naturalness,	   irreversibility	   and	   stableness	   of	   the	   dichotomy	  
between	  ‘men’	  and	  ‘women’	  and	  their	  gender.111	  They	  also	  generally	  prioritise	  and	  
assume	  heterosexual	  desires	  and	  experiences	  in	  their	  feminist	  projects.112	  	  	  
For	   example,	   she	   criticises	   radical	   feminist	   MacKinnon’s	   construction	   of	   sexuality	  
and	   gender,	   which	   actually	   produces	   and	   reproduces	   some	   problematic	   gender	  
normativity.113	  She	  argues	  that	   in	  MacKinnon’s	  system,	  women’s	  gender	   is	  defined	  
by	  oppressed	  female	  sexuality.	  Men’s	  gender	   is	  defined	  by	  aggressiveness	  and	  the	  
domination	   of	   women.	   Although	  MacKinnon	   aims	   to	   challenge	   male	   domination,	  
Butler	   argues	   that	  MacKinnon	   actually	   ‘institutes	   a	   regulation	   of	   another	   kind:	   to	  
have	   a	   gender	  means	   to	   have	   entered	   already	   into	   a	   heterosexual	   relationship	   of	  
subordination.’ 114 	  She	   criticises	   MacKinnon’s	   assumption	   of	   the	   subordinated	  
female	   sexuality	   and	   her	   heterosexist	   reduction	   of	   the	   concept	   and	   problem	   of	  
sexual	  harassment	  to	  male	  domination	  and	  violence	  towards	  women.115	  	  She	  argues	  
that	  this	  kind	  of	  construction	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  sexual	  harassment	  in	  law	  ‘become[s]	  
themselves	   the	   instrument	   by	   which	   gender	   is	   thus	   reproduced.’116	  Women’s	  
gender	   is	   reproduced,	   constructed	   and	   institutionalised	   as	   structurally	   vulnerable,	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  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  6,	  9-­‐10.	  
110	  Judith	  Butler,	  ‘Against	  Proper	  Objects’,	  in	  Elizabeth	  Weed	  and	  Naomi	  Schor	  eds.,	  Feminism	  Meets	  
Queer	  Theory	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  2.	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  Ibid.,	  2,9-­‐14.	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  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  viii,	  1-­‐46.	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  Butler,	  n	  53	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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	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heterosexual	   and	   subordinated	   in	   heterosexist	   systems	   of	   sexual	   harassment	  
jurisprudence.117	  	  
Butler	  herself	  opposes	  this	  kind	  of	  heterosexism	  in	  feminism	  and	  urges	  feminism	  to	  
expand	   their	   concerns	   to	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  minority	   people	   such	   as	   gay	  men,	  
lesbians	  and	   trans	  people.118	  She	  argues	   that	   it	   is	  problematic	  and	  narrow-­‐minded	  
for	  mainstream	  feminism	  to	  premise	   their	  gender	  politics	  on	  heterosexist	   ideas	  of	  
‘gender’	  or	   ‘women’.119	  She	  argues	  that	  feminists	  ought	  not	  to	   limit	  their	  concerns	  
to	   only	   the	   oppression	   and	   subordination	   of	   heterosexual	   women	   by	   men,	   but	  
rather,	  that	  there	  are	  other	  important	  sexual	  and	  gender	  oppression	  matters	  to	  be	  
addressed.120	  We	   need	   to	   question	   the	   heterosexist	   concepts	   of	   sex,	   gender	   and	  
sexuality	   to	  be	  able	   to	  see	  the	  gender	  and	  sexual	  oppression	  of	  gay	  men,	   lesbians	  
and	  trans	  people.121	  	  
To	   illustrate	  by	  means	  of	  an	  example,	  she	  argues	  that	   in	  modern	  heteronormative	  
society,	   we	   largely	   interpret	   and	   read	   the	   human	   body	   through	   a	   binary	  
male/female	   distinction	   and	   through	   the	   notion	   of	   ideal	   dimorphism.122	  The	   ideal	  
dimorphism	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality	   expects	   that	   the	   human	   body	   can	   and	  
should	   always	   be	   distinguished	   in	   a	   binary	   male/female	   body	   model.123	  Intersex	  
bodies	   thus	   become	   unrecognised	   and	   illegitimate	   under	   heteronormative	   law,	  
knowledge	  systems	  and	  state	  policies.	  Indeed,	  ‘[S]evere	  and	  violent	  gender	  policing’	  
such	  as	  coercive	  surgery	  are	  widely	   imposed	  on	   infants	  and	  children	  with	  sexually	  
indeterminate	   bodies.124	  Trans	   people	   are	   also	   easily	   subjected	   to	   pathologisation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Katherine	   M.	   Franke,	   ‘What's	   Wrong	   with	   Sexual	   Harassment?’,	   Stanford	   Law	   Review	   49,	  
(1997),761-­‐762.	  
118	  Butler,	  n	  109	  above,	  1-­‐3.	  
119	  Ibid.	  
120	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  4-­‐	  10.	  
121	  Butler,	  ibid.,	  52-­‐54.	  Butler,	  n	  110	  above,	  1-­‐3.	  	  
122	  Brady	  and	  Schirato,	  n	  82	  above,	  35-­‐39.	  
123	  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  145-­‐150.	  
124	  Butler,	  ibid.,207;	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  4-­‐6.	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and	   discrimination	   through	   the	   heteronormative	   lens	   and	   ideals	   of	   the	   human	  
body.125	  	  	  
By	   criticising	   the	   heterosexism	   in	   some	   feminist	   theories	   and	   by	   arguing	   for	   the	  
need	  for	  being	  attentive	  to	  the	  oppression	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minorities,	  Butler	  
does	  not	  argue	  that	  women	  are	  not	  oppressed	  in	  heteronormative	  societies.	  Neither	  
does	  she	  suggest	  that	  gender	  relationships	  are	  not	  hierarchal,126	  or	  indeed	  that	  we	  
cannot	   use	   identities	   categories	   such	   as	   ‘women’	   and	   ‘lesbians’	   in	   the	   law	   and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   She	   rather	   argues	   that	   ‘[d]iscrimination	   against	  
women	   continues…so	   this	   dimension	   of	   gender	   discrimination	   remains	   crucial	   to	  
acknowledge.’ 127 	  She	   maintains	   that	   gender	   injustices	   towards,	   and	   gender	  
oppression	  of,	  women	  ought	   to	  be	  acknowledged,	   taken	   seriously,	   and	   treated	  as	  
one	  of	  the	  major	  concerns	  in	  equality	  jurisprudence.128	  At	  the	  same	  time	  she	  wants	  
to	  broaden	  and	  extend	  feminist	  concerns	  of	  women’s	  oppression	  to	  the	  oppression	  
of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  non-­‐conformity	  people	  in	  equality	  jurisprudence.129	  	  	  	  
However,	  while	   she	   acknowledges	   the	  problem	  of	   ‘discrimination	   against	  women’	  
and	   ‘violence	   against	  women’130	  and	   argues	   that	   they	   ought	   to	   be	   addressed	   and	  
taken	  seriously,	  she	  never	  mentions	  or	  uses	  the	  terms	  ‘discrimination	  against	  men’	  
or	   ‘violence	  against	  men’	   in	  her	  research.	  This	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  she	  
thinks	   all	   men	   never	   suffer	   from	   gender	   discrimination	   or	   gender	   violence.	  	  
However,	   this	  might	   indicate	  that	  she	  tends	  to	  assume,	  that	  unlike	  women,	  only	  a	  
minority	   of	   sexual	   and	   gender	   non-­‐conformity	   men	   such	   as	   gay	   men,	   bi	   men,	  
feminine	   men	   and	   trans	   people	   are	   victims	   of	   gender	   violence	   and	   gender	  
oppression.	   I	   want	   to	   argue	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   thinking	   and	   assumptions	   regarding	  
gender	  oppression	  are	  problematic	  and	  inadequate.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Brady	  and	  Schirato,	  n	  82	  above,	  35-­‐39.	  
126	  Butler,	  n	  110	  above,	  18.	  
127	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  6.	  
128	  Butler,	  n	  52	  above,	  61.	  
129	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  6.	  	  
130	  Ibid.,	  9.	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She	   further	   argues	   that	   both	   feminism	   and	   queer	   studies	   (or	   lesbian	   and	   gay	  
studies)	   ought	   not	   to	   refute	   each	   other.131	  She	   urges	   feminism	   to	   abandon	   its	  
heterosexism	  and	  to	  extend	   its	  concerns	  beyond	   just	   the	  subordination	  of	  women	  
by	  men.	  She	  also	  urges	  queer,	  lesbian	  and	  gay	  studies	  to	  include	  feminist	  analyses	  of	  
gender	   oppression	   of	   women	   and	   gender	   hierarchy.	   In	   fact,	   she	   holds	   that	   while	  
feminism	   ought	   to	   learn	   from	   queer	   or	   lesbian	   and	   gay	   studies	   to	   overcome	   its	  
heterosexism,	  queer	  and	  gay	  studies	  also	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  ‘liberated’	  from	  feminist	  
analyses	  of	  gender.132	  	  She	  believes	  that	  without	  including	  feminist	  ideas	  of	  gender	  
oppression	  and	  gender	  hierarchy,	  queer	  and	  gay	  studies	  would	  be	  uncritical	  of	  the	  
sexism	  (against	  women)	  in	  their	  projects.133	  	  She	  argues	  that:	  	  
‘If	  sexuality	  is	  conceived	  a	  liberated	  from	  gender,	  then	  the	  sexuality	  that	  
is	  ‘‘liberated’’	  from	  feminism	  will	  be	  one	  which	  suspends	  the	  reference	  to	  
masculine	  and	  feminine,	  reinforcing	  the	  refusal	  to	  mark	  that	  difference,	  
which	  is	  the	  conventional	  way	  in	  which	  the	  masculine	  has	  achieved	  the	  
status	  of	  ‘’sex’’	  which	  is	  one.	  Such	  a	  ‘’liberation’’	  dovetails	  with	  
mainstream	  conservatism	  and	  with	  male	  dominance	  in	  its	  many	  and	  
various	  forms,	  thus	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  assumed	  
symmetry	  of	  ‘‘lesbian	  and	  gay’’.’134	  	  	  	  
Here,	   Butler	   argues	   that	   the	   feminist	   take	   on	   gender	   hierarchy	   and	   gender	  
subordination	  ought	   to	   always	   inform	  and	  be	   incorporated	   into	   sexuality	   theories	  
such	   as	   queer	   or	   gay	   studies.	  Without	   feminist	   analyses	   of	   gender	   hierarchy,	   she	  
thinks	  we	  will	   cease	   to	   notice	   the	   difference	   between	   ‘masculine’	   and	   ‘feminine’,	  
and	  by	   doing	   so,	  we	  will	   fail	   to	   challenge	  male	   domination,	  which	   often	  operates	  
under	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  gender	  neutral	  appearance.	  She	  suggests	  that	  we	  need	  a	  queer	  
feminist	   sexual	   politics	   that	   combines	   both	   feminist	   concerns	   of	   unjust	   gender	  
hierarchy	  and	  radical	  sexual	  theory’s	  concerns	  of	  arbitrary	  sexual	  stratification;	  135	  a	  
proposal	  suggested	  by	  Gayle	  Rubin.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  Butler,	  n	  110	  above,	  1-­‐3.	  
132	  Halley,	  n	  42	  above,	  247-­‐253,	  273-­‐276.	  
133	  Butler,	  n	  110	  above,	  23-­‐24.	  
134	  Ibid.,	  23-­‐24.	  
135	  Ibid.,	  18.	  
164	  
	  
Queer	   feminist	   projects	   such	   as	   Butler’s,	  136	  compared	   to	   subordination	   feminism,	  
adopt	  a	  more	  nuanced,	  helpful	  and	  in	  many	  respects,	  more	  welcome	  and	  balanced	  
approach	  by	  arguing	  that	  not	  only	  women,	  but	  also	  a	  minority	  of	  sexual	  and	  gender	  
non-­‐conformity	  men	   such	   as	   gay	  men,	   bi	  men	   and	   trans	   people	   are	   victimised	   in	  
dominant	  gender	  norms	  and	  patriarchal	  culture.	  They	  argue	  that,	  like	  women	  (as	  a	  
gender	   group)	   who	   are	   oppressed	   by	   dominant	   gender	   norms,	   these	   sexual	   and	  
gender	   non-­‐conformity	   men	   are	   also	   oppressed	   in	   heteronormative	   culture	   and	  
they	  should	  also	  be	  included	  and	  covered	  in	   law	  and	  projects	  of	  sexual	   justice	  and	  
gender	  equality.137	  Queer	  feminism	  highlights	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  women	  who	  suffer	  
from	  gender	  oppression,	  but	  also	  some	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minority	  men.	  However,	  
as	  stated	  above,	  queer	  feminists	  still	  generally,	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously,	  imply	  
in	  their	  projects	  that	  those	  men	  that	  suffer	  from	  gender	  oppression	  are	  only	  in	  the	  
minority,	   are	   exceptional,	   and	   are	   oppressed	   only	   because	   of	   their	   deviation	   of	  
standard	  gender	  norms	  or	  sexuality.	  While	  they	  explicitly	  acknowledge	  the	  problems	  
of	   gender	   discrimination	   against	   women	   and	   gender	   oppression	   of	   women,	   they	  
tend	  to	  think	  that	  generally	  men	  (as	  a	  group)	  do	  not	  experience	  systematic	  gender	  
oppression,	  unless	  they	  are	  sexual	  or	  gender	  minorities.	  Gender	  relations	  between	  
men	   and	  women	   (or	   between	  masculinity	   and	   femininity)	   are	   still	   understood	   as	  
hierarchal	  and	  under	  the	  unilateral	  oppression	  of	  men.138	  This	  kind	  of	  thinking	  and	  
construction	   of	   gender	   oppression	   by	   queer	   feminism	   to	   some	   extent	   exhibits	   an	  
important	   breakthrough	   in	   feminist	   sexual	   justice	   scholarship	   because	   it	   goes	  
beyond	   pure	   women-­‐centred	   and	   women-­‐exclusive	   gender	   justice	   projects	   and	  
incorporates	   some	   gay	   theories	   or	   queer	   theories’	   orientation	   in	   their	   theory	   of	  
sexual	   justice.	   Some	   dimensions	   of	   suffering	   and	   oppression	   of	   gay,	   bi	   or	   trans	  
people	  could	  be	  acknowledged	  and	  addressed.	  These	  are	  very	  significant	  merits	  and	  
contributions	   from	   the	   queer	   feminist	   approach.	   However,	   I	   argue,	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  A	  useful	  outline	  of	  queer	  feminism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Mimi	  Marinucci’s	  book	  on	  queer	  feminism.	  See	  
Marinucci,	  n	  51	  above,	  85-­‐113.	  
137	  For	  example	  see	  Butler,	  n	  48	  above,	  6-­‐7.;	  Gayle	  S.	  Rubin,	  ‘Thinking	  Sex:	  Notes	  for	  a	  Radical	  Theory	  
of	   the	   Politics	   of	   Sexuality’,	   in	   Henry	   Abelove,	   Michele	   Aina	   Barale	   and	   David	   M.	   Halperin	   eds.,	  
Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Studies	  Reader,	  Volume	  I	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  3-­‐44.	  
138	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  6-­‐7.	  Butler,	  n	  110	  above,	  23-­‐24;	  Rubin,	  ibid.,	  3-­‐44.	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perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies,	   there	   still	   exists	  
major	  limitations	  in	  such	  queer	  feminist	  thinking.	  	  
Firstly,	   as	   queer	   legal	   theorist	   Janet	   Halley	   has	   argued,	   Butler’s	   insistence	   on	  
adopting	   a	   feminist	   analysis	   of	   gender	   hierarchy	   and	   gender	   subordination	   of	  
women	   in	   issues	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   manifests	   the	   fact	   that	   her	  
queer	  feminist	  project	  is	  still	  significantly	  influenced	  and	  informed	  by	  subordination	  
feminist	  ideologies.	  Halley	  argues	  that	  in	  Butler’s	  work	  she	  has	  a:	  
	  ‘strong	  will	  to	  pair	  f	  [women,	  femaleness	  and	  femininity]	  with	  m	  [men,	  
maleness,	  and	  masculinity]	  as	  a	  relevant	  opposition,	  to	  insists	  that	  
coming	  untethered	  from	  it	  reinstates	  male	  dominance,	  and	  to	  keep	  vigil	  
against	  the	  subordination	  of	  f.’139	  	  
Butler	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  hold	  fast	  to	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  subordination	  of	  
females	  or	  femininity	  when	  analysing	  issues	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  gender	  oppression.	  	  
Butler	  therefore	  ‘regards	  the	  omission	  of	  gender	  as	  its	  elision:	  gender	  as	  m	  >f	  must	  
be	  marked	  if	  we	  are	  to	  avoid	  recapitulating	  masculinist	  epistemology	  and	  reinstating	  
male	   dominance.’ 140 	  However,	   this	   assumed	   female	   gender	   subordination	  
perspective	  is	  problematic	  and	  dogmatic;	  it	  may	  still	  oversimplify	  and	  overgeneralise	  
the	   complexities	   of	   gender	   relationships.	   Indeed,	   as	   Halley	   rightly	   comments:	  
‘[o]ddly	  enough,	  MacKinnon	  could	  have	  said	  exactly	  the	  same	  thing.’141	  By	  insisting	  
on	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies	  of	  gender	  oppression	  
in	   thinking	   about	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	   Butler	  may	   commit	   a	   similar	   fault	   to	   that	  
found	  in	  MacKinnon’s	  subordination	  feminist	  system	  that	  she	  wants	  to	  challenge.	  
Thus,	   I	   argue	   that	   one	   of	   the	   major	   insufficiencies	   in	   Butler’s	   critiques	   of	  
heteronormativity	   is	   that	   she	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   address	   the	   gender	  
oppression	   of	   men	   as	   a	   gender	   group.	   While	   she	   explicitly	   acknowledges	   the	  
problems	  of	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  women,	  she	  tends	  to	  assume	  that	  men	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Halley,	  n	  42	  above,	  19-­‐20.	  
140	  Ibid.,	  276.	  
141	  Ibid.,	  150.	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a	  group	  do	  not	  experience	  systematic	  gender	  oppression,	  unless	   they	  are	  within	  a	  
sexual	  or	  gender	  minority.	  Gender	  relations	  between	  men	  and	  women	  (or	  between	  
masculinity	   and	   femininity)	   are	   still	   understood	   as	   hierarchal-­‐only,	   remaining	   the	  
unilateral	   oppression	  of	  women	  by	  men.	  By	   taking	   these	   subordination	   feminism-­‐
informed	   ideologies,	   Butler	   has	   difficulties	   in	   addressing	   the	   systematic	   gender	  
injustices	  and	  oppression	  of	  men.	  Some	  areas	  of	  injustice	  in	  the	  heterosexual	  matrix	  
are	   marginalised	   and	   invisible	   in	   her	   queer	   feminism.	   Also,	   by	   implying	   that	   we	  
ought	   to	   always	   adopt	   a	   (subordination)	   feminist	   perspective	   of	   unidimensional	  
gender	  hierarchy	  and	  gender	  oppression,	  her	  queer	  project	  might	  contribute	  to	  the	  
reproduction	   and	   perpetuation	   of	   certain	   heteronormative	   gender	   stereotypes,	  
myths	   and	   orders.	   For	   example,	   although	  men	   sometimes	   suffer	   from	   systematic	  
gendered	   violence,	   the	   problems	   of	   violence	   against	   men	   could	   become	   easily	  
trivialised	  and	  invisible	  under	  the	  approach	  adopted	  by	  queer	  feminism.142	  She	  only	  
notices	   and	   mentions	   the	   problems	   of	   ‘violence	   against	   women’	   and	   gender	  
violence	  against	  sexual	  and	  gender	  minorities,	  but	  never	  addresses	  the	  problems	  of	  
violence	  against	  men	  in	  her	  theory.143	  	  She	  can	  see	  the	  harm	  and	  injustice	  of	  gender	  
violence	  against	  women	  but	  fails	  to	  see	  gender	  violence	  against	  men	  as	  a	  group	  an	  
issue	  of	   justice.	  Gender	   injustices	  towards	  men	  and	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  are	  
reduced	   to	   that	   of	   some	   minority	   men,	   while	   the	   problems	   of	   injustices	   against	  
women	   (as	   a	   group)	   are	   acknowledged,	   highlighted	   and	   addressed	   in	   her	   queer	  
feminist	  projects.	  	  
From	   the	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  masculinities	   studies,	   I	   argue	  
that,	  though	  it	  is	  very	  important	  to	  address	  gender	  injustices	  towards	  women	  in	  the	  
law	  and	  politics	  for	  sexual	  justice,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  solely	  address	  issues	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   against	  women.	   I	   contend	   that	   problems	   of	   gender	   injustices	   towards	  
men	  qua	  men	  also	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  in	  critiques	  of	  heteronormativity	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  For	  example,	   researches	   indicate	  violence	  against	  men	   is	  pervasive	   in	  conflicts	  but	  are	  generally	  
trivialised	  compared	  with	  violence	  against	  women.	  See	  Sivakumaran	  n	  2	  above.	  Also,	  Carpenter	  n	  2	  
above.	  Researches	   indicate	  that	  boys	  are	  more	  often	  more	  heavily	  physically	  punished	  than	  girls	   in	  
school.	  ‘When	  corporal	  punishment	  was	  legal,	  boys	  were	  much	  more	  often	  beaten	  than	  girls.’	  See	  R.	  
W.	  Connell,	  The	  Men	  and	  The	  Boys	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2000),	  158.	  
143	  Butler,	  n	  53	  above,	  1-­‐56.	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they	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   just	   issues	   of	   injustices	   towards	   some	   minority	   men.	  
Furthermore,	   I	   argue	   that,	   whereas	   queer	   feminists	   correctly	   criticise	   the	  
heterosexism	  in	  some	  feminism	  and	  correctly	  aim	  to	  address	  the	  sexual	  oppression	  
of	   sexual	   and	   gender	   non-­‐conventional	   people,	   they	   generally	   fail	   to	   address	   the	  
intersectional	   oppression	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   of	   gay	   and	   bi	  men.	   They	   fail	   to	  
notice	   that,	   just	   like	   lesbians	  who	   suffer	   from	   discrimination,	   not	   just	   because	   of	  
their	   sexuality	  but	  also	  due	  to	   their	   femaleness	  or	   femininity,	  gay	  men	  sometimes	  
might	  also	  suffer	  from	  gender	  injustices,	  gender	  discrimination	  or	  gender	  violence,	  
and	  not	   just	  because	  of	   their	  homosexuality,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  their	  male	  gender	  or	  
maleness.	   For	   example,	  men	   as	   a	   gender	   group,	   including	   gay	  men,	   are	   all	   more	  
likely	   to	   be	   victims	   of	   the	   gender	   violence	   of	   sex-­‐selective	   massacre	   or	   forced	  
recruitment	  into	  state	  conflict.144	  There	  is	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  men,	  which	  
constrains	   not	   only	   straight	  men	  but	   also	   gay	   and	  bi	  men;	   just	   as	   there	   is	   gender	  
oppression	  of	  women	  as	  women,	  which	   constrains	  both	  heterosexual	  women	  and	  
lesbians.	   	   I	   contend	   that	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   fully	   understand	   and	   address	   the	  
gender	  oppression	  gay	  men	  might	  experience,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  only	  treat	  gender	  
injustices	  towards	  gay	  men	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
non-­‐conventionality.	  We	  also	  need	  to	  address	  the	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  as	  
a	  group.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  challenge	  Butler’s	  and	  Rubin’s	  claim	  and	  tendency	  to	  equate	  critical	  
theories	  and	  analyses	  of	  gender	  with	  feminist	  analyses	  of	  gender	  hierarchy.	  I	  agree	  
with	  Halley	  that	  the	  feminist	  ideology	  of	  gender	  hierarchy	  and	  gender	  subordination	  
of	  women	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  only	  legitimate	  authority	  in	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender. 145 	  	   There	   are	   other	   valuable	   theories	   and	  
perspectives	   of	   gender	   also	   worth	   consideration.	   For	   example,	   I	   propose	   the	  
perspectives	   from	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   as	   possible	  
alternatives	   in	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   My	   proposed	   queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   are	   partially	   inspired	   by	   Halley’s	   queer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  For	  example	  see	  Carpenter,	  n	  2	  above,	  88-­‐93.	  
145	  Halley,	  n	  42	  above,	  249-­‐253,	  274-­‐277.	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project	  in	  law	  and	  politics.	  However	  there	  are	  also	  important	  divergences	  between	  
my	  project	  and	  her	  queer	  theory.	  	  I	  discuss	  her	  theory	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  	  	  
4.2.4   Halley’s	  queer	  legal	  theory	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  her	  project	  of	  
‘Take	  a	  Break	  from	  Feminism’:	  
Janet	  Halley	  proposes	  a	  very	   inspiring	  and	   insightful	  queer	   legal	  theory	  on	  the	   law	  
and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  She	  argues	  that	  subordination	  feminist	  ways	  of	  
thinking	   and	   ideologies	   have	   become	   the	   dominant	   model	   in	   modern	   feminist	  
scholarship	   and	   feminist	   politics	   in	   the	   U.S. 146 	  	   She	   holds	   that	   although	  
subordination	  feminism	  is	  useful	  in	  disclosing	  some	  realities	  and	  interests	  in	  sexual	  
and	  gendered	  lives,	  they	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  the	  sole	  authority	  and	  the	  only	  
legitimate	   perspective	   in	   thinking	   about	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   because	   there	   are	  
complex,	   diverse	   and	   conflicting	   realities,	   interests,	   harms,	   benefits,	   desires	   and	  
power	   relationships	   in	   sexual	   and	   gendered	   lives.147	  Subordination	   feminism	   is	  
inevitably	   limited	   and	   incomplete,	   and	   hence	   unable	   to	   reveal	   all	   aspects	   of	   the	  
realities,	   dimensions	   and	   interests	   in	   complex	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   issues.	  
Unfortunately,	  most	  contemporary	  feminist	  projects	  she	  surveys	  tend	  to	  assume	  the	  
necessity	  of	  holding	  certain	  forms	  of	  subordination	  theory	  of	  f	  (women,	  femaleness	  
or	   femininity)	   in	   projects	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.148	  They	   tend	   to	   assume	   and	  
maintain	   that	   subordination	   feminist	   analyses	   of	   male	   domination	   and	   female	  
subordination	   is	   an	   indispensable	   element	   or	   the	   overarching	   structure	   of	   any	  
adequate	  theory	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics.149	  Halley	  challenges	  this	  kind	  of	  
prescriptive	   and	   totalising	   tendency	   in	   mainstream	   feminism	   and	   argues	   that	   we	  
sometimes	   need	   to	   ‘Take	   a	   Break	   from	   Feminism’	   in	   order	   to	   see	   realities	   that	  
subordination	  feminism	  cannot	  and	  does	  not	  reveal.150	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  her	  queer	  legal	  project	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  is	  very	  useful	  in	  sexuality	  
and	  gender	   studies.	  Many	  of	  her	   insights	  are	  drawn	  upon	  and	   incorporated	   in	  my	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Halley,	  n	  42	  above,	  17-­‐22.	  
147	  Ibid.,	  3-­‐10,	  319-­‐347.	  
148	  Ibid.,	  4-­‐6,	  17-­‐22.	  
149	  Ibid.,	  4-­‐5.	  
150	  Ibid.,	  8-­‐10,	  17-­‐20,	  282.	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proposed	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  Also,	  some	  of	  her	  insights	  
and	   arguments	   could	   be	   read	   as	   manifesting	   and	   being	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  
concerns	   and	   spirits	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  masculinities	   studies.	   However,	  
there	  are	  also	  some	  crucial	  differences	  between	  my	  project	  and	  her	  project.	  Also,	  I	  
discuss	  the	  possible	  limitations	  of	  her	  project.	  
Halley’s	  queer	   critiques	  of	   feminism	  begin	  with	  her	  observation	  of	   the	  dominance	  
and	  popularity	  of	  the	  thesis	  of	  subordination	  of	  f	  (women,	  femininity	  or	  femaleness)	  
in	   modern	   feminisms.	   She	   argues	   that	   feminism	   in	   the	   U.S.	   today,	   very	   often	   ‘is	  
persistently	   a	   subordination	   theory	   set	   by	   default	   to	   seek	   the	   social	   welfare	   of	  
women,	  femininity,	  and/or	  female	  or	  female	  gender	  by	  undoing	  some	  part	  or	  all	  of	  
their	   subordination	   to	   men,	   masculinity,	   and/or	   male	   or	   masculine	  
gender.’151’According	  to	  Halley,	  despite	  the	  differences	  in	  feminisms,	  three	  common	  
characteristics	   can	   be	   descriptively	   identified	   in	   most	   feminism	   theories	   she	  
surveyed	   in	   the	   U.S.152	  She	   finds	   that	   ‘these	   attributes	   are	   noticeable	   in	   virtually	  
every	  form	  of	  feminism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  today.’153	  
First,	   Halley	   holds	   that	   feminism	  makes	   ‘a	   distinction	   between	  m	   and	   f.	   Different	  
feminisms	   do	   this	   differently:	   some	   see	   men	   and	   women,	   some	   see	   male	   and	  
female,	   some	   see	   masculine	   and	   feminine.’154	  She	   notices	   that	   contemporary	  
feminisms	  in	  the	  U.S.	  will	  ‘turn	  in	  some	  central	  or	  core	  way	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  
m	  and	  f’	  in	  their	  systems.155	  The	  second	  core	  characteristic	  is	  that	  feminisms	  hold	  a	  
descriptive	   claim,	  belief	   and	  assertion	   that	  women	  or	   femininity	   are	   subordinated	  
by	   men	   or	   masculinity.	   For	   feminisms,	   ‘a	   position	   must	   posit	   some	   kind	   of	  
subordination	  as	  between	  m	  and	  f,	  in	  which	  f	  is	  the	  disadvantaged	  or	  subordinated	  
element.’156	  Lastly,	   followed	   by	   the	   above	   descriptive	   claim	   that	   women	   (and/or	  
femininity)	  are	  disadvantaged,	  modern	  feminisms	  argue	  that	  normatively	  something	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ought	   to	   be	   done	   to	   eliminate	   and	   address	   women’s	   subordination	   and	  
disadvantages	  in	  law,	  politics	  and	  society.	  She	  summarises	  the	  belief	  as	  ‘feminisms	  
oppose	   the	   subordination	   of	   f	   …	   feminism	   carries	   a	   brief	   for	   f.’157	  	   The	   three	  
common	  characteristics	  can	  be	  outlined	  as:	  
	  ‘a	  distinction	  between	  something	  m	  [men,	  masculinity,	  and	  maleness]	  
and	  something	  f	  [women,	  femininity,	  and	  femaleness];	  a	  commitment	  to	  
be	  a	  theory	  about,	  and	  a	  practice	  about,	  the	  subordination	  of	  f	  to	  m;	  and	  
a	  commitment	  to	  work	  against	  that	  subordination	  on	  behalf	  of	  f.’158	  	  
She	  sometimes	  presents	  them	  in	  the	  shorthand:	  ‘m/f,	  m>f,	  and	  carrying	  a	  brief	  for	  
f.’159	  	  
She	  claims	   that	   the	   feminist	  assumption	  of	   ‘m/f,	  m>f,	  and	  carrying	  a	  brief	   for	   f’	   is	  
very	  visible	  and	  influential	  in	  current	  American	  feminist	  scholarship.	  She	  argues	  that	  
attributes	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  feminism	  ‘are	  noticeable	  in	  virtually	  every	  form	  of	  feminism	  
in	   the	  United	  States	   today.’160	  Second	  wave	   feminism,	   such	  as	  power	   feminism	  by	  
MacKinnon	  or	   cultural	   feminists,161	  rely	  on	   some	   sort	  of	   subordination	   theory	  of	   f	  
(women,	  femaleness,	  or	  femininity)	  in	  their	  feminist	  theory.	  Even	  some	  visible	  post-­‐
modernising,	  queer	  or	  sex-­‐positive	  feminists	  such	  as	  Judith	  Butler’s	  queer	  feminism,	  
in	  spite	  of	  their	  critical	  approach,	  nevertheless	  still	  resort	  to	  subordination	  theory	  of	  
f	   in	  their	   feminist	  theories.162	  Halley	  argues	  that	  these	  post-­‐structuralist	  and	  queer	  
feminisms	   such	   as	   Butler’s	   projects	   still	   do	   not	   really	   take	   a	   break	   from	   the	  
subordination	   of	   f	   thesis	   and	   remain	   constrained	   by	   the	   subordination	   feminist	  
ideologies	  of	  gender	  and	  women.	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  Global	   (Oxford;	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  Oxford	  University	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2006).	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Halley	  notices	   that	   some	  hybrid	   feminism163	  such	  as	   antiracist	   or	   socialist	   feminist	  
projects	  could	  depart	  from	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  thesis	  ‘by	  diverging	  from	  and	  
thus	   suspending	   (subordination)	   feminism.’164	  What	   she	  means	   here	   is	   that	   some	  
hybrid	   feminisms	   suspend	   the	  employment	  of,	   and	   reliance	  on,	   the	   subordination	  
feminist	   thesis	   in	   some	   parts	   of	   their	   systems	   by	   resorting	   to	   other	   non-­‐
subordination-­‐feminist	  perspectives	  such	  as	  antiracist	  thoughts.165	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  although	  hybrid	  feminism	  is	  useful	  by	  being	  able	  to	  see	  the	  impacts	  of	  
other	   identities,	   the	  divergence	  towards,	  or	   the	   inclusion	  of,	  perspectives	  of	  other	  
identity	  categories	  itself	  does	  not	  address	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  and	  weakness	  
in	   the	   subordination	   feminist	   paradigm.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   divergence	   from	   or	  
inclusion	   of	   perspectives	   from	   other	   identities	   categories	   does	   not	   challenge	   the	  
claimed	  exclusive	  authority	  of	  subordination	  feminism	  with	  regard	  to	  thinking	  about	  
gender.	   Therefore,	   some	   kinds	   of	   feminism	   based	   on	   gender	   oppression	   and	  
discrimination	   subordination	   do	   not	   see	   that	   gender	   oppression	   of	  men	  qua	  men	  
may	   still	   be	   trivialised	   or	   rendered	   invisible.	   I	   use	   Young’s	   hybrid	   feminism	   an	   as	  
example	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  	  
As	   stated	   earlier	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   Young	   develops	   a	   concept	   of	   oppression	   based	   on	  
structural	   injustices	   towards	   social	   groups.	   For	   her,	   oppression	   is	   primarily	   a	  
structural	  concept	  that	  denotes	  systematic	  and	  often	  taken	  for	  granted	  constraints	  
on	  members	   of	   social	   groups.166	  Oppression	   in	   this	   sense	   refers	   to	   injustices	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  In	   jurisprudence,	   feminist	   critical	   race	   theorist	   Kimberle	   Crenshaw	   highlights	   the	   concept	   of	  
intersectionality	  and	  argues	   that	   the	   law	  needs	   to	  address	   the	   intersection	  of	  group	  discrimination	  
and	   oppressions	   based	   on	  multiple	   identities	   categories	   such	   as	   gender,	   race	   and	   social	   class.	   For	  
example,	  she	  criticises	  that	  African	  American	  women’s	  oppressions	  and	  experiences	  are	  marginalised	  
in	  both	  mainstream	  feminism	  and	  critical	  race	  theory	  because	  the	  former	  assumes	  a	  white	  women’s	  
perspective	   while	   the	   latter	   assumes	   an	   African	   American	   men’s	   perspective.	   She	   argues	   for	   the	  
importance	  of	  addressing	  the	  intersection	  of	  racism	  and	  sexism	  in	  African	  American	  women’s	  cases.	  	  
See	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  Crenshaw,	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  Intersection	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  Black	  Feminist	  Critique	  
of	  Antidiscrimination	  Doctrine,	   Feminist	  Theory	  and	  Antiracist	  Politics’,	  University	  of	  Chicago.	   Legal	  
Forum	   (1989),	   139-­‐167;	   Kimberle	   Crenshaw,	   ‘Mapping	   the	   Margins:	   Intersectionality,	   Identity	  
Politics,	  and	  Violence	  Against	  Women	  of	  Color’,	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  43,	  no.	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  (1991),	  1241-­‐1299.	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disadvantages	   caused	   by	  widely	   held	   unquestioned	   social	   stereotypes,	   prejudices,	  
norms	   and	   practices	   and	   institutionalised	   rules,	   policies	   and	   ideologies.167	  She	  
contends	   that	   oppression	   can	   be	   categorised	   into	   five	   major	   forms:	   exploitation,	  
marginalization,	   powerlessness,	   cultural	   imperialism	   and	   violence.168	  She	   holds	   a	  
subordination	  feminist	  thesis	  of	  gender	  in	  her	  feminist	  project,	  for	  example,	   in	  her	  
theory	  of	  family	   justice.169	  She	  argues	  that	  women	  as	  a	  social	  group	  are	  oppressed	  
and	   implies	   that	   men	   as	   a	   group	   are	   privileged	   in	   relation	   to	   women.170	  Young	  
suggests	   that	   women	   as	   a	   gender	   group	   per	   se	   suffer	   from	   gender	   oppression.	  	  
Gender	  oppression	  of	  women	  consists	  of	   all	   five	   forms	  of	  oppression:	  women	  are	  
exploited,	   marginalised,	   powerless,	   culturally	   stereotyped	   and	   devalued,	   and	   are	  
targeted	  by	  gendered	  violence	  against	  women.171	  However,	   she	  only	  discusses	   the	  
oppression	  of	  women	  as	  a	  group,	  but	  never	  mentions	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  a	  group.	  
She	  seems	  to	   imply	   that	  men	  as	  a	  gender	  group	  per	  se	  do	  not	  suffer	   from	  gender	  
oppression.	   Rather,	   she	   suggests	   that	   men	   could	   be	   oppressed	   by	   their	   other	  
identity	  categories	  such	  as	  social	  class,	   race	  or	  sexual	  orientation.172	  	  For	  example,	  
working	   class	   men	   suffer	   from	   class	   oppression	   based	   on	   exploitation,	  
powerlessness	  and	  cultural	  devaluation.	  Gay	  men	  suffer	   from	  sexuality	  oppression	  
based	  on	  homophobic	  violence	  and	  cultural	  stigmatisation.173	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  
line	  of	  thinking	  is	  that	  while	  Young	  can	  see	  the	  injuries	  done	  to	  working	  class	  men	  
because	  of	  their	  class	  status,	  and	  the	  oppression	  of	  gay	  men	  because	  of	  stigmatised	  
sexuality,	   she	   nevertheless	   fails	   to	   see	   that	   both	  working	   class	  men	   and	   gay	  men	  
might	  also	  suffer	  gender	  injustices	  because	  of	  their	  male	  sex/gender.	  Moreover,	  she	  
fails	  to	  consider	  how	  the	  oppressions	  of	  homosexuality	  and	  the	  gender	  oppressions	  
of	   men	   might	   intersect	   in	   gay	   men’s	   lives,	   or	   how	   class	   discrimination	   might	  
intersect	  with	  sexism	  against	  men	  in	  working	  class	  men’s	  lives.	  It	  is	  surely	  important	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to	   address	   the	   multidimensionality	   of	   social	   injustices	   as	   Young	   or	   other	   hybrid	  
feminists	   emphasise.	   However,	   if	   they	   cannot	   see	   that	   there	   are	   systematic	   and	  
institutional	  gender	   injustices	  towards	  men	  as	  a	  social	  group,	   their	  hybrid	   feminist	  
project	  is	  still	  limited	  by	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  paradigm.	  
Halley	  describes	  the	  departure	  and	  split	  from	  subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  as	  
‘Taking	  a	  Break	  from	  Feminism’,174	  and	  contends	  that	  theories	  of	  law,	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	   sometimes	   do	   need	   to	   make	   this	   break	   so	   that	   they	   can	   see	   more	  
possibilities,	  interests,	  injuries	  and	  realities.175	  	  
There	   are	  many	   strengths	   and	   contributions	   in	  Halley’s	   project.	   She	   rightly	   points	  
out	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  paradigm	  and	  rightly	  highlights	  the	  
need	  also	  to	  consider	  other	  theories	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  that	  are	  not	  premised	  
on	   the	   overarching	   subordination	   feminist	   thesis	   of	   gender.	   She	   also	   rightly	  
challenges	   the	   subordination	   feminist	   tendency	   to	   claim	   prescriptively	   that	   the	  
subordination	   theory	   of	   f	   (women,	   femaleness	   or	   femininity)	   is	   the	   necessary	  
ultimate	  authority	  and	  normative	  paradigm	  in	  analysing	  issues	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  
sexual	   politics.176	  Furthermore,	   her	   project	   is	   one	   of	   the	   very	   few	   critical	   sexual	  
theories	   that	   explicitly	   discusses	   and	   addresses	   the	   harms	   of	   gender	   injustices	  
towards	  men	  (as	  a	  group),	  take	  them	  seriously,	  and	  does	  not	  reduce	  them	  to	  simply	  
issues	   of	   injuries	   to	   sexuality	   minority	   men.	  177	  She	   does	   not	   only	   reflect	   on	   and	  
discuss	  sexuality	  constraints	  of	  LGBT	  as	  most	  queer	  theories	  and	  gay	  studies	  do,	  she	  
also	  suggests	  that	  men	  as	  a	  gender	  group	  can	  also	  be	  problematically	  stereotyped	  
and	   biasedly	   constructed	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.178	  She	  
contends	  that:	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‘I	  also	  noted	  that	  a	  very	  profound	  (but	  highly	  contingent)	  commitment	  
among	  many	  feminists	  to	  the	  Injury	  Triad―to	  seeing	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  
of	  female	  injuries,	  female	  innocence	  and	  male	  immunity―not	  only	  
involved	  them	  in	  a	  denial	  of	  their	  will	  to	  power,	  and	  of	  their	  power,	  but	  
precluded	  them	  from	  acknowledging	  their	  actual	  social	  effects	  when	  
these	  take	  the	  form	  of	  female	  immunity,	  female	  aggression,	  and/or	  male	  
injury.’179	  
Here	   she	   questions	   the	   subordination	   feminist	   construction	   of	   maleness	   and	  
femaleness	  in	  sexual	  politics.	  	  
I	   agree	  with	   her	   that	   there	   is	   a	   problematic	   tendency	   in	   some	   legal	   and	   political	  
projects	   of	   subordination	   feminism	   to	   assume	   and	   to	   reproduce	   myths	   and	  
stereotypes	   of	   vulnerable	   and	   innocent	   women/femininity	   and	   invulnerable	   and	  
dangerous	  men/masculinity,	  for	  example,	  the	  violence	  against	  women	  approach	  to	  
family	  violence	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  This	  approach	  holds	  that	  domestic	  violence	  
should	  be	  regarded	  as	  gender	  violence	  against	  women,	  where	  the	  root	  of	  domestic	  
violence	   is	   patriarchy	   and	   male	   control	   and	   dominance.180	  	   Under	   the	   violence	  
against	  women	  legal	  framework	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  family	  violence	  against	  LGBT	  
people	   and	   family	   violence	   against	   men	   are	   generally	   unaddressed	   and	   remain	  
marginalised.	  Men	  are	  implicitly	  assumed	  and	  constructed	  as	  heterosexual,	  violent,	  
dominant	   and	   invulnerable,	  while	  women	   are	   generally	   assumed	   as	   heterosexual,	  
harmless,	  subordinated	  and	  victimised	   in	  the	  violence	  against	  women	  approach	  to	  
domestic	  violence.	  This	  kind	  of	  approach	  of	  domestic	  violence,	  I	  argue,	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  
perpetuating	  heteronormativity	  and	  stereotypes	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.181	  
I	   also	   agree	   with	   Halley’s	   observations	   that	   despite	   queer	   feminist	   critiques	   on	  
second	  wave	   feminism,	   some	   post-­‐modern	   and	   queer	   feminisms	   such	   as	   Butler’s	  
project	   still	   imply	   or	   suggest	   certain	   problematic	   subordination	   theses	   of	   female	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  Helen	   Reece,	   ‘Feminist	   Anti-­‐violence	   Discourse	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   In	   Regulating	   Autonomy:	   Sex,	  
Reproduction	   and	   Family,	   edited	   by	   Shelley	   Day	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gender,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   on	   Butler.	   	   I	   agree	   with	   Halley’s	  
observations	  that	  the	  subordination	  theory	  of	  f	  is	  very	  popular	  and	  visible	  in	  modern	  
Anglo-­‐American	   feminist	   scholarship	   and	   politics,	   a	   point	   I	   also	   mentioned	   in	  
Chapter	  2.	  	  
However,	  there	  are	  two	  major	  differences	  between	  my	  project	  and	  that	  of	  Halley.	  	  
The	  first	  major	  difference	  between	  my	  suggested	  queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  and	  
her	  queer	  project	   is	  related	  to	  our	  different	  understanding	  and	  use	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  
oppression	   and	   subordination.	   Halley	   is	   sceptical	   about	   a	   sexual	   politics	   that	   is	  
based	   on	   subordination/oppression	   theories.182	  One	   of	   the	   strongest	   critiques	   of	  
Halley’s	  project	   is	   related	   to	  some	  criticisms	  about	  her	   ideas	  of	   subordination	  and	  
structural	  injustices.	  For	  example,	  subordination	  feminist	  Davina	  Cooper	  argues	  that	  
by	   suspending	   subordination	   theory	   Halley	   fails	   to	   address	   the	   problems	   of	  
structural	   injustices,	   institutionalised	   inequalities	  and	  systematic	  biases	  and	  norms	  
in	   social	   justice	   projects.183	  The	   structural	   and	   systemic	   injustices	   towards	  women	  
are	  neglected	  and	  unaddressed	  in	  Halley’s	  project.	  Cooper	  holds	  that	  we	  still	  need	  a	  
sexual	   politics	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   subordination	   theory	   of	   women,	   otherwise	  
structural	  gender	  injustices	  will	  be	  ignored	  and	  remain	  invisible	  and	  unaddressed.184	  
Cooper	   recommends	   subordination	   feminist	   perspectives	   such	   as	   Nancy	   Fraser’s	  
feminist	  justice	  theory.185	  	  	  
However,	   I	   argue	   that	   Fraser’s	   gender	   justice	   theory	   has	   serious	   limitations	   and	  
insufficiencies.	   Fraser	   argues	   that	   we	   need	   to	   keep	   both	   distributive	   justice	   and	  
recognition	  justice	  in	  sight	  in	  thinking	  about	  social	  justice,	  including	  issues	  of	  gender	  
justice.186	  	   In	  gender	   justice	   issues	  she	  adopts	  a	  subordination	  feminist	  perspective	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  Davina	   Cooper,	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   Power	   of	   Sexual	   Interests:	   Responding	   to	   Split	   Decisions’,	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  6,	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  (2010):	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  Ibid.,	  94-­‐99.	  
185	  Ibid.,	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  Nancy	  Fraser,	  ‘Feminist	  Politics	  in	  the	  Age	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by	  arguing	   that	  men	  are	   the	   ‘dominant	  group’187	  	  and	  masculinity	   is	   the	  privileged	  
gender188	  while	  women	  are	  the	  oppressed	  group189	  	  and	  femininity	   is	  the	  devalued	  
gender.	  By	  holding	  this	  kind	  of	  subordination	  feminist	  ideology,	  Fraser	  only	  notices	  
and	   addresses	   gender	   oppression	   of	   women	   as	   a	   group	   in	   her	   theory	   and	   has	  
difficulties	   in	   seeing	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  harms	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  a	  
group.190	  She	   argues	   that	   women	   experience	   gender	   injustices	   in	   criminal	   law,	   in	  
social	  welfare	  programmes,	  and	  in	  asylum	  policies.191	  She	  claims	  that:	  	  
‘[w]omen	  suffer	  gender-­‐specific	  forms	  of	  status	  subordination,	  including	  
sexual	  harassment,	  sexual	  assault,	  and	  domestic	  violence;	  trivialising,	  
objectifying,	  and	  demeaning	  stereotypical	  depictions	  in	  the	  media;	  
disparagement	  in	  everyday	  life;	  exclusion	  or	  marginalisation	  in	  public	  
spheres	  and	  deliberative	  bodies;	  and	  denial	  of	  the	  full	  rights	  and	  equal	  
protections	  of	  citizenship.’192	  
The	  problem	  with	  Fraser’s	  gender	  justice	  theory	  is	  not	  that	  her	  accounts	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   of	   women	   do	   not	   exist;	   there	   exists	   serious	   problems	   of	   gender	  
oppression	   of	   women	   in	   modern	   societies	   that	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   seriously.	   The	  
problem	   is	   rather	   that	   by	   holding	   a	   subordination	   feminist	   perspective,	   she	   has	  
difficulties	   in	   seeing	   the	   realities	   that	   gender	   oppression	   is	   not	   simply	   unilateral	  
oppression,	  constraining	  women	  and	  femininity.	  She	  fails	  to	  see	  the	  multiple	  faces,	  
forms,	   dynamics	   and	   power	   relationships	   of	   gender	   oppression.	   She	   fails	   to	  
acknowledge	  and	  address	  the	  existence	  and	  the	  harms	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  
qua	  men.	  As	  a	  result,	  her	  gender	  justice	  approach	  could	  contribute	  to	  perpetuating	  
some	  problematic	  heteronormative	  gender	  stereotypes	  and	  norms.	  
Most	  of	  the	  above	  gender	  injustices	  Fraser	  lists	  do	  not	  just	  affect	  women,	  but	  also	  
men.	  For	  example,	  there	  are	  not	  only	  gender	  injustices	  towards	  women	  in	  criminal	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  26.	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justice	  systems,	  but	  also	  systematic	  gender	  injustices	  towards	  men	  and	  boys	  in	  the	  
criminal	  justice	  system.	  	  Research	  finds	  that	  women	  and	  girls	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
treated	   more	   leniently	   in	   custodial	   remand	   judgements;193	  similarly,	   judges	   are	  
more	   reluctant	   to	   impose	   custody	   sentences	   on	  women	   and	   girls.194	  The	   criminal	  
justice	   system	   tends	   to	   treat	   female	   offenders	   as	   ‘in	   need	   of	   medical	   or	  
psychological	  treatment	  rather	  than	  as	  pure	  criminal.’195	  Research	  finds	  that	  in	  cases	  
of	   female	   offending	   ‘courts	   tend	   to	   consider	   mitigating	   circumstances	   such	   as	  
current	  and	  personal	  problems	  rather	  than	  emphasizing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  offence	  as	  
are	   done	   with	   male	   offenders.’196	  The	   court	   is	   more	   willing	   to	   contextualise	   the	  
offence	   of	   female	   offenders,	   but	   not	   the	   male	   offenders.	   Compared	   to	   female	  
offenders,	  male	  offenders’	  psychological	  and	  psychiatric	  background	  and	  factors	  are	  
less	   investigated	   and	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   considered.197	  As	   a	   consequence,	   a	  
sentence	   for	   female	   offenders	   ‘may	   result	   in	  minimal	   prison	   sentences	   compared	  
with	   men.’198	  Female	   offenders’	   criminal	   intention	   is	   more	   likely	   denied	   and	   her	  
dangerousness	   is	   minimised	   in	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system.199 	  	   Research	   also	  
indicates	   that	   both	   the	   traditionalist	   patriarchal	   chivalrous	   ideology	   and	   modern	  
subordination	   feminist	   ideology	   intersect	   and	   contribute	   to	   the	   reproduction	   of	  
heteronormative	   gender	   myths	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   men	   and	   women	   in	   criminal	  
systems.200	  As	  Hird	  elaborates:	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‘We	  equate	  femininity	  with	  passivity	  and	  masculinity	  with	  aggression.	  
We	  also	  assume	  that	  women’s	  relationships	  are	  structured	  around	  a	  
non-­‐hierarchical	  ethics	  of	  care.	  This	  supposed	  female	  preferencing	  of	  
relationships	  necessarily	  implies	  that	  these	  relationships	  are	  premised	  
around	  selfless	  caring.	  Precisely	  because	  of	  these	  powerful	  a	  priori	  
associations,	  a	  certain	  discursive	  manoeuvring	  often	  takes	  place	  in	  which	  
girls	  and	  women	  are	  able	  to	  talk	  freely	  about	  what	  they	  desire	  and	  what	  
they	  do	  ‘‘for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  relationship’’;	  rather	  than	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  
control	  or	  power	  over	  the	  person.’201	  
The	   gender	  myths	   and	   stereotypes	   perpetuated	   by	   patriarchal	   chivalrous	   thinking	  
and	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   render	   the	   problem	   and	   harm	   of	   female	  
violence	   as	   trivialised,	   minimised,	   silenced,	   hidden	   or	   redirected	   to	   other	   issues.	  	  
Under	   these	   circumstances,	   male	   victims	   of	   female	   violence	   are	   easily	   ignored,	  
ridiculed,	  disbelieved,	   stereotyped	  and	  experience	  difficulties	   in	   receiving	   the	  help	  
and	  support	  they	  deserve.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  although	  according	  to	  the	  latest	  
survey	  and	  correctional	  data,	   female	   correctional	  workers	  perpetrate	   the	  majority	  
of	  staff-­‐to-­‐inmate	  sexual	  abuse	  in	  male	  facilities,	  the	  problems	  and	  harms	  of	  female-­‐
to-­‐male	  sexual	  abuse	  in	  prison	  are	  still	  largely	  ignored	  and	  trivialised.202	  Recent	  U.S.	  
surveys	   ‘found	  that	   incarcerated	  men	  report	  much	  higher	  rates	  of	  sexual	  abuse	  by	  
staff	  than	  by	  fellow	  inmates,	  and	  found	  that	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  staff	  perpetrators	  of	  
sexual	   abuse	   are	   women.’203	  Research	   finds	   that	   in	   sexual	   abuse	   custody	   cases	  
‘female	  sex	  offenders	  receive	  less	  harsh	  sanctions	  overall	  than	  male	  sex	  offenders;	  
they	  are	  even	   less	   likely	   to	  be	  prosecuted	  or	  punished	  when	   the	  victims	  are	  male	  
and	   in	   custody.’204	  Despite	   such	   visible	   female-­‐perpetrated	   sexual	   abuse	   in	   prison	  
and	   in	   correction	   systems,	   the	   research	  and	  policies	  of	   sexual	  abuse	   in	  prison	   still	  
focus	   generally	   on	   male-­‐to-­‐female	   abuse.	   The	   mainstream	   research	   and	   public	  
policy	   of	   correction	   systems	   still	   assume	   heteronormative	   gender	   ideologies	   and	  
myths	  of	  harmless	  women	  and	  dangerous	  men.	  As	  Kim	  Shayo	  Buchanan	  holds:	  ‘the	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  Ibid.,	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  Kim	   Shayo	   Buchanan,	   ‘Engendering	   Rape’,	   UCLA	   Law	   Review	   59	   (2012):	   1630-­‐1688;  Lauren	   A.	  
Teichner,	   ‘Unusual	   Suspects:	   Recognizing	   and	   Responding	   to	   Female	   Staff	   Perpetrators	   of	   Sexual	  
Misconduct	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  (2007):	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  Brenda	  V.	  Smith,	  ‘Uncomfortable	  
Places,	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   Workers'	   Sexual	   Interactions	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   Men	   and	   Boys	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Custody’,	  UCLA	  Law	  Review	  59	  (2011):	  1690-­‐1745.	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  Buchanan,	  ibid.,	  1646-­‐1647.	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  Smith,	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main	   stereotype	   that	   seems	   to	   shape	   the	   selective	   attention	   of	   prison	   rape	  
discourse	  to	  expected	  forms	  of	  prison	  rape	  is	  the	  heterosexist	  and	  gendered	  ‘‘sexual	  
script’’	   by	   which	   masculinity	   is	   understood	   to	   dominate	   femininity,	   and	   its	  
corresponding	   pervasive	   societal	   belief	   that	   women	   are	   incapable	   of	   sexual	  
aggression.’205	  The	  heterosexist	  and	  gendered	  norms	  and	  expectations	  of	  aggressive	  
masculinity	  and	  innocent	  femininity	  in	  criminal	  justice	  system	  render	  sexual	  abuses	  
that	   do	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   paradigm	   of	  male-­‐to-­‐female	   violence	   unrecognisable,	  
marginalised	  or	  excused.	  ‘Instances	  of	  abuse	  perpetuated	  by	  females,	  rather	  against	  
females,	  become	  hard	  for	  people	  to	  see.’206	  	  
In	   family	   violence	   jurisprudence	   and	   legal	   practice,	   as	   I	   elaborated	   in	   detail	   in	  
Chapter	  3,	   the	  myths	  and	  biases	  of	   the	  aggressive	  men/innocent	  women	  model	   is	  
still	  highly	  pervasive	  and	  dominant.207	  The	  result	  is	  that	  female	  violence	  in	  the	  family	  
is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   trivialised,	   while	   male	   victims	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   taken	   less	  
seriously.	  Indeed,	  ‘[t]he	  presumption	  that	  all	  men	  are	  potential	  abusers	  and	  women	  
the	  only	   victims	  of	   IPA	   [intimate	  partner	   abuse]	   permeates	   victims’	   advocacy,	   the	  
criminal	   justice	  professionals	   systems,	   and	   society	   as	   a	  whole.’208	  	  Men	  abused	  by	  
women	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  issued	  a	  protection	  order	  by	  court,	  even	  in	  similar	  abuse	  
cases.209	  Research	   finds	   that	   ‘male	  victims	  of	  domestic	  violence	  were	  not	  afforded	  
the	   same	   protections	   as	   their	   female	   counterparts.	   This	   inequality	   in	   court	  
responses	  occurred	  even	  though	  male	  and	  female	  plaintiffs	  were	  similarly	  victimized	  
by	  their	  opposite	  gender	  defendants.’210	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  See	  n	  132	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  n	  133	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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  Kim	  A.	  Reeves,	  Sarah	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  Desmarais,	  Tonia	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  Kevin	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  Douglas,	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  Abuse	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  Considerations	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  Risk’,	  Journal	  of	  Elder	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  Neglect	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  (2007),	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   Partners’,	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The	  crucial	  point	  to	  make	  here	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  need	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  of	  
gender	  oppression	  against	  women;	   the	  problems	  of	   gender	  oppression	  of	  women	  
are	   very	   serious.	   The	   point	   I	   would	   like	   to	   emphasise	   rather	   is	   that	   there	   are	  
limitations	   and	   insufficiencies	   in	   the	   unilateral	   and	   unidimensional	   concept	   of	  
gender	   oppression	   presented	   by	   subordination	   feminist.	   For	   example,	   in	   Fraser’s	  
system,	   she	   generally	   reduces	   the	   concept	   of	   gender	   subordination	   and	   gender	  
oppression	  to	  the	  oppression	  and	  subordination	  of	  women	  or	  femininity.	  This	  kind	  
of	   reductionist	   and	   oversimplified	   understanding	   and	   approach	   to	   gender	  
oppression,	   I	  argue,	   is	  too	   limited	  to	  see	  the	  complexity	  and	  multiplicity	  of	  gender	  
oppression.	  
With	  respect	  to	  Halley’s	  project,	  I	  agree	  with	  Cooper	  or	  Fraser’s	  claim	  that	  we	  need	  
to	  continue	  to	  use	  the	  concepts	  of	  oppression	  or	  subordination,	  not	  suspend	  their	  
use.	  So	  the	  first	  major	  difference	  between	  my	  project	  and	  Halley’s	  is	  related	  to	  our	  
different	   attitudes	   towards	   the	   concepts	   of	   subordination	   and	   oppression	   in	  
theories	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  Her	  ‘Take	  a	  Break	  of	  Feminism’	  project	  
is	   sceptical	   of	   a	   sexual	   politics	   based	   on	   subordination	   theory	   and	   urges	   us	   to	  
suspend	  subordination	  theories	  in	  law	  and	  politics.211	  However,	  my	  queer	  humanist	  
project	   does	   not	   hold	   that	   we	   need	   to	   suspend	   the	   subordination	   theory	   or	  
concepts	   such	   as	   oppression	   and	   subordination	   in	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	  
sexual	   justice.	  My	   project	   still	   uses	   these	   concepts	   of	   gender	   oppression,	   gender	  
injustices	   or	   systematic	   gender	   discrimination,	   but	   not	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	  
subordination	   feminists	   such	   as	   Young,	   Fraser	   or	   MacKinnon.	   The	   difference	  
between	   my	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies’	   understanding	   and	  
employment	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   gender	   oppression	   and	   subordination	   feminism’s	  
understanding	  of	  gender	  oppression,	  is	  that	  gender	  oppression	  in	  my	  project	  is	  not	  
primarily	  a	  unilateral	  and	  unidimensional	  concept,	  but	  rather,	  a	  more	  multifaceted	  
and	  complicated	  concept.	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As	   discussed	   already,	   subordination	   feminism’s	   idea	   of	   gender	   oppression	   and	  
gender	   subordination	   is	   generally	   unilateral	   and	   unidimensional,	   mainly	   only	  
referring	   to	  male	   domination	   over	  women.	   	  On	   the	   contrary,	   I	   argue	   that	   gender	  
subordination	   or	   gender	   oppression	   should	   adopt	   a	   complex	   and	   multifaceted	  
narrative,	   with	   multi-­‐directional	   and	   complex	   forms	   of	   subordination	   and	  
oppression	  co-­‐exist	  in	  gender	  relationships,	  gendered	  lives	  and	  gender	  politics.	  We	  
cannot	   simply	   reduce	   or	   crudely	   oversimplify	   gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	  
subordination	  to	  unilateral	  oppression	  of	  women	  by	  men	  in	  gender	  relations,	  or	  vice	  
versa.	  The	  realities	  are	  much	  more	  complicated	  and	  multifaceted.	  Also,	  mostly	  men	  
and	  women	  are	  constrained	  and	  restricted	  to	  heteronormative	  norms	  of	  gender	  and	  
sexuality,	  although	  perhaps	  in	  different	  ways,	  by	  different	  means,	  and	  on	  different	  
occasions.	  The	  main	  point	   is	   that	   in	  modern	  developed	  heteronormative	  societies,	  
gender	  oppression	  is	  not	  just	  about	  the	  oppression	  of	  women	  by	  men.	  By	  adopting	  a	  
unilateral	  and	  oversimplified	  idea	  of	  gender	  oppression,	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  fail	  to	  see	  
and	  address	  the	  multiple	  forms	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  complicated	  realities	  of	  gender	  
oppression	  in	  modern	  societies.	  	  
In	   Chapter	   2	   I	   defined	   the	   concept	   of	   oppression	   as	   institutional,	   systematic	   and	  
collective	   injustices	   caused	  by	   social	   stereotypes,	   biases,	   norms	   and	  practices	   and	  
also	   by	   institutional	   rules,	   policies	   and	   ideologies	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Under	   the	   above	  
elaboration	  and	  definition,	  men	  and	  women	  both	  suffer	  from	  some	  forms	  of	  gender	  
oppression.	  Take	  familial	  lives	  and	  family	  relationships	  as	  an	  example,	  subordination	  
feminist	   family	   law	   and	   family	   justice	   theories	   hold	   a	   unilateral	   understanding	   of	  
gender	  oppression	  and	  claim	  that	  women	  (as	  a	  group)	  are	  oppressed	  by	  men	  (as	  a	  
group)	   in	   the	   heteronormative	   institution	   of	   family.	   They	   hold	   that	   women	   (as	   a	  
group)	   are	   oppressed	   while	   men	   (as	   a	   group)	   are	   privileged	   within	   the	   family.212	  
They	  argue	  that	  women	  are	  disadvantaged	  and	  oppressed	  in	  the	  family	  because	  of	  
the	   unequal	   caring	   responsibility	   expectations,	   the	   exploitative	   division	   of	   labour	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  For	  example,	  see	  Susan	  Moller	  Okin,	  Justice	  Gender	  and	  the	  Family	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  books,	  1989),	  
134-­‐186;	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman,	  ‘Fatherhood,	  Feminism	  and	  Family	  Law’,	  McGeorge	  Law	  Review	  
32,	   no.	   4	   (2000):	   1031-­‐1049.	  Martha	  Albertson	   Fineman,	   ‘The	   Sexual	   Family’,	   in	  Martha	  Albertson	  
Fineman,	   Jack	   E.	   Jackson,	   and	   Adam	   p.	   Romero	   eds.,	   Feminist	   and	   Queer	   Legal	   Theory:	   Intimate	  
Encounters,	  Uncomfortable	  Conversations,	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  45-­‐64.	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and	  the	  problems	  of	  male	  violence	  in	  the	  home.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  women	  certainly	  suffer	  
from	  gender	  oppression	  because	  of	  the	  unequal	  caring	  roles,	  because	  of	  their	  lower	  
involvement	  in	  the	  career	  market,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  male	  violence	  in	  
the	  family.	  I	  agree	  that	  all	  these	  examples	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  gender	  injustices	  
towards	  women	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  addressed.	  	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  
mean	   we	   should	   only	   acknowledge	   the	   existence	   and	   the	   harm	   of	   gender	  
oppression	   of	  women	   in	   the	   family.	   By	   thinking	   of	   gender	   oppression	   as	   complex	  
and	   multidimensional	   from	   the	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  in	  gender	  relationships,	  not	  only	  women,	  but	  
also	   men	   might	   suffer	   from	   some	   gender	   injustices	   and	   gender	   oppressions.	   For	  
instance,	   my	   previous	   discussion	   of	   family	   violence	   indicates	   that	   heterosexual	  
women	   are	   not	   the	   only	   gender	   group	   suffer	   from	   family	   violence.	   Domestic	  
violence	  cannot	  be	  easily	  reduced	  to	  just	  a	  problem	  of	  male	  dominance	  of	  women	  in	  
patriarchy,	   as	   mainstream	   subordination	   feminist	   theories	   of	   family	   violence	  
assume.213	  	  Or	  as	  indicated	  above,	  men	  and	  boys	  sometimes	  experience	  systematic	  
gender	  discrimination	   in	  criminal	   justice	   system.	  By	  abandoning	   the	  unilateral	  and	  
oversimplified	  idea	  of	  gender	  oppression	  whereby	  one	  dominant	  gender	  oppresses	  
the	   victimised	   gender,	  we	   no	   longer	   need	   to	   assume	   that	   only	   one	   gender	   group	  
suffers	  from	  gender	  oppression.	  By	  overcoming	  the	  limitation	  can	  see	  the	  multiple	  
dynamics,	  forms	  and	  power	  relationship	  in	  gender	  and	  be	  able	  to	  better	  address	  the	  
complicated	   dimensions	   and	   impacts	   of	   gender	   oppression	   of	   different	   groups	   of	  
people.	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   by	   adopting	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	   and	   complex	   concept	   of	   gender	  
oppression,	  the	  harm	  of	  the	  gender	  oppression	  of	  trans	  people	  could	  also	  be	  more	  
visible.	  Gender	  oppression	  of	  trans	  people	   is	  a	  very	  serious	  problem	  that	  needs	  to	  
be	  addressed	  urgently.	  Trans	  people	  often	  suffer	  from	  most	  violent	  forms	  of	  gender	  
oppression	  and	  gender	  policing.214	  The	  topic	  deserves	  devoted	  research	  by	  sexuality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  See	  n	  180	  above.	  
214	  Judith	   Butler	   is	   one	   of	   the	   leading	   philosophers	   who	   have	   specifically	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	  
transgender	  people	   in	  her	  works.	  One	  of	   the	   research	  motivations	   for	  Butler’s	  queer	  project	   is	  her	  
observation	  of	  heterosexist	  oppression	  and	  violence	  towards	  transgender	  persons.	  She	  says,	  ‘I	  grew	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and	  gender	  studies	  scholars.	  However,	   in	  order	  to	  better	  concentrate	  on	  the	  main	  
arguments	   and	   main	   topic	   of	   sexual	   justice,	   gender	   oppression	   and	   men	   in	   this	  
thesis,	   I	   do	   not	   go	   further	   to	   present	   a	   systematic	   exploration	   and	   review	   of	  
transgender	   jurisprudence.215	  I	   instead	   focus	   on	   the	   critical	   examination	   of	   the	  
impacts	   and	   oppression	   of	   heteronormative	   constraints	   on	   the	   male	   body,	   male	  
gender	  and	  male	  sexuality	  and	  their	  intersections	  in	  law,	  politics	  and	  public	  polities	  
since	   these	   aspects	   of	   heteronormative	   gender	   and	   sexual	   suppressions	   and	  
injustices	  are	  still	  largely	  understudied	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  law,	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
Overall,	   unlike	   Halley,	   I	   do	   not	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   suspend	   the	   theory	   and	  
concepts	   of	   subordination	   and	  oppression	   in	   the	   law	   and	  politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	  
gender.	   In	  this	  respect	   I	  am	  in	  accordance	  with	  subordination	  feminism	  by	  holding	  
that	   we	   still	   need	   to	   use	   the	   concepts	   of	   gender/sexuality	   oppression	   and	  
gender/sexuality	   subordination	   in	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics	   projects.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
up	   understanding	   something	   of	   the	   violence	   of	   gender	   norms:	   an	   uncle	   incarcerated	   for	   his	  
anatomically	  anomalous	  body,	  deprived	  of	  family	  and	  friends,	  living	  out	  his	  days	  in	  an	  ‘‘institute’’	  in	  
the	  Kansas	  prairies.’	  See	  Butler,	  n	  47	  above,	  xx.	   	  She	  challenges	  the	  heterosexist	  assumption	  of	  the	  
naturalness	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  biological	  male/female	  distinction	  independent	  of	  and	  prior	  to	  the	  
discursive	   force	   of	   sex/gender.	   The	   bodies	   of	   transgender	   people	   are	   too	   often	   rendered	  
unintelligible	  and	  unnatural	  in	  heteronormative	  norms	  of	  the	  human	  body	  and	  are	  too	  often	  forced	  
to	  meet	  the	  body	  intelligibility	  in	  the	  heteronormative	  world	  by	  imposed	  medical	  ‘treatment’,	  such	  as	  
the	   construction,	  diagnosis	   and	   treatment	  of	   the	  Gender	   Identity	  Disorder	   (GID).	  Butler	   challenges	  
the	  naturalness	  of	  the	  binary	  sexed	  body	  and	  its	  immunity	  from	  any	  cultural	  influence.	  See	  Butler,	  n	  
52	  above,	  4-­‐10,	  87.	  She	  does	  not	  deny	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  material	  body	  but	   insists	  we	  already	  
view	   and	   understand	   such	   a	   material	   body	   under	   gendered	   views	   constructed	   within	   a	  
heteronormative	  culture.	  Heterosexist	  societies	  and	  laws	  render	  transsexual	  bodies	  unintelligible	  by	  
already	   viewing	   via	   a	   heteronormative	   lens	   and	   expect	   binary	   normative	   bodily	   traits	   and	  
dichotomies.	  	  
215	  A	  group	  of	  inspiring	  works	  from	  transgender	  jurisprudence	  and	  political	  philosophy	  have	  recently	  
emerged	  to	  challenge	  the	  binarist	  hegemony	  of	  sex,	  gender	  and	  sexual	  desire	   in	   law.	  For	  example,	  
Andrew	  N.	  Sharpe	  argues	  that	  transsexuality	  not	  only	  challenges	  heterosexism	  but	  also	  casts	  doubt	  
on	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  coherence	  of	  certain	  forms	  of	  gay	  identity	  that	  exclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  
‘transsexual	   homosexual’.	   See	   Andrew	   N.	   Sharpe,	   ‘Institutionalizing	   Heterosexuality:	   The	   Legal	  
Exclusion	   of	   “Impossible’’	   (Trans)	   sexualities’,	   in	   Leslie	  Moran,	   Daniel	  Monk,	   and	   Sarah	   Beresford	  
eds.,	   Legal	   Queeries:	   Lesbian,	   Gay	   and	   Transgender	   Legal	   Studies	   (London:	   Cassell,1998),	   26-­‐41.	  
There	  are	  other	   important	  recent	  works	  on	  transsexuality	   jurisprudence.	  For	  example,	  see	  Stephen	  
Whittle,	   ‘Gemeinschaftsfremden-­‐	  or	  How	  to	  Be	  Shafted	  by	  Your	  Friends:	  Sterilization	  Requirements	  
and	  Legal	  Status	  Recognition	  for	  the	  Transsexual’,	  in	  Leslie	  Moran,	  Daniel	  Monk	  and	  Sarah	  Beresford	  
eds.,	   Legal	   Queeries:	   Lesbian,	   Gay	   and	   Transgender	   Legal	   Studies	   (London:	   Cassell,	   1998),	   42-­‐56;	  
Andrew	   N.	   Sharpe,	   ‘Transgender	   Jurisprudence	   and	   the	   Spectre	   of	   Homosexuality’,	   Australian	  
Feminist	  Law	  Journal	  14	  (2000),	  23-­‐37;	  Paisley	  Currah,	  ‘The	  Transgender	  Rights	  Imaginary’,	  in	  Martha	  
Albertson	   Fineman,	   Jack	   E.	   Jackson,	   and	   Adam	   p.	   Romero	   eds.,	   Feminist	   and	   Queer	   Legal	   Theory:	  
Intimate	  Encounters,	  Uncomfortable	  Conversations	  (Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2009)	  245-­‐258.	  	  
184	  
	  
concepts	  of	  oppression	  and	  subordination	  are	  still	  useful	   in	  sexual	   justice	  projects.	  
Also,	   I	   agree	   with	   subordination	   feminism	   that	   we	   need	   to	   address	   systematic	  
gender	  oppression	  and	  injustices.	   	  However,	   I	  also	  argue	  that	  what	  we	  require	  is	  a	  
complex	   and	  multidimensional	   idea	   of	   gender	   oppression	   rather	   than	   a	   unilateral	  
concept	   of	   gender	   oppression.	   I	   argue	   that	   by	   employing	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	  
concept	   of	   gender	   oppression,	   we	   can	   avoid	   the	   weakness	   of	   subordination	  
feminism	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  keep	  the	  problems	  of	  systematic	  gender	   injustices	  
and	   oppression	   in	   sight	   without	   having	   to	   suspend	   the	   use	   of	   the	   ideas	   of	  
oppression	   and	   subordination.	   I	   argue	   that	   these	   kinds	   of	   concepts	   of	   gender	  
oppression	   and	   gender	   subordination	   are	   useful	   to	  my	   proposed	   queer	   humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  	  
The	   second	  major	   difference	   between	  my	   project	   and	  Halley’s	   is	   that	   on	   the	   one	  
hand	  I	  agree	  with	  her	  that	  we	  ought	  not	  to	  treat	  our	  theory	  as	  having	  the	  ultimate	  
authority,	  or	  the	  only	  way	  to	  think	  about	  sexuality	  and	  gender,	  or	  as	  a	  complete	  and	  
closed	  normative	  system.216	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   I	  do	  not	  agree	  this	  means	  that	  we	  
should	  not	  aim	  to	  explore	  the	  moral	  grounds	  and	  the	  normative	  foundations	  of	  our	  
projects	   for	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics.	   Like	   some	   other	   queer	   theorists,	  
Halley’s	  project	  implies	  some	  normative	  values	  and	  commitments	  but	  she	  generally	  
does	  not	  clearly	  elaborate	  the	  normative	  grounds	  of	  her	  queer	  project.217	  	  She	  faces	  
similar	   problems	   as	   Butler	   or	   Warner,	   as	   argued	   earlier.	   There	   are	   normative	  
questions	   they	   do	   not	   sufficiently	   answer,	   such	   as	   why	   we	   need	   to	   seek	   more	  
possibilities,	   why	   certain	   sexual	   and	   gender	   constraints	   ought	   to	   be	   resisted,	   and	  
ethically	  and	  morally,	  why	  we	  need	  queer	  or	  critical	  thinking	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
politics.	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   need	   to	   try	   to	   think	   about	   and	   elaborate	   upon	   the	  
normative	   grounds	   and	   implications	   of	   our	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	  
projects.	  Also,	  some	  of	  the	  liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  such	  as	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Halley,	  n	  42	  above,	  9.	  
217	  For	   example,	   although	   Halley	   endorses	   a	   sex-­‐positive	   and	   sex-­‐affirmative	   position	   in	   sexual	  
politics,	  she	  does	  not	  elucidate	  the	  normative	  foundation	  of	  sex-­‐positive	  politics	  and	  public	  policies.	  
See	  Janet	  Halley,	  ‘Queer	  Theory	  by	  Men’,	  in	  Martha	  Albertson	  Fineman,	  Jack	  E.	  Jackson,	  and	  Adam	  P.	  
Romero	  eds.,	  Feminist	   and	  Queer	   Legal	   Theory:	   Intimate	  Encounters,	  Uncomfortable	  Conversations	  
(Surrey:	  Ashgate,	  2009),	  26-­‐27.	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theories,	  can	  be	  inspiring	  in	  this	  respect.	  However,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  highlight	  also	  that	  
by	  trying	  to	  articulate	  the	  normative	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  justice	  projects,	  we	  need	  not	  
treat	   our	   normative	   projects	   as	   absolute,	   complete,	   unchanging	   and	   a	   foreclosed	  
system.	   We	   still	   need	   to	   keep	   our	   normative	   elaboration	   and	   analysis	   open	   for	  
challenge,	  critical	  reflection	  and	  adjustment.	  We	  need	  to	  admit	  and	  to	  acknowledge	  
that	   our	   normative	   sexual	   justice	   project	   is	   never	   complete	   and	   never	   totally	  
certain.	  As	  Butler	  and	  Halley	  point	  out,	  there	  is	  always	  some	  unknowingness	  in	  the	  
future	  and	  we	  need	   to	   keep	  our	  project	  open	   for	   reflection	  and	   re-­‐examination.	   I	  
will	  discuss	  the	  normative	  grounds	  for	  projects	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  sexual	  politics	  in	  
the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
There	   is	  one	  more	  point	   I	   can	  make	  on	  Halley’s	  project.	   She	  presents	   a	  definition	  
and	  description	  of	  ‘feminism’	  in	  modern	  American	  society.	  However,	  I	  suggest	  that	  
her	   analysis	   of	   feminism	   is	   better	   understood	   as	   an	   analysis	   and	   summary	   of	  
‘subordination	   feminisms.’	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   can	   be	   feminisms	  without	   holding	  
the	  overarching	  subordination	  thinking	  of	  women	  or	  femininity.	  I	  suggested	  that	  this	  
is	   the	   kind	  of	   feminism	   that	   is	   consistent	   and	   in	   accordance	  with	   queer	   humanist	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   One	   example	   is	   the	   sexual	   harassment	   theory	  
proposed	   by	   Katherine	   M.	   Franke.218 	  However,	   I	   agree	   with	   Halley	   that	   the	  
dominant	  trend	  in	  modern	  feminism	  is	  the	  subordination	  feminist	  approach.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   critically	   evaluated	   the	   strengths	   and	   limitations	   of	   two	  
approaches	   to	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics:	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	  
and	   queer	   theory.	   I	   argued	   that	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   have	   the	   strength	   of	  
noticing	  the	  problem	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  qua	  men.	  However,	  they	  tend	  to	  
assume	   a	   heterocentrist	   perspective	   with	   respect	   men.	   Therefore	   some	  
heteronormative	  ideologies	  are	  still	  unchallenged	  in	  this	  approach.	  They	  also	  do	  not	  
systematically	  elaborate	  the	  normative	  foundation	  of	  their	  humanist	  men’s	  studies.	  
I	   argue	   that	   they	  would	  benefit	   from	   incorporating	   some	  perspectives	   from	  queer	  
theory	   and	   liberal	   theory	   of	   sexual	   justice.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	   theorists	   provide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  Franke,	  n	  117	  above,	  691-­‐772.	  
186	  
	  
useful	   theoretic	   tools	   to	   unravel	   and	   unsettle	   the	   naturalised	   and	   moralised	  
heteronormativity	  in	  our	  sexual	  and	  gendered	  lives.	  Queer	  theorists	  to	  some	  extent	  
address	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   oversimplified	   and	   reductionist	   approach	   of	  
subordination	  feminism	  by	  attending	  to	  the	  perspectives	  from	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  
non-­‐conforming	   minorities	   and	   by	   problematising	   the	   essentialist	   construction	   of	  
sexuality	   and	   gender.	   However	   queer	   feminism	   is	   still	   limited	   by	   subordination	  
feminist	   ideologies	   in	   thinking	   about	   gender	   justice.	   I	   argue	   that	   Halley’s	   queer	  
theory	  is	  inspiring	  but	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  we	  need	  to	  avoid	  resorting	  to	  the	  concepts	  
of	  oppression	  and	  subordination	  in	  sexual	  politics	  projects.	  I	  also	  point	  out	  that	  most	  
queer	  theory,	  despite	  normative	  concerns,	  fails	  to	  elaborate	  and	  address	  normative	  
implications	  and	  grounds	  in	  their	  queer	  projects.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  fundamental	  questions	  for	   issues	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	   justice	   is	  
the	   moral	   foundation	   for	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   projects.	   What	   is	  
wrongfulness	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  bias,	  discrimination	  and	  oppression?	  	  Why	  do	  
we	  need	  to	  address	  heteronormative	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  oppression?	  We	  need	  to	  
reflect	   on	   the	   normative	   foundation	   and	   implications	   of	   our	   legal	   and	   political	  
projects	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  topic	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  5   Liberal	  Justice	  Theories	  and	  Liberal	  Gay	  Rights	  Theories	  on	  
Sexual	  Justice	  
5.1   Introduction	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   I	   elaborated	   the	   need	   and	   usefulness	   of	   employing	   a	  
queer/critical	  approach	  to	  unravel	  and	  destabilise	  heteronormativity	   in	  projects	  of	  
sexual	   politics.	   I	   also	   argued	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   subordination	   feminist	  
commitment	  to	  challenge	  gender	  oppression	  of	  women,	  we	  could	  also	  broaden	  our	  
concerns	   by	   considering	   the	   findings	   of	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  critically	  evaluated	  the	  possible	  limitations	  of	  some	  projects	  of	  queer	  
theory	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  insufficiencies	  
in	  some	  queer	  projects	  or	  in	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  is	  their	  relative	  
lack	   of	   exploration	   and	   clarification	   of	   the	   normative	   grounds,	   values	   and	  
implications	  of	  their	  studies.	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  follow	  a	  double	  path	  in	  sexual	  
politics;	  we	  not	  only	  need	  critical/queer	  thinking	  in	  sexual	  politics,	  we	  also	  need	  to	  
reflect	   on	   the	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   moral/normative	   claims	   and	   concerns	   in	   our	  
projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice.	   Queer	   projects	   generally	   focus	   on	  
critical	  thinking	  and	  inquiries	  in	  sexual	  politics;	  the	  normative	  implications	  and	  moral	  
grounds	  are	  not	  addressed	  to	  a	  significant	  degree.	  Humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  
studies,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  either	  concentrate	  on	  presenting	  a	  description	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   of	   men/masculinities,	   or	   fail	   to	   elucidate	   the	   normative	   values	   and	  
grounds	   of	   their	   studies.	   I	   argue	   for	   the	   perspectives	   inspired	   by	   queer	   humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	   studies,	  which	  emphasise	   the	  need	   for	  critical	   thinking,	   the	  
concerns	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  all	  gender	  types,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  reflect	  morally	  
and	   normatively	   on	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   to	   be	   taken	  
seriously.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   aim	   to	   explore	   normative	   questions	   of	   sexual	   politics,	  
such	  as	  what	  is	  the	  normative	  foundation	  for	  theories,	  policies,	  and	  laws	  that	  aim	  to	  
challenge	   the	   norms,	   ideologies	   and	   culture	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality?	   Why	  
should	   heteronormative	   law,	   policies,	   norms	   and	   ideologies	   to	   be	   destructed,	  
unsettled	   and	   unravelled?	   Why	   should	   we	   resist	   and	   problematise	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heteronormativity?	   What	   should	   we	   rework	   in	   terms	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
normativity	  within	  heteronormativity?	  
To	   answer	   these	   questions	   we	   need	   to	   explore	   the	   normative	   values	   and	   ethical	  
implications	  of	   a	   sexual	  politics	   that	  questions	  normative	  heterosexuality.	   For	  me,	  
the	  arguments	  from	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  theories	  from	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  and	  Carlos	  A.	  
Ball	   are	   very	   useful	   and	   can	   be	   drawn	   upon	   in	   this	   topic.1	  Insights	   from	   some	  
feminist	   justice	   theorists	   such	   as	   Young,	   are	   also	   valuable	   as	   I	   already	   articulated	  
earlier	   in	   this	   thesis.2	  I	   focus	  on	  discussing	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice	   in	   this	  
chapter.	   I	   critically	   review	   how	   some	   visible	   liberal	   justice	   scholars	   discuss	   the	  
normative	  foundation	  of	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  3	  I	  ask	  what	  we	  
can	   learn	   from	   these	   discussions	   in	   law	   and	   sexual	   justice;	   what	   are	   the	  
contributions	  and	  possible	  limitations	  of	  their	  projects?	  
There	   are	   different	   liberal	   approaches	   to	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexual	   justice.	  
Bamforth	  provides	  a	  very	  useful	  and	   insightful	   critical	  evaluation	  of	  various	   liberal	  
approaches	   to	   sexual	   justice.4	  I	  will	   not	   repeat	  his	  arguments	  here	  as	   I	   agree	  with	  
most	   of	   his	   evaluation	   and	   comments.	   For	   example,	   I	   agree	   with	   Bamforth’s	  
critiques	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  David	  A.	  J.	  Richards’	  respect	  for	  privacy	  arguments	  on	  
issues	   of	   gay	   rights.	   As	   Bamforth	   points	   out,	   if	  we	   read	  Richards’	   argument	   as	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Nicholas	  Bamforth,	  Sexuality,	  Morals	  and	  Justice:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Rights	  Law	  (London,	  
Washington	  D.C.:	  Cassell,	  1997);	  Carlos	  A.	  Ball,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Gay	  Rights:	  An	  Exploration	  in	  Political	  
Philosophy	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2003).	  
2	  Young’s	  concept	  of	  oppression	   is	  adopted	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	  denote	   structural	   sexuality	  and	  gender	  
constraints,	  prejudices	  and	  injustices.	  See	  section	  2.3	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
3	  Although	   liberalism	   itself	   is	  not	  a	  united	  school	  of	  thought	  without	   internal	  debates	  and	  conflicts,	  
generally	   speaking,	   contemporary	   liberal	   theories	   in	   politics	   are	   of	   theoretic	   tradition	   and	   schools	  
advocate	  the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  various	  moral	  and	  political	  values	  such	  as	  personal	  liberty,	  
autonomy	   and	   equality	   in	   law	   and	   politics.	   Different	   liberals	   therefore	   often	   have	   a	   different	  
emphasis	   or	   proposal	   of	   how	   to	   best	   promote	   liberty	   and	   equality.	   See	  Alan	   Ryan,	   ‘Liberalism’,	   in	  
Rebert	   E.	   Goodin	   and	   Philip	   Pettit	   eds.,	   A	   Companion	   to	   Contemporary	   Political	   Philosophy,	   2nd	  
Edition	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  2007),	  360-­‐365.	  	  
4	  Bamforth	   has	   analysed	   and	   reviewed	   various	   liberal	   approaches	   to	   gay	   rights,	   including	   liberal	  
immutability	   arguments,	   liberal	   respect	   for	   privacy	   arguments,	   liberationist	   sexual	   theory,	   liberal	  
equality	  arguments	  and	   liberal	  autonomy	  arguments.	  He	  argues	  that	   the	   last	  approach	   is	   the	  more	  
preferred	   as	   other	   approaches	   have	   some	   insufficiencies	   in	   the	   justification	   of	   gay	   rights.	   See	  
Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  196-­‐271.	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anti-­‐perfectionist	  project,	  5	  	  	  then	  Richards	  is	  holding	  an	  implausible	  position	  on	  ‘the	  
separation	   of	   law	   and	  morals.’	   If	   we	   read	   Richards’	   arguments	   as	   a	   perfectionist	  
project,	   then	   there	   are	   internal	   inconsistencies	   in	   his	   privacy	   arguments.6	  Also,	   I	  
agree	  with	  Bamforth’s	  comments	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  Richard	  D.	  Mohr’s	  arguments	  
for	   respect	   for	   privacy	   is	   that	   his	   privacy	   arguments	   are	   premised	   on	   other	  more	  
fundamental	  moral	  values	  such	  as	  human	  dignity	  or	  equal	  respect.	  Also,	  Mohr	  does	  
not	   clearly	   and	   coherently	   present	   the	   arguments	   regarding	   dignity	   or	   equal	  
respect.7	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  critically	  evaluate	  four	  leading	  liberal	  lawyers’	  approaches	  
to	   sexual	   justice:	  Hart,	  Dworkin,	  Bamforth	  and	  Ball.	   I	   first	   critically	   review	  H.	   L.	  A.	  
Hart’s	   arguments	   on	   law,	   morality	   and	   sexuality;	   although	   providing	   a	   great	  
contribution,	   are	  nevertheless	   limited	  by	  his	   failing	   to	  ground	  his	   liberal	   theory	  of	  
sexuality	   on	   substantive	   moral	   values.	   I	   then	   critically	   examine	   Dworkin’s	   later	  
liberal	   theory	  of	   justice	  and	   its	   implications	   for	  sexual	   justice.	   I	  hold	   that	  although	  
his	   liberal	   justice	   theory	   has	   potential	   in	   providing	   us	   a	   valuable	   normative	  
justification	  for	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  his	  theory	  nevertheless	  leaves	  
many	  aspects	  of	  structural	  heteronormative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  ideologies,	  norms,	  
practices	   and	   prejudices,	   unchallenged.	   Then	   I	   discuss	   Bamforth	   and	   Ball’s	   liberal	  
gay	   rights	   theories	   that,	   I	   argue,	   provide	   the	   most	   convincing	   justifications	   for	  
projects	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Anti-­‐perfectionist	   liberals	   such	  as	  political	   liberal	   John	  Rawls	  argues	   for	  a	   restriction	  of	   the	  use	  of	  
comprehensive	   moral	   and	   philosophical	   perspectives	   and	   principles	   in	   the	   justification	   of	   public	  
policies	  and	   law.	  See	   John	  Rawls,	  Political	   Liberalism,	   (Columbia	  University	  Press:	  New	  York,	  1996),	  
xliii-­‐xlvi.	   Liberal	   perfectionism	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   opposes	   political	   liberalist	   separation	   theses	   and	  
emphasises	   the	   need	   for	   substantive	   moral	   evaluation	   in	   law	   and	   politics.	   Liberal	   projects	   from	  
Joseph	  Raz	  and	  Nicolas	  Bamforth	  are	  examples	  of	  perfectionist	  liberal	  projects	  in	  law	  and	  politics.	  Raz	  
defends	   a	   political	   morality	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   personal	   autonomy.	   See	   Joseph	   Raz,	   The	  
Morality	   of	   Freedom	   (Oxford:	   Clarendon	   Press,	   1986);	   Joseph	   Raz,	   ‘Liberty	   and	   Trust’,	   in	   George,	  
Robert	  P.	  ed.,	  Natural	  Law,	  Liberalism,	  and	  Morality:	  Contemporary	  Essays	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  
1996),	  113-­‐130.	  Bamforth’s	  liberal	  theory	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
6	  Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  209-­‐212.	  
7	  Ibid.,	  216-­‐219.	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5.2   Hart’s	  liberal	  jurisprudence	  of	  sexuality	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  critically	  review	  Hart’s	  liberal	  approach	  to	  law	  and	  sexual	  morality.	  
Inspired	  by	  J.	  S.	  Mill’s	  famous	  ‘harm	  principle’,8	  Hart	  opposes	  the	  legal	  enforcement	  
of	  morality	  and	  suggests	  that	  liberty	  requires	  respect	  for	  one’s	  private	  life.9	  	  
Respect	  for	  privacy	  is	  an	  important	  and	  popular	  approach	  adopted	  by	  liberal	  lawyers	  
in	  LGBT	  campaigns	  against	  intrusive	  state	  power.	  In	  1957	  the	  Wolfenden	  Report	  in	  
the	  UK	  recommended	  partial	  decriminalisation	  of	  adult	  male	  homosexual	  practices	  
in	  private	  by	   referring	   to	  a	   liberal	   concept	  of	   the	   respect	   for	  privacy.10	  The	   report	  
holds	  that	  ‘there	  must	  remain	  a	  realm	  of	  private	  morality	  and	  immorality	  which	  is,	  in	  
brief	  and	  crude	  terms,	  not	  the	  law’s	  business.’	  11	  	  
Mill,	  a	  classic	   liberal	  philosopher,	  explores	  the	  question	  of	  personal	   liberty	  and	  the	  
legitimate	   grounds	   of	   the	   state’s	   use	   of	   coercive	   power.	   Mill	   argues	   that	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   distinguish	   self-­‐regarding	   from	   other-­‐regarding	   behaviour	   when	  
reflecting	  on	   the	   legitimate	  use	  of	   state	  coercive	   law.12	  Self-­‐regarding	  conduct	   is	  a	  
person’s	  conduct	  that	  ‘affects	  the	  interests	  of	  no	  persons	  besides	  himself,	  or	  needs	  
not	   affect	   them[other	   persons]	   unless	   they	   like.’13	  An	   other-­‐regarding	   conduct	   is	  
conduct	  affecting	  others’	   interests.	  He	  argues	  that	  only	  the	  wrongfulness	  of	  other-­‐
regarding	   conduct	   can	   be	   legitimately	   subjected	   to	   the	   sanction	   of	   public	  
enforcement.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   self-­‐regarding	   conduct	   does	   not	   raise	   issues	   of	  
morality	  and	  justice,	  but	  rather	  of	  nobility	  and	  prudence,	  and	  hence	  this	  conduction	  
should	  not	  be	   subject	   to	  enforcement	  of	   compulsory	   standards	  by	   law	  and	  public	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  On	  Liberty	  and	  Other	  Essays,	  John	  Gray	  ed.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  
14.	  
9	  H.	  L.	  A.	  Hart,	  Law,	  Liberty	  and	  Morality	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1963),	  4-­‐5,	  46-­‐48,	  
10	  	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Homosexual	  Offences	  and	  Prostitution	  (London:	  HMSO,	  1957)	  
11	  Ibid.,	  Cmd.247,	  Par.61.	  For	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  usefulness	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  respect	  for	  
privacy	   arguments	   in	   areas	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gay	   rights,	   see	   Nicholas	   Bamforth,	   ’Same-­‐sex	  
Partnership:	  Arguments	  of	  Justice’,	  in	  Robert	  Wintemute	  and	  Mads	  Tønnesson	  Andenæs,	  eds.,	  Legal	  
recognition	  of	  same-­‐sex	  partnerships:	  A	  study	  of	  National,	  European	  and	  International	  Law.	  (Oxford:	  
Hart	  Publishing,	  2001),	  33-­‐38.	  
12	  Mill,	  n	  8	  above,	  83-­‐85.	  
13	  Ibid.,	  84,	  104.	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power.14	  Mill	   intends	   to	   elaborate	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   a	   domain	   of	   liberty	   in	  
private	   that	   should	   be	   left	   without	   the	   intervention	   of	   public	   coercion.15	  Only	  
conduct	   that	   infringes	   other	   members’	   legitimate	   advantages	   is	   subject	   to	   the	  
domain	   of	   possible	   state	   coercive	   intervention.	   Therefore,	   he	   famously	   proposed	  
the	  harm	  principle:	  	  
‘[T]he	  principle	  is	  that	  the	  sole	  end	  for	  which	  mankind	  are	  warranted,	  
individually	  or	  collectively,	  in	  interfering	  with	  the	  liberty	  of	  action	  of	  any	  
of	  their	  member,	  is	  self-­‐protection.	  The	  only	  purpose	  for	  which	  power	  can	  
be	  rightfully	  exercised	  over	  any	  member	  of	  a	  civilized	  community,	  against	  
his	  will,	  is	  to	  prevent	  harm	  to	  others.	  His	  own	  good,	  either	  physical	  or	  
moral,	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  warrant.’16	  	  
Inspired	  by	  Mill,	  Hart	  proposes	  a	  modified	  liberal	  jurisprudence	  based	  on	  the	  harm	  
principle.	   Hart	   agrees	   with	   Mill	   that	   the	   law	   should	   not	   enforce	   morality,17	  but	  
disagrees	  with	  Mill	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  legal	  paternalism	  and	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  
conduct	   that	  causes	  serious	  offence.18	  Hart	  defends	  a	   liberal	   jurisprudence	  against	  
the	   legal	   enforcement	   of	   private	   immoralities,	   but	   holds	   that	   paternalism	   and	  
offences	   to	  public	  decency	  could	  be	   legitimate	  grounds	   for	   legal	  enforcement.	  His	  
liberal	   jurisprudence	   of	   law	   and	   sexuality	   was	   developed	   during	   the	   debates	   he	  
exchanged	  with	  Lord	  Patrick	  Devlin	  from	  late	  1950s	  to	  1960s.	  
According	   to	  Devlin,	   society	   is	   justified	   in	   enforcing	   certain	   common	   standards	   or	  
popular	   morality	   as	   a	   means	   of	   self-­‐preservation.19	  He	   holds	   that	   social	   cohesion	  
depends	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  shared	  set	  of	  moral	  beliefs	  among	  its	  members.20	  Due	  
to	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   preservation	   of	   shared	   morality	   to	   the	   existence	   and	  
integration	   of	   society,	   he	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   legitimate	   for	   the	   state	   to	   resort	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  John	   Gray,	   ‘Introduction’,	   in	   John	   Stuart	   Mill	   On	   Liberty	   and	   Other	   Essays	   (Oxford:	   Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  1998),	  ix-­‐xiii.	  
15	  Ibid.,	  xv.	  
16	  Mill,	  n	  11	  above,	  14.	  
17	  Hart,	  n	  9	  above,	  4-­‐5.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  33-­‐34,	  41-­‐48.	  
19	  Patrick	  Devlin,	  The	  Enforcement	  of	  Morals	  (London:	  Oxford	  University,	  1965),	  11-­‐14.	  
20	  Ibid.,	  10,120.	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criminal	   law	   to	   enforce	   common	   morality.21	  This	   line	   of	   thinking	   implies	   that	  
homosexuality	   should	   be	   criminally	   punished	   in	   a	   society	  where	   homosexuality	   is	  
widely	  viewed	  as	  immoral.	  A	  further	  point	  is	  that	  Devlin	  thinks	  it	   is	  unnecessary	  to	  
defend	  legal	  enforcement	  of	  morality	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  substantive	  moral	  truth.	  For	  
him	   it	   is	   the	  requirement	  of	  social	  cohesion	  that	   justifies	  the	   legal	  enforcement	  of	  
morality,	  not	  moral	  truth.22	  Both	  liberal	  legal	  scholars	  and	  new	  natural	  law	  theorists	  
criticise	  Devlin’s	  arguments.	  New	  natural	   law	  theorist	  Robert	  P.	  George	  insists	  that	  
legal	   enforcement	   can	   never	   be	   justified	   without	   considering	   objective	   moral	  
values.23	  However,	  the	  moral	  criteria	  and	  the	  premises	  that	  George	  and	  other	  new	  
natural	  law	  lawyers	  rely	  upon	  in	  their	  theory	  of	  sexual	  morality	  are,	  as	  Bamforth	  and	  
Richards	   rightly	   point	   out,	   problematic,	   discriminatory	   and	   unappealing.24	  	   Hart	  
criticises	   Devlin	   for	   failing	   to	   provide	   sufficient	   empirical	   evidence	   to	   support	   the	  
‘disintegration	  thesis.’25	  Hart	  argues	  that	  changes	  in	  societal	  morality	  do	  occur	  from	  
time	  to	  time;	  however,	  they	  are	  not	  ‘tantamount	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  a	  society.’	  26	  
Hart	   then	   suggests	   a	   liberal	   jurisprudence	   inspired	   by	   Mill’s	   harm	   principle	   by	  
arguing	   for	   valuing	   individual	   liberty	   and	   opposing	   legal	   enforcement	   of	   private	  
moral	  wrongfulness.	  Hart	  holds	  that	  individual	  liberty	  should	  not	  be	  invaded	  unless	  
there	  are	  other	  legitimate	  grounds	  for	  legal	  intervention.	  However,	  unlike	  Mill	  who	  
holds	   that	   the	   only	   legitimate	   grounds	   for	   legal	   enforcement	   is	   the	   prevention	   of	  
harm	  to	  others,	  Hart	  provides	  three	  possible	  grounds	  that	  justify	  legal	  coercion	  that	  
restricts	   personal	   freedom:	   prevention	   harm	   to	   others,	   legal	   paternalism	   and	  
prevention	  of	  offensive	  acts	  in	  public.27	  Hart	  holds	  that	  private	  immorality	  per	  se	   is	  
not	  the	  proper	  area	  for	  criminal	  enforcement.28	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Ibid.,	  11-­‐14.	  
22	  Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  180;	  Robert	  P.	  George,	  Making	  Men	  Moral:	  Civil	  Liberties	  and	  Public	  Morality,	  
(Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  1993),	  53.	  
23	  George,	  Ibid.,	  71-­‐82.	  
24	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  and	  David	  A.	  J.	  Richards,	  Patriarchal	  Religion,	  Sexuality,	  And	  Gender:	  A	  Critique	  
of	  New	  Natural	  Law	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  190-­‐278.	  
25	  Hart,	  n	  9	  above,	  50-­‐52,	  82-­‐83.	  
26	  Ibid.,	  51.	  
27	  Ibid.,	  30-­‐34,	  38-­‐48.	  
28	  Ibid.,	  4-­‐5,	  45-­‐48.	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Different	  from	  Mill,	  Hart	  contends	  that	  legal	  paternalism	  and	  protection	  from	  public	  
indecency	   can	   also	   be	   grounds	   for	   coercive	   law.	   Hart	   defends	   legal	   paternalism	  
because	  there	  is	  ‘a	  general	  decline	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  individuals	  know	  their	  interests	  
best.’29	  Some	  choices	  or	  undertakings	  that	  people	  make	  are	  harmful	  to	  themselves.	  
Acts	  out	  of	  free	  choice	  and	  consent	  can	  be	  controlled	  by	  coercive	  legal	  regulations	  
for	   the	   prevention	   of	   grave	   self-­‐harm.30	  Personal	   liberty	   could	   be	   outweighed	   by	  
some	   other	   significant	   considerations	   of	   personal	   interest	   or	   welfare.	   Hart	   only	  
provides	  examples	  of	  physical	   (legal	   regulations	  of	  drugs)	  paternalism.31	  Hart	  does	  
not	   explicitly	   state	   whether	   he	   would	   ever	   allow	   moral	   legal	   paternalism.	  
Nonetheless,	   he	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	  moral	   harm	   is	   an	   uncertain	   idea	   so	  moral	  
paternalism	  is	  thus	  problematic.	  	  
The	  third	  reason	  for	  the	  legitimate	  justification	  of	  legal	  enforcement	  for	  Hart	  is	  the	  
offence	   principle.	   Hart	   thinks	   that	   criminal	   law	   could	   intervene	   in	   cases	   of	  
‘protection	   from	  shock	  or	  offence	   to	   feelings	   caused	  by	   some	  public	  display.’32	  He	  
holds	  that	  bigamy	  and	  polygamy	  are	  punishable	  not	  because	  of	  their	   immoralities,	  
but	  because	  of	   their	  serious	  offence	  or	  nuisance	  to	  others.33	  He	  argues	  that	   ‘[I]t	   is	  
important	  to	  see	  that	  if,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  bigamy,	  the	  law	  intervenes	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  
religious	   sensibilities	   from	  outrage	  by	   a	  public	   act.’34	  Bigamy	   is	   punishable	  neither	  
due	  to	   its	   irreligiousness	  nor	   immorality	  but	   the	  offence	  and	  nuisance	   it	  causes	   to	  
the	   public.35	  According	   to	   Hart,	   because	   immediate	   and	   public	   offensiveness	   is	  
present	   in	   the	   case	   of	   public	   sex,	   soliciting	   on	   street,	   public	   displaying	   of	  
pornography,	   bigamy,	   or	   public	   homosexual	   behaviour,	   prohibitions	   of	   these	   acts	  
could	  be	  enforced	  by	  criminal	  law	  while	  immoral	  sex	  in	  private	  between	  consenting	  
adults	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  punished	  by	  criminal	  law.36	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Ibid.,	  32.	  
30	  Ibid.,	  32-­‐33.	  
31	  Ibid.,	  32.	  
32	  Ibid.,	  47.	  
33	  Ibid.,	  41-­‐45.	  
34	  Ibid.,	  41.	  
35	  Ibid.,41.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  41-­‐48.	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I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  Hart	  does	  not	  pay	  enough	  attention	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  
the	  outrage	  of	   the	  public	  holds	  any	   rational	   foundation.	  Nor	  does	  he	  emphasise	  a	  
critical	   perspective	   by	   which	   to	   challenge	   whether	   popular	   public	   feelings	   are	  
products	   of	   oppressive	   heteronormative	   ideologies	   and	   biases.	   Hart’s	   liberal	  
jurisprudence	   is	   at	   risk	   of	   endorsing	   and	   perpetuating	   pervasive	   and	   influential	  
heteronormative	  norms	  or	  homophobic	  rules	  in	  public	  lives	  because	  his	  theory	  fails	  
to	   challenge	   the	   power	   relations,	   the	   social	   construction	   and	   the	   delusional	  
naturalness	   and	   taken-­‐for-­‐grantedness	   of	   some	   possible	   public	   bias	   and	  
stereotyping.	   Under	   Hart’s	   principle	   of	   offence,	   which	   relies	   on	   positive	   morality	  
(popular	  social	  morality)37	  as	  the	  standards	  for	  the	  law	  of	  public	  decency,	  same	  sex	  
behaviours	  in	  public	  like	  kissing	  or	  hand-­‐holding	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  offensive	  and	  be	  
forbidden	  in	  a	  homophobic	  society	  where	  homosexuality	  is	  deeply	  stigmatised	  by	  its	  
homophobic	  and	  oppressive	  social	  norms.	  Hence	  Hart’s	  liberal	  jurisprudence	  might	  
in	  reality	  endorse,	  rather	  than	  subvert,	  the	  problematic	  heterosexist	  popular	  culture	  
in	   the	   law	  and	  politics	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality.	   Furthermore,	   as	  Bamforth	   argues,	  
another	  major	   limitation	  of	  Hart’s	   project	   is	   his	   failure	   to	   address	   the	   substantive	  
moral	  justifications	  of	  the	  law	  about	  sexuality.38	  By	  adopting	  an	  approach	  towards	  a	  
separation	  of	  law	  and	  morality,39	  Hart	  is	  unable	  to	  clarify	  the	  moral	  wrongfulness	  of	  
some	  oppressive	  homophobic	  biases	  and	  heteronormative	  norms.	  Hart	  also	  fails	  to	  
acknowledge	   that	   legal	   paternalism	   or	   criminal	   punishment	   of	   public	   nuisances	  
often	   already	   entails	   and	   assumes	   some	   substantive	  moral	   judgements.	   They	   are	  
not	   pure	   neutral	   legal	   principles	   without	   moral	   judgements,	   as	   Hart	   assumes.40	  	  
Hart’s	   liberal	   jurisprudence	  on	  the	  one	  hand	   is	  an	   important	  breakthrough	   for	   the	  
oppressive	  homophobic	   law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   failing	   to	  
take	   a	   critical	   thinking	   approach	   and	   assuming	   the	   separation	   of	   law	   from	  
substantive	  moral	   inquiries	  makes	  his	  project	   vulnerable	   to	  heterosexism.	  Overall,	  
as	  Bamforth	  argues,	  the	  privacy	  arguments	  although	  holding	  some	  benefits,	  cannot	  
really	   explain	   the	   moral	   goodness	   and	   value	   foundation	   of	   same	   sex	   love	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Ibid.,	  20.	  
38	  Nicholas	  Bamforth,	  Sexuality,	  Morals	  and	  Justice:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Rights	  Law,	  134.	  
39	  Ibid.,	  132-­‐133.	  
40	  Ibid.,	  132-­‐3,	  143.	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intimate	   life	   and	   cannot	  properly	   justify	   the	  normative	   foundation	  of	   the	   law	  and	  
politics	  of	  gay	  rights.41	  	  
5.3   Dworkin’s	  theory	  of	  social	  justice	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  sexual	  justice	  
Dworkin’s	  early	   theory	  adopts	  a	  more	  anti-­‐perfectionist	  approach	   in	   jurisprudence	  
and	   political	   theory.	   He	   endorses	   a	   state	   neutrality	   principle	   by	   arguing	   that	  
‘political	   decisions	   must	   be,	   as	   far	   as	   is	   possible,	   independent	   of	   any	   particular	  
conception	  of	   the	  good	   life,	  or	  of	  what	  gives	  value	  to	   life.’	  42	  He	  contends	  that	  the	  
principle	   of	   political	   neutrality	   of	   the	   state	   requires	   the	   state	   to	   refrain	   from	  
imposing	  majoritarian	  moral	   standards	   on	   sexual	  minorities.43	  Perfectionist	   liberal	  
lawyers	   Bamforth	   and	   Ball	   both	   argue	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   neutral	   liberalism	   cannot	  
address	   the	   fundamental	   moral	   wrongfulness	   of	   homophobic	   laws	   and	   public	  
policies	   and	   is	   not	   the	   best	  way	   to	   advance	   the	   promotion	   and	   protection	   of	   gay	  
rights.44	  Later,	  Dworkin	  revised	  his	  position	  of	  political	  neutrality	  by	  shifting	  towards	  
liberal	   perfectionism	   in	   jurisprudence	   and	   political	   theory.	   In	   his	   later	   works,	   he	  
supports	   a	   political	   morality	   based	   on	   human	   dignity	   and	   its	   requirements	   of	  
personal	   autonomy/authenticity	   and	   equality.45	  I	   think	   his	   later	   position	   is	   more	  
inspiring	  and	  useful	  in	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  
without	  weaknesses.	  I	  will	  focus	  mostly	  on	  critically	  evaluating	  his	  later	  works.	  
Dworkin’s	   later	   theory	   of	   social	   justice	   theory	   is	   premised	   on	   his	   idea	   of	   human	  
dignity	  and	  its	  moral	  implications	  in	  human	  lives.	  He	  argues	  that	  to	  be	  able	  to	  best	  
explain	  the	  moral	  meanings,	  values	  and	  normative	  implications	  of	  human	  lives,	  we	  
need	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   dignity	   and	   its	   two	  moral	   principles.46	  He	   argues	   that	  
there	  are	  two	  fundamental	  ethical	  requirements	  and	  implications	  of	  human	  dignity:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Ibid.,	  206-­‐220;	  Bamforth,	  n	  11	  above,	  33-­‐38.	  
42	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Principle	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  191.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  196-­‐197,	  366-­‐371.	  
44	  Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  135-­‐136,	  212-­‐220;	  Carlos	  A.	  Ball,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Gay	  Rights:	  An	  Exploration	  
in	  Political	  Philosophy	  (Routledge:	  London,	  2003),	  30-­‐37.	  
45	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  Justice	  for	  Hedgehogs	  (Harvard	  University	  Press:	  Cambridge,	  2011),	  1-­‐19.	  
46	  Ibid.,	  14-­‐15,	  191-­‐218.	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self-­‐respect	   and	   authenticity.47	  	   In	   personal	  moral	   life	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐respect	  
means:	   ‘[e]ach	  person	  must	   take	  his	  own	   life	  seriously:	  he	  must	  accept	  that	   it	   is	  a	  
matter	  of	  importance	  that	  his	  life	  be	  a	  successful	  performance	  rather	  than	  a	  wasted	  
opportunity.’48	  He	   argues	   that	   people	   have	   an	   ethical	   responsibility	   to	   treat	   their	  
lives,	  bodies,	   talents	  and	  existence	  seriously	  and	  to	  grasp	  the	  opportunities	  to	   live	  
meaningfully.	   The	   principle	   of	   authenticity	   means	   ‘[e]ach	   person	   has	   a	   special,	  
personal	  responsibility	  for	  identifying	  what	  counts	  as	  success	  in	  his	  own	  life;	  he	  has	  
a	  personal	  responsibility	  to	  create	  that	  life	  through	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  or	  style	  that	  
he	   himself	   endorses.’49	  The	   principle	   of	   authenticity	   asks	   us	   to	   make	   our	   own	  
decisions	   of	   how	   to	   best	   use	   our	   lives.	   Dworkin	   himself	   prefers	   using	   the	   term	  
authenticity	  over	  autonomy:	   ‘Authenticity	  demands	  that,	  so	  far	  as	  decisions	  are	  to	  
be	  made	  about	  the	  best	  use	  to	  which	  a	  person’s	   life	  should	  be	  put,	  these	  must	  be	  
made	   by	   the	   person	   whose	   life	   it	   is.’50	  	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   ‘[a]uthenticity	   is	  
damaged	  when	  a	  person	  is	  made	  to	  accept	  someone	  else’s	  judgement	  in	  place	  of	  his	  
own	  about	  the	  values	  or	  goals	  his	  life	  should	  play.’51	  	  
Following	   the	   above	   arguments	   about	   human	   dignity	   and	   its	  moral	   principles,	  
Dworkin	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  two	  corresponding	  political	  principles	  in	  his	  liberal	  
justice	  project.52	  First,	  there	  is	  a	  requirement	  for	  the	  state’s	  respect	  for	  individual	  
freedom	   and	   responsibility	   in	   life-­‐planning,	   and	   decision-­‐making:	   a	   political	  
principle	   that	   is	   derived	   from	   the	   ethical	   principle	   of	   authenticity.53	  Second,	  
there	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  equal	  concern	  and	  respect	  by	  the	  government	  towards	  
all	  citizens.54	  This	  political	  principle	  of	  equal	  concern	  and	  respect	  is	  related	  to	  the	  
ethical	  principle	  of	  self-­‐respect	  in	  personal	  life.	  He	  argues	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Ibid.,	  195.	  
48	  Ibid.,	  203.	  
49	  Ibid.,	  204-­‐205.	  
50	  Ibid.,	  212.	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  Ibid.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  2.	  
53	  Ibid.,	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‘No	  government	  is	  legitimate	  unless	  it	  subscribes	  to	  two	  reigning	  
principles.	  First,	  it	  must	  show	  equal	  concern	  for	  the	  fate	  of	  every	  person	  
over	  whom	  it	  claims	  dominion.	  Second,	  it	  must	  respect	  fully	  the	  
responsibility	  and	  right	  of	  each	  person	  to	  decide	  for	  himself	  how	  to	  make	  
something	  valuable	  of	  his	  life.’55	  
Dworkin	   therefore	  proposes	  a	   liberal	   jurisprudence	  and	  political	   theory	  by	  arguing	  
for	  an	  equality	  of	  resources	  and	  respect	  for	  personal	  freedom	  and	  responsibility	  in	  
the	   law	  and	  politics.	  There	  are	  two	  major	  areas	  of	  social	   justice	  about	  which	  he	   is	  
particularly	   concerned.	   The	   first	   is	   about	   distributive	   justice	   of	   resources,	   and	   the	  
second,	  the	  protection	  of	  personal	  liberty.	  In	  issues	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  he	  argues	  
for	  adopting	  a	  model	  of	  equality	  of	  resources.	  He	  holds	  that	  liberal	  equality	  requires	  
equality	   of	   resources,	   not	   equality	   of	   outcome.56	  The	   principle	   of	   equal	   resources	  
treats	  people	  ‘as	  equals	  when	  it	  distributes	  or	  transfers	  so	  that	  no	  further	  transfer	  
would	   leave	   their	   shares	   of	   the	   total	   resources	   more	   equal.’57	  The	   underlying	  
rationale	   for	   adopting	   the	  model	   of	   equality	   of	   resources	   rather	   than	   equality	   of	  
outcome	   is	   the	  personality/circumstances	  distinction,	  or	   the	  ambition/endowment	  
distinction.58	  Dworkin	   contends	   that	   a	   society	   should	   partially	   compensate	   for	  
people	  who	  suffer	  from	  ‘brute	  bad	  lucks’,59	  but	  should	  also	  leave	  enough	  space	  for	  
people	  to	  make	  choices	  and	  face	  the	  consequences	  of	  their	  own	  decisions	  based	  on	  
personal	  preferences,	  ambitions	  or	   tastes.60	  Therefore,	   for	  example,	  while	   it	   is	   fair	  
to	   channel	   certain	   resources	   to	   disabled	   people,	   it	   would	   be	   inappropriate	   for	   a	  
government	  to	  cover	  a	  person’s	  extravagant	  tastes.61	  	  
His	  views	  lie	  in	  the	  area	  of	  distributive	  justice:	  the	  duty	  of	  a	  state	  and	  the	  law	  is	  to	  
make	   sure	   the	   redistribution	   of	   resources	   is	   based	   on	   a	   model	   of	   equality	   of	  
resources.	  He	   resorts	   to	   a	   hypothetical	   insurance	  market	   to	   speculate	   and	  decide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Ibid,	  2.	  
56	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  Sovereign	  Virtue:	  The	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  of	  Equality	  (Boston:	  Harvard	  University	  
Press,	  2000),	  65-­‐120.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  12.	  
58	  Ibid.,	  81-­‐89.	  
59	  Ibid.,	  73-­‐74,	  76-­‐78.	  
60	  Ibid.,	  71-­‐92.	  
61	  Ibid.,	  82.	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how	  much	  reasonable	  people	  would	  insure	  against	  different	  events	  of	  bad	  luck,	  risks	  
and	   inequalities	   according	   to	   the	   overall	   preferences	   of	   individuals	   in	   a	  
community.62	  In	  a	  hypothetical	  insurance	  market,	  people	  decide	  the	  premiums	  they	  
would	   like	   to	  pay	  against	  specific	  bad	   luck	  and	   inequalities	  according	   to	   their	  own	  
preferences	   and	   judgments.63	  However,	   they	   do	   not	   know	   their	   own	   or	   other	  
people’s	  exact	  rate	  of	  risks	  of	  bad	   luck	  or	   inequalities	   in	  question.	   	  Dworkin	  thinks	  
that	  through	  this	  insurance	  model	  we	  can	  ‘identify	  a	  top	  coverage	  level	  at	  which	  we	  
can	   sensibly	   assume	   that	   most	   people	   in	   our	   community	   would	   have	   chosen	   to	  
insure,	   given	   what	   we	   know	   about	   their	   needs	   and	   preferences,	   and	   given	   the	  
premium	   structure	   that	   coverage	   would	   require’. 64 	  Dworkin	   therefore	   uses	   a	  
hypothetical	   insurance	  market	   approach	   to	   speculate	   and	   decide	   how	   to	   allocate	  
benefits	  and	  burdens	  among	  citizens	  in	  real	  life	  social	  justice	  issues.	  He	  argues	  that	  
the	   results	   reflect	   ‘reasonable	   assumptions	   about	   overall	   preferences	   of	   the	  
community	  over	  risk	  and	  insurance.’65	  Dworkin’s	  approach	  to	  equality	  represents	  a	  
liberal	  approach	  by	  aiming	  to	  reconcile	  the	  respect	  of	  individual	  autonomy	  and	  the	  
concern	  of	  addressing	  social	  inequalities	  in	  society.	  	  	  
In	  respect	  of	  personal	  freedom,	  Dworkin	  holds	  that	  his	  liberal	  justice	  project	  would	  
require	  liberal	  tolerance.66	  As	  elaborated	  above,	  Dworkin	  argues	  that	  people	  should	  
be	  able	   to	  have	   the	  moral	   independence	  and	   freedom	  of	  decision-­‐making	   in	   their	  
own	   lives.67	  Liberal	   tolerance	   opposes	   any	   imposition	   of	   popular	   morality	   via	  
criminal	  law	  on	  minorities.68	  Indeed:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Ibid.,	  65-­‐119.	  
63	  Dworkin,	  n	  45	  above,	  356-­‐361.	  
64	  Ibid.,	  361.	  
65	  Ibid.	  
66	  Dworkin,	  n	  56	  above,	  211-­‐213;	  282-­‐283.	  	  
67	  Dworkin,	  n	  45	  above,	  211-­‐213.	  
68	  Dworkin,	  n	  56	  above,	  282-­‐283.	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‘People	  have	  the	  right	  not	  to	  suffer	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  
social	  goods	  and	  opportunities,	  including	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  liberties	  
permitted	  to	  them	  by	  the	  criminal	  law,	  just	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  their	  
officials	  or	  fellow-­‐citizens	  think	  that	  their	  opinions	  about	  the	  right	  way	  
for	  them	  to	  lead	  their	  own	  lives	  are	  ignoble	  or	  wrong.’69	  	  
Gay	   men	   and	   lesbians’	   sexual	   freedom	   should	   not	   be	   denied	   simply	   because	  
homosexuality	   is	   regarded	   as	   immoral	   by	   the	   majority	   in	   society.70	  	   Similarly,	   he	  
opposes	  moral	   paternalism	  on	   the	   same	   grounds	   of	   upholding	   liberal	   tolerance.71	  
Dworkin	   argues	   that	   liberal	   equality	   denies	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   outlawing	   human	  
behaviour	   simply	   because	   the	   state	   or	   the	   majorities	   find	   it	   demeaning	   or	  
corrupting.	   A	   liberal	   community	   can	   outlaw	   conduct	   under	   the	   requirements	   of	  
social	  justice,	  but	  not	  from	  the	  disapproval	  of	  others’	  moral	  tastes.72	  
I	  argue	  that	  Dworkin’s	  later	  elaboration	  of	  the	  two	  political	  requirements	  of	  liberal	  
justice:	   equal	   concern	   and	   respect,	   and	   respect	   for	   individual	   freedom	   and	  
responsibility	  could	  partially	  explain	  the	  moral	  grounds	  of	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  
and	  sexual	  justice	  if	  we	  accept	  his	  moral	  theory.73	  His	  ideas	  of	  equality	  of	  resources	  
and	   liberal	   toleration	   could	   partially	   tackle	   some	  of	   the	   inequalities	   in	   sexual	   and	  
gender	  lives.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  limitations	  in	  his	  project.	  	  
First,	   Dworkin	   tends	   to	   view	   political	   rights	   and	   human	   rights	   largely	   from	   a	  
perspective	   of	   protecting	   individual	   interests	   and	   freedom	   from	   collective	  
enforcement	  and	  actions.	  His	  arguments	  of	  liberal	  tolerance	  of	  homosexuality	  focus	  
almost	   exclusively	   on	   condemning	   arbitrary	   state	   invasion	   of	   sexual	   freedom	   of	  
sexual	  minorities.74	  Although	  resistance	  to	  a	  state’s	  violent	  coercive	  inference	  of	  gay	  
and	  lesbian	  people’s	  sexual	  freedom	  is	  very	  important,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  the	  core	  point	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  Dworkin,	  n	  42	  above,	  353.	  
70	  Dworkin,	  n	  56	  above,	  282.	  
71	  Ibid.,	  211-­‐225.	  
72	  Ibid.,	  211-­‐212.	  
73	  Dworkin,	  n	  45	  above,	  2.	  
74	  Dworkin,	  n	  56	  above,	  282-­‐283.	  	  
200	  
	  
of	   the	   injustices	   and	   oppression	   LGBT	   people	   face	   in	   everyday	   life.75	  What	   LGBT	  
people	   need	   goes	   far	   beyond	   simply	   liberal	   tolerance,	   as	   Dworkin	   assumes.	   His	  
sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics	   project	   does	   not	   go	   far	   enough	   to	   challenge	  
systematic	  heteronormative	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  norms	  and	  their	  negative	   impact	  
and	  constraints	  on	  LGBT	  people.	  Therefore,	  his	  idea	  of	  liberal	  toleration	  is	  of	  limited	  
usefulness	  in	  addressing	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  oppression.	  
Secondly,	   Dworkin	   focuses	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   addressing	   issues	   of	   equality	   of	  
material	  resources	   in	  distributive	   justice	  while	  marginalising	  other	   important	  areas	  
of	  social	  injustice.	  Many	  aspects	  of	  injustice	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  go	  beyond,	  and	  
are	   not	   limited	   to,	   the	   distribution	   of	  material	   resources,	   for	   example,	   sexist	   and	  
heterosexist	   prejudices,	   homophobic	   and	   gendered	   violence,	   or	   heteronormative	  
family	   law	   and	   public	   policies.	   Dworkin’s	   system	   ignores	   or	   marginalises	   non-­‐
material	  aspects	  of	  injustice	  and	  oppression	  in	  social	  life	  and	  leaves	  them	  generally	  
unaddressed	  in	  his	  project.	  
Feminist	   theories	   of	   social	   justice	   of	   Fraser	   or	   Young,	   for	   example,	   have	   the	  
advantage	  of	  going	  beyond	  the	  limited	  distributive	  model	  of	  material	  resources	  in	  a	  
theory	  of	  social	   justice	  and	  are	  therefore	  worth	  considering	  in	  this	  connection.	  For	  
instance,	   as	   elaborated	   above,	   Fraser	   argues	   that	   social	   justice	   projects	   need	   to	  
address	   injustices	  with	   regard	   to	  both	   resources	  and	   recognition.76	  	  A	  much	  wider	  
problem	   of	   social	   injustice	   could	   be	   acknowledged	   and	   addressed	   under	   Fraser’s	  
model.	  However,	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  limitations	  of	  Fraser	  and	  Young’s	  
projects,	   owing	   to	   their	   failure	   to	   address	   the	   problem	   of	   structural	   gender	  
injustices	   and	   oppression	   of	  men	   qua	   men.	  While	   I	   would	   agree	  with	   Fraser	   and	  
Young’s	   insights	   that	   social	   justice	   projects	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   reduced	   to	   issues	   of	  
resource	   redistribution,	   I	   also	   diverge	   from	   their	   projects	   by	   arguing	   in	   favour	   of	  
taking	  gender	  oppression	  and	  gender	  constraints	  on	  men	  qua	  men	  more	  seriously.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  See	   Beyond	   Tolerance:	   Making	   Sexual	   Orientation	   a	   Public	   Matter,	   Equality	   and	   Human	   Rights	  
Commission,	  2009.	  (Accessed:	  22	  August	  2014).	  
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/research/beyond_tolerance.pdf	  
76	  See	  my	  discussion	  in	  4.2.4	  in	  Chapter	  4.	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I	  argue	  that	  Dworkin’s	  theory	  not	  only	  fails	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  systematic	  
constraints	  placed	  on	  women	   in	  society,77	  but	  also	   that	  his	  project	   fails	   to	  address	  
the	  structural	  constraints	  placed	  on	  men	  and	  masculinity	  by	  heteronormativity.	  I	  use	  
an	   example	   of	   the	   heteronormative	   gender	   role	   of	   masculinity	   in	   the	   family	   to	  
illustrate	  this	  point.	   In	  heteronormative	  society	  and	  culture,	  men	  are	  still	  expected	  
to	   shoulder	   the	  major	  provider’s	   responsibilities	   in	   the	   (heterosexual)	   family.	  Men	  
are	  often	  expected	  to	  fulfil	  the	  gendered	  breadwinner	  responsibility	  by	  society	  and	  
by	   their	   partners.78	  Men	   take	  most	   unsocial	   jobs	   and	   the	  most	   dangerous	  work.79	  
They	   also	   tend	   to	  work	   longer	  hours	   and	   commute	  over	   longer	  distances.80	  These	  
formal	  and	  informal	  social,	  legal	  and	  cultural	  gender	  expectations	  of	  men	  have	  some	  
negative	  and	  constraining	   impacts	  on	  them,	  especially	  on	  working	  class	  and	  ethnic	  
minority	  men.81	  	   The	   expectation	   for	  men	   of	   being	   the	   normative	   provider	   has	   a	  
negative	   impact	  on	  men’s	   family	   lives.	   They	  have	   less	   time	  and	   receive	   less	   social	  
support	   to	   care	   for	   their	   children.	  Although	   it	   is	   important	   to	  address	   the	  earning	  
power	   inequalities	   in	   relationships,	   it	   is	   also	   an	   issue	   of	   social	   justice	   when	   one	  
gender	   is	  particularly	  disadvantaged	   in	  parenting	  and	   in	  parent-­‐child	   relationships.	  
When	   men	   are	   disproportionately	   imposed	   upon	   in	   terms	   of	   breadwinning	   in	  
heteronormativity,	   this	   can	   be	   an	   issue	   of	   social	   justice	   which	   is	   beyond	   pure	  
material	  injustice.	  As	  research	  indicates:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  For	  feminist	  discussion	  of	  structural	  injustices	  towards	  women	  in	  society,	  see,	  for	  example:	  Nancy	  
Fraser,	  ‘Feminist	  Politics	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Recognition:	  A	  Two-­‐dimensional	  Approach	  to	  Gender	  Justice’,	  
Studies	   in	   Social	   Justice	   1,	   no.	   1	   (2007):	   23-­‐35.Also,	   Iris	  Marion	   Young,	   Justice	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	  
Difference,	  (New	  Jersey:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  40-­‐65.	  
78	  Research	   show	   in	  many	   households	   and	  marriages,	  men’s	   economic	   ability	   is	   one	   of	   the	  major	  
concerns	  for	  their	  female	  partners.	  In	  heterosexual	  relationships,	  if	  men	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  earning	  
ability,	   their	   chance	   of	   getting	  married	   and	   staying	  married	   is	   dramatically	   decreased.	   ‘Most	  men	  
have	   little	   choice	   in	   how	   to	   spend	   their	   lives,	   being	   forced	   into	   full-­‐time	   continuous	   life-­‐long	  
employment	  career	  whether	  they	  like	  it	  or	  not,	  whether	  they	  take	  on	  the	  breadwinner	  role	  for	  a	  wife	  
and	   children	  or	  not.’	   See	  Catherine	  Hakim,	  Key	   Issues	   in	  Women’s	  Work:	   Female	  Diversity	   and	   the	  
Polarisation	  of	  Women’s	  Employment,	  (London,	  Glass	  House	  Press,	  2004),	  201.	  
79	  For	  example,	   in	   the	  UK	  men	  are	  more	  than	  20	  times	  more	   likely	   to	  suffer	  occupational	  mortality	  
than	  women.	  See	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistic,	  Statistical	  Bulletin:	  Occupational	  Mortality	  1991-­‐2000,	  
2009,	  3.	  
80	  Louie	  Burghes,	  Lynda	  Clarke,	  and	  Natalie	  Cronin,	  Fathers	  and	  Fatherhood	  in	  Britain	  (London,	  Family	  
Policy	  Studies	  Centre,	  1997),	  44-­‐46.	  
81	  Michael	  E.	  Lamb,	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Father	   in	  Child	  Development	   (New	  Jersey:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  
2010),	  296-­‐315.	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‘In	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  particularly	  southern	  Africa	  and	  Asia,	  men	  
work	  several	  hundreds	  of	  miles	  away	  from	  their	  homes	  to	  provide	  
sufficient	  income	  for	  their	  families.	  Many	  other	  men	  have	  to	  work	  long	  
hours,	  often	  in	  two	  jobs,	  to	  keep	  their	  families	  afloat.	  Under	  such	  
circumstances,	  hands-­‐on	  involvement	  with	  children	  is	  impossible.’82	  
In	  many	   societies	   it	   is	   mainly	   a	  man’s	   duty	   to	   work	   in	   the	   labour	  market	   and	   to	  
provide	  for	  their	  family.	  Fathers	  are	  defined	  and	  expected	  to	  be	  financial	  providers	  
within	   heteronormative	   culture.83	  When	   the	   budget	   is	   tight,	   many	   working	   class	  
men	   have	   to	   sacrifice	   their	   family	   life	   and	   time	  with	   children	   by	  working	   abroad,	  
during	   unsocial	   hours,	   managing	   double	   shifts,	   or	   risk	   their	   life	   and	   health	   by	  
working	   in	  unsafe,	   unpleasant	   and	  dangerous	  workplaces.84	  This	   kind	  of	   burden	   is	  
disproportionately	   imposed	  on	   fathers.	  Moreover,	   these	  working	   class	   fathers	   are	  
likely	   to	   be	   further	   disadvantaged	   following	   divorce	   or	   separation	   in	   respect	   of	  
parent-­‐child	  relations.	  They	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  become	  non-­‐resident	  parents	  under	  
current	   family	   law	   systems,	   which	   often	   assume	   the	   de	   facto	   primary	   caretaker	  
principle	   in	   separation.	   Since	   full-­‐time	  working	   fathers	   follow	   the	   expectations	   of	  
performing	   the	  primary	  breadwinning	  gender	   role	  and	  devote	   themselves	   to	   their	  
family	  as	   the	  primary	  provider,	   they	  are	  unlikely	   to	  be	  afforded	  an	  opportunity	  of	  
being	   the	   resident	   parent	   after	   separation.	   As	   a	   result,	   these	   full-­‐time	   working	  
fathers	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   further	   disadvantaged	   after	   separation	   in	   respect	   of	  
maintaining	  good	  personal	  relations	  and	  being	  involved	  with	  their	  children.85	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Ibid.,	  109.	  
83	  For	   example,	   an	   American	   study	   finds	   that	   the	   child	   support	   policies	   in	   the	   US	   show	   different	  
cultural	  expectations	  towards	  low	  income	  noncustodial	  fathers	  and	  mothers.	  The	  research	  finds	  that	  
‘regardless	  of	  how	  little	  a	  noncustodial	   father	  earns,	  he	  may	  be	  expected	  to	  provide	  some	  minimal	  
amount	  for	  the	  support	  of	  his	  children.	  Often	  the	  same	  is	  not	  required	  of	   low-­‐income	  noncustodial	  
mothers.’	   See	  Daniel	   R.	  Meyer	   and	   Steven	  Garasky,	   ‘Custodial	   Fathers:	  Myths,	   Realities,	   and	   Child	  
Support	  Policy’,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  the	  Family	  55,	  no.	  1	  (1993),	  87-­‐88.	  
84	  See	  n	  79	  above.	  
85 	  Edward	   Kruk,	   ‘Psychological	   and	   Structural	   Factors	   Contributing	   to	   the	   Disengagement	   of	  
Noncustodial	   Fathers	   after	   Divorce’,	   Family	   Court	   Review	   30,	   no.	   1	   (1992):	   81-­‐101;	   Alexander	  
Marardo,	  ‘Negotiating	  Shared	  Residence:	  The	  Experience	  of	  Separated	  Fathers	  in	  Britain	  and	  France’,	  
in	   Jo	  Bridgeman,	  Heather	  Keating	  and	  Graig	  Lind	  eds.,	  Regulating	  Family	  Responsibilities	  	  (Farnham:	  
Ashgate,	  2011),	  119-­‐136;	  Susan	  D.	  Stewart,	   ‘Nonresident	  Mothers'	  and	  Fathers'	  Social	  Contact	  with	  
Children’,	  Journal	   of	   Marriage	   and	   Family	  61,	   no.	   4	   (1999):	   894-­‐907;	   Lamb,	   n	   81	   above,	   180-­‐183;	  
Jonathan	  Bradshaw,	  Absent	  Fathers?	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1999),	  80-­‐98.	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The	  heteronormative	  gender	  norms	  tend	  to	  naturalise	  and	  unfairly	  burden	  women	  
with	  the	  caring	  role	  while	  devaluing	  men’s	  caring	  ability,	  motivation	  and	  work.86	  
	  ’Many	  custodial	  mothers	  face	  chronic	  strains	  due	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  solo	  
parenting	  and	  raising	  children	  on	  a	  reduced	  budget.	  Similarly,	  many	  
noncustodial	  fathers	  face	  chronic	  strains	  due	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  contact	  
with	  their	  children	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  maintaining	  close	  father-­‐child	  
relationships	  under	  conditions	  of	  limited	  access.’87	  	  
Heteronormative	  gender	  norms	  that	  define	  men	  as	  better	  providers,	   less	  able	  care	  
takers	   and	   women	   as	   better/natural	   caretakers,	   have	   negative	   and	   constraining	  
effects	   on	   both	   men	   and	   women.	   Liberals	   such	   as	   Dworkin	   do	   not	   fully	   address	  
these	   kinds	   of	   structural	   heteronormative	   injustices	   and	   constraints	   in	   his	   theory.	  
His	   project	   of	   sexual	   justice	   is	   of	   limited	   use	   in	   challenging	   the	   institutions	   and	  
norms	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  
Dworkin’s	  project	  of	  liberal	  justice	  not	  only	  has	  limited	  usefulness	  in	  addressing	  the	  
gender	  oppression	  of	  women,	  it	  also	  leaves	  structural	  gender	  constraints	  placed	  on	  
men	  unaddressed.	  A	  project	   for	   social	   justice	  with	   regard	   to	   sexuality	   and	  gender	  
ought	   to	  address	  women’s	  disproportionate	   share	  of	  domestic	   life	  and	  also	   tackle	  
the	  demand	  for	  men’s	  disproportionate	  burden	  of	  work	  and	  negative	  constraints	  on	  
their	   parental	   role	   and	   involvement	  with	   children.	   Furthermore,	   as	   argued	   above,	  
structural	   heteronormative	   injustices	   towards	   LGBT	   people	   are	   not	   sufficiently	  
challenged	   in	   Dworkin’s	   system	   of	   thought.	   By	   focusing	   narrowly	   on	   material	  
injustice,	   Dworkin’s	   social	   justice	   system	   fails	   to	   properly	   challenge	   broader	  
institutional	  and	  cultural	  heteronormative	  constraints,	  either	   for	  men,	   for	  women,	  
or	  for	  LGBT	  people.	  It	  also	  has	  limited	  use	  in	  unsettling	  heterosexism	  in	  society.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Pruett,	   Marsha	   Kline,	   Lauren	   A.	   Arthur,	   and	   Rachel	   Ebling,	   ‘The	   Hand	   That	   Rocks	   the	   Cradle:	  
Maternal	  Gatekeeping	  after	  Divorce’,	  Pace	  L.	  Rev.	  27,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  709-­‐739;	  Jay	  Fagan,	  and	  Marina	  
Barnett,	  ‘The	  Relationship	  Between	  Maternal	  Gatekeeping,	  Paternal	  Competence,	  Mothers'	  Attitudes	  
about	  the	  Father	  Role,	  and	  Father	  Involvement’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  24,	  no.	  8	  (2003):	  1020-­‐1043;	  
Sarah	  M.Allen,	   and	   Alan	   J.	   Hawkins,	   ‘Maternal	   Gatekeeping:	   Mothers'	   Beliefs	   and	   Behaviors	   That	  
Inhibit	  Greater	  Father	   Involvement	   in	  Family	  Work’,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  the	  Family	  61,	  (1999):	  
199-­‐212.	  	  
87	  Lamb,	  n	  81	  above,	  181.	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5.4   Liberal	  gay	  rights	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  critically	  review	  liberal	  gay	  rights’	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  focus	  
on	   engaging	   with	   the	   theories	   of	   two	   leading	   liberal	   gay	   rights	   theorists:	   Nicolas	  
Bamforth	   and	   Carlos	   A.	   Ball.	   This	   is	   because	   they	   present	   some	   of	   the	   most	  
sophisticated	  and	  persuasive	  arguments	  on	  issues	  of	  law	  and	  sexual	  justice	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  liberal	  theories	  of	  social	  justice.	  Their	  articulation	  and	  arguments	  for	  
the	   idea	   of	   sexual	   autonomy	   are	   particularly	   inspiring	   and	   valuable	   and	   can	   be	  
drawn	  upon	  to	  elucidate	  the	  implicit	  moral	  values	  in	  some	  projects	  of	  critical	  sexual	  
justice.	   Furthermore,	   Bamforth	   (together	   with	   David	   A.	   J.	   Richards)	   provides	   the	  
most	  systematic,	  convincing	  and	  eloquent	  critiques	  on	  the	  conservative	  new	  natural	  
law	  theory.88	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  some	  of	  the	  important	  insights	  from	  their	  arguments	  of	  
sexual	   autonomy.	   	   However,	   I	   also	   identify	   possible	   problems	   in	   some	   of	   their	  
arguments;	   I	   focus	  on	  two	  points.	  The	  first	   is	  those	  tendencies	  of	  some	  liberal	  gay	  
rights	   theories	   such	   as	   Balls’	   theory	   to	   imply	   or	   argue	   for	   a	   sexual	   hierarchy	   and	  
stratification	   in	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	   sexual	   justice.	   Certain	   sexual	   practices	   or	  
intimate	   relationships	   may	   be,	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly,	   prioritised	   in	   their	   sexual	  
justice	  projects,	  while	  others	  devalued.	  This	  might	  be	  an	  inevitable	  result	  in	  practical	  
law	   and	   politics	   as	   some	   distinctions	   and	   decision-­‐making	   is	   inevitable	   in	   the	  
practice	   of	   law	   and	   sexuality.	   However,	   I	   argue	   that	  when	   claiming	   or	   suggesting	  
some	  new	  sexual	  hierarchies,	  liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  justice	  might,	  consciously	  or	  
unconsciously,	  produce	  new	  levels	  of	  exclusion	  or	  marginalisation	  in	  sexual	  politics	  
and	   in	   LGBT	   communities.	   Secondly,	   some	   of	   the	   theories	   and	   arguments	   about	  
gender	   injustices	   and	   gender	   oppression	   in	   liberal	   theories	   of	   gay	   rights	   are	  
significantly	   influenced	   by	   some	   kinds	   of	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   and	  
approaches.	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  always	  unproblematic	  to	  generally	  adopt	  
subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  in	  thinking	  about	  sexuality,	  gender,	  justice	  and	  
law.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  	  Nicholas	  Bamforth	  and	  David	  A.	  J.	  Richards	  co-­‐author	  Patriarchal	  Religion,	  Sexuality,	  And	  Gender:	  
A	  Critique	  of	  New	  Natural	  Law.	  In	  this	  inspiring	  book,	  Bamforth	  and	  Richards	  systematically	  examine	  
and	  criticise	  the	  limitations,	  faults,	  inconsistences	  and	  prejudices	  in	  the	  conservative	  new	  natural	  law	  
theory.	  See	  Bamforth	  and	  Richards,	  n	  24	  above.	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Contemporary	   normative	   legal	   and	   political	   theorists	   adopt	   different	   principles	   of	  
social	   justice	  and	  political	  morality	  and	  therefore	  hold	  different	  opinions	  and	  ideas	  
of	  how	  law	  and	  public	  policies	  ought	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  sexuality.	  Principles	  
of	   political	   morality	   are	   those	   principles	   that	   guide	   the	   political	   actions	   of	   public	  
institutions	   and	   state	   power,	   including	   the	   practice	   of	   legal	   institutions.89	  Major	  
normative	   legal	   and	   political	   theorists	   develop	   various	   views	   of	   the	   requirements	  
and	  meaning	   of	   political	  morality	   in	  modern	   democratic	   societies.	   Applying	   these	  
conceptions	   of	   political	   morality	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender,	   normative	  
theorists	  advance	  various	  arguments	  about	  how	  law	  and	  state’	  power	  ought	  to	  be	  
employed	  in	  areas	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  in	  modern	  democratic	  societies.	  	  
Liberal	  gay	  rights	  theorist	  Bamforth	  provides	  one	  of	  the	  most	  convincing	  arguments	  
for	   the	   normative	   justification	   of	   sexual	   justice	   law.	   Bamforth	   argues	   that	   the	  
fundamental	   justification	   and	   the	   underpinning	   value	   for	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   of	  
sexual	   justice	   in	   modern	   democratic	   societies	   is	   the	   value	   of	  
autonomy/empowerment.90	  	  Personal	  autonomy,	  according	  to	   liberal	   legal	  theorist	  
Joseph	  Raz,	  denotes	  the	  ideal	  that	  ‘people	  should	  make	  their	  own	  lives.’91	  Raz	  holds	  
that:	  
‘The	  autonomous	  person	  is	  a	  (part)	  author	  of	  his	  own	  life.	  The	  ideal	  of	  
personal	  autonomy	  is	  the	  vision	  of	  people	  controlling,	  to	  some	  degree,	  
their	  own	  destiny,	  fashioning	  it	  through	  successive	  decisions	  throughout	  
their	  lives.’92	  
The	   ideal	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   refers	   to	   some	   degree	   of	   self-­‐decision,	   self-­‐
authorship,	   self-­‐responsibility,	   self-­‐control	   and	   self-­‐creation	   in	   one’s	   own	   life.	  	  
Autonomous	  life	  is	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy.	  We	  can	  also	  talk	  about	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Dworkin	  holds	  that	  political	  morality	  ‘studies	  what	  we	  all	  together	  own	  other	  as	  individuals	  when	  
we	  act	  in	  and	  on	  behalf	  of	  that	  artificial	  collective	  person.’	  By	  the	  collective	  person	  he	  means	  political	  
communities.	   See	   Dworkin,	   n	   45	   above,	   327-­‐28.	   On	   the	   discussion	   and	   elaboration	   of	   theories	   of	  
political	  morality	   and	   its	   relationship	  with	   theories	   of	   justice	   in	   legal	   and	   political	   philosophy,	   see	  
Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  5-­‐10.	  
90	  Bamforth,	  ibid.,	  258-­‐267;	  Bamforth,	  n	  11	  above,	  41-­‐46.	  
91	  Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  n	  5	  above,	  369.	  
92	  Ibid.,	  369.	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‘conditions	  of	  autonomy.’93	  Raz	  argues	  that	  to	  be	  able	  to	   live	  autonomously,	  there	  
are	  three	  necessary	  conditions:	  ‘appropriate	  mental	  abilities,	  an	  adequate	  range	  of	  
options,	   and	   independence.’94	  We	   need	   an	   adequate	   range	   of	   options	   for	   us	   to	  
choose	  from	  and	  to	  consider	  within	  our	  lives.	  The	  condition	  of	  independence	  means	  
one’s	  life	  is	  not	  coerced	  or	  manipulated	  by	  others.95	  	  
Bamforth	   applies	   the	   idea	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   into	   sexual	   justice	   and	   holds	  
that	   sexual	   autonomy	   is	   the	  most	   persuasive	   and	   profound	  moral	   justification	  
and	  moral	  grounding	  for	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  He	  holds	  that	  in	  a	  
democratic	   society	  where	   the	  value	  of	   autonomy	   (or	  dignity/empowerment)	   is	  
appreciated,	  people	  can	  find	  sexual/emotional	  expression,	  aspirations,	  affection	  
and	  behaviours	  that	  are	  significant	  human	  goods	  and	  important	  human	  needs.96	  
They	  are	   ‘of	  central	   importance	  for	  human	  beings.’97	  The	  value	  and	  importance	  
of	   sexual	   expression	   and	   emotional	   communication	   can	   be	   shown	   by	   the	   fact	  
that	   people	   have	   often	   suffered	   from	   the	   suppression	   of	   sexual	   impulses	   and	  
emotional	  feelings.98	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  always	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  reciprocity	  
and	  exchange	  in	  sex	  encounters,	  a	  reality	  denoting	  the	  value	  and	  need	  of	  human	  
interdependence	   in	   sex.99	  Also,	   the	   reality	   that	  people’s	   sexual	   tastes	   vary	  also	  
helps	   to	   explain	   the	   importance	   of	   sexual	   autonomy.100	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
discriminatory	   laws	   and	   politics	   of	   sexuality	   have	   the	   negative	   effect	   of	  
objectifying	   and	   devaluing	   the	   targeted	   groups	   such	   as	   LGBT	  people.101	  Hostile	  
and	   discriminatory	   law	   and	   politics	   in	   sexuality	   objectify	   the	   discriminated	  
groups	  and	   individuals,	   such	  as	  gay,	   lesbian,	  bi	  and	  trans	  by	  stigmatising	   them,	  
refusing	  them	  recognition,	  marginalising	  their	  needs	  and	  interests,	  and	  imposing	  
a	   homophobic	   social	   culture	   and	   legal	   practices.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Ibid.,	  372.	  
94	  Ibid.	  
95	  Ibid.,	  377-­‐378.	  	  
96	  Bamforth,	  n	  11	  above,	  41.	  
97	  Ibid.	  
98	  Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  259.	  
99	  Bamforth,	  n	  11	  above,	  41.	  
100	  Bamforth,	  n	  1	  above,	  259-­‐260.	  
101	  Ibid.,	  261-­‐264.
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autonomy	   of	   LGBT	   people	   is	   deeply	   violated,	   disrespected	   and	   dismissed	   by	  
these	   kinds	   of	   systematic	   discriminatory	   laws	   and	   politics.102	  From	   the	   above	  
arguments,	  Bamforth	  concludes	  that	  we	  need	  to	  respect	  the	  sexual	  autonomy	  of	  
individuals	  and	  grant	  sexual	  minority	  people	  proper	  legal	  protection,	  such	  as	  the	  
protection	  provided	  by	  antidiscrimination	   legislation	  and	  human	   rights	   law.	  He	  
argues	  that:	  
‘[b]y	   granting	   legal	   protection	   we	   are,	   in	   consequence,	   both	   helping	   to	  
combat	  objectification	  and	  disempowerment	  and	  protecting	  the	  moral	  good	  
associated	  with	  freely	  chosen	  sexual	  behaviour,	  conceptions	  of	  sexuality,	  and	  
sexual/emotional	  relationships.’103	  	  
I	   find	   Bamforth’s	   arguments	   regarding	   sexual	   autonomy	   very	   persuasive	   and	  
insightful	  in	  the	  way	  that	  they	  set	  out	  the	  moral	  value	  and	  moral	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  
justice	  law	  and	  politics.	  The	  moral	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  justice	  law	  and	  politics	  could	  be	  
properly	   explained	   and	   justified	   by	   the	   idea	   and	   value	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   in	  
sexual	  and	  gendered	  lives.	  
Ball	   later	  develops	  a	  similar	  argument	   for	  gay	   rights	   law	  and	  politics	  based	  on	   the	  
ideas	   of	   human	   need,	   human	   capacities	   and	   personal	   autonomy.104	  I	   agree	   with	  
Bamforth	  and	  Ball	   that	   the	  arguments	   for	  autonomy	  are	  useful	   in	  elaborating	  and	  
justifying	  the	  moral	  foundations	  and	  normative	  grounds	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  
justice	  law.	  The	  normative	  grounds	  for	  supporting	  the	  suggestion	  by	  queer	  theories	  
of	  the	  need	  for	  constant	  critical	  thinking	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  our	  commitment	  to	  
the	  value	  of	  personal	  autonomy	  or	  agency.	  However,	  holding	  that	  autonomy/agency	  
could	   be	   plausible	   moral	   grounds	   for	   sexual	   politics	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   sexual	  
politics	   projects	   ought	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   foreclosed,	   certain,	   complete	   and	  
unchanging	   normative	   projects.	   We	   still	   need	   to	   constantly	   reflect	   on	   our	  
understandings	   of	   the	   meanings,	   requirements	   and	   conditions	   of	   personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  Bamforth.	  n	  11	  above,	  42-­‐44.	  
103	  Ibid.,	  44.	  
104	  Ball,	  n	  44	  above,	  75-­‐138.	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autonomy/agency	   in	   sexual	   and	   gender	   life.	   Our	   grasp	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
meaning	   and	   requirements	   of	   autonomy/agency	   ought	   not	   to	   be	   treated	   as	  
comprehensive,	   static	  and	   totalising.	  We	  need	   to	  keep	  our	  moral	  analysis	  open	   to	  
constant	   reflection,	   adjustment	   and	   possible	   challenges.	   After	   all,	   there	   is	   always	  
some	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  unknowingness	  and	  we	  need	   to	  be	  willing	   to	   see	  
the	   possible	   limitations	   and	   tensions	   in	   our	   projects,	   including	   our	   normative	  
arguments	  regarding	  sexual	  justice	  and	  law.	  	  
There	   is	   one	   major	   concern	   I	   raise	   about	   Ball’s	   theory	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gay	  
rights.	  Ball	  claims	  that	  long-­‐term	  and	  stable	  intimate	  relationships	  are	  morally	  more	  
valuable	   than	   ‘promiscuous’,	   pure	   sexual,	   or	   only	   short	   term	   intimate	  
relationships.105	  He	   argues	   that	   gay	   men	   and	   lesbians	   are	   not	   more	   promiscuous	  
than	  straight	  people,	  and	  gay	  people	  are	  as	  capable	  as	  straight	  people	  to	  commit	  to	  
long	  term	  relationships.106	  He	  holds	  that	  governments	  should	  not	  only	  permit	  same	  
sex	  marriage,	  but	  should	  also	  actively	  promote	  and	  encourage	  long-­‐term,	  stable	  and	  
long-­‐lasting	   relationships	   between	   gay	   people	   because	   these	   relationships,	   he	  
thinks,	  are	  more	  valuable	  than	  those	  of	  a	  casual	  and	  non-­‐committed	  nature.107	  	  He	  
holds	  that	  family	  law	  and	  family	  policies	  ought	  to	  favour	  and	  promote	  stable,	  loyal	  
and	  committed	  relationships	  in	  LGBT	  communities.	  I	  share	  with	  queer	  theorists	  such	  
as	  Warner108	  and	  Butler109	  their	   concerns	   that	   such	  proposals	  might	   construct	   and	  
produce	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  problematic	  sexual	  hierarchy	  in	  gay	  communities.	  ‘Queer’	  gay	  
people	  might	  be	  marginalised	  under	  this	  kind	  of	  homonormativity	  in	  gay	  politics.	  A	  
possible	  new	  kind	  of	  sexual	  exclusion	  and	  sexual	  normativity	  could	  be	  produced	  and	  
imposed	   on	   LGBT	   people	   in	   mainstream	   gay	   politics.	   	   I	   am	   not	   claiming	   that	   we	  
cannot	   make	   a	   distinction	   between	   relationships,	   nor	   do	   I	   oppose	   gay	   marriage.	  
Rather,	  what	   I	  would	   like	   to	   emphasise	   is	   that	  we	   also	   need	   to	   be	   vigilant	   of	   the	  
possible	  violence	  and	  arbitrariness	  in	  constructing	  sexual	  hierarchies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	  Ibid.,	  106-­‐111.	  
106	  Ibid.,	  131-­‐133.	  
107	  Ibid.,	  106-­‐117;	  126-­‐133.	  
108 	  Michael	   Warner,	   ‘Beyond	   Gay	   Marriage’,	   in	   Wendy	   Brown	   and	   Janet	   Halley	   eds.,	   Left	  
Legalism/Left	  Critique	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  259-­‐289.	  
109Judith	  Butler,	   ‘Is	   Kinship	  Always	  Already	  Heterosexual?’,	   in	  Wendy	  Brown	  and	   Janet	  Halley	   eds.,	  
Left	  Legalism/Left	  Critique	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  232-­‐258.	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Secondly,	  although	   I	  agree	  with	  Bamforth	   that	   sexual	  autonomy	   is	  a	  plausible	  and	  
convincing	  normative	   grounding	   for	   the	   law	  and	  politics	   of	   sexual	   justice,	   I	  would	  
like	   to	   raise	  one	  point	   about	  his	   elaboration	  of	   gender	  and	   sexual	  oppression.	  On	  
reviewing	   three	   major	   reports	   on	   sexual	   and	   gender	   violence	   from	   Amnesty	  
International,	  Bamforth	  argues	  that	  both	  women	  (as	  a	  group)	  and	  sexual	  minorities	  
such	   as	   LGBT	   communities	   are	   imposed	   upon	   by	   oppressive	   gender	   norms	   in	  
heteronormative	  societies.110	  Sexual	  minorities	  such	  as	  gay	  men,	  lesbians	  and	  trans	  
people	   are	   punished	   and	   discriminated	   because	   they	   violate	   the	   supposed	  
normative	   gender	   expectations	   and	   rules	   in	   sexual	   life.111	  Women	   (as	   a	   group),	  
according	   to	   Amnesty	   International	   and	   Bamforth,	   suffer	   from	   double	   gender	  
oppressions.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   they	  are	  oppressed	  because	  of	   their	   conformity	   to	  
the	   heteronormative	   gender	   norms.	   	   This	   is	   because	   normative	   gender	   rules	   in	  
normative	   heterosexuality	   are	   oppressive	   and	   harmful	   to	  women.	   	   So	   even	  when	  
women	   conform	   to	   the	   ascribed	   and	   expected	   gender	   norms,	   they	   are	   still	   being	  
oppressed.112	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   women,	   like	   gay	   men	   and	   lesbians,	   also	   are	  
punished	   and	  disadvantaged	   if	   they	   try	   to	   break	   away	   from	   the	  dominant	   gender	  
norms	   imposed	   upon	   them.113 	  	   So	   whether	   conforming	   to	   gender	   norms	   in	  
normative	  heterosexuality	   or	   not,	  women	  are	  oppressed	   anyway	  because	  of	   their	  
sex/gender.	   	   However,	   Bamforth	   seems	   to	   imply	   that,	   unlike	   women,	   men	   who	  
conform	   to	   dominant	   gender	   norms	   or	   expectations	   in	   heteronormativity	   are	   not	  
oppressed.	  Only	   sexual	   and	   gender	  minority	  men	  who	  deviate	   and	   violate	   gender	  
norms	   are	   oppressed	   because	   of	   their	   gender/sex.	   If	   my	   understanding	   of	   his	  
argument	  is	  correct,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  add	  that,	  just	  like	  women,	  men	  sometimes	  suffer	  
from	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  per	   se.	  Men	  are	   sometimes	  discriminated	  against	  
and	   oppressed,	   not	   just	   because	   they	   deviate	   from	   the	   normative	   gender	  
expectations,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  conform	  to	  the	  expected	  and	  imposed	  gender	  
norms	  of	  men/masculinity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Nicholas	  Bamforth,	  ‘Introduction’,	  in	  Sex	  Rights:	  The	  Oxford	  Amnesty	  Lectures	  2002	  (Oxford;	  New	  
York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  1-­‐43.	  
111	  Ibid.,	  4-­‐8.	  
112	  Ibid.,	  3-­‐8.	  
113	  Ibid.	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I	   totally	   agree	   with	   Bamforth	   that	   sexual	   minority	   people	   such	   as	   gay	   men	   and	  
lesbians	  suffer	   from	  heteronormative	  oppression	  because	  they	  violate	  and	  deviate	  
from	   the	   constraining	   and	   compulsory	   heterosexualist	   norms	   and	   expectations.	   I	  
also	   totally	   agree	   with	   him	   that	   women	   do	   suffer	   double	   gender	   oppressions.	  
Women	  who	   conform	   to	   normative	   gender	   rules	  may	   suffer	   from	   unequal	   caring	  
responsibility,	   various	   forms	  of	   violence	   against	  women,	   or	   discrimination	   in	   their	  
career.	   Women	   who	   resist	   dominant	   gender	   roles	   also	   face	   discrimination.	  
However,	  I	  argue	  that	  men	  sometimes	  also	  suffer	  double	  gender	  oppressions.	  Men	  
are	   not	   only	   punished	   by	   societies	   if	   they	   violate	   heteronormative	   norms	   of	  
sexuality	   and	   gender,	   for	   example,	   the	   oppression	   and	   discrimination	   against	   gay	  
men,	   trans	   men	   or	   feminine	   men.	   Sometimes	   men	   may	   also	   suffer	   gender	  
oppression	   precisely	   because	   of	   their	   male	   sex/gender,	   because	   they	   are	   men,	  
because	  they	  conform	  to	  certain	  expected	  and	  imposed	  gender	  stereotypes	  or	  rules.	  
For	  example,	  as	  elaborated	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  numerous	  pieces	  of	  research	  indicate	  that	  
domestic	   violence	   is	   not	   just	   a	   male-­‐to-­‐female	   phenomenon.	   A	   significant	  
percentage	   of	   domestic	   violence	   victims	   in	   heterosexual	   relations	   are	   men.	  
Domestic	  violence	  occurs	  in	  same	  sex	  relations	  as	  well.114	  	  Research	  finds	  that	  one	  of	  
the	  main	  reasons	  men	  suffer	   from	  female	  violence	   in	  heterosexual	   relationships	   is	  
related	  to	  the	  constructed	  masculine	  expectations	  and	  assumptions	  made	  of	  men	  in	  
normative	   heterosexuality. 115 	  Under	   heteronormative	   culture,	   men	   are	   often	  
constructed	  and	  expected	  to	  be	  relatively	  invulnerable	  to	  harm,	  abuse	  and	  violence,	  
especially	   by	   violence	   by	   women.	   Under	   these	   ideologies,	   some	   heterosexual	  
women	   assume	   that	  men	   cannot	   be	   hurt,	   or	   assume	   the	   harmlessness	   of	   female	  
violence;	  men	  are	   supposed	   to	  be	  able	   to	   take	   it	   (female	  violence).	   	   For	  example,	  
according	   to	   sociological	   research,	   two	  of	   the	  major	   reasons	   for	   female	  university	  
students	  using	  violence	  against	   their	  boyfriends	  are	   ‘they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	   they	  
can	  hurt	  men’	  and	  ‘they	  expect	  that	  men	  do	  not	  care	  about	  slaps	  and	  punches,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  See	  Section	  3.5	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  
115	  Pasi	   Malmi,	   Discrimination	   Against	   Men:	   Appearance	   and	   Causes	   in	   the	   Context	   of	   a	   Modern	  
Welfare	  State	  (PhD	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  Lapland,	  2009).	  236-­‐237;	  Xiying	  Wang	  and	  Sik	  Ying	  Ho	  Petula,	  
‘My	  Sassy	  Girl:	  A	  Qualitative	  Study	  of	  Women's	  Aggression	  in	  Dating	  Relationships	  in	  Beijing’,	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of	  Interpersonal	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  22,	  no.	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  (2007):	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do	   not	   retaliate.’116	  	   The	   normative	   gender	   norms	   and	   expectations	   of	   macho	  
masculinity	  imposed	  on	  men	  mean	  that	  men	  are	  often	  expected	  to	  be	  invulnerable	  
to	  female	  violence.	  The	  problem	  of	  female	  to	  male	  violence	  therefore	  is	  that	  it	  can	  
be	  easily	   trivialised	  or	   invisible	   in	   law	  and	   in	  society	  under	  such	  normative	  gender	  
constructions	   in	  heteronormativity.117	  Sometimes	  men	  suffer	  gender	   injustices	  and	  
gender	   violence	   precisely	   because	   men	   are	   assumed	   to	   meet	   some	   dominant	  
gender	  norms	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality;	   indeed,	  some	  dominant	  gender	  norms	  
of	  men	  and	  masculinity	  themselves	  are	  oppressive	  and	  constraining.	  
I	  illustrate	  another	  example.	  Scholar	  R.	  Charli	  Carpenter	  indicates	  how	  gender-­‐based	  
violence	   is	   inappropriately	   understood	   and	   read	   as	   synonymous	   with	   violence	  
against	  women	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  both	  feminist	  and	  traditionalist	  legal	  theories	  
in	  international	  humanitarian	  law.	  She	  describes	  how	  violence	  against	  men	  and	  boys	  
in	   conflicts	   is	   therefore	   marginalised,	   ignored	   and	   trivialised	   in	   international	  
humanitarian	   law.	   She	   argues	   for	   the	   pressing	   need	   and	   significance	   of	   the	  
recognition	  of,	  and	  attention	  to,	  the	  harms	  and	  injustices	  of	  gender-­‐based	  violence	  
against	  men	  and	  boys	  in	  conflict.	  She	  holds	  that	  ‘adult	  men	  and	  adolescent	  boys	  also	  
face	  major	   risks	   of	   abuse	   and	   violence	   based	   upon	   culturally	   constructed	   notions	  
about	   gender	   roles.’118	  She	   indicates	   that	   ‘the	   human	   security	   proponents	   have	  
failed	  to	  adequately	  recognize,	  take	  it	  seriously,	  and	  respond	  to	  adult	  men’s	  risk	  of	  
summary	   execution,	   sexual	   violence	   or	   mutilation,	   and	   conscription	   as	   a	   human	  
rights	  abuse	  and	  human	  security	  problem.’119	  	  
Carpenter	  finds	  that	   in	  conflicts	  men	  and	  boys	  suffer	  from	  gender	  violence	  against	  
men	   such	   as	   sex-­‐selective	   massacre	   or	   forced	   conscription	   precisely	   because	   of	  
these	   men	   and	   boys’	   male	   sex/gender.	   They	   suffer	   sex-­‐selective	   massacre,	   not	  
because	   they	   deviate	   from	   their	   male	   gender,	   but	   just	   because	   they	   are	   men.	  
Similarly,	  they	  suffer	  from	  forced	  recruitment	  into	  military	  forces,	  not	  because	  they	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  Malmi,	  ibid.,	  236-­‐237.	  Wang	  and	  Ho,	  ibid,.	  626-­‐635.	  
117	  See	  n	  131	  and	  n	  132	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  
118	  R.	  Charli	  Carpenter,	  ‘Recognizing	  Gender-­‐Based	  Violence	  Against	  Civilian	  Men	  and	  Boys	  in	  Conflict	  
Situations’,	  Security	  Dialogue	  2006;	  37;	  97.	  
119	  Ibid.	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are	  judged	  as	  gender	  non-­‐conventional,	  but	  because	  they	  are	  treated	  like	  ‘normal’	  
men.	  My	  point	  here	   is	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  gender	  oppression	  on	  men	  is	  wider	  than	  
Bamforth	   implies.	   I	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  and	  address	  how	  men	  might	  
be	   constrained	   or	   oppressed,	   not	   just	   because	   they	   deviate	   from	   the	   standard	  
gender	  expectations	  of	  men	  and	  masculinity,	  but	  also	  in	  situations	  where	  they	  suffer	  
gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   injustices	   just	   because	   they	   conform	   to	   normative	  
gender	  norms	  and	  stereotypes,	  or	  simply	  because	  of	  their	  male	  sex/gender.	  I	  further	  
hold	   that	   Bamforth’s	   sexual	   autonomy	   theory	   can	   provide	   a	   solid	   normative	  
grounding	  for	  a	  humanist	  sexual	  justice	  project	  that	  aims	  to	  challenge	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	  oppressions	  of	  LGBT,	  women	  and	  men	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  critically	  evaluated	  liberal	  justice	  theories	  on	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  found	  
that	  Hart’s	  arguments	  against	  legal	  moralism,	  although	  to	  some	  extent	  meaningful,	  
nevertheless	  fail	  to	  provide	  a	  solid	  normative	  ground	  against	  heterosexism.	  He	  also	  
fails	   to	  address	   the	  structural	   injustices	  of	  heteronormativity.	  Dworkin’s	  project	  of	  
liberal	  equality,	  although	  helpful	  in	  addressing	  some	  problems	  of	  some	  inequalities	  
in	   distributive	   justice,	   also	   fails	   to	   address	   many	   aspects	   of	   injustices	   in	  
heteronormativity.	   I	  contend	  that	   liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  proposed	  by	  
Bamforth	   and	   Ball	   provide	   the	  most	   solid	   and	   convincing	   normative	   grounds	   and	  
moral	  justification	  of	  the	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  I	  argue	  that	  liberal	  sexual	  
autonomy	   theories	   can	   also	   provide	   some	   normative	   explanations	   of	   the	   implicit	  
normative	   values	   in	   the	   queer	   approach.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   queer	   approach	  
highlights	   the	   significance	   of	   critical	   thinking	   in	   liberal	   projects	   of	   sexual	   justice.	  
Despite	  the	  usefulness	  of	  liberal	  theories	  of	  gay	  rights,	  I	  also	  indicated	  their	  possible	  
limitations.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   I	   elaborate	   how	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinity	   studies	   draw	   on	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   autonomy,	   humanist	  men’s	  
studies	  and	  queer	  theory,	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  approaches	  in	  sexual	  justice	  
law	  and	  politics.	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Chapter	  6   Conclusion:	  Incorporating	  The	  Approaches	  of	  Queer	  
Humanist	  Men	  and	  Masculinities	  Studies	  in	  Sexual	  Justice	  
Law	  and	  Politics	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  I	  critically	  evaluated	  salient	  contemporary	  progressive	  and	  
critical	   theories	  on	  sexual	   justice,	   sexual	  politics	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality.	   In	  
Chapter	   3	   I	   discussed	   the	   early	   critiques	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   from	   the	  
perspective	  of	  theories	  of	  lesbian	  feminism	  and	  gay	  liberation.	  Despite	  their	  original	  
contribution	  of	  subjecting	  normative	  heterosexuality	  to	  critical	  reflection,	  they	  tend	  
to	   hold	   essentialist	   ideas	   of	   sex,	   gender	   and	   sexual	   orientation.	   Gay	   liberationist	  
theorist	  Altman	  notices	  the	  possible	  connection	  between	  gay	   liberation	  and	  men’s	  
liberation.	  However,	  he	  fails	  to	  fully	  address	  the	  issue	  and	  leaves	  the	  topic	  generally	  
unexplored	   and	   undeveloped.	   Contemporary	   subordination	   feminism	  extends	   and	  
revises	  early	  lesbian	  feminists’	  critiques	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Subordination	  
feminism	   contributes	   greatly	   to	   the	   tasks	  of	   elaborating	   and	  addressing	   structural	  
gender	   injustice	   and	   gender	   oppression	   of	   women	   in	   normative	   heterosexuality.	  
However,	  those	  theorists	  tend	  to	  hold	  an	  oversimplified	  view	  of	  gender	  oppression	  
and	   structural	   gender	   injustices	   by	   assuming	   women/femininity	   as	   the	   only	  
sex/gender	  that	   is	  oppressed	  within	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Furthermore,	  their	  
focus	   on	   women’s	   subordination	   often	   marginalises	   or	   renders	   invisible	   the	  
experiences	   and	   perspectives	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   minorities	   within	   these	  
subordination	  feminist	  projects	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  law.	  I	  use	  the	  violence	  against	  
women	  feminist	  approach	  to	  family	  violence	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  I	  find	  LGBT	  and	  
male	   victims	   are	   generally	   marginalised	   while	   the	   problem	   of	   female	   violence	   is	  
generally	   trivialised	   in	   subordination	   feminist	   family	   violence	   jurisprudence	   and	  
politics.	   Subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   also	   inform	   and	   dominate	   the	  
mainstream	  approach	  to	  men’s	  studies.	  I	  find	  that	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  and	  
masculinities	  studies	  suffer	  from	  similar	  limitations	  to	  those	  found	  in	  subordination	  
feminism.	  In	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men’s	  studies,	  family	  power	  and	  family	  violence	  
is	  generally	  essentialised	  and	  reduced	  to	  male	  domination	  and	  male	  violence	  over	  
women	  and	  children.	  The	  multiple	  power	  relations	  and	  dynamics	  in	  the	  family	  and	  
the	  problems	  of	  female	  abuse	  and	  violence	  are	  overlooked.	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In	   Chapter	   4	   I	   critically	   analysed	   two	   alternative	   approaches	   to	   mainstream	  
subordination	   feminism	   with	   respect	   to	   sexual	   justice	   and	   sexual	   politics:	  	  
humanist	  men’s	  studies	  and	  queer	  theory.	  I	  find	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  valuable	  
and	  useful	  owing	  to	  their	  unravelling	  the	  often	  overlooked	  gender	  discrimination	  
and	  injustices	  towards	  men.	  However,	  these	  approaches	  are	  limited	  by	  failing	  to	  
provide	  a	  solid	  normative	  grounding	   for	  humanist	  men’s	   studies	  projects.	  They	  
also	   tend	   to	   assume	   heterosexist	  men’s	   experiences	   and	   perspectives	   in	   their	  
research.	  I	  argue	  that	  their	  study	  could	  benefit	  from	  incorporating	  insights	  from	  
liberal	   theories	   of	   justice	   and	   queer	   theories.	   I	   also	   critically	   review	   queer	  
theories	   in	   this	   chapter.	   I	   find	  queer	   theories	   especially	   useful	   and	   inspiring	   in	  
problematising	   and	   unsettling	   naturalised	   and	   moralised	   heteronormativity.	  
Queer	   theories	   also	   contribute	   significantly	   by	   questioning	   the	   essentialist	  
tendency	  in	  second	  wave	  feminism	  and	  in	  highlighting	  existing	  heteronormative	  
oppression	   and	   injustices	   towards	   LGBT	   people.	   However,	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	  
feminism	   is	   still	   significantly	   influenced	  by	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	  of	  
gender	  oppression.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  they	  often	  have	  difficulty	  in	  seeing	  
and	   addressing	   the	   gender	   oppression	   of	   men	   as	   men.	   With	   this	   weakness,	  
queer	   feminism	   is	   unable	   fully	   to	   subvert	   the	   oppression	   of	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  Moreover,	  just	  like	  some	  subordination	  feminist	  projects,	  queer	  
feminism	   might	   to	   some	   extent	   further	   perpetuate	   unjust	   and	   constraining	  
gender	  norms	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  I	  also	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  
some	  queer	  and	  gay	  theories	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  tackling	  sexuality	  oppression	  in	  
normative	  heterosexuality.	  As	  queer	  feminism	  theorists	  rightly	  point	  out,	  gender	  
analysis	   is	   also	   an	   important	   dimension	   in	   critiques	   of	   heteronormativity.	  
However,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  the	  analyses	  presented	  by	  subordination	  feminism	  
and	  their	  perspectives	  on	  gender	  hierarchy	  and	  oppression	  are	  the	  only	  plausible	  
and	   legitimate	   analyses	   of	   gender,	   as	   some	   queer	   feminist	   theory	   assumes.	   I	  
argue	  that	  a	  more	  balanced,	  inclusive	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional	  concept	  of	  gender	  
power	   relations	   and	   gender	   oppression	   is	   needed.	   I	   also	   contend	   that	   some	  
injustices	  towards	  and	  discrimination	  against	  gay	  men	  cannot	  be	  fully	  unravelled	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and	  addressed	   if	  we	  solely	   focus	  on	  addressing	  sexuality	  discrimination	  against	  
gay	  men.	   I	  argue	   that	   just	  as	   lesbians	  may	  experience	  double	  discrimination	  of	  
sexuality	   and	   gender,	   gay	   men	   too	   also	   sometimes	   experience	   double	  
discrimination	   and	   intersectional	   injustices	   of	   sexuality	   and	  male	   sex/gender.	   I	  
argue	   that	   it	   is	   important	   for	   a	   queer	   critique	   of	   normative	   heterosexuality	   to	  
address,	   not	   only	   oppression	   on	   grounds	   of	   sexuality,	   but	   also	   gender	  
oppression.	   I	   also	   contend	   that	   although	   many	   queer	   projects	   imply	   some	  
normative	  values	  and	  concerns,	  they	  generally	  do	  not	  address	  and	  articulate	  the	  
normative	  grounds	  and	  values	   that	   inform	  and	  underpin	   their	  projects.	   I	   argue	  
that	   we	   need	   to	   consider	   moral/normative	   thinking	   in	   our	   projects	   of	   sexual	  
justice	  against	  heteronormativity.	  	  
In	   Chapter	   5	   I	   critically	   evaluated	  different	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice.	   I	   find	  
that	  liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  provided	  by	  liberal	  gay	  rights	  theorists	  such	  
as	   Bamforth	   and	   Ball	   best	   elucidate	   and	   justify	   the	   moral	   values	   and	   normative	  
grounds	   for	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   law	   against	   normative	   heterosexuality.	  
However,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  cautious	  about	  making	  a	  new	  sexual	  hierarchy	  
in	  liberal	  justice	  theory.	  Also,	  I	  argue	  that	  some	  liberal	  theories	  of	  sexual	  autonomy	  
adopt	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies	   in	   their	   arguments	   regarding	   gender	  
oppression.	   I	   argue	   that	   they	   are	   likely	   to	   suffer	   from	   the	   same	   weaknesses	   as	  
subordination	   feminism	   in	   this	   respect.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	  
autonomy	   itself	  can	  provide	  a	  solid	  normative	  grounding	  by	  which	  to	  challenge	  all	  
aspects	  of	   sexuality	  and	  gender	  oppression	   in	  heteronormativity.	  Their	   theories	  of	  
sexual	   justice	   support	   and	   suggest	   the	   need	   to	   address,	   not	   only	   oppression	   of	  
women	  as	  women,	  but	  also	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  men.	  	  
After	  critically	  reviewing	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  contemporary	  progressive	  
and	  critical	  theories	  on	  law,	  sexual	  justice	  and	  normative	  heterosexuality,	  I	  argue	  in	  
this	  concluding	  chapter	  that	  it	  is	  worth	  incorporating	  a	  combined	  approach	  of	  queer	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   in	   thinking	   about	   gender	   oppression,	  
normative	  heterosexuality,	  law	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  A	  combined	  approach,	  I	  argue,	  is	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an	  approach	   that	  draws	  on	  queer	   theories,	   liberal	   theories	  of	   sexual	   justice,	   some	  
feminist	  theories,	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  	  
I	   hold	   that	   there	   are	   two	   layers	   of	   convergence	   in	   such	   an	   approach	   of	   queer	  
humanist	  men’s	  studies.	  First,	   I	   suggest	  a	  convergence	  between	   liberal	   theories	  of	  
sexual	  justice	  and	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  I	  employ	  liberal	  theories	  
of	   sexual	   justice	   to	   explain	   the	   moral	   grounds	   that	   underpin	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies	   while	   also	   bringing	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	   studies’	  
concerns	   into	   liberal	   theories	   of	   sexual	   justice.	   Together	   they	   can	   form	   liberal	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   Then	   I	   suggest	   a	   combined	   queer	   and	  
liberal	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  by	  bringing	  queer	  orientations	   into	  
liberal	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies,	  while	  also	  bringing	  liberal	  humanist	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   orientations	   into	   queer	   studies.	   I	   contend	   that	   liberal	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  can	  benefit	   from	  a	  consideration	  of	  some	  
notions	  and	  insights	  from	  queer	  theories,	  while	  queer	  projects	  can	  also	  benefit	  from	  
a	   consideration	   of	   some	   insights	   from	   liberal	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	  
projects.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  combined	  perspective	  inspired	  by	  queer	  liberal	  humanist	  
men’s	   studies	   can	   contribute	   to	   our	   knowledge	   of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   gender	  
oppression.	  They	  are	  worthy	  of	  being	  considered	  and	  taken	  seriously	  in	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	  of	  sexual	  justice.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  use	  both	  the	  approaches	  of	  critical/queer	  
theory	   and	   also	   analytical	   moral	   and	   political	   philosophy	   to	   study	   the	   law	   and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   Insights	   from	   queer	   theories	   are	   drawn	   upon	   in	  
queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies.	  Sexuality	  and	  gender	  categories	  are	  not	  regarded	  as	  
fixed,	   stable,	   static,	   or	   closed.	  Rather,	   they	  are	  partially	  products	  of	   various	   social	  
forces.	  In	  the	  politics	  of	  sexual	  justice,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  use	  identity	  categories	  
to	   reflect	   on	   issues	   of	   social	   groups	   and	   social	   justice.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	  
important	   to	   critically	   examine	   and	   to	   reflect	   upon	   how	   sexuality	   and	   gender	  
boundaries,	  distinctions	  and	  categories	  are	  made	  and	  the	  power	  relations	  involved	  
in	  exclusion	  and	  inclusion,	  and	  the	  process	  of	  recognition	  and	  the	  non-­‐recognition.	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Since	   there	   are	   important	   moral/normative	   implications	   and	   concerns	   in	   visible	  
queer	  projects,	   I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  follow	  a	  double-­‐path	  in	  sexual	  politics	  and	  
sexual	  justice	  projects	  by	  emphasising	  the	  needs	  of	  both	  critical	  thinking	  and	  moral	  
inquiry	  in	  sexual	  politics	  against	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  critical	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  use	  of	  identities	  categories	  and	  the	  critical	  reflections	  on	  normative	  
heterosexuality,	   we	   also	   need	   to	   explore	   the	   normative	   grounds	   and	   the	  
implications	  of	  our	  projects	  of	  sexual	  politics	  and	  sexual	  justice.	  	  
I	   share	   Butler’s	   insight,	   that	   to	   think	   critically	   is	   a	   necessary	   requirement	   for	   a	  
responsible	   ethics	   and	   social	   justice	   project.	   Normative	   projects	   of	   sexual	   justice	  
need	   critical	   reflection.	   I	   further	   expand	   her	   argument	   by	   claiming	   that	  
ethical/moral	  concerns	  and	  reflections	  are	  also	  important	  dimensions	  of	  the	  law	  and	  
politics	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender.	   We	   need	   moral	   philosophical	   investigation	   and	  
elaboration	  of	  the	  normative	  implications	  of	  queer	  projects.	  For	  instance,	  we	  need	  
to	   think	   about	   why	   we	   need	   to	   open	   up	   possibilities,	   why	   we	   need	   to	   resist	  
domination,	   and	   why	   values	   such	   as	   freedom,	   autonomy	   or	   agency	   ought	   to	   be	  
promoted.	   	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  are	  also	  critical	  reasons	  why	  normative	   legal	  
theories	   of	   sexuality	   and	   gender	   should	   also	   always	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   power	  
relations	  and	  the	  possible	  exclusion,	  distinction	  and	  hierarchies	  they	  make	  or	  rely	  on	  
in	   their	   normative	   systems	   and	   judgements.	   Critical	   thinking	   reminds	   us	   to	   be	  
vigilant	  of	  the	  possible	  violence	  behind	  normative	  judgements	  and	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  the	  virtue	  of	  openness	  in	  thinking	  about	  normative	  law	  and	  politics	  of	  
sexuality	  and	  gender.	  The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  regard	  our	  normative	  project	  as	  
comprehensive,	  complete,	  stable,	  foreclosed,	  absolute	  and	  unchanging.	  We	  need	  to	  
acknowledge	   the	   possibilities	   of	   unknowingness	   and	   uncertainty	   and	   keep	   self-­‐
reflective	  in	  our	  normative	  projects.	  	  
By	   applying	   a	   moral/ethical	   approach,	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	  
studies	   explore	   the	   moral	   values,	   the	   moral	   grounds	   and	   the	   normative	  
requirements	  of	   sexual	   justice	   and	   their	   implications	   for	  men	  and	  masculinities	   in	  
law,	   politics	   and	   social	   life.	   By	   also	   employing	   a	   queer	   approach,	   queer	   humanist	  
men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   would	   like	   to	   investigate	   how	   the	   ideas,	   norms,	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performativity	   and	   stereotypes	   of	   masculinities	   are	   produced,	   reproduced	   and	  
reiterated	  in	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  	  Both	  the	  normative	  analysis	  and	  the	  critical	  
reflections	  will	  benefit	   from	  being	   informed	  by	  up	   to	  date	  and	  balanced	  empirical	  
research	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  	  
Some	  findings	  from	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  are	  also	  incorporated	  in	  
the	   combined	   approach	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies.	   Humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	   studies	   reject	   conservative	   traditionalist	   and	   patriarchal	   articulation	  
and	  proposals	  of	  sexuality	  and	  gender.	  However,	  unlike	  subordination-­‐feminist	  men	  
and	  masculinities	  studies,	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  are	  not	  bound	  by	  
the	  overarching	  subordination-­‐feminist	  ideologies	  and	  perspectives	  on	  gender,	  men	  
and	   masculinities.	   Therefore,	   they	   are	   more	   capable	   of	   not	   only	   seeing	   gender	  
oppression	  of	  women,	  but	  also	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  men.	  Some	  insights	  of	  
humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   are	   drawn	   upon	   in	   the	   combined	   approach	   of	  
queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   For	   example,	   their	   finding	   that	  
sexism	   is	   not	   just	   about	   sexism	   against	  women	   is	   crucial	   in	   sexual	   justice	   study.	   I	  
hold	  that	  gender	  oppression	  against	  men	  does	  exist	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  
taken	  more	  seriously.	  However,	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  do	  not	  provide	  systematic	  
normative	   arguments	   to	   elucidate	   the	   moral	   grounds	   for	   addressing	   gender	  
oppression	   of	  men	  qua	  men.	   Their	   descriptions	   of	   gender	   oppression	   of	  men	   are	  
also	   based	   on	   a	   heterocentrist	   analysis.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   combined	   approach	   of	  
queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  addresses	  this	  weakness	  by	  exploring	  the	  normative	  
grounds	  for	  tackling	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  and	  by	  highlighting	  the	  significance	  
of	  considering	  perspectives	  from	  gay,	  bi	  and	  trans	  men	  in	  men’s	  studies.	  	  
I	  point	  out	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  hold	  that,	  although	  it	  
is	  very	   important	  to	  address	  gender	   injustices	  towards	  women,	   it	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  
solely	  see	  and	  address	   issues	  of	  gender	  oppression	  of	  women	  in	  sexual	   justice	   law	  
and	  politics.	  The	  studies	  hold	   that	   the	  problems	  of	  gender	   injustices	   towards	  men	  
also	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  solely	  to	  issues	  of	  injustices	  
towards	  some	  minority	  men.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  both	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  
between	  queer	  feminism	  and	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  Queer	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feminist	   projects	   such	   as	   Butler’s	   argument	   that	   not	   only	   women,	   but	   also	   a	  
minority	   of	   sexual	   and	   gender	   non-­‐conforming	   men,	   are	   victimised	   in	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  They	  hold	  that	  sexual	  and	  gender	  non-­‐conforming	  men	  should	  also	  
be	  protected	  and	  covered	  by	  law	  and	  projects	  of	  sexual	  justice	  and	  gender	  equality.	  
However,	   they	   generally	   still,	   consciously	   or	   unconsciously,	   imply	   in	   their	   projects	  
that	   those	   men	   who	   suffer	   from	   gender	   oppression	   are	   only	   minorities,	   are	  
exceptional	   and	   are	   oppressed	   only	   because	   of	   their	   deviation	   from	   standard	  
gender	   and	   sexuality	   norms.	   They	   imply	   that	   generally	   men	   (as	   a	   group)	   do	   not	  
experience	   systematic	   gender	   oppression	   per	   se.	   Gender	   relations	   between	   men	  
and	  women	  (or	  between	  masculinity	  and	  femininity)	  are	  still	  hierarchal	  and	  are	  still	  
assumed	   to	   be	   the	   unilateral	   oppression	   of	   women.	   Queer	   feminism	   has	   some	  
important	   breakthroughs	   because	   it	   goes	   beyond	   purely	   women-­‐centred	   and	  
women-­‐exclusive	   gender	   justice	   projects	   and	   incorporates	   some	   concerns	   of	   gay	  
theories	  or	  queer	  theories.	  There	  are	  significant	  merits	   in	  this	  approach.	  However,	  
they	  still	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  address	  systematic	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  qua	  
men.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  convergences	  between	  queer	  feminism	  and	  queer	  humanist	  
men	  and	  masculinities	  studies.	  For	  example,	  they	  both	  challenge	  heterosexism	  and	  
oppression	  of	  women	   in	   their	   projects	   regarding	   sexual	   justice.	  However,	   there	   is	  
also	  divergence.	  Queer	  feminism	  generally	  does	  not	  see,	  acknowledge	  and	  address	  
gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  qua	  men.	  Queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinity	  studies	  
instead	  hold	   that	   just	   like	   lesbians	   suffer	  discrimination,	  not	  only	  because	  of	   their	  
sexuality	   but	   also	   their	   femaleness	   or	   femininity,	   gay	   men	   sometimes	   may	   also	  
suffer	   injustices	  and	  discrimination,	  not	  solely	  because	  of	   their	  homosexuality,	  but	  
also	   because	   of	   their	   male	   sex/gender.	   For	   example,	   men	   as	   a	   gender	   group,	  
including	   gay	  men,	   are	   all	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   victims	   of	   the	   gender	   violence	   in	   the	  
event	  of	   sex-­‐selective	  massacres	  or	   forced	   recruitment	   in	   conflicts.	  Adult	  men,	  no	  
matter	  whether	  they	  are	  gay,	  bi	  or	  straight	  are	  all	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  targets	  of	  gender	  
violence	   in	   the	  event	  of	   sex-­‐selective	  massacres	  or	   forced	  conscription	  because	  of	  
their	  biological	  sex.	  There	  is	  gender	  oppression	  of	  men	  as	  men,	  which	  constrains	  not	  
only	   straight	  men,	   but	   also	   gay	   and	  bi	  men;	   just	   as	   there	   is	   gender	  oppression	  of	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women	   as	   women,	   which	   constrains	   both	   heterosexual	   women	   and	   lesbians.	   	   In	  
order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   fully	   understand	   and	   address	   the	   gender	   oppression	   that	   gay	  
men	  experience,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  only	  treat	  injustices	  towards	  gay	  men	  as	  
simply	   an	   issue	   of	   oppression	   of	   sexuality	   and	   of	   gender	   non-­‐conventional	   men.	  
Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies	   maintain	   that	   we	   also	   need	   to	  
address	   gender	   oppression	   against	   men	   as	   men	   to	   fully	   understand	   the	   double	  
discrimination	  gay	  men	  may	  experience.	  
I	   contend	   that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	   also	   remind	  us	   that	  
some	   oppressive	   gender	   myths	   and	   stereotyping	   could	   be	   reproduced	   and	  
perpetuated	   consciously	   or	   unconsciously	   not	   only	   by	   patriarchal	   chivalrous	  
thinking,	   but	   also	   by	   some	   subordination	   feminist	   ideologies.	   	   For	   example,	   both	  
patriarchal	  chivalrous	  and	  some	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies	  tend	  to	  construct	  
and	  reproduce	  the	  myths	  and	  biases	  of	  harmless/vulnerable	  women	  and	  femininity	  
and	  violent/invulnerable	  men	  and	  masculinity	  in	  law	  and	  in	  politics,	  such	  as	  in	  child	  
abuse	   law	   and	   public	   policies.1	  	   The	   problems	   and	   harm	   of	   female	   violence	   and	  
female	   abuse	   by	   women	   might	   be	   rendered	   invisible,	   trivialised,	   minimised	   or	  
silenced.	   	   Victims	   of	   female	   abuse,	   especially	   male	   victims,	   may	   also	   be	   easily	  
ignored,	   ridiculed,	   disbelieved,	   stereotyped	   and	   experience	   obstacles	   to	   legal	   and	  
professional	   help	   and	   support	   due	   to	   the	   biased	   institutional	   culture.	   Queer	  
humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  would	   like	   to	   remind	  us	   that	   the	   law	  and	  
policies	   proposed	   by	   subordination	   feminism	   are	   not	   necessarily	   guaranteed	   to	  
unsettle	   heteronormativity	   and	   gender	   prejudices	   and	   injustices.	  On	   the	   contrary,	  
they	   sometimes	   produce	   and	   perpetuate,	   rather	   than	   transform,	   oppressive	  
heteronormative	   and	   unjust	   gender	   constraints	   in	   their	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	  
and	  sexual	  justice.	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies,	   the	   power	  
relations	  with	  respect	  to	  gender	  and	  within	  the	  family	  are	  understood	  as	  far	  more	  
complicated	  and	  multifaceted	  than	  the	  oversimplified	  model	  of	  ‘dominant	  men	  (as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Camille	   Gear	   Rich,	   ‘Innocence	   Interrupted:	   Reconstructing	   Fatherhood	   in	   the	   Shadow	   of	   Child	  
Molestation	  Law’,	  California	  Law	  Review	  101,	  no.	  3	  (2013),	  609-­‐698.	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group)/oppressed	   women	   (as	   a	   group)’,	   a	   model	   implied	   by	   some	   salient	  
subordination	   feminist	   theories	   and	   subordination-­‐feminist	  men	   and	  masculinities	  
theories.	   I	   suggest	   that	   a	   more	   nuanced	   and	   multi-­‐dimensional	   idea	   of	   gender	  
oppression	  and	  gender	  power	  relations	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  reflect	  adequately	  on	  
issues	   of	   sexual	   justice,	   sexual	   politics,	   gender	   oppression	   and	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  	  
I	   contend	   that	   one	   of	   the	   core	   insights	   of	   queer	   humanist	  men	   and	  masculinities	  
studies	   is	   the	  rejection	  of	  an	  oversimplified	  and	  unidimensional	  concept	  of	  gender	  
oppression	   and	   gender	   power	   relations;	   a	   concept	   frequently	   assumed	   by	  
subordination	   feminism.	   Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  masculinities	   studies	   view	   the	  
power	  relations	  of	  gender	  and	  the	  gender	  oppression	  in	  the	  family	  as	  multi-­‐layered	  
and	  complex,	  not	   just	  about	  male	  domination	  and	   female	  subordination.	  Complex	  
forms	  of	  subordination,	  domination	  and	  oppression	  can	  co-­‐exist	  and	  do	  co-­‐exist	   in	  
gender	  relations,	  gendered	   lives	  and	   in	  the	  family.	  We	  ought	  not	  to	  simply	  reduce	  
gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   subordination	   to	   only	   unilateral	   oppression	   of	  
women	   by	   men,	   or	   vice	   versa;	   the	   realities	   are	   much	   more	   complicated	   and	  
multifaceted.	   Most	   of	   the	   time,	   men	   and	   women	   are	   both	   constrained	   and	  
restricted	   in	  heteronormative	  norms	  of	   gender	  and	   sexuality,	   although	  perhaps	   in	  
different	  ways,	  by	  different	  means,	  and	  on	  different	  occasions.	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  taking	  
a	   multifaceted	   view	   of	   gender	   oppression	   in	   the	   family,	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   see	  
oppression,	   injustice	  and	  injury	  not	  generally	  appreciated,	  noticed	  or	  addressed	  by	  
patriarchal,	  chivalrous	  or	  subordination	  feminist	  perspectives	  on	  sexual	  justice,	  law	  
and	  the	  family.	  I	  contend	  that	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  model	  of	  gender	  power	  relations	  
and	   gender	   oppression	   is	   a	   very	   important	   theoretical	   tool	   to	   destabilise	   and	   to	  
unravel	   oppressive	   gender	   ideologies	   and	   stereotyping	   in	   normative	  
heterosexuality.	  
Take	   familial	   lives	   and	   family	   relationships	   as	   an	   example.	   As	   elaborated	   earlier,	  
theories	  of	  family	  law	  and	  family	  justice	  offered	  by	  subordination	  feminists	  tend	  to	  
hold	  a	  unilateral	  understanding	  of	  gender	  oppression	  and	  claim	   that	  women	   (as	  a	  
group)	  are	  oppressed	  by	  men	  (as	  a	  group)	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  marriage	  and	  family.	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I	  argue	   that	  women	  certainly	  suffer	   some	  forms	  of	  gender	  oppression	  such	  as	   the	  
unequal	   caring	   roles,	   their	   lower	   involvement	   in	   the	   career	   market,	   and	   the	  
problems	  of	  male	  violence	   in	   the	   family.	   I	   totally	   agree	   that	  gender	  oppression	  of	  
women	  ought	  to	  be	  taken	  seriously	  and	  be	  addressed;	  however,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	  we	  only	  acknowledge	  the	  existence	  and	  the	  seriousness	  of	  gender	  oppression	  
of	   women	   in	   the	   family.	   By	   viewing	   gender	   oppression	   as	   complex	   and	   multi-­‐
dimensional	  as	  I	  suggest,	  we	  can	  acknowledge	  that	  in	  family	  lives,	  not	  only	  women,	  
but	   also	   men	   may	   suffer	   certain	   gender	   injustices	   and	   oppression.	   Just	   as	   my	  
discussion	  of	   family	   violence	   in	   Chapter	   3	   indicates,	   gender	   oppression	   is	   not	   just	  
about	  women’s	  oppression.	  Family	  violence	  cannot	  be	  easily	  reduced	  to	  a	  problem	  
of	   male	   dominance	   over	   women	   (and	   children)	   in	   the	   patriarchal	   family	   as	  
mainstream	  subordination	  feminism	  holds.	  	  	  
Different	  from	  the	  subordination	  feminist’s	  unilateral	  concept	  of	  gender	  oppression	  
as	  oppression	  of	  women	  by	  men	   in	  the	   family,	   I	  argue	  that	   family	  power	  relations	  
and	  family	  oppression	  are	  much	  more	  complex	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional.	  	  Not	  only	  do	  
women	  suffer	  certain	  forms	  of	  gender	  oppression	   in	  the	  family,	  but	  men	  may	  also	  
experience	   gender	   oppression	   and	   gender	   injustices	   in	   the	   family.	   For	   instance,	  
fathers	  face	  greater	  obstacles	  in	  playing	  and	  fulfilling	  the	  caring	  roles.	  Under	  current	  
English	   family	   law	   systems,	   the	   biological	   mother	   has	   automatic	   parental	  
responsibility	  and	  right.	  Biological	  fathers,	  unless	  they	  are	  married	  to	  the	  biological	  
mothers,	   are	   not	   automatically	   afforded	   parental	   responsibilities.	   They	   have	   to	  
acquire	  it	  by	  birth	  registration,	  by	  a	  parental	  responsibility	  agreement	  with	  mothers,	  
or	   by	   applying	   for	   parental	   responsibility	   orders,	   usually	   occurring	   in	   conflicting	  
cases.2	  While	   biological	   mothers	   have	   the	   institutional	   privilege	   of	   automatically	  
secured	  parental	  responsibility	  and	  rights	  before	  law	  and	  do	  not	  suffer	  the	  burden	  
of	  having	   to	  ask	   for	   their	  partner’s	  agreement	   to	  acquire	  parental	   responsibilities.	  
Biological	   fathers	   (gay	  or	   straight)	  who	  are	  not	  married	   to	  biological	  mothers	  may	  
struggle	   emotionally,	   financially	   and	   legally	   to	   see	   their	   parental	   responsibilities	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Sonia	  Harris-­‐Short	  and	  Joanna	  Miles,	  Family	  law:	  Text,	  Cases,	  and	  Materials	  second	  edition	  (Oxford:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  661.	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recognised	  by	   law	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  be	   involved	  with	  their	  beloved	  children.	  They	  
may	  face	  tremendous	  obstacles	  from	  biological	  mothers.3	  	  
Research	  also	  indicates	  that	  despite	  the	  formal	  and	  apparent	  use	  of	  gender	  neutral	  
language,	  current	  family	  law	  culture	  and	  practice	  still	  de	  facto	  favours	  mothers	  over	  
fathers	  in	  residence	  arrangements	  after	  separation.4	  Fathers	  often	  express	  their	  fear	  
of	  antagonising	  children’s	  mothers	  because	  they	  are	  often	  dependent	  on	  mothers’	  
good	  will	  in	  maintaining	  contact	  or	  shared	  residence	  arrangements.5	  	  
‘Whether	  or	  not	  fathers	  had	  played	  an	  equal	  part	  in	  the	  care	  and	  
upbringing	  of	  their	  children	  or	  indeed	  been	  the	  primary	  carer,	  there	  was	  
a	  clear	  sense	  that	  parental	  separation	  had	  left	  them	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  
becoming	  a	  ‘second-­‐class’	  parent.	  Fathers	  often	  felt	  mothers	  were	  able	  
to	  act	  arbitrarily	  and	  that	  their	  own	  relationships	  with	  their	  children	  
were	  now	  somewhat	  dependent	  on	  the	  mother’s	  goodwill.’6	  	  
Legal	   professionals	   often	   advise	   fathers	   and	   mothers	   differently	   by	   discouraging	  
involved	   fathers	   to	   seek	   child	   residence/physical	   custody	   in	   divorce/separation	  
cases	   even	   though	   both	   parents	   are	   highly	   involved	   and	   competent	   parents.7	  	  
Research	  also	  indicates	  that	  even	  equal	  parenting	  fathers	  and	  primary	  carer	  fathers	  
often	   suffer	   gender	   discrimination	   and	   bias	   in	   child	   custody	   cases.8	  The	   gender	  
injustices	  and	  gender	  discrimination	  against	  fathers	   in	  parental	  responsibilities	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ibid.,	  662-­‐663.	  
4	  Richard	  A.	  Warshak,	  ‘Gender	  Bias	  in	  Child	  Custody	  Decisions’,	  Family	  Court	  Review	  34,	  no.	  3	  (1996),	  
396-­‐409;  Edward	  Kurk,	   ‘Psychological	   and	   Structural	   Factors	   Contributing	   to	   the	  Disengagement	   of	  
Noncustodial	  Fathers	  after	  Divorce’,	  Family	  Court	  Review	  30,	  no.	  1	  (1992),	  81-­‐101;  Sanford	  L.	  Braver,	  
Jeffrey	  T.	  Cookston,	  and	  Bruce	  R.	  Cohen.	  ‘Experiences	  of	  Family	  Law	  Attorneys	  with	  Current	  Issues	  in	  
Divorce	  Practice’,	  Family	  Relations	  51,	  no.	  4	  (2002),	  330-­‐331;  Joyce	  A.	  Arditti,	  and	  Katherine	  R.	  Allen,	  
‘Understanding	   Distressed	   Fathers’	   Perceptions	   of	   Legal	   and	   Relational	   Inequality	   Postdivorce’,	  
Family	   Court	   Review	   31,	   no.	   4	   (1993),	   461-­‐476;  Leighton	   E.	   Stamps,	   ‘Maternal	   Preference	   in	   Child	  
Custody	  Decisions’,	   Journal	   of	  Divorce	  &	  Remarriage	   37,	   no.	   1-­‐2	   (2002),	   1-­‐11;	   Alexander	  Masardo,	  
‘Negotiating	   Shared	   Residence:	   The	   Experience	   of	   Separated	   Fathers	   in	   Britain	   and	   France’,	   in	   Jo	  
Bridgeman,	   Heather	   Keating	   and	   Craig	   Lind	   eds.,	   Regulating	   Family	   Responsibilities,	   (Farnham:	  
Ashgate,	   2011),	   127-­‐129;  Charlie	   Lewis,	   Amalis	   Papacosta,	   Jo	  Warin.	   Cohabitation,	   Separation	   and	  
Fatherhood	  (York:	  York	  Publishing	  Services	  for	  Joseph	  Rowntree	  Foundation,	  2002),	  24-­‐53.	  
5	  Masardo,	  ibid.,	  127-­‐129.	  
6	  Ibid.	  
7	  Braver,	  Cookston	  and	  Cohen,	  n	  4	  above,	  330-­‐331;	  Kurk,	  n	  4	  above,	  81-­‐101.	  
8	  Lewis,	  Papacosta	  and	  Warin,	  n	  4	  above,	  24-­‐53.	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child	  custody	  are	  not	  trivial.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies,	  
these	  injustices	  should	  be	  taken	  seriously.	  
Gay	  fathers	  suffer	  double	  burdens	  and	  double	  discrimination	  in	  parenting	  issues.	  On	  
the	   one	   hand,	   gay	   fathers	   experience	   heterosexist	   discrimination	   and	   hostility	  
because	   of	   their	   sexuality.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   also	   suffer	   sexist	   gender	  
discrimination	  against	  men	   in	  parenting	   issues.9	  For	  example,	   in	  the	  case	  Salgueiro	  
da	   Silva	  Mouta	   v	   Portugal,10	  the	  Court	   of	  Appeal	   in	   Portugal	   overruled	   a	   previous	  
decision	   giving	   a	   gay	   father	   physical	   custody	   and	   responsibility	   for	   his	   young	  
daughter	  on	   two	  grounds.	  First,	   the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   stated	   that	   ‘as	  a	  general	   rule	  
custody	   of	   young	   children	   should	   be	   awarded	   to	   the	   mother	   unless	   there	   were	  
overriding	  reasons	  to	  the	  contrary.’11	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  finds	  
that	  ‘homosexuality	  was	  an	  abnormality	  and	  the	  children	  should	  not	  grow	  up	  in	  the	  
shadow	   of	   abnormal	   situations.’12	  The	   ECHR	   Court	   decides	   that	   the	   Portuguese	  
Appeal	  Court’s	  decision	  violates	  art	  8	  of	  the	  ECHE	  Convention	  taken	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  art	  14.	  	  The	  ECHR	  Court	  declares	  the	  Portuguese	  court’s	  articulation	  on	  making	  
discriminatory	   treatment	   on	   grounds	   of	   homosexuality	   unconvincing,	   clumsy	   and	  
failing	  to	  meet	  the	  proportionality	  test.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  legality	  of	  
the	  arguments	  and	   the	  principle	  of	  maternal	  preference	  are	  not	  addressed	   in	   this	  
case	  by	  the	  ECHR	  Court.	  	  
The	   above	   case	   shows	   that	   gay	   fathers	   do	   sometimes	   face	   double	   discrimination	  
because	  of	  their	  male	  sex/gender	  and	  their	  homosexuality.	  To	  properly	  understand	  
and	   to	   address	   fully	   discrimination	   against	   and	   injustices	   towards	   gay	   fathers,	  we	  
need	   to	   tackle	   not	   only	   sexuality	   injustices	   towards	   gay	   men,	   but	   also	   gender	  
injustices	  towards	  gay	  men.	  	  Also,	  both	  gay	  men	  and	  straight	  men	  may	  suffer	  similar	  
gender	  injustices	  towards	  men	  qua	  men,	  for	  example,	   in	  cases	  of	  gender	  injustices	  
towards	  fathers	  in	  child	  custody	  law.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  the	  perspectives	  inspired	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Michael	  E.	  Lamb,	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Father	  in	  Child	  Development,	  327.	  Rich,	  n	  1	  above,	  695-­‐696.	  
10	  Salgueiro	  da	  Silva	  Mouta	  v.	  Portugal,	  31	  E.H.R.R.	  47	  (2001).	  
11	  Ibid.	  
12	  Ibid.	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by	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  double	  
and	  intersectional	  oppressions	  of	  gay	  men.	  
Queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies	  suggest	  that	  multiple	  factors	  and	  criteria	  other	  than	  
economic	  earning	  power	  can	  be	  and	  should	  be	  used	  to	  analyse	  and	  to	  understand	  
power	  relations	  within	  the	  family.	  One	  important	  factor	  concerning	  the	  dynamics	  of	  
familial	   power	   concerns	   power	   arising	   from	   relationships	   in	   the	   family.	   Biological	  
mothers,	   no	   matter	   whether	   in	   homosexual	   or	   heterosexual	   relations,	   normally	  
have	  a	  greater	  say	  over	  issues	  of	  caring,	  parenting	  and	  children.	  Biological	  mothers	  
have	  more	  familial	  power	  and	  opportunities	  to	  play	  the	  maternal	  gatekeeping	  roles	  
by	   restricting	   or	   deciding	   the	   range	   of	   involvement	   of	   the	   other	   partner	   or	   other	  
people	   with	   children.13	  For	   many	   children	   and	   fathers,	   mothers	   have	   significant	  
power	  over	  other	  family	  members.	  	  	  
I	   emphasise	   that	   the	   approach	   of	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   has	   significant	  
implications	   in	  many	  areas	  of	   law	  and	  policy	   regarding	   children	  and	  parenting.	  By	  
not	   denying	   the	   contribution	   and	   love	   of	  many	   devoted	   parents,	   queer	   humanist	  
men’s	  studies	  question	  not	  only	  the	  uncritical	  construction	  of	  the	  image	  of	  harmless	  
and	  safe	  men,	  but	  also	  the	  harmless	  and	  safe	  female	  image	  in	  the	  family.	  The	  caring,	  
safe	   and	   harmless	   female	   image,	   especially	   caring,	   safe	   and	   harmless	  
mother/mothering	   images,	  are	  assumed	  and	  reinforced	   in	  both	  patriarchal	  culture	  
and	  in	  some	  subordination	  feminist	  ideologies.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  with	  some	  
subordination	   feminist	   theories	   in	   the	  way	   that	   they	   consciously	   or	   unconsciously	  
trivialise,	  minimise	  or	  ignore	  the	  harm	  and	  problems	  caused	  by	  female	  abuse	  in	  the	  
family.	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  although	  mothers	  and	  fathers	  perpetrate	  similar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  Mignon	  R.	  Moore,	  ‘Gendered	  Power	  Relations	  among	  Women:	  A	  Study	  of	  Household	  Decision	  
Making	   in	   Black,	   Lesbian	   Stepfamilies’,	   American	   Sociological	   Review	   73,	   no.	   2	   (2008),	   335-­‐356;	  
Pruett,	  Marsha	  Kline,	  Lauren	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  Arthur	  and	  Rachel	  Ebling,	  ‘The	  Hand	  That	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  the	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  Maternal	  
Gatekeeping	  after	  Divorce’,	  Pace	  L.	  Rev.	   27,	  no.	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   (2006),	  709-­‐739;	   Jay	  Fagan,	  and	  Marina	  Barnett,	  
‘The	  Relationship	  between	  Maternal	  Gatekeeping,	  Paternal	  Competence,	  Mothers'	  Attitudes	  about	  
the	  Father	  Role,	  and	  Father	  Involvement’,	  Journal	  of	  Family	  Issues	  24,	  no.	  8	  (2003),	  1020-­‐1043;	  Sarah	  
M.	  Allen,	   and	  Alan	   J.	  Hawkins,	   ‘Maternal	  Gatekeeping:	  Mothers'	   Beliefs	   and	  Behaviors	   That	   Inhibit	  
Greater	  Father	  Involvement	  in	  Family	  Work’,	  Journal	  of	  Marriage	  and	  the	  Family	  61,	  (1999),	  199-­‐212;	  
Marion	   L.	   Kranichfeld,	   ‘Rethinking	   Family	   Power’,	   Journal	   of	   Family	   Issues	   8,	   no.	   1	   (1987):	   42-­‐56;	  
Naomi	  Segal,	  ‘Why	  Can’t	  a	  Good	  Man	  Be	  Sexy?	  Why	  Can’t	  a	  Sexy	  Men	  Be	  Good?’	  in	  David	  Porter	  ed.,	  
Between	  Men	  and	  Feminism	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  37,	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rates	  of	  child	  physical	  and	  psychological	  abuse,	  maternal	  abuse	  is	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  
reported	   and	   addressed	   compared	   to	   paternal	   child	   abuse.	   I	   challenge	   some	  
subordination	  feminists’	  reduction	  of	  problems	  of	  child	  abuse	  and	  family	  violence	  to	  
almost	  only	  problems	  of	  male	  power	  and	  control	  over	  women	  and	  children.	  	  
Another	   example	   to	  problematise	   the	   subordination	   feminist’s	   oversimplified	   idea	  
of	   family	  power	  as	  male	  control	  over	  women	  and	  children	   is	   the	   issue	  of	   intrusive	  
parenting/parental	   psychological	   control.14	  Parental	   psychological	   control,	   overall,	  
denotes	  parenting	  that	  ‘does	  not	  allow	  children	  psychological	  autonomy.’15	  Scholars	  
argue	   that	   ‘[t]he	   central	   elements	   of	   psychological	   control	   are	   intrusive	   into	   the	  
child’s	  psychological	  world	  and	  self-­‐definition	  and	  parental	  attempts	  to	  manipulate	  
the	   child’s	   thoughts	   and	   feelings	   through	   invoking	   guilt,	   shame,	   and	   anxiety.’16	  
Research	   finds	  that	  parental	  psychological	  control	  has	  negative	  effects	  on	  children	  
and	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  disturbances	  of	  self-­‐processes	  and	  some	  internalised	  and	  
externalised	  problems	  of	   children	  and	  adolescents.17	  Studies	   suggest	   some	   fathers	  
and	  mothers	  perpetrate	   intrusive	  parenting	  towards	  their	  children;	  the	  majority	  of	  
research	   finds	   that	  mothers	   perpetrate	   a	   higher	   level	   and	   percentage	   of	   parental	  
psychological	   control	   over	   children. 18 	  LGBT	   children	   and	   adolescents	   may	   be	  
particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  parental	  psychological	  control	  over	  and	  intrusion	  into	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Barber	  and	  Harmon	  argue	   that	  parental	   ‘psychological	   control	   refers	   to	  paternal	  behaviours	   that	  
are	   intrusive	   and	  manipulative	   of	   children’s	   thoughts,	   feelings	   and	   attachments	   to	   parents.	   These	  
behaviours	  appear	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  disturbances	   in	  psychoemotional	  boundaries	  between	  the	  
child	  and	  parent,	  and	  hence	  with	  the	  development	  of	  an	  independent	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  identity.	  It	  is	  
also	  predictive	  of	  numerous	  forms	  of	  psychological	  and	  social	  maladaption.’	  See	  Brian	  K.	  Barber	  and	  
Elizabeth	   Lovelady	   Harmon,	   ‘Violating	   the	   Self:	   Paternal	   Psychological	   Control	   of	   Children	   and	  
Adolescents’,	   in	  Brian	  K.	  Barber	  ed.,	   Intrusive	  Parenting:	  How	  Psychological	  Control	  Affects	  Children	  
and	  Adolescents	  (Washington:	  American	  Psychological	  Association,	  2002),	  15.	  
15	  Susanne	   Frost	  Olsen	   et	   al,	   ‘Maternal	   Psychological	   Control	   and	   Preschool	   Children’s	   Behavioural	  
Outcomes	   in	  China,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  United	  States’,	   in	  Brian	  K.	  Barber	  ed.,	   Intrusive	  Parenting:	  How	  
Psychological	   Control	   Affects	   Children	   and	   Adolescents	   (Washington:	   American	   Psychological	  
Association,	  2002),	  235,	  
16	  Gaye	   Stone,	   Cheryl	   Buehler,	   and	   Brian	   K.	   Barber,	   ‘Interparental	   Conflicts,	   Parental	   Psychological	  
Control,	  and	  Youth	  Problem	  Behaviour’,	  in	  Brian	  K.	  Barber	  ed.,	  Intrusive	  Parenting:	  How	  Psychological	  
Control	   Affects	   Children	   and	   Adolescents	   (Washington:	   American	   Psychological	   Association,	   2002),	  
57.	  
17	  Barber	  and	  Harmon,	  n	  14	  above,	  25-­‐46.	  
18	  Brian	   K.	   Barber,	   Roy	   L.	   Bean	   and	   Lance	  D.	   Erickson,	   ‘Expanding	   the	   Study	   and	  Understanding	   of	  
Psychological	  Control’,	   in	  Brian	  K.	  Barber	  ed.,	   Intrusive	  Parenting:	  How	  Psychological	  Control	  Affects	  
Children	  and	  Adolescents	  (Washington:	  American	  Psychological	  Association,	  2002),	  266.	  
227	  
	  
feelings,	   self-­‐development,	   self-­‐discovery,	   and	   emotional	   lives	   in	   homophobic	  
families	  as	  many	  LGBT	  youths	  suffer	  from	  parental	  rejection	  and	  disapproval	  of	  their	  
sexual	  orientation.19	  With	  a	  plural	   idea	  of	  gender	  power	  and	  gender	  oppression	   in	  
the	   family,	   I	   argue	   that	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   will	   enable	   us	   to	   see	   and	  
address	   the	   problem	   of	   not	   only	   paternal	   psychological	   control,	   but	   also	   the	  
problem	  of	  maternal	  psychological	  control	  over	  children	  in	  the	  family.	  	  
My	  point	  is	  that	  family	  power	  relations	  and	  gender	  oppression	  in	  families	  are	  not	  a	  
unilateral	   and	   simplified	   male	   dominance/female	   subordination	   model.	   Family	  
power	  relations	  and	  gender	  oppression	  in	  the	  family	  are	  better	  understood	  from	  a	  
multi-­‐dimensional	   and	   complex	   model.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   by	   adopting	   a	   multi-­‐
dimensional	  and	  complex	  concept	  of	  gender	  oppression,	  we	  will	  not	  only	  be	  able	  to	  
see	   the	   gender	   oppression	   of	   women,	   but	   also	   the	   gender	   oppression	   of	   trans	  
people,	  of	  gay	  men	  and	  lesbians,	  and	  of	  men	  in	  the	  family.	  Also,	  we	  will	  not	  only	  see	  
dangerous	  or	  harmful	   parenting	  perpetrated	  by	   some	   fathers,	   but	   also	  dangerous	  
and	  harmful	  parenting	  perpetrated	  by	  some	  mothers.	  
I	  also	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  also	  emphasise	  the	  
importance	  of	   intersectionality	  and	  the	   influence	   from	  other	  categories	   that	  make	  
up	   a	   person’s	   identity	   such	   as	   race,	   class	   and	   age.	   Queer	   humanist	   men	   and	  
masculinities	  studies,	  while	  focusing	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  and	  their	  interactions,	  
do	  not	  claim	  that	  sexuality	  and	  gender	   identities	  are	  more	  fundamental	  categories	  
than	   others	   such	   as	   race	   or	   class.	   Queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   emphasise	   the	  
significance	   of	   addressing	   the	   intersections	   and	   impacts	   of	   different	   identity	  
categories.	  For	  example,	  working	  class	  men	  often	  face	  the	  intersectional	  oppression	  
of	  burdens	  of	  a	  heavy	  workload,	  unsocial	  working	  hours	  and	  unpleasant	  and	  even	  
dangerous	   working	   conditions.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   see	   and	   address	   the	   particular	  
experiences	  and	  the	  intersection	  of	  class	  and	  gender	  of	  working	  class	  men.	  Although	  
normative	  heterosexuality	  is	  primarily	  a	  concept	  related	  to	  sexuality	  normativity	  and	  
gender	  normativity,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  their	  intersections	  with	  other	  axes	  of	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Melinda,	   S.	  Miceli,	   ‘Gay,	   Lesbian	   and	   Bisexual	   Youth’,	   in	   Diane	   Richardson	   and	   Steven	   Seidman	  
eds.,	  Handbook	  of	  Lesbian	  and	  Gay	  Studies	  (London:	  Sage,	  2002),	  200.	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categories	   in	   heteronormative	   culture	   should	   be	   neglected.	   For	   example,	   in	  
addressing	   the	   injustice	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality	  and	   its	   impact	  on	  East	  Asian	  
gay	  men,	  we	  not	  only	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  how	  heteronormative	  sexuality	  and	  
gender	   norms	   might	   affect	   gay	   men	   as	   a	   social	   group,	   we	   may	   also	   need	   to	  
appreciate	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  ethnic	  background	  and	  its	   intersection	  
with	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  in	  East	  Asian	  gay	  men’s	  lives,	  such	  as	  the	  influence	  from	  
Confucian	  ideologies.	  	  	  
I	  contend	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  criticise	  equality	   law	  
approaches	   promoted	   and	   adopted	   by	   some	   subordination	   feminists,	   such	   as	   the	  
women-­‐exclusive	   approach	   to	   gender	   equality	   and	   sexual	   justice	   adopted	   by	   the	  
CEDAW	   Convention	   and	   the	   CEDAW	   Committee.	   I	   criticise	   this	   approach	   for	   its	  
institutionalisation	   and	  perpetuation	  of	   certain	   heteronormative,	   constraining	   and	  
binary	   gender	   norms	   and	   ideologies	   and	   its	   ignorance	   of	   gender	   discrimination	  
against	   men.	   I	   also	   question	   the	   oversimplified	   and	   binary	   ‘male	   as	   privileged	  
group/female	   as	   disadvantaged	   group’	   model	   adopted	   in	   some	   equality	  
jurisprudence.	  There	  is	  a	  trend	  in	  some	  equality	  and	  discrimination	  jurisprudence	  to	  
label	  and	  define	  men	  as	  the	  privileged	  gender	  group	  and	  women	  as	  the	  oppressed	  
group.20	  However,	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   approach	   to	   gender	   equality	   law	  may	  
actually	   reproduce	   and	   reinforce	   some	   heteronormative	   gender	   norms.	   For	  
example,	  in	  Canada,	  female	  inmates	  are	  not	  subjected	  to	  cross-­‐gender	  frisk	  searches	  
and	  surveillance	  while	  male	  inmates	  are	  subjected	  to	  frisk	  searches	  and	  surveillance	  
by	  female	  guards	  in	  prison.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Weatherall	  v	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),21	  	  
a	  male	  inmate	  challenged	  the	  different	  treatment	  of	  genders	  in	  prison	  but	  this	  claim	  
was	  rejected	  by	  the	  Canadian	  court.	  One	  of	  the	  important	  reasons	  the	  court	  cites	  in	  
rejecting	   the	   male	   inmate’s	   claim	   is	   that	   women	   are	   generally	   a	   disadvantaged	  
group	  while	  men	  are	  privileged.	  Therefore	  women	  are	  regarded	  and	  judged	  as	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Kathleen	  E.	  Mahoney,	  ‘Canadian	  Approaches	  to	  Equality	  Rights	  and	  Gender	  Equity	  in	  the	  Courts’,	  in	  
Human	   Rights	   of	   Women:	   National	   and	   International	   Perspectives,	   edited	   by	   Rebecca	   J.	   Cook,	  
(Philadelphia:	   University	   of	   Pennsylvania	   Press,	   1994),	   437-­‐462.	   Andrew	   Koppelman,	  
Antidiscrimination	   Law	   and	   Social	   Equality,	   (New	   Haven:	   Yale,	   1996).	   Catharine	   A.	   MacKinnon,	  
Women’s	  Lives,	  Men’s	  Laws,	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,2005),	  32-­‐57,240-­‐244.	  
21	  Weatherall	  v	  Canada	  (Attorney	  General),	  1993	  S.C.R.2	  872	  (1993)	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vulnerable	  and	  more	   threatened	  by	   sexual	  abuse	  or	   sexual	  harassment	   than	  men.	  
The	  Canadian	  court	  holds	  that:	  	  
‘[W]omen	  generally	  occupy	  a	  disadvantaged	  position	  in	  society	  to	  men.	  
Viewed	  in	  this	  light,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  cross-­‐gender	  
searching	  is	  different	  and	  more	  threating	  for	  women	  than	  for	  men.	  The	  
different	  treatment	  to	  which	  the	  appellant	  objects	  thus	  may	  not	  be	  
discrimination	  at	  all.’22	  	  
Here	   the	   Canadian	   court	   implicitly	   expects,	   holds,	   produces	   and	   reinforces	   a	  
heteronormative	  gender	  standard	  and	  stereotype	  for	  all	  men:	  men	  are,	  and	  ought	  
to	  feel,	  less	  threatened	  than	  women	  when	  experiencing	  cross-­‐gender	  searching	  and	  
surveillance	  by	  the	  opposite	  sex.	  By	  constructing	  the	  male	  subject	   in	   this	  way,	   the	  
court	   implicitly	   reproduces	   and	   sustains	   some	   heteronormative	   gender	   order,	  
norms	  and	  stereotypes	  such	  as	  men	  are	  (and	  should	  be)	  more	  invulnerable	  to	  sexual	  
harassment	   by	   females,	   and	   women	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   perpetrators	   of	   sexual	  
aggression	  and	  sexual	  abuse.	  The	  monolithic	  and	  institutionalised	  ‘men	  as	  privileged	  
group/	  women	  a	  disadvantaged	  group’	  approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  Canadian	  court	  is	  
likely	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  myths	  that	  female-­‐to-­‐male	  sexual	  abuse	  and	  violence	  is	  less	  
threatening,	  less	  damaging	  and	  less	  harmful	  than	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  violence;	  and	  men	  
are,	   and	  ought	   to	  be,	  more	   immune	   from	  sexual	   aggression	  and	  harassment	   than	  
women.	   I	  argue	  that	   this	  kind	  of	  equality	   law	  approach	  and	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	  
sex,	   gender	   and	   sexual	   justice	   is	   problematic.	   It	   is	   reproducing	   new	   forms	   of	  
heteronormative	   gender	   norms	   and	   oppression	   through	   the	   construction	   and	  
adoption	  of	  problematic	  gender	  equality	  jurisprudence.	  	  
One	  more	  point	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men’s	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  would	  like	  to	  
emphasise	   is	   that	   we	   need	   to	   collect	   empirical	   data	   and	   investigate	   experiences	  
from	  all	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  groups	   in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  realities	  of	  
gender	  and	  sexual	  life.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Ibid.	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Unfortunately,	  some	  legal	  and	  political	  projects	  on	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  do	  not	  base	  
their	  theories	  and	  claims	  on	  solid	  or	  up	  to	  date	  empirical	  studies.	  The	  consequences	  
are	   that	   their	   proposals	   and	   claims	  may	   be	   unbalanced,	   biased	   or	   discriminatory.	  
For	  example,	  some	  domestic	  violence	  and	  gender	  violence	  research	  tends	  to	  collect	  
or	   survey	   only	   empirical	   data,	   perspectives	   and	   experiences	   regarding	   domestic	  
violence	   committed	   against	   women	   by	   men.	   Data	   and	   experiences	   in	   same	   sex	  
intimate	   relations	   are	   frequently	   ignored.23	  Data	   and	   experiences	   of	   male	   victims	  
are	   often	   uncollected,	   ignored	   or	   avoided;	   and	   if	   collected,	   are	   sometimes	  
suppressed.24	  By	   only	   collecting	   data	   and	   surveying	   experiences	   of	   female	   victims	  
affected	   by	   male	   violence,	   such	   research	   inappropriately	   bases	   its	   theories	   and	  
policies	   regarding	   family	   violence	   on	   one-­‐dimensional	   empirical	   data	   and	  
perspectives.	   By	   ignoring	   male	   and	   non-­‐heterosexual	   victimisation,	   they	   tend	   to	  
claim	  that	  family	  violence	  is	  generally	  a	  problem	  of	  violence	  against	  women	  by	  men.	  
Non-­‐heterosexual	  victims	  are	  too	  easily	  marginalised	  and	  male	  victims	  are	  silenced	  
and	  unrecognised	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  problematic	  research	  approach.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  
World	  Report	   on	  Violence	   and	  Health	   from	   the	  World	  Health	  Organization	   (WHO)	  
justifies	   its	   concern	   and	   discussion	   of	   domestic	   violence	   to	   solely	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  
violence	  by	  stating	  that	   ‘the	  overwhelming	  burden	  of	  partner	  violence	   is	  borne	  by	  
women	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  men.’25	  However,	  the	  research	  sources	  that	  the	  report	  cites	  
in	  its	  references	  for	  the	  claim	  are	  researches	  which	  collect	  and	  survey	  only	  data	  of	  
male-­‐to-­‐female	   violence.26	  No	   empirical	   data	   of	  male	   victims,	   female	   perpetrators	  
and	   experiences	   within	   same	   sex	   relations	   in	   domestic	   violence	   are	   collected,	  
addressed	  and	  surveyed	  in	  the	  sources	  the	  WHO	  report	  cites	  and	  relies	  on.	  In	  fact,	  
the	   two	   sources	   the	  WHO	   report	   uses	   to	   justify	   its	   sole	   focus	   on	  male-­‐to-­‐female	  
domestic	   violence	   are	   both	   violence	   against	   women	   studies.	   Issues	   of	   violence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  Kierrynn	  Davis	  and	  Nel	  Glass,	  ‘Reframing	  the	  Heteronormative	  Construction	  of	  Lesbian	  Partner	  
Violence:	  An	  Australian	  Case	  Study’,	  in	  Janice	  L.	  Ristock	  ed.,	  Intimate	  Partner	  Violence	  in	  LGBTQ	  Lives,	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  16-­‐18.	  	  	  
24	  Murray	   A.	   Straus,	   ‘Processes	   Explaining	   the	   Concealment	   and	   Distortion	   of	   Evidence	   on	   Gender	  
Symmetry	   in	  Partner	  Violence’,	  European	   Journal	  on	  Criminal	  Policy	  and	  Research	  13,	  no.	  3	   (2007),	  
227-­‐232.	  
25	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  World	  Report	  on	  Violence	  and	  Health,	  Geneva,	  2002:	  89-­‐91,	  113.	  
26	  	  See	  L.L.	  Heise,	  M.Ellsberg,	  M.	  Gottemoeller,	  Ending	  Violence	  Against	  Women,	  Population	  Reports	  
Series	  L	  no.	  11	  (Baltimore:	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  School	  of	  Public	  Heath,	  1999),	  4-­‐6;	  WHO,	  Violence	  
against	  Women:	  A	  Priority	  Heath	  Issue	  (Geneva:	  WHO,	  1997)	  (Document	  WHO/FRH/WHD	  97.8).	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against	   men	   and	   LGBT	   are	   hardly	   covered	   and	   addressed	   in	   these	   sources.	   	   By	  
relying	   on	   research	   that	   focuses	   on	   and	   includes	   only	   heterosexual	   women’s	  
experience	  of	  victimisation	  in	  domestic	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  a	  male	  partner,	  it	  is	  
not	  surprising	  that	  the	  WHO	  report	  finds	  only	  male	  violence	  against	  women	  worthy	  
of	   being	   addressed.	   However,	   the	   reductionist	   and	   oversimplified	   approach	   is	  
biased,	   unjust	   and	   dangerous.	   Harms	   and	   injuries	   suffered	   by	   same	   sex	   couples,	  
trans	   couples	   and	   male	   victims	   are	   easily	   marginalised	   in	   this	   kind	   of	   research	  
approach	  and	   in	  public	  policies.	  Moreover,	  heteronormative	  norms	  and	   ideologies	  
of	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  are	  further	  perpetuated	  and	  sustained	  by	  the	  WHO	  policy	  of	  
domestic	  violence.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  collect	  solid	  and	  balanced	  empirical	  
data	  and	  experiences	  in	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  research	  to	  help	  us	  better	  understand	  
and	  grasp	  the	  reality.	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   we	   will	   be	   able	   to	   see	   more	   realities	   and	   previously	   hidden	   or	  
marginalised	  sexuality	  and	  gender	  oppression	  by	  incorporating	  perspectives	  inspired	  
by	   queer	   humanist	   men	   and	   masculinities	   studies.	   Also,	   the	   core	   idea	   of	   this	  
approach	  on	  gender	  oppression	  is	  to	  adopt	  a	  multi-­‐dimensional	  concept	  of	  gender	  
oppression.	  	  
In	  respect	  of	  gay	  and	  queer	  studies,	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  approach	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  
and	  masculinities	  studies	  can	  possibly	  contribute	  to	  the	  research	  of	  gay	  men’s	  needs	  
and	   interests,	   an	   area	   that	   is	   still	   underexplored	   in	   gay	   and	   queer	   studies.	   For	  
example,	   this	   kind	   of	   approach	  might	   help	   us	   better	   understand	   and	   identify	   the	  
specific	  difficulties	  and	  discriminations	  gay,	  bi	  or	  trans	  fathers	  may	  experience,	  but	  
are	   not	   always	   captured	   or	   appreciated	   in	   subordination	   feminist	   and	   lesbian	  
feminist	   theories	  of	   family	   law.	   I	   also	  hold	   that	   jurisprudence	  of	   sexuality,	   gender	  
and	   justice	   could	   benefit	   from	   incorporating	   perspectives	   of	   queer	   humanist	  men	  
and	   masculinities	   studies.	   Furthermore,	   I	   contend	   that	   unless	   we	   also	   take	   the	  
injustices	   of	   gender	   normativity	   of	   men	   and	   sex/gender	   discrimination	   and	  
prejudices	  against	  men	  as	  men	  seriously,	  we	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  challenge	  
and	   transform	  the	  systems	  of	  normative	  heterosexuality.	  Rather,	  we	  are	  at	   risk	  of	  
further	  perpetuating	  heteronormativity.	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In	   relation	   to	   feminism,	   I	  hold	   that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	   studies	  
are	  consistent	  with	  humanist	  feminist	  projects,	  which	  are	  willing	  to	  see	  and	  address	  
structural	   and	   collective	   gender	   injustices	   towards,	   not	   just	   women,	   but	   also	  
injustices	   towards	   trans	  people,	   sexual	  minorities	  and	  men	  as	  men.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	  
this	  kind	  of	  approach	  of	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinities	  studies	  is	  consistent	  
with	  humanist	   feminist	  projects,	  because	   the	  elimination	  of	  discrimination	  against	  
girls	  and	  women	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  core	  concerns	  in	  queer	  humanist	  men’s	  studies.	  I	  
argue	   that	   queer	   humanist	   men’s	   studies	   insist	   we	   cannot	   effectively	   subvert	  
normative	  heterosexuality	  by	  only	  seeing	  and	  addressing	  gender	  normativity	  in	  one	  
gender.	   	   I	   also	   hold	   that	   there	   are	   explicit	   or	   implicit	   normative	   dimensions	   and	  
aspirations	  in	  queer	  projects,	  so	  queer	  projects	  do	  not	  necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  read	  
as	   solely	   projects	   of	   pure	   deconstruction.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   learning	   from	   queer	  
approaches	   reminds	   us	   that	   projects	   of	   sexual	   politics	   and	   sexual	   justice	   need	  
constant	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  self-­‐correction.	  
In	  conclusion,	  I	  argue	  that	  queer	  humanist	  men	  and	  masculinity	  studies	  can	  broaden	  
our	  base	  of	   concerns	  and	  knowledge	  of	   sexual	   injustices	  and	   sexual	  oppression	   in	  
sexual	   justice	   projects.	   It	   is	   an	   approach	  worth	   considering	   and	   an	   area	   of	   sexual	  
justice	  study	  worth	  further	  exploration	  and	  research.	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